Kosovo conflict or Kosovo war (1998-1999) that was followed by the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, has gained a widespread attention in recent international relations. This conflict has its root to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) which existed between 1963 to 1992. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created at the end of World War I and consisted of six republics
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia — and two autonomous entities inside Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Yugoslavia was under the influence of the Soviet Union until 1948. The Republic of Yugoslavia broke away from the communist regime and became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, and adopted a more de-centralized and less repressive form of government as compared with other East European communist states during the Cold War (The breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990-1992). However, together with external factors, the constant cultural, religious, ethnic tensions inside the countries comprising the republic of Yugoslavia, resulted in breakup of the Republic itself. In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Following 1992, Bosnia became an independent country (ibid).
The ethnic tensions between ethic Serbians and Kosovo Albanians escalated as Slobodan Milosevic became the president of Serbia in 1989 (Allcock 2020). In his speeches, he was systematically praising ethnic Serbians, discriminating non-Serbs living in Kosovo and other regions, some of whom suffered mass atrocities, “… in a political light the perception is very present that the desire for an ethnically pure Kosovo is well-founded and possible. That foundation is here {Kosovo}” (Speech of Slobodan Milosevic 1987). He went even far when removing the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of their constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy within Serbia by using mass rallies to force the local leaderships to resign in favor of his own preferred candidates and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. By mid-1989 Kosovo and Vojvodina had been reintegrated into Serbia, and the Montenegro leadership was replaced by Milosevic allies (The Breakup of Yugoslavia 1990-1992 ). During 1998, the long-standing dispute between Serbia and the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo deteriorated rapidly into open armed conflict between federal security forces and the Kosovo Liberation Movement (KLM). The violence arose mostly with the province’s majority Albanian population who were calling for independence from Serbia. The escalations resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes (NATO’s role in Kosovo, overview 1999). Thousands of ethnic Albanian villages in Kosovo had been partially or completely destroyed by burning or shelling. The killings and terror against civilians began to encompass any area with a current or historic link to the Kosovo Liberation Movement, gained the name of systematic ethnic cleansing (Human Rights Watch Report 2001).
The international community became severely concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries. On 31 March 1998, the UN Security council formulated warnings through the Resolution 1160 for both parties: Serb Government and the Kosovo/ Albanian leadership. The Resolution 1160 condemned “the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, arms and training” (UN Security Council Resolution 1160, 1998). The Resolution demanded urgently from the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community “to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues, and notes the readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate such a dialogue” (ibid). Moreover, the Council expressed its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo “which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration” (ibid). Last but not least, the Council warned the parties that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo “will lead to the consideration of additional measures” (UN Security Council Resolution 1160», 1998). Despite the warnings and threats from the UN Council, the parties failed to reach an agreement on ceasefire. On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, the NATO Council authorized Activation Orders for air strikes. This move was designed to support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence and facilitate the return of refugees to their homes (NATO’s role in Kosovo, 1999).
NATO’s increased presence in Kosovo and economic sanctions forced the Milosevic regime to accept a NATO-led international peace keeping force. Kosovo province was placed under U.N. administrative mandate. Meanwhile, the economic conditions began to deteriorate in Serbia, Milosevic lost his influence as well as power. In 2008, Kosovo (backed by the US) declared independence unilaterally and was recognized by the United States and most European states, despite Russian objections (NATO’s role in Kosovo, 1999). Serbia challenged Kosovo’s actions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); however, the ICJ’s 2010 advisory opinion found that Kosovo had not contravened international law, “the adoption of [the] declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law ” (United States Institute of Peace 2010). Serbia continues to refuse Kosovo’s independence and considers it as part of Serbia.
The political calculus behind the conflict has brought several international actors in place. The U.S. played a crucial role to increase its presence and influence in Kosovo. The United States was one of the first nations to recognize Kosovo as an independence state after Kosovo declared its independence. Moreover, the U.S. continues to push other international community to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Apart from that, Washington has tried to mediate the political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo but Serbia opposed the U.S. mediated process and instead, the EU engaged in the facilitation process in 2011. The parties could not come to an agreement on the status of Kosovo. Tensions and frustrations on both sides resulted in political unrest. Many Kosovars did not trust their leaders to maintain Kosovo’s sovereignty in negotiations with Serbia and were concerned that the U.S. would push their government leaders into an agreement that would not be in Kosovo’s interests (U.S. Interests in Negotiations Between Serbia and Kosovo, 2020 ). On the other hand, The EU urges Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence otherwise it will not let Serbia to join the union. Meantime, Russia did not stay inactive. Instead, increased its ally with Serbia and condemned NATO’s intervention in Kosovo as an illegal military action. The main point that Russia strives for is to undermine the U.S and EU actions in the Balkan countries and to minimize their influence in the Eastern Europe. In August, 2019 Serbia agreed to a trade pack with Russia, ignoring the EU warnings.
The political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo has reached a stalemate. It is highly unlikely that the countries could come to a consensus under the current circumstances. The future developments mostly depend on the global political order and whether President Biden’s policy towards the Balkan states take a new shape.
References
Allcock, J. B. (2020) Slobodan Milošević. Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed 10 June 2021 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Slobodan-Milosevic.
CEPA: “The Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue: ripe for resolution?” (2021), accessed 10 June 2021 <https://cepa.org/the-serbia-kosovo-dialogue-ripe-for-resolution/>
Human Rights Watch Report 2001. Accessed 10 June 2021 https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/kosovo/undword-03.htm.
NATO’s role in Kosovo, overview 1999. Accessed 10 June 2021 https://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm
Speech of Slobodan Milosevic at Kosovo Polje (1987). Accessed 10 June 2021 <http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic-1987-3-eng.htm>.
The breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990-1992, accessed 10 June 2021 <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia >.
UN Security Council Resolution 1160» (1998). Accessed 10 June 2021 https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980331a.htm.
United States Institute of Peace (2010). Accessed 10 June 2021 https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB55%20The%20ICJs%20Advisory%20Opinion%20on%20Kosovo.pdf>.
U.S. Interests in Negotiations Between Serbia and Kosovo (2020). Accessed 10 June 2021 https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-interests-negotiations-between-serbia-and-kosovo.
By Nino Zotikishvili: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
