More than 50 ballistic tests in one year: is the North Korean belligerent attitude representing a nuclear threat?

Last week North Korea launched an ICBM missile capable of transporting a nuclear weapon with the potential to reach the US mainland, that landed in the Japanese exclusive economic zone close to the island of Hokkaido; this is the second missile fired in one month by North Korea, showing a trend of increased frequency of its provocative actions carried out during 2021-2022. The North Korean regime announced new actions to be undertaken as retaliation against the growing security commitment of the US to its allies in the region, warning of “fiercer military responses” that would make the regional situation more unpredictable, as stated by DPRK’s foreign minister. A reference is made to a side meeting which took place few days before the launch within the ASEAN summit in Cambodia, where the US, South Korea and Japan reached an agreement to work together to reinforce security cooperation: in the final statement it is expressed a strongly condemnation for the DPRK’s military actions, reaffirming a trilateral commitment toward a denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and toward a policy of reinforced extended deterrence backed by a “full range of capabilities, including nuclear”.[1]

The North Korean strategy is part of a recent tendency towards re-militarisation, abandoning the rhetoric adopted since 2018 after having opened a fragile dialogue with the US under the Trump Presidency (which terminated with a vague declaration of intent stating that the two countries would engage in denuclearising the entire Korean peninsula, but without any plan of action). As a matter of fact, last year Kim Yong-un developed a quinquennial plan delineating a series of new weapons willing to be developed: the recent tests are the proof that the dictator is training the troops to use these weapons, which are ready to be deployed. Moreover, in September North Korea approved a law that allows the State to launch preventive nuclear attacks whenever it is identified a potential threat posed by a foreign State: in its preamble, it is written that ‘the nuclear posture of the DPRK is guaranteed by the reliable, effective and matured nuclear deterrence, defensive and responsible nuclear forces policy and flexible and purposeful strategy for using nuclear weapon capable of actively coping with any existing and developing nuclear threats in future’.[2] This brand-new Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces draws a flexible strategy for employing nuclear weapons, stressing the possibility to use them preemptively to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity through an offensive attack aimed to eliminate any danger arising from a possible attack by an enemy. This legal instrument replaces a 2013 law which was stating that nuclear weapons could be used only defensively to reject an attack or invasion by a foreign State.

As a reaction to the North Korean unprecedented number of ballistic tests, Australia called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council, saying that this provocation violates multiple UN resolution and therefore must stop, and calling for a global answer to this threat. Along with Australia, leaders of the US, South Korea, Japan, Canada and New Zealand held an urgent meeting at the APEC summit, where the US Vice-President Harris underlined that the Korean belligerent attitude undermines regional security, unnecessarily raising tensions: she condemned the escalation of these unlawful, destabilising acts. The EU Parliament condemned the ballistic activities, encouraging the EU to foster its engagement in the dialogue to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, Xi Jinping commented that Asia-Pacific is nobody’s backyard and should not become an arena for big power competition; despite having expressed concerns about the rising tension between North Korea and the US, China avoided talking about denuclearisation, simply inviting the UNSC to make an attempt towards de-escalation without blankly blaming the DPRK’s legitimate apprehension, and the US to take the initiative presenting realistic proposals in order to avoid miscalculations. In this context, Russia accused Washington of fomenting tension by trying to force North Korea into unilateral disarmament through sanctions and force.

Provocations from the side of North Korea are definitely not new, but tensions are reaching high peaks due to the current global geopolitical scenario. Because the US are busy dealing with the situation in Ukraine, the talks to reduce sanctions against Pyongyang stopped and reached the bottom of global agenda. It is true that sanctions from the international community have not impeded to North Korea to develop new weapons, but those are damaging its economy. As per a rare admission made by Kim Jong-un the DPKR’s economy is facing difficult times, especially because the COVID pandemic impaired North Korean trade with its closest ally, China: diminishing trade exchanges, floods that devastated crops leading to a food insecurity crisis, instability of the health system are all factors that undermined Kim Yong-un regime. To show a potential but immediate danger could bring back the US and South Korea to the negotiation table, with Pyongyang eager to agree a more favourable solution that would include lifting part of the UNSC sanctions. However, the current war in Ukraine provided a potential occasion to North Korea: if it would launch another missile, or conduce another nuclear test, the DPRK knows it will not be sanctioned. Since Russia itself is criticising sanctions within the Security Council, thus having led to a de facto impasse, impunity is fostered and missiles may be used as negotiation mean for North Korea, remembering to the US that Pyongyang is not willing anymore to deal pledges without obtaining nothing in exchange.

In the end, these actions should be considered as a provocation aimed to coerce the US into direct bilateral negotiations more than a real risk of a nuclear war, that would meet a strong opposition by the entire international community including China. As highlighted by President Biden at the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT this summer, nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. However, North Korea represent an example of the inability of the non-proliferation regime to reach consensus on the threat of nuclear proliferation. The true question is: Is a denuclearization of North Korea really feasible? Or is it better for the international community to adopt an approach aimed to minimise the threat? In any case, the rapid increasing of tension should remind to US that the threat in the Korean peninsula is real, and that it should be included in the political agenda in order to curb the destabilisation of the region. President Biden needs to re-open the dialogue with Pyongyang setting aside the retaliation mindset, with a sound understanding of the real leverages that he can exercise and avoiding the deployment of military means (nuclear or not) in favour of a diplomatic solution, for defusing any chance of a pre-emptive nuclear attack.

By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.