Turkey has become the focus of criticism for its unilateralism, mainly due to its recent actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the oil exploration and search activities and the agreements reached with the GAN in Libya. The situation has generated tension and contributed to the formation of two fronts, one composed of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel, and the other by Turkey and Libya. The root of the conflict between Greece and Turkey is a sovereign dispute over the delimitation of their respective boundaries which dates from many years back. However, in the recent years the tension between the two countries has increased because of political and economic interests, such as the discovery of gas and the further steps of Turkey to delimitate its exclusive economic zone.
Background
The delimitation of the territorial waters and national airspace, the delimitation of exclusive economic zones, the use of flight information region, and the demilitarization of the Greek islands in Aegean Sea are some of the controversial issues that need to be solved. International agreements, such as the 1923 Lausanne Convention on the Straits, the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, and the 1947 Paris Treaty have stated that the disputes must be solved through bilateral negotiations. However, Greece argues that the only dispute in the Aegean Sea is the delimitation of the continental shelf and that a settlement must be through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On the other hand, Turkey suggested a direct negotiation instead of a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.
The Greco-Turkish conflict has its origins in a territorial delimitation dispute. The sovereign dispute centers on three issues.
First, the disagreement over the boundaries of Greek territorial waters and the ownership of the isles in the Aegean Sea.
The conflict in this area of the Mediterranean is extremely high and stems from two different interpretations regarding the distribution of areas of sovereignty, that is, territorial waters and airspace.
International law, through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), lays down the criteria for the delimitation of maritime areas under the sovereignty of States, generally establishing 12 nautical miles (NM) the extent of the territorial waters in which a State exercises full sovereignty. For historical reasons, this general criterion has not been applied in this part of the Mediterranean and the extent of the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey has been limited to 6 NM. Greece’s attempt to extend the limits of its territorial waters to 12 NM during the UNCLOS ratification process in 1995 provoked a hostile reaction from Turkey, which declared this issue a causus belli.
As for airspace, it is the 1944 Chicago Convention that defines it as the region of the Earth’s atmosphere situated over the territory of full sovereignty of States, including but not outside their territorial waters. And here too the Aegean has its peculiarities. For various reasons, since 1931 Greece has unilaterally extended its sovereign airspace to 10 NM, not confining it to the 6 NM of its territorial sea, an unusual circumstance in international law that has never been accepted by Turkey, whose Air Force deliberately flies into that area habitually.
Second, the delimitation of the two countries’ exclusive economic zones in the eastern Mediterranean.
As in the case of territorial waters, it is UNCLOS that sets the EEZ and continental shelf of a State at a maximum of 200 NM, the possibility of extension up to a maximum of 350 NM is allowed under certain circumstances.
The distinction between the continental shelf and the economic zone is not simple as both legal institutions are established on the same space, the 200 NM. The continental shelf includes the seabed and subsoil, and establishes sovereign rights of the State to which it belongs over the resources found there, regardless of its express declaration. The EEZ, on the other hand, includes, in addition to the bed itself and subsoil, the overlying waters. But, unlike the continental shelf, a State must make an express claim on it in order to exercise the «…sovereign rights for the purposes of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources…» which it considers to be its responsibility… (art. 56 UNCLOS). The problem of the delimitation of EZZ comes from the fact that the size of the Mediterranean in this area precludes the automatic application of the 200 NM criterion, and coastal States are obliged to establish these limits by bilateral agreements. Additionally, not all costal countries are signatories to the UNCLOS. In fact, Turkey did not sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, mainly as a result of disagreements over the division of jurisdictional waters between Greece and Turkey. Hence, it is not possible to resort to the control resolution mechanisms provided in it.
Greece applies the principle of equidistance to delimit its continental shelf, while Turkey argues that an island territory cannot under any circumstances generate the same rights as the continental mass. In this sense, the UNCLOS determines (Art. 59) that any conflict «should be resolved on an equitable basis and in the light of all relevant circumstances…». This excludes the application of the principle of equidistance, which would establish the limit of the respective EEZs on the intermediate line equidistant between their coasts, and should take into account other considerations, such as the respective lengths of coastline.
Third, the unsolved conflict of Cyprus. After independence, the high tension between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island led in July 1974 to a coup d’état plotted against the Government of Archbishop Makarios and provoked Turkish intervention, which de facto divided the country in two. On the one hand, in the south of the island, the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (RC) is a member of the European Union. On the other hand, in the north of the island, the Turkish-Cypriot community has proclaimed itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is only recognized by Turkey and owes its existence to the permanent presence of the Turkish Army. In addition to the United Kingdom, both Greece and Turkey were designated by the Treaty of Guarantees (1960) as guarantors of the status of the island, although both have de facto positioned themselves as supporters of the interests of the respective communities.
Cyprus, considering that in the absence of an agreement by the parties only the principle of equidistance is acceptable, declared its EEZ by Law 64(1)/2004 and Law 97(1)/2014. Once again, Turkey’s interpretation of the principle of equity gives rise to two views that are difficult to harmonize. On the basis of the criterion of equidistance between coasts, the RoC has established delimitation agreements with Egypt (17 January 2003), Lebanon (17 January 2007) and Israel (17 December 2010). In principle, none of them conflicts with Turkey’s aspirations, but the non-participation of the Turkish-Cypriot community in its negotiations has led Turkey to consider them null and void. In doing so, it is argued, the Turkish Cypriot community would be deprived of the potential benefits of exploiting resources that belong to them on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community.
