The European Union as we know today it’s the work of years of reforms and improvements. It started as an economic community, but already there was an idea to transform the institution into a global political power. The European Union dares to call itself peacekeeping actor, despite the well-known failures in past conflict situations, i.e. in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. A plan called ‘European Security Strategy’ was implemented in 2003 and it is recognized as the first attempt to draw a foreign policy strategy at the supranational level. All the subsequent works, including the ‘EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy’ (EUGS), built up the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Then, through the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Union strengthened its third pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), retaining even more powers on this matter and depriving Member States of some decisional authority. The European Union has depicted itself as an incubator of democratic values (article 7 TUE) and a model of international governance. It has never been humble, assuming its superiority in front of non-member states and affirming that European security “starts abroad”, therefore identifying challenges only beyond EU borders. Focused on its resilience and own interests, the EU uses this “perfection mask” to externalize negative opinions, as it happened for the bad management of the COVID crisis, and internal problems, like the Polish non-compliance to the rule of law.
Geopolitical shifts, in particular the recent Russian aggression on Ukraine, destabilized the prospects of the existing security plan but also enforced the commitment of the EU Member states to its common defence project. It appeared important today more than ever to develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, addressing both conflicts and crises together and protecting the Union and its citizens. Even reluctant nations, i.e. Denmark that opted in in 2022, agreed on the implementation of the CSDP. Yet, it is not alone in this security progress, getting assistance from NATO-trained armies, UN experts and so on. These cooperations reinforce the European visions and goals of security, namely the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of self-determination of peoples: Western ideas of democracy. However, the approaches used by the EU are revolutionary compared to the UN and NATO mechanisms. A comprehensive approach, already adopted at the end of the last century, emphasises the benefits of combining civilian and military tools in external security challenges. Instead, a normative approach, traditionally envisaged by the European Union but uncommon in the security and defence field, privileges non-coercive means, like conditionality, and promotes bottom-up attitudes to conflict prevention and resolution. Issues arise with numbers: ten out of 27 member states provide nearly 80 percent of the experts deployed to EU civilian crisis management missions and the number of seconded experts has decreased over time, which cannot solely be attributed to the closing of missions or a reduction in field positions. For these purposes, the EU has been investing in its civilian staff. The recruitment of non-contracted agents has engaged Member States in this new security project and enhanced cooperation, coordination and autonomy of the European system.
Striking today is that the European Union has understood the importance of adaptability in accepting a continuously changing world, which reveals new challenges every time. The problem is in the objective. According to Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the position of Europe should be revised. In a globalized world, the European Union is excluded from the management of conflicts, for example in Nagorno-Karabakh, and he auspicates the EU to achieve a higher leadership role in security affairs. As a matter of fact, a ‘Strategic Compass’ designed to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider was advanced in 2021, even before Member States could imagine the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. With the agreement of its Members, the European Union will establish a strong ‘EU Rapid Deployment Capacity’ of 5000 troops for different types of crises and reinforce both the civilian and military CSDP. In foresight, the EU will invest in intelligence and military industrial base, focusing on cybersecurity and developing a space strategy. It continues stressing cooperation with its Atlantic allies, NATO and UN, but nominates even tactical countries like Japan, Norway and the UK. Finally, tailored partnerships with the Western Balkans and other neighbouring regions in Africa and Asia are built up in this plan to strengthen the EU security policy in times of “return of war in Europe”.
In sum, the actual Security and Defence project aims to secure European territories rather than to bring peace elsewhere. However, this policy seems purposely protective for Europe in fields like military intelligence and arms export but does not avoid the possibility of any other European policy acting with a peacemaking function. Actually, the European enlargement package has proposed the membership of Ukraine and Moldova and alluded to future developments involving Georgia and Kosovo. As many of these countries were and still are influenced by the Russian Federation, the candidate status, meaning being part of a democratic and Western Union, threatens Russia and its geographical expansion goals. Although the European Union is not a military alliance like NATO, and cannot decide to attack Russia because it does not have the technical capacity, it has a normative power that may be disadvantageous for Russia. For instance, besides condemning the invasion, the EU applied economic sanctions against the Russian Republic that did not have the capacity to stop the war, but for sure damaged the Russian system. Ukraine, followed by Moldova, signed a record in asking and getting the status of EU candidate. A possible Membership could have repercussions even in war settings since the Treaty of the European Union does not pose a detailed action in case of Member States in the actual state of war. Moreover, if Ukraine enters the EU, this would be an extra input to develop a common defence, as defined in Article 24 TUE and as it was already attempted in 1954.
For these reasons, the access of Ukraine would constitute an advantage for this European sector and, with positive outcomes, it would be a success for the European Union as a supranational peacemaking institution and its ‘soft power’ diplomacy. In the long term, it could apply the same approach to Kosovo as well. What is not clear is whether the Union pursues this peacemaking capacity only within its neighbours or it has intentions to extend it to other conflict situations in the world.
References
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-peace-security-and-defence_en#8030
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/pb_2011_csdp_compact_brief_1_civilian.pdf
https://fba.se/en/newspress/nyhetsarkiv/2023/civilian-csdp-summer-forum2/
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lehne_EUGlobalStrategy11.pdf
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations
