Mahmoud Refaat
From Donbas to Nagorno- Karabakh and from Syria to Caucasus, Putin’s Russia has been steadily but cautiously expanding its operations during the last two decades. Using a variety of different means and tactics, it seems that Russia has recalibrated its perception on the international power equilibrium and tried to re-establish itself as a great power with global reach. Ergo, as a revisionist power, it uses its set of tools from a previous era, to expand its influence taking advantage of endemic instability and weak institutions, investing its limited resources to harvest augmented gains.
Henceforth this paper aims to expose the new dogma of Russia’s foreign policy by examining four case-studies, in its so-called near abroad and proposes several measures that could be adopted to limit the negative effects of this phenomenon. The policies adopted by the EU and the US are also presented in order to demonstrate their strong points as well as their weaknesses. Firstly the paper analyzes the case of Russian involvement in Belarus, where Russia firmly supports the authoritarian regime of Lukashenko, using Minsk not only as a buffer zone but also as an export market for its products. The second chapter focuses on the Arctic, a region of primordial importance due to its abundant natural resources that could become easily accessible due to climate change. In this case, Russia deploys its military might to signal its presence in the area. Afterwards, the study examines the case of Ukraine conflict, where Russia has taken advantage of the internal instability of the country, to promote its interests and prevent further expansion of the EU and NATO near its borders. Finally, in a similar context, the paper illustrates the Russo-Georgian conflict where Russia acted as a local hegemon to secure its interests and stop Georgia’s increasing cooperation with the West. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations that can be added to the tool-kit of policy makers of the European Union and the west in general, to face effectively the de facto revisionist foreign policy of Moscow, that threatens not only the regional power equilibrium, but also international peace and stability.
Chapter 1: Russia’s imminent threat on Belarus
Belarus has been in the world’s spotlight for some time, especially after the country’s presidential election in August 2020, where President Alexander Lukashenko, was accused of rigging them to keep himself in power and massive demonstrations have been occurring across the entire country ever since, which have been met by police brutality. The leaders of the opposition have been either jailed or have had to flee abroad to avoid this. These events have triggered a chain reaction, which has involved various actors like Russia or the EU, as for instance the EU decided to impose sanctions, such as visa bans to over eighty officials from Belarus, as well as financial restrictions to different entities that are associated with Lukashenko’s regime (Glod, 2021). The objectives of this chapter are to give a historical background, which explains how the situation has gotten to this point, as well as an overview of the current situation, showcasing the actions that are being carried out by the different actors involved in this conflict. Finally, a series of recommendations will be given describing how the International Community, especially the European Union should act, in order to avoid the possibility of Russia further increasing its control over Belarus.
Historical Context
The relationship between Belarus and Russia has usually been particularly tight, for instance, these two countries established in 2000 what is known as a ´Union State’, showcasing the close relationship between them. This deal offers mainly the free movement of goods and people between the two nations, for example, some of the tangible benefits for the Belarusian population that this deal offers is the opportunity of jumping the queue with the Russians at the different Russian airports. What is more, this deal also showcases the Slavic Unity between them (Wilson, 2017). Belarus and Russia have not only developed a close cultural relationship as the Belarusian economy has been heavily dependent on Russia, for instance it has benefitted from the oil and gas that has been subsidised by Russia. Belarus is extremely dependent on the energy sector for generating important sums of revenue domestically, both by the resale of cheap Russian energy on its domestic market, as well as, by the revenues generated by the export of petroleum products, as Belarus is one of the leading countries in oil refinement, this has always left Belarus in a difficult position when it comes to dealing with Russian aggression (Challis, 2020). This goes in accordance with Russia’s plans over its neighbourhood as Russia has always made it very clear their intention of maintaining a strong influence over their periphery, keeping what former president Dmitry Medvedev has called their privileged interests, mainly by maintaining a strong economic grip over this region, but also by trying to restrain as much as possible the influence that the West can exert over this region, especially through their diplomatic activity and their threat of possible military retaliation always open (Mankoff, 2020). What is more, in recent years, Russia has also been able to learn from past events and has maintained their strong grip over Belarus or the South Caucasus region without the need of using their military force like in Ukraine or Georgia, showcasing their capabilities of maintaining control without the need to use actions that would spark new sanctions (Mankoff, 2020).
