This article offers an analysis on the current state of global international efforts towards the de-nuclearization of states that possess nuclear warheads, the different dynamics that affect such a scenario and uses the North Korea case as a case study for what changes must be taken to put in check rogue states that refuse to follow international law and slow the spread of nuclear arms.
On the 8th of September, 2022, North Koreas regime promulgated a new legislation in regards to its nuclear weapons program titled “law on the state policy on nuclear forces” also known as “2022 nuclear law” which replaced the “law on consolidating the position of nuclear weapon state” which together with its missile launches and tests has increased the nuclear risks and tensions in the region, with South Korea and Japan being greatly alarmed by its actions.
North Korea´s intends on continuing to expand its nuclear arsenal in spite of clearly breaking international law and putting at risk the security of not only its population but the populations of China, South Korea, Japan and the greater Pacific Region, sparking debates on the international arena and in the neighbouring countries on what to do.
However, it should firstly be made clear and understood the strategic reasons for the North Korean regime to have changed its law and the major differences between the previous and the current law in regards to its nuclear arsenal and what it effectively means for the nuclear proliferation debate.
The North Korean regime has decided to in its new law of 2022 declare itself a “responsible nuclear weapon state”, in a clear sign towards the international community of declaring that its nuclear weapon state status is for all matters a fait accompli, emphasizing on the “impossibility of denuclearization” and thus on the irreversibility of its possession of nuclear arms.
In comparison with the its previous 2013 law, previously the North Korean regime attempted to give a legal justification that would legitimize its possession of nuclear arms as a “means of defence” to “cope with the ever-lasting policy of US and nuclear threats”, justifying its strategic necessity to have such weapons with the argument of wanting to become fully autonomous and capable of protecting itself from “outside forces” that could put at risk the power of its regime or interfere in its political decisions.
These explanations have however been erased in the 2022 law as the regime felt it was not anymore necessary to justify its possession of arms since it already has successfully armed itself with nuclear warheads.
Instead, the new nuclear law specifies the five cases to use nuclear weapons, with the regime aiming to encompasses almost all thinkable nuclear and non-nuclear political crisis situations that would threaten it, with some of the conditions going far beyond the traditional functions of nuclear weapons, such as war deterrence and retaliation, including the justification of the use of its nuclear warheads in the case of its elite and leadership being put to in danger by an internal or external force.
It has also advanced the argument that it may use its nuclear arms even in cases where the enemy might not be a nuclear-state in order to achieve strategic victory in a protracted conventional war where its existence may be put to test or in any other “catastrophic crisis” scenario that threatens the existence of its state.
It should be taken into account that these arguments are directly targeted at the pacific and stable liberal democratic states of Japan and South Korea, as a well as the imaginary threat of a potential operation to eliminate its leadership by the US.
Secondly, the new law further advances the argument that the use of nuclear weapons may even be used by the regime on its own society in the case of a national crisis that is driven by internal political and economic reasons in order to also preserve its power.
The third reason to have into account is that as result of the new law that seeks to cement its use of nuclear arms, the nuclear risk has risen dramatically to the next level, with the chain of command for the use of the nuclear weapons being changed from the “Supreme Commander of the Korean People´s Army” in the 2013 law to the “President of the State Affairs” in the 2022 law, with the new law establishing a “state nuclear forces command organization” to assist the supreme leader nuclear use decisions.
Additionally, the new law commands that “automated nuclear strikes” may be used in the case of the safety of the supreme leader being put at stake as well as in the case that the nuclear command and the control system are put also in danger.
These new directives increase the risks of nuclear use by accidents or planning in crisis, with the new legislation requiring the nuclear arsenal of North Korea to be ready for launch “in any conditions and circumstances” by order of the supreme leader.
This requirement thus demands the nuclear forces of NK to be at a higher level of preparedness and alert level than most small and medium nuclear states and since the North Korean nuclear command and control safety and security systems is suspected to be weak, the risks are now or this very reason higher.
In response to this grave threat, the South Korean military has adopted the “kill-chain” principle for pre-emptive military strikes as one of the 3 pillars of its defence systems when North Korean nuclear attacks may be imminent. The risks are thus also higher for a misperception to happen due to the pre-emptive doctrines of both countries being destined to collide.
The fourth and more important aspect of the change for the analysis of the state of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the role of rogue states nuclear play in the current scenario is the fact that while previously North Korea intended on appearing as a “responsible weapon state” by addressing nuclear safety and concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international society, now with its change of law, its has in the 2022 law deleted such worries, speaking only on the fact that it has the status of nuclear state.
It should be understood that this new law makes North Korea does not make it a legitimate nuclear weapon state under NPT as the previous one also did not make it either.
What this shows is that, inevitably, with states such as North Korea possessing such weapons and with the increasing trend in tensions between various geo-political actors in the region, a much more in other regions globally- the final outcome will be the increase nuclear arms proliferation in spite of two years ago the Treaty of Prohibition of nuclear weapons entering into legal force after Honduras become the 50th state to support it, since even moderate states will seek for their protection to arm themselves with such weapons.
This trend is also a cause-effect result of the fact that majority of powerful states have not signed the treaty, thus making the treaty not de facto enforceable since no super-power, with the US being the main one, officially supporting it or even showing a clear interest in willing to enforce effectively in a multipolar world order the respect for the treaty.
The new law of the North Korean regime also shows that rogue states that want to possess nuclear arms, even under the pressure of sanctions will inevitably get them and once having a nuclear arsenal, will not feel the necessity of even justifying the possession of such a lethal and destructive arsenal on the world stage, thus further putting in danger the respect for international law.
For a serious effort to hinder or in the very least slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons to actually take place, the international society must continue to pressure states and with special focus super-states to come to the discussion and find a series of realistic indirect measures that can be taken to make it more difficult for other rogue states that do not respect international law to effectively get weapons of mass destruction, through a combination of sanctions and technological transfers barriers on these same rogue states.
It should be also taken into account that state parties should and will continue to develop in parallel to this advised effort alternative pathways to negotiate in group with powerful moderate and responsible nuclear states new strategies for more countries to join the signing states of the treaty.
Additionally, there should be putt an effort to create a greater platform for an inclusive discussion on ways to develop a coherent approach for the future designation of a more effective and competent international authority foreseen in Article 4 of the TPNW.
Regarding the NPT- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons- the US should lead a new effort to create a effective system of control with an entity to assure its implementation in similarity with the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Another missing element that needs to be addressed is the creation of an administrative body to enforce and verify the decrees and diplomatic provisions of the NPT.
These changes would be in the strategic interest of the US since it would also reassure globally that its authority would become more legitimate under the eyes of most non-nuclear states and thus legitimise in a multipolar world order its authority.
It should be taken into account that this strategic analysis only gives reference to the main elements that are in the very least necessary to slow the spread of nuclear arms. The nuclear arms debate will continue and the risks of proliferation ‘of nuclear weapons must be properly addressed by the democratic liberal side of the world in order to assure a more stable and free world.
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
