BRICS – the acronym that has been widely circulated among international arena, is relatively a young union that has been formed in the beginning of the 2000s (Larionova and Kirton, 2018). Initially the acronym BRIC referred to the superpowers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China with S being added to the list in 2010 as South Africa joined the union (Carmody, 2013). For now, BRICS is the group composed by the five major emerging countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which together represent about 42% of the population, 23% of GDP, 30% of the territory and 18% of the global trade (Radulescu et al 2014). Originally, Goldman Sachs used the acronym to introduce four growing economics (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as a promising investment opportunities for global investors. It was not until 2009, when BRIC changed from a fictive community into an institutionalized platform in world politics (ibid).
The first official BRIC summit was hosted by Russian government in Yekaterinburg in 2009 (Stuenkel, 2020). In their first summit, leaders from Brazil, Russia, India and China expressed a joint position and called for an increased role of the emerging and developing economies in global financial institutions, alongside underlined the need for a stable and more diversified international monetary system. Since the beginning of their dialogue, these countries have sought to establish international governance, one that would be more suitable to their national interests (Van Agtmael, 2012). It needs to be mentioned that the discourse around BRIC have fallen mainly on economic dimension and aspects. In 2010, South Africa joined the bloc and the acronym was modified as BRICS.
Through BRICS’s membership, South Africa aimed at four levels of engagement: 1) the domestic level to strengthen political and economic relations; 2) on the regional level to enhance the African agenda and to promote Africa’s sustainable development with emphasis placed on continental and regional infrastructure development programs; 3) to pursue global governance reform and 4) to strengthen intra-BRICS cooperation from a more organizational perspective (Harvard International Review, 2019, “South Africa in the BRICS: Evolving International Engagement and Development”). In the fourth summit in 2012, the member states collectively urged a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council for the purpose of making it more effective and representative (ibid). Thus, alongside economic issues, BRICS members have been diversifying their agenda and trying to engaged actively in multilateral institutions. The reform of the international institutions is clearly the common goal for BRICS (Vom Hau et al Hulme, 2012).
There is no doubt that the BRICS has a significant influence on regional affairs and very active position on the global stage (Stuenkel, 2020). All of BRICS countries are members of the G20. It needs to be mentioned that the political system of BRICS countries is different: Russia and China are authoritative states, while Brazil, India and South Africa are institutionalized, democratic states. Economically, Russia is represented as an energy resource base possesses about 20 per cent of the world’s gas and oil resources (Cheng et al 2007). India, on the other hand, specializes in service sector and is a software powerhouse, while Brazil is engaged in agriculture production and is seen as an exporter of agricultural products, especially to China. China itself, has about 12 per cent of world’s mineral resources. Although, the diverse economic and political nature of the BRICS countries is clear, however, the member states still find and share common values in BRICS mission (Käkönen, 2014). The mutually beneficial interests of the states open a window of opportunity for the BRICS to enhance their cooperation and to present themselves as a solid platform heading towards tangible outcomes.
Apart from economics, BRICS is clearly a political instrument for member states, especially for China and Russia – the countries that are aiming at enhancing their role in the world politics (Macfarlane, 2006). It provides an opportunity for both states to increasingly engage themselves in discussions and negotiations and thus, arrive at the decisions based on mutual interest (Nayyar, 2016). But does BRICS possess enough power to challenge the existing international order? This question clearly cannot have a clear-cut answer but speaking from the economic point of view, the international order is already changing. China, India and Brazil are expected to continue to rise (Mielniczuk, 2013). At the same time, Middle range powers such as South Korea, Turkey, Iran, Egypt are becoming increasingly important. The changing ranking orders of national economies challenge the role and influence of the current leading powers but perhaps not necessarily change the system itself. For now, BRICS’ powers have done little to really challenge the Euro-US domination of the international system (Cameron, 2011).
While the group has received both praise and criticism from different corners of the world, BRICS is steadily working towards realizing its set goals, bilateral relations among them are conducted on the basis of non-interference, equality and mutual benefits (Desai, 2013). The members have not clearly agreed on their position in international power games but their collective aspiration and determination for contesting the western dominance is out of question (Cheng et al 2007). BRICS do represent vision that can easily be translated into the concrete actions. It seems that the BRICS have a considerable potential for articulating a collective voice in the world of multilateralism (Beeson and Zeng, 2018). Coordination and cooperation among them carries significant potential for exercising influence on multilateral institutions, which could reshape rules and create policy space for countries that are latecomers to development (Nayyar, 2016). The future of the platform depends on developments of factors in international arena, the rise and fall of the dominant powers and the determination of the BRICS states to confront the existing political arrangements.
References
Beeson, M., & Zeng, J. (2018). The BRICS and global governance: China’s contradictory role. Third World Quarterly, 39(10), 1962-1978.
Cameron, F. (2011). The EU and the BRICs. Policy paper, 3, 1-4.
Carmody, D. P. (2013). The rise of the BRICS in Africa: The geopolitics of South-South relations. Zed Books Ltd..
Cheng, H. F., Gutierrez, M., Mahajan, A., Shachmurove, Y., & Shahrokhi, M. (2007). A future global economy to be built by BRICs. Global Finance Journal, 18(2), 143-156.
Desai, R. (2013). The Brics are building a challenge to western economic supremacy. The Guardian, 2.
Harvard International Review (2019), South Africa in the BRICS: Evolving International Engagement and Development accessed 12 December 2021, <https://hir.harvard.edu/south-africa-in-the-brics-evolving-international-engagement-and-development/>.
Larionova, M., & Kirton, J. J. (Eds.). (2018). BRICS and global governance. New York: Routledge.
Mielniczuk, F. (2013). BRICS in the Contemporary World: changing identities, converging interests. Third World Quarterly, 34(6), 1075-1090.
Macfarlane, S. N. (2006). The ‘R’in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?. International affairs, 82(1), 41-57.
Nayyar, D. (2016). BRICS, developing countries and global governance. Third World Quarterly, 37(4), 575-591.
Radulescu, I. G., Panait, M., & Voica, C. (2014). BRICS countries challenge to the world economy new trends. Procedia economics and finance, 8, 605-613.
Stuenkel, O. (2020). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lexington Books.
Van Agtmael, A. (2012). Think again: the BRICS. Foreign Policy, (196), 76.
Vom Hau, M., Scott, J., & Hulme, D. (2012). Beyond the BRICs: alternative strategies of influence in the global politics of development.
By Nino Zotikishvili: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