In addition, Belarus has always been a key place in the geopolitical sphere, due to its decisive location alongside the Suwalki Gap, which is the strip of land that connects the Baltic States to Poland and thus to the rest of NATO, as well as connects the Russian territory of Kaliningrad to Russia. This decisive position, where NATO and Russia meet, makes Belarus an incredibly sensitive issue in geopolitics, as an increase of tensions can lead to a confrontation between NATO and Russia (Challis, 2020). Nevertheless, this situation has enabled Belarus to get some protection from the West, as the United States government has made it repeatedly clear that if Russia tries to overextend its influence over Belarus, thus putting Belarus´ sovereignty in danger would be met with decisive action, for instance in the form of sanctions, due to the importance of maintaining Belarus as an independent state for the protection of the Baltic republics, Poland or Ukraine (Whitmore, 2021). However, even though the importance of Belarus is very clear for all the parties involved, the EU has not managed to achieve a successful policy that would bring Belarus more towards the West, strengthening their own stance in Belarus and freeing them from such a big Russian influence, especially if compared with the US. Moreover, the EU has also failed to promote fair and democratic elections in the country, instead it has permitted Lukashenko to remain in power by rigging elections. The EU has focused more on demanding policy change in Belarus, like for instance the abolition of the death penalty or progress in human rights, in spite of the fact that Lukashenko’s regime has made it very clear repeatedly that the EU has not got enough influence to force them to carry out these changes (Preiherman, 2020). In addition, when the EU has tried a tougher stance in order to achieve real change in the country it has not been able to obtain major accomplishments as for example, the sanctions used by the EU against eighty members of the Belarusian regime, including President Lukashenko have proven particularly ineffective against improving the human rights situation in this country or as a form of pressure against Russian influence (Williamson, 2021).
Nevertheless, part of the reasons why the West and especially the EU have been ineffective in getting a stronger position of influence over Belarus are due to the actions of President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has been able to remain in power since 1994 by balancing his relationship with Russia and the West and using these two sides for his own advantage and political safety (Wilson, 2017). Lukashenko has always been able to remain close to Russia but not too close where his own position or the sovereignty of Belarus would be put in danger, he has been able to do this in the most part by portraying Belarus as in danger of being annexed by Russia if the West did not help them (Slunkin, 2020). Thus, Lukashenko has kept both sides happy enough so that they would deal with him and not risk forcing him out and find a replacement, thus enabling him to stay in power, in spite of his history of human rights violations for instance. Moreover, he was able to use events like Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 for his own advantage. He used this event to portray himself as a strong party leader that could control Russia’s dominant ambitions over its neighbourhood. By doing this, he was able to acquire a greater amount of independence from Russia, as well as get a more favourable opinion from Western leaders (Whitmore, 2021). He has also taken decisions, like for instance refusing to allow Russian troops to be permanently stationed on Belarusian territory or even rejecting Russia’s insistence for an ever-closer union state between the two countries (Whitmore, 2021). For all these reasons, Lukashenko has been known as a political survivor, which has been able to remain in power for over twenty years, in spite of the tensions that have occurred between Belarus and Russia during his tenure, or even, as it has been widely argued, the bad relationship between President Lukashenko and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (Wilson, 2017). In addition, Lukashenko has been able to maintain for several years what has been called the “social contract” with its population, where the government would keep the growing living standards of the country and in return the Belarusian population would accept the lack of democracy and would remain away from the political sphere, thus allowing Lukashenko to maintain its strong grip over the decision-making in the country and forcing both Russia and the West to work with him (Glod, 2020).
