On 9 July 2011 the Republic of South Sudan achieved independence, concluding what had been Africa’s longest civil war. The process leading to independence was driven by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement, an insurgency force and political movement begun in South Sudan but intent on bringing about the reformed unity of the whole of Sudan through revolution. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, a six-year peace process unfolded in the form of an Interim Period premised upon “making unity attractive” for the Sudan. This failed in its purpose and culminated in an almost unanimous vote for independence by Southerners in a referendum held in January 2011 (Arnold & LeRiche, 2013). Violence has escalated since, and unity didn’t keep away civil war for many years. Ten years after gaining independence, some South Sudanese say their struggle for liberation has been supplanted by an autocratic system of government led by the nation’s ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Wudu, 2021). They and some analysts also blame the SPLM party for a power struggle that turned into a five-and-a-half year civil war.
The Perpetrators’ Ideology in play in South Sudan, as in Central Equatoria evolved around Dinka group legitimacy and ownership leading to extreme group entitlement. It embraced the idea of a “master race” whose ethnic identity was primordial. From 2015 to 2017, the perpetrators manifested this exclusionary ideology of Dinka supremacy in Western Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. South Sudan is in the East African region also known as Equatoria that covers 6,644,329 square kilometers of land with an estimated population of 12 million people.
When a new state is born in crises, is enmeshed in crises, and has not actually been able to get its authorities entrenched in its crises-prone systems, and in the structures that may guarantee future good governance, what obtains under these scenarios are akin to a state failure. The current South Sudanese civil war began in 2013 (2 years after independence) as precipitated by rivalries between belligerent leaders of the new entity. Personalities who assume authority to make rules to govern the society in South Sudan were essentially neither elected nor even selected, but only appointed on the bases of their capacities to precipitate domestic violence during the previous wars (Chukwudi Okeke et al., 2021). Laski highlights that “the performance of the state is significant for each one of us”. But it appears as if such performance of the state is only significant for the belligerent South Sudanese leaders (Laski, 2008). This article will analyse the weakness, or even defeat, of the Southern Sudanese state, underlining the danger that this represents for its population, which is suffering from ethnic state violence.
Autocracy and the Failure of State
The two broad dimensions in which a state exists are the empirical and juridical dimensions (Jackson & Roseberg, 1982). The practical aspects of statehood are, therefore, reducible to an enduring population and an effectual administration, which suggests in the tradition of Max Weber, the exercise of unbroken record of organization and possession of the monopolies of power and influence. The juridical attributes are also condensable to the definiteness of location and autonomy, as universally recognized (Brownlie, 1979; Jackson & Roseberg, 1982; Weber, 1964). Immediately after World War II, the question of state security constituted the most central dimension of the international system, as the creation of the United Nations served as the ultimate effort of nations to promote peace and security between themselves. State stability and human security are, in fact, inextricable conditions for peace and prosperity in countries and constitute an important aspect of international development and security challenges nowadays (Bilali, 2020).
In general, the criteria of state fragility are around five main elements (Grand & UK, 2019).The first characteristic of state fragility is related to conflicts. A fragile state is in a constant situation of conflict, or at least presents constantly conditions of a violent crisis. This violence and the constant potential for conflict to erupt not only disrupt the legitimacy of the state, but it could also hamper the latter’s ability to fulfil its responsibilities and even weaken the economy. The second aspect of a fragile state is the high rate of displaced persons that it displays. The displacement of persons is caused, most of the time, by extreme poverty, state persecution, war situation, or even increased unemployment (Grand & UK, ibid). The inability of a state to deliver the basic needs of its citizens is also a sign of its fragility because it is failing the very responsibilities for which it exists. This inability leads to a vicious circle; if a state doesn’t provide basic services it becomes fragile, and if it becomes fragile it won’t either be able to provide basic services (Bilali, ibid). The fourth condition of state fragility is related to the institutions’ unsustainability (Grand & UK, ibid). Weak state means also weak institutions characterised by a lack of legitimacy or central authority. These institutions are part of an employer’s logic of clientelism with their constituents who are more like consumers. The last characteristic of state fragility is related to social inclusion (Grand & UK, ibid). Every state is more or less based on the equality of all its citizens. But when individuals are excluded from the social welfare, based on their ethnic or religious group, their ideas, and ideologies, then inequalities increase. So how can we say that South Sudan is a fragile state in our case?