Its role as guarantor of the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community has made it easy to reach an agreement on the delimitation of their respective EEZs between Turkey and the self-proclaimed TRNC (2011), this time based on the principle of equity, agreement obviously not recognized by the RdC.
Neither Turkey nor Greece have declared their respective EEZs in express form in this Mediterranean area, although they have done so indirectly by detailing the limits of what they consider their continental shelf in numerous official communications. But the signing on 27 November 2019 of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Turkish Government and the internationally recognized National Agreement Government (GAN), agreeing on the delimitation of their respective continental and EEZ platforms on a stretch of 18.6 NM broke this custom.
In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, this MoU was officially registered with the UUNN Secretary-General on December 11, however, the UUNN has refused to rule on the legality of this declaration, as they lack the capacity to do so. But beyond the legal effects that this declaration may have, the fact is that the express definition of the limits of its EEZ in an area in direct conflict with Greek territory (island of Crete) implies a change in policy. A change of strategy that has been accompanied by the deployment of troops in Libya in support of the GAN that reinforces Turkey’s character as a regional power with which it is essential to negotiate and which cannot be marginalized.
The Greece’s reaction to the deal was the immediate expel of the GNA ambassador from Athens and cultivating closer ties with the Libyan National Army. However, because the deal disregards the big Greek islands, such as Crete and Rhodes, it is highly contested and on shaky ground from an international law perspective. Not only has this step further increased tension between both countries, but it also paved the way for Greece to sign a deal with Egypt in August 2020 to delimitate their respective maritime jurisdictions (Dalay, 2021).
The Turkish-Libyan deal conflicts with Greece’s view of its own maritime boundaries as it does the Greek-Egyptian deal with Turkey’s view.
Is that all? What are the aggravating circumstances of the Greco-Turkish conflict?
The territorial dispute between Greece and Turkey has been calmed during last decades, in part because of the Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union. However, the recent political situation in Turkey, added to the gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean, has aggravated the Greco-Turkish conflict for the sovereign control and the establishment of maritime borders.
There are two interlinked reasons that have deepened the conflict and Turkey’s concerns of being sidelined from the region’s emerging energy and security order. First, the projected route for the Eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and second, the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.
The envisioned pipeline to Europe is premised on closer cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, but excludes Turkey. This tripartite cooperation gained an institutional form in January 2020 with the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Italy. The establishment of the EMGF responds to the need for a regionally coordinated effort to unlock the full potential of Eastern Mediterranean offshore gas wealth (Sukkarieh, 2021).
Turkey has been at the forefront of opposition to the EastMed project, claiming that the chosen pipeline route will transfer gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe while bypassing the long Turkish coastline. Turkey also claims that the pipeline project disregards Turkey’s equal rights to natural resources in Cypriot territorial seas. The agreement between Turkey and Libya signed on December 2019 for the delimitation of their respective economic zones is seen as a roadblock to the project because the EastMed pipeline will have to pass through it.
The EU, as an observer of the EMGF, recognises the objectives of the EMGF and is ready to engage with its members to enable and enhance a dialogue on natural gas but also the EU will play a role in addressing the clean energy transition, including renewable gas production, in line with the European Green Deal.
What is the EU’s role?
Turkey is a strategic partner on migration, security, counter-terrorism and trade issues for the European Union. However, relations have been overshadowed by issues such as democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Turkey has been a candidate to join the EU since 1990, but following the coup d’état in Turkey and the deterioration of the domestic rule of law, talks have stalled. In November 2016, the European Parliament called for a freeze on talks over the deteriorating rule of law in the country. Their relations are conditioned by their mutual interests: the EU has an important cooperation partner in Turkey, especially in the area of migration (in the wake of the war in Syria) but also in the economic position, the EU is the largest export market for Turkey (42.4% of the total in 2019) and Turkey is the EU’s 5th largest trading partner (Ochoa de Olza, 2019). Since 2015, financial aid has been granted to Turkey to combat illegal immigration and to help manage the humanitarian crisis. First, with an Action Plan and, most recently, with the Agreement called Joint Statement of 18 March 2016, and the creation of the European Refugee Facility in Turkey.
Concerning the political situation in Turkey, the possibility of imposing sanctions has been raised at the European Council, but finally the détente in the eastern Mediterranean and Turkey’s desire for dialogue led to a further opportunity for dialogue on 25 March 2021 between Charles Michel, Ursula Von Der Leyen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The EU is divided between those who are in favor of imposing sanctions, such as France, which has strong interests in the region, including those supporting opposing factions in the war in Libya) and Greece, which supports the Republic of Cyprus. On the other hand, there is a group of countries that are more favorable to moderation and favor compromise, including Germany and Italy.
Conclusion:
The large hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean create a tension which complicates the resolution of the conflict that has divided the island of Cyprus since the 1970s and of the disputes over the delimitation of EEZs.
Although in its initial stages, the exploitation of the deposits has led to the formation of two major strategic alignments: a first alignment that includes Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, cooperating to find ways to capitalize on their potential resources and a second alignment between Turkey and the RTNC, the latter without international recognition. At first glance, it seems that the EU, with direct interests in the supply of gas from this area, have positioned themselves in support of the claims of the first group of countries, leaving Turkey and the RTNC isolated. However, the strategic position of Turkey as the door to the EU and its commitment to prevent the entry of immigrants in exchange for money highlights its substantial bargaining power of Turkey.
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