Nevertheless, this situation has drastically changed in recent times and Lukashenko’s position of power has been increasingly vulnerable, because of both internal, as well as international tensions. This has occurred, due to a wide variety of circumstances, such as, the multiple economic shocks that the Russian economy has experienced in recent times has left the Belarusian economy also in a particularly weak position, due to its dependency on Russian subsidies, which have decreased as the economic problems have increased (Wilson, 2017). What is more, the sanctions imposed by the West, the collapse of the global energy prices, as well as, the reduction of the Russian export market have left the Eurasian Economic Union devastated, for instance the GDP in Belarus fell by 3.9% in 2015 and also by 2.6% in 2016, showcasing how much damage the Belarusian economy has experienced in recent times. This has left Lukashenko in an increasingly weak position, due to the fact that part of the “social contract” with its population was maintaining the living standards of the country, which he is now increasingly unable to provide because of the weak economy, which has resulted in a rapidly increasing opposition against him among the Belarusian population (Wilson, 2017). These economic problems have left Lukashenko ever more dependent on Russia and thus in a weaker position, due to the fact that Putin tends to demand full loyalty from its allies and Lukashenko is now in a position where he has to accept these conditions. Events in Ukraine have also affected Belarus, because of the rumours of another ´gas war’ against Ukraine, which has left Putin needing Belarus as an alternative if Ukraine decides to cut the supply routes. This has resulted for instance in 2017 when thousands of Russian troops descended into Belarus for the Zapad exercises, which are carried out every four years, amid the worries of the Belarusian government that they could have stayed. Lukashenko has been able to stay in power mainly due to his handling of the relations between Belarus, Russia and the West, nevertheless in recent times it seems that the tables have turned and that he does not enjoy such a position anymore, thus resulting in his higher reliance on Russia (Wilson, 2017).
Current Situation
As mentioned before, Belarus finds itself now on the brink of possible political change due to Lukashenko’s very weakened position, as well as because of the mass demonstrations and labour strikes, which have swept across the country after the presidential elections of August 2020, which have been widely categorised as fraudulent (Courtney and Haltzel, 2020). The current situation that Lukashenko faces has forced him to seek a closer alignment with Russia, mainly due to the burned bridges with the West because of the extremely rough handling of the mass demonstrations by the Belarusian police, thus he has been forced to accept a closer integration with Russia in exchange for protection and continuing in power (Mankoff, 2020). Russia has taken advantage of this situation for further strengthening its control over Belarus, just like it did in Ukraine and Georgia. Nevertheless, Russia’s approach is very different compared with previous examples as it has been trying to play a longer game in order to accomplish a further annexation of Belarus without making any headlines (Whitmore, 2021). In addition, Russia has been able to use the weakened Belarusian economy in its favour for intensifying its presence in Belarus, due to the fact that for example, the Russian oligarchy has been left as one of the few sources of foreign exchange, which are still available for the Belarusian regime (Slunkin, 2020). It was revealed by the Belarusian Ministry of Finance in 2019 that Belarus owed $7.55 billion to Russia and it has been reported that around 70% of Belarus’ external financing is Russian (Challis, 2020). There are several examples of how Russia is taking advantage of this situation by slowly trying to increase its control over Belarus in a more silent form that before, for instance it has been reported that the Russian company Uralkali, which is connected to the Kremlin has been trying to acquire Belaruskali, which is an important Belarusian company that produces potash, which is a sector particularly important for the Belarusian economy, or it has also been stated that Russian company Uralkhem has been trying to buy Belarusian company Hrodna Azot (Whitmore, 2021). With the acquisition of these large Belarusian enterprises, Russia will acquire the possibility of using the senior levels of these enterprises for their own particular interests as lobbyists (Slunkin, 2020). What is more, Russia and Belarus have signed a deal to ship over 9.8 million tons of refined old products through Russian ports for the next three years, which is a clear statement of how Lukashenko is in such a weak position that he has agreed to this deal, due to the fact that before, these products were shipped through ports mainly in Latvia and Lithuania, in order to enable Belarus to be more independent from Russia (Whitmore, 2021).
