There are not many countries that could be described with the term “failed state”. In fact, as Halden (2008, p. 15) notes: “Somalia is the paradigmatic case around which an entire category has been built encompassing cases like Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Thus, it is a common place that the situation in Somalia constitutes not only a herald of state failure that could also affect other countries in Africa and the world, but also a problem rooted in the historical complexities of colonialism, foreign intervention and the internal societal structure of the country per se.
Structuring chaos
In the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, colonialist countries divided Somalia into five parts—the United Kingdom (UK) took two parts while Italy, Ethiopia and France took one each. As the Somalis fought for independence from all the colonial powers, Northern and Southern Somalia gained independence on 26 June 1960 and 01 July 1960, respectively and they merged to create the Republic of Somalia (Venugopalan, 2017). However, the region of Somalia had never been unified prior to the colonization period and in addition the British ruled the area with as little engagement as possible (Halden, 2008). The region was therefore ruled by different groups that could be distinguished in larger or smaller units depending on the circumstances. In general, three clan- families, the Isaaq (66%), the Dir (15%) and the Darod (19%) constituted the most prominent groups among the Somali region, with numerous subdivisions between them (Halden, 2008, p. 15). Nevertheless, even with these deep societal divisions, the country managed to establish a democratic regime during the first nine years of its existence. In 1969 Muhammad Siad Barre assumed power in coup d’état and declared Somalia a socialist state, nationalizing most of the economy and becoming an ally of the Soviet Union (BBC, 2018). Barre tried to unite the Somalis by promoting Somali nationalism and in 1977 attempted to take Ogaden, the Somali- inhabited territory from Ethiopia. For this reason, the Soviets decided to back Ethiopia, enraging Barre and resulting in Somalia and the Soviet Union breaking their ties. Hence the US, who seized the opportunity to approach Somalia, offered foreign aid for military technology, amounting to US $163.5 million between 1980 and 1988, and four times that for economic development (Venugopalan, 2017). The victory of Ethiopia combined with the divide and conquer rule of Barre resulted in uprisings against his reign, especially by the Isaaq clan, that led to a civil war in the beginning of the 1990s (BBC, 2018). During that period the central institutions deteriorated rapidly and the army split into several fractions based on the clan affiliation, forcing Barre to flee Mogadishu in January 1991 (Halden, 2008). Since the fled of Barre, the country submerged into chaos and it was divided in different regions with the northern Somaliland acting as a de facto independent nation (Venugopalan, 2017). The war and the hunger stressed the already dire situation of Somalis so much that by 1992, an estimated 350,000 Somali people had died due to disease, starvation or as direct casualties of the civil war (Venugopalan, 2017). Therefore in December 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 794 creating a U.N. force with a mandate to create and maintain peace in order to provide humanitarian assistance. However the mission, comprised most of U.S. soldiers, was involved in fighting with local militias and it was forced to abandoning Mogadishu in 1994 (Halden, 2008).
Two years after the region of Puntland declared autonomy 1998, one of the most significant attempts to bring peace and stability in Somalia took place in Djibouti. During the Arta Peace Conference Somali clan leaders and senior figures elected Abdulkassim Salat Hassan for president of Somalia and formed the Transitional National Government (TNG) (BBC, 2018). However the TNG never prospered as different sub-clans with the backing of Ethiopia withdrew their support and the country fell once again into anarchy forcing the TNG to be recomposed and rebranded as Transitional Federal Government in 2004. By October 2005, the TFG had weakened considerably as clashes broke out again in Mogadishu, opening the way for Islamic extremists, under the label of Union of Islamic Courts to take over the capital in July of 2006 (BBC, 2018). Therefore, Ethiopian forces backed by the U.S. returned to the TFG most of the nation’s southern conflict zones. However the Islamic extremists of Al- Shabaab took over the fight and in 2010 declared alliance with al-Qaeda and began to concentrate troops for a major offensive to capture the capital. However a Kenyan intervention in 2011 and a U.S. force in the region succeeded in limiting the reach of the extremist group.
Escaping Anarchy
Today the country is still in distress. The newly elected president since 8 February 2021 Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, faces widespread phenomena of corruption, terrorism, piracy, black market and weak institutional capacity. At the same time however,
“Somalia has become as a strategic location for the flow and exchange of commodities from Asia and the Middle East to be traded tax-free throughout the African continent. Above all, one of the informal economy’s most positive externalities is the promotion of peace. As business opportunities and interests have changed from a war economy based on looting and arms trading to one based on extensive trans-regional commerce and remittance flows, business groups in various economic sectors have greater interests in establishing a safe and stable social environment free of robbery and extortion at militia checkpoints” (Chen, 2019, p. 96).
Ergo in order to provide effective assistance to the country it must be stressed that “the modern “nation-state” in Somalia and in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is a colonial creation, which conflicts with the indigenous socioeconomic structure. Lamentably, the colonial apparatus of the “nation-state” was continued after Somalia’s and Sub-Saharan Africa’s independence. In Somalia, the social structure within the nation-state framework is not only largely pastoral and nomadic; it is also based on clan membership” (Chen, 2019, p. 91).
For this reason one measure should be the coordinated action of the U.N. and the African Union to provide humanitarian assistance and economic aid to the divided country under the condition of relaunching inter-clan dialogue for a unified federal state with autonomous regions. The new constitution of 2012 could be the basis for the commencing of the negotiations. At the same time the U.S. should also provide the Somali army with equipment and training in order to effectively combat Islamic fundamentalism and piracy that disrupts international sea routes. Finally, the civil society should also be strengthened to promoted democratic engagement and public dialogue that would not only legitimize the government but would also strengthen institutional capacity. Today, Somalia continues to be the paradigm for a “failed state” that unfortunately bypasses the root causes of colonialism, foreign intervention and the diverse societal structure. The international community should support the new government and ameliorate the institutional capacity of the country in order to be able to effectively answer its internal and external threats and become a positive paradigm for the region and the world.
References
Chen, J. Y. 2019. Beyond A “Failed” State: The Role Of Local Politics And The Informal Economy In Post-1991 Somalia. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 6(4) 90-98.
Halden, P. 2008. Somalia: Failed State or Nascent State- System? FOI
Somalia profile – Timeline. 2018 January 4. BBC. Retrieved in 2021 June 12 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632
Venugopalan, H. 2017. Somalia: A Failed State? Observer Research Foundation. Issue No. 170
By Georgios Mavrodimitrakis, The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