There is no need to recall here the warring precedents that not only saw the birth of the country, but also accompanied its development as a state. Recently, a new peace deal has been signed, but there is no guarantee at all that it will keep the country from falling into a new military confrontation between the rebellion and the regime in power (Burke, 2018). Until now attempted peace talks failed shows that the conditions for a conflict relapse are still present. It is also the existence of the state itself that is challenged, since, because of the rebellion, the government failed to have, in the Weberian perspective, the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force (Bilali, ibid). The number of displaced persons in South Sudan is essentially very high. The situation of war, poverty and the harsh conditions of living pushed a tremendous number of South Sudanese to flee from their country (The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2019). According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, the number of South Sudanese refugees is estimated up to more than two million, third in the world behind Syria and Afghanistan. A large part of these refugees is under 18 years old. Although many succeeded in refuging themselves in neighbour countries, a large number remained in the country after fleeing their houses (ibid). South Sudan has also enormous difficulties to provide basic services especially security, because, as we mentioned early, the country turned into a war-torn zone. Besides the failure to deliver security to the citizens, both education and health system are nearly in a state of collapse. The civil war worsened the education system that was very fragile from the beginning (Bilali, ibid). There are up to 2.2 million children out of school (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2018). The country also failed to build a proper healthcare system, due mainly to the prolonged internal armed conflict (World Health Organization, 2016). South Sudan also has the distinction of being a particularly young state, and therefore lacks strong democratic institutions and a time-honoured political tradition. The respective two leaders of the regime and the opposition, who represent the main political actors in the country, have both a military background. So, while civilians occupy a less important role in the political organization of the country, soldiers have much more impact on both the political and social life in South Sudan (Freedom House, 2018). Officials benefit from prosecution, the impunity of soldiers is also rampant to a point that they often defy court orders (Bertelsmann Stiftung , 2018:11).This institutional weakness is also worsened by widespread corruption. Just in 2018, South Sudan was ranked as the 3rdmostcorrupted country in the world by International Transparency (Transparency International). Besides, there is an overarching lack of social inclusion, as people tend to be identified through their tribal identity, rather than their citizenship which, in theory, represents an inclusive concept that encompasses every member of society regardless of his origins (Bryce, 2013). With the lack of social inclusion, violence-based ethnic discrimination became widespread, especially after the outbreak of the armed conflict. Various ethnic groups, either from the government forces or the rebellion, are victims of armed attacks based on their tribal origins, hence making the notion of common citizenship irrelevant (Civil Rights Defenders, 2017). South Sudan is thus a state with an unstoppable dynamic of fragility. If the state fails to deliver the basic services it is supposed to provide, then the South Sudanese state can be described as a failed state.
Attempts to Human Security
The past 10 years in South Sudan have been marked by brutal conflict, hundreds of thousands of deaths, and the largest displacement crisis in Africa. The U.N. refugee agency says 1.6 million people are internally displaced within South Sudan and another 2.2 million are refugees in neighbouring countries (Schlein, 2021).
The establishment of ethnic organizations to emulate state functions, and the adoption of ethnonationalism were all means to aid the Dinka elites ambition. Genocide, for example, was committed to change the ethnic demographic composition of South Sudan in order to achieve the Dinka ambition (Bakheit, 2020). During the process initiated in 2005 to determine the borders between northern and southern Sudan, clashes between soldiers and civilians were recurrent and violent. During the armed struggle some senior military officers employed scorched-earth tactics on communities and villages to establish a permanent military buffer zone. These crimes were committed to not only protect pipelines and perimeters of other discovered natural resources, but to also permanently displace people and claim those areas as land belonging to the Dinka (ibid). In the Upper Nile region of Bentiu and Malakal, as the Dinka and Nuer contended for dominance over the assumed autonomous government of South Sudan, ethnic hostilities increased. These clashes, accompanied by ethnic purges, led to the creation of ethnic civilian militias such as Mathaing Ayoor/Amiatnon as well as irregular mobile forces whose objective was to disrupt and sow disorder on ethnic communities. It was this situation that accompanied the creation of South Sudan, between conflict and ethnic cleansing, which resulted in massive population displacement. The situation has never really calmed down since then, with the 2013 coup and the ensuing civil war.
In February 2020, the parties to the 2018 peace deal formed a transitional government of national unity led by President Salva Kiir, with Riek Machar as first vice president, and four other vice presidents from opposition groups. The government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition, the National Democratic Front and non-signatory groups to the 2018 peace deal, recommitted to a ceasefire in January 2020. This ceasefire broke down in April, when fighting resumed in Yei, Lobonok, Mundri, Maridi, and other parts of the Equatoria region. Peace talks restarted in October, but nothing is less certain than the perpetuity of a possible purchased peace. All armed groups committed abuses against civilians including unlawful killings, abductions, and sexual violence. The army, as well as armed groups SPLM/A-IO and National Salvation Front (NAS) recruited and used children (HRW, 2021). Following a dispute over a government disarmament operation in August, at least 127 people including 82 civilians were killed and thousands more displaced in clashes between soldiers and armed civilians in Tonj town, Warrap state. Armed groups attacked UN and humanitarian actors and restricted their movement. Personal security has been particularly vulnerable in South Sudan. While mechanisms of accountability for issues such as abuses and violations are nearly inexistent, attacks against civilians in such an environment dominated by violent conflict became common and go unpunished (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). Both the government forces and the rebellion groups are in a logic of systematic abuses, as each side accuses civilians of siding with the enemy. One of the particularities of personal insecurity in South Sudan was sexual and gender-based violence. A South Sudanese civil society organization reported that since Covid-19 restrictions were imposed in April, at least 1,535 girls were subjected to child marriages, pregnancies, or forced prostitution in states of Western, Eastern, and Central Equatorial (HRW, ibid).
Ethnic violence represents a major challenge to community security in South Sudan. An important factor in inter-community violence is the role played by warring forces. Ethnic-oriented mass killings perpetrated during the conflict have reached a level that accusations of genocide along tribal lines are justified (Muhumuza, 2017). But the denial of ethnic cleansing allegations by the warring parties (Morgan, 2017),the inaction of the international community and, despite the UN arms embargo, the military support of the US government to the South Sudanese regime made the situation even worse (Aljazeera, 2017). According to Freedom House’s 2018 report on freedom, South Sudan is the world’s second least free country (Haines, 2018). The regime of South Sudan and the opposition forces created a climate of fear and intimidation in which alternative voices to their views are perceived as threats. In this regard, violations of fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression and opinion are frequent. South Sudan’s National Security Service detained journalists and activists critical of the government. For example, on May 29, NSS detained political activist Kanybil Noon, and held him without charge for 117 days, releasing him on condition that he stop criticizing the government, which constitutes obviously a crime against the freedom of speech and the press freedom. Besides, human rights activists are also in the government target. Activism and ideas expressed can be causes of constant intimidation and threats. Even public officials who express view contradictory to the government position may lose their job (Bilali, ibid). The inefficiency of the institutions, coupled with the corruption of the country’s elites, means that this situation is becoming entrenched. The broken legal system gave birth to a “culture of impunity” (Wudu, 2018).The perpetrators of crimes do not face any sort of accountability.
The U.S. State Department released its annual report to Congress on genocide and atrocities prevention on the 12 July 2021. The Biden administration said Eritrea, Ethiopia, Myanmar and South Sudan could face consequences for their actions against ethnic groups in conflicts they are involved in (Cagnassola, 2021). In Africa, the report cited deteriorating conditions in South Sudan, where it said the government “has perpetrated extrajudicial killings including ethnic-based killings of civilians, widespread sexual violence, and use of food as a weapon of war”.”Those responsible for human rights violations in South Sudan must be held to account,” it said (ibid). The truth is that the current generations of South Sudanese leadership members are not peaceful people. They do not also belong to the class of persons who listen to sermons on repentance. It however appears as if the humanitarian interventions embolden the combatants in South Sudan to continue to fight. The international community must then brace up to the challenge of generically replacing such unrepentant deviant actors in one way or another. International community brokers an accord of upper age limit for leadership in the executive branch of government in South Sudan. This implies an internationally coordinated retirement for the current war-lords. As we have seen, events in the country have led to the mass displacement of people. The implication of this is continuing depopulation, ineffective government, and deficiencies in the empirical attribute of the state. Malakal, South Sudan’s second city, became empty, razed to the ground (described as vanished) in the rage of warfare (Franks, 2015). There will be need for the funding of education in South Sudan (on massive scales), building of schools, and sending of teachers to the country. In other words, the situation in a new South Sudan will require human capital (re)generation and the rebirth of the nationals. It calls for a focus on education for national rebirth and social reconstruction (Okeke et al., ibid). Education must become the fulcrum of an enlightened people who will seize the political power essential to the structuring and solidification of state institutions. Power-sharing mechanisms, ameliorative conflict resolution mechanisms may have to continue for an extended period (Rolandsen, 2015), the long-term post-violence focus would need to emphasize the building of the structures for a functional state in South Sudan. The emergent state and the worldviews of the bud-ding leaders of the new state will also need to be demilitarized. Enduring peace is expected to be guaranteed by this novel class of nationals and leaders, not the contemporary unrepentant warlords. Notwithstanding these facts, the South Sudanese regime being the highest and legitimate authority representing the country, the greatest responsibilities of overcoming both state fragility and the human security issues remain in its hands.
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