Nevertheless, Russia has not only increased recently its control over Belarus economically, but also militarily. Military analyst Michael Kofman has stated that there has been an increase in joint military exercises between the two countries. Even politically, Russia has been trying to control the Belarusian parliament with pro-Russian parties, as well as through pushing for a constitutional amendment that would give further powers to the country’s parliament (Whitmore, 2021). Thus, there are various examples that showcase how Russia is taking advantage of the circumstances to take as much control as possible over Belarus, with the objective of making it a de facto colony as it has been argued (Gressel, 2020). Moreover, if Russia continues unopposed along this path, this will have very negative consequences for Western objectives in this area, as for instance having Belarus as a satellite state would enable Russia an easier deployment of troops through the country, thus Ukraine would have to handle a longer border where Russian troops could easily operate. Therefore, the changes that are occurring in Belarus could significantly shift the balance of power in the region (Gressel, 2020).
Russia has decided this strategy for various reasons but mainly due to the fact that it is unwilling to face the risks that an increase in tensions would cost, for example, engaging militarily with Belarus could spark intense amounts of discontent in Russia, especially because an important part of the population might see it as an unnecessary use of their money, just like Syria or Ukraine. What is more, Russia’s economy is also dependent on the EU, for instance, between 2014 and 2018, 40% of Russia’s export goods went to the EU, while 41% of the goods that Russia imported came from here (Courtney and Shatz, 2020). In addition, it has been estimated that Russia’s trade with the EU in 2019 was worth around $260 billion, thus it is in Russia’s interest to try and take control over Belarus in a less forceful way, in order not to receive further sanctions from the EU that could further damage their economy, especially because it is already in a weak position after the sanctions imposed by the West in 2014. After the invasion of eastern Ukraine, for example Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated in November 2014 that the sanctions imposed costed around 2% of Russia’s GDP per year. Nevertheless, Putin’s regime has made it continuously clear the importance that Belarus has for them and their willingness to maintain their close relationship in spite of the possible risks (Courtney and Shatz, 2020).
These changes have left Western powers with the need of readdressing the situation and evaluating what the next steps should be. As mentioned before, Belarus and the West have not always had the smoothest relationship since Belarus has always left Western influence at a distance and have only used them to acquire some independence from Russia, but without any real political change in return, like for instance an improvement in human rights as the EU has proposed several times (Preiherman, 2020). Nevertheless, since 2016 it looked like the relationship between Belarus and the EU was improving, as for instance there was a lift of sanctions from the EU in exchange for the release of political prisoners by the Belarusian regime. Even the relationship between the US and Belarus seemed to improve as for instance the US nominated its first ambassador to Belarus in over a decade (Courtney and Haltzel, 2020). Nevertheless, this all changed after the presidential elections of August 2020 and the discharge of police brutality against the peaceful protests that started after the elections. This resulted in further sanctions by the EU, like visa bans and the freezing of assets of over eighty officials, including President Lukashenko and financial and business restrictions on a number of entities which have been closely linked with the regime (Glod 2021). This has resulted in a variety of proposals of how the EU should tackle this situation, for example by following the examples of past crises and using sanctions as a method of trying to resolve this situation, or by trying a new approach, as for example the offers made by Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, which argue in favour of carrying out actions that would result in a decline of tensions in the country (Courtney and Haltzel, 2020).
