Thailand has been in mass antigovernment protests and rallies in a decade, largely caused by the combination of democratic deterioration and frustrations over the role of the monarchy. The recent protests kicked off in August 2020 as Thai people took the streets and started to vividly criticize the institution of the monarchy and King Maha Vajiralongkorn, demanding reduced royal powers (BBC, 2020 ). The activists have been pushing the political reforms and constitutional changes that would make Thailand’s King more accountable for public institutions, improve checks and balances and transform the senate where the members are unelected (ibid).
Since 1923, Thailand has been a constitutional monarchy (Thananithichot, 2011). The history of this institution goes back more than seven hundred years and has preserved itself in the contemporary Thailand. Currently Thailand is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy (Ferrara, 2015). The king is the head of the state, and the administration of the country is carried out by the prime minister who is elected through an open vote by members of the House of Representatives – and the cabinet that the prime minister forms (ibid). Thailand has experienced periods of political turbulences, clashes between conservative monarchists and pro-democracy reformists known as ‘yellow shirts’ and ‘red shirts’ (Ungpakorn, 2009). These two groups reflect deep social divides and class struggles in Thailand’s society (ibid).
Politically, Thailand is in the constant power struggle. The authority in Thailand has often been held by the military which has taken power through coups (Chen, 2014). During the last two decades of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st, parliamentary democracy steadily gained wider popular support. In 2006, Thailand witnessed the street protests led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a loose alliance of civil society, businesses, elite and royalist groups who opposed the parliamentary power of Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party (Hewison, 2014). These demonstrations resulted in military coup and military rule whose leaders instituted martial law. They also suspended the constitution and legislative bodies, and replaced the Constitutional Court “with an appointed military tribunal” until 2007, when the parliamentary elections took place and the “pro-Thaksin” People Power Party (PPP) won the most votes (ibid). In January 2008, the PPP announced a six-party coalition government but it did not last for long as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and approximately 10,000 supporters engaged in months of protest to force the PPP-led government from office (Hewison, 2014). The government was thrown out by a judicial intervention in late 2008 and PAD dissolved into several ideological groups. Following another election victory by the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party in 2011, PAD morphed into several protest groups that eventually became the antidemocratic “People’s Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State” (PCAD) that was on the streets from late 2013 until the May 2014 coup (Kongkirati, 2016).
In the first two months after the coup, Thailand was run by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). NCPO issued several coup orders and adopted a temporary constitution (Baker, 2016). The new regime announced two reform agendas (including politics, administrations, economy, and education) and promoted the newly proposed 12 national values which emphasized the protection of the nation, religious, and the monarchy (Prasirtsuk, 2015).
Since 2014, the Thai government has been headed by former army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha, from 2014 to 2019 as head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta, and since the 2019 elections as leader of the Palang Pracharath (People’s State Power) party (EPRC, 2019). Although the elections were held under a new constitution adopted in 2017, however the military control of Thai politics have been ensured even under a civilian government. According to the constitution, the prime minister is chosen by a combined vote of the two houses of parliament, the Senate (250 members, hand-picked by the junta before its dissolution) and the House of Representatives (500 elected members). The Senate also approves appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, a body whose judgments have traditionally been heavily weighted against opponents of military rule (ibid).
Constitutionally, the Thai monarch is an apolitical figure who avoids taking sides (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). Nevertheless, in practice the monarchy and the military are closely linked. Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, which forbids any insult to the monarchy, is among the strictest in the world (Kamatali, 2014). Section 112 of the country’s Penal Code, which says whoever defames, insults or threatens the king, the queen, the heir-apparent or the regent shall be punished with imprisonment of three to 15 years (Reuters, 2020). The lese majeste law has become the subject of criticism by the human rights defenders and civil society organizations. The UN human rights experts also expressed grave concerns over Thailand’s increasingly severe use of lèse-majesté laws to curtail criticism of the monarchy (OHCHR, 2021). Under lèse-majesté law, detention and interrogation of people have gained a wide scale. Human Rights Watch report states that “Between 2016 and 2018, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand received more than 100 torture allegations” and … “the junta put more than 1,800 civilians on trial before military tribunals” (Human Rights Watch (2020).
Additionally, the Thai people and civil society organizations experience restricted rights and freedoms that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Their participation in political life is insignificant and their voices are not heard. The rule of law is exercised partially, favouring the oligarchs and corrupted public officials whose influence on Thai politics have become the driving force. Almost all public sectors are engaged in a wide-scale corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, including the military junta (ibid).
Considering the domestic disorder, Thailand seeks to maintain positive relations with its key neighbors. As a founding member of ASEAN, Thailand has been a major player in building cooperation with neighbouring countries (Busbarat, 2014). Not surprisingly, the Thai government focuses on strengthening the ties with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea rather than with those in the West, given that the former have refrained from harsh comment on Thai domestic politics and mainly focused on mutual economic interests. Thailand has drawn closer to China in all areas, most notably after the 2014 coup as it sees China as a comfort zone for political, security and economic engagement (Chambers and Bunyavejchewin, 2019). China has been Thailand’s biggest trade partner since 2013, with a two-way trade volume of US$61 billion in that year increasing to US$77.5 billion in 2019 (ibid. Hongfang, 2013). Not only that, Thailand put considerable effort to rebuild confidence with Japan after the 2014 coup as Japan is the main engine for its export-led economy for half a century. Thailand has also engaged with the Republic of Korea by signing the six memoranda of understanding in such areas as smart cities.
The above-mentioned developments underline that the democratic development of Thailand is far from the agenda. The demands of activists do not match with the priorities of the Thai government who cares less about the participatory democracy and human rights. Instead, it strives for strengthening economic cooperation with the neighbouring countries as it promises reliable allies in future perspectives.
References
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By Nino Zotikishvili: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