The results of sanctions in Belarus have not been particularly positive since the Belarusian regime has kept its position against protesters, which has resulted in over 33,000 detentions and prosecutions between May and December 2020, including 900 people facing criminal charges. Also, there has been an increase in political firings, resulting in the weakening of the opposition’s stance because of what they are having to endure (Glod 2021). Nevertheless, the EU has also tried different methods for trying to further empower the opposition in Belarus, for instance they have not recognised the election results (Antonenko et al. 2020). In addition, the EU has also taken some unprecedented actions to boost civil society in Belarus, particularly treating opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as a head of state in exile when she has addressed for example the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the European Parliament has even recognised the Coordinating Council led by Tsikhanouskaya as the “interim representation of the people of Belarus” and the Lithuanian Parliament has recognised Tsikhanouskaya as the “elected leader of the people of Belarus”, thus showing a diversification of actions by the EU and its member states in order to further strengthen the situation of the opposition (Whitmore, 2021). On the other hand, the US has not been so active, instead what the Biden Administration has transmitted that this issue is not one that they are giving priority to, instead they have limited themselves to showing support for human rights and democratic values although without any detailed action course on how they will try to achieve this objective, thus showing that they will probably keep the sanctions against Belarus but will probably not go further than that (Melyantsou, 2021).
As stated above, the most crucial event in recent times in Belarus are the revolts that happened as a result of the rigged presidential campaign of 2020. This has been able to occur due to the upswing in civic consciousness among the Belarusian population, which has been the result of different factors. More precisely, employment in the private sector has experienced an increase in recent years, going from 37.8% in 2012 to 44.7% of the total workforce in 2019. This increase in the private sector has been key in the development and consolidation of a middle-class in Belarus, which is more prone to welcome the changes that globalisation brings and see the old way of ruling the country of the Lukashenko regime as a thing of the past. In addition, the emergence of the internet has also been a key factor for enabling these demonstrations to occur, as firstly it has allowed the population to access information other than the given by the state media, as well as, it has allowed the easier communication among vast amounts of people which has resulted in the establishment of a logistical groundwork to support the protests. These factors have enabled protests of hundreds of thousands, which has sent in motion a series of events, which showcase the vulnerability of Lukashenko’s regime that has not been able to control these protests in other form than by using brute force against the protesters (Glod 2021).
These protests and Belarus´ new situation have also had a significant amount of influence in the current relationship between Russia and Western powers, which was exemplified in the High Representative of the European Union, Josep Borrell’s visit to Moscow, thus Western Powers also have to reconsider how to deal with Russia during this time (Fischer, 2021). It has been argued that the US with its new administration will take a tougher approach towards Russia, as President Biden has made it very clear his intention of rebuilding the relationship between the US and the EU in order to be able to exercise pressure on Russia in a more effective way, especially after events like the treatment of Alexei Navalny (Trenin, 2021). What is more, this view has also been followed by the EU, especially after the end of the German EU Presidency, where it also had in mind discussions on common areas like climate change or regional issues. Now the EU is also working with a tougher approach in mind with a focus on the possible sanctions that they could establish, as well as, safeguarding themselves from Russian interference through disinformation, corruption or money laundering (Fischer, 2021). Nevertheless, it has been argued that Western powers, especially the EU should consider also new approaches for dealing with Russia, particularly after the experiences of 2014 where sanctions did take a toll on the Russian economy but were fruitless in changing any major Russian policy, neither domestic nor international, as Russia has not shown the absolute need for these sanctions to be uplifted in order to continue with their foreign influence (Trenin, 2021). What is more, sanctions against Russia also hinder even further the West’s position in Belarus, as it drives this country even further into Russian control, due to the fact that for instance the foreign exchange fluctuations that the Western sanctions towards Russia has made the Belarusian government loss of around $3 billion (Challis, 2020).
Summing up, the Belarusian problem is one with no easy solution in sight. Belarus and Russia have always had a particularly tight relationship and even areas like the Belarusian economy have been incredibly close and dependent on Russia, for instance for its subsidies in oil and gas (Challis, 2020). Nevertheless, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, which has been in power since 1994 has always managed to keep Russia at a safe distance for him by using the West as a safeguard. Western powers have always been particularly willing to put up with Lukashenko, its human rights violations and the clearly lack of a free democracy in the country (Wilson, 2017) because of the strategic position in which Belarus is connected as it is the border between the NATO states of Lithuania or Poland and Russia, as well as, it is connected with the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, which is why Belarus is also a key actor in Russian international affairs. This situation makes Belarus a very dangerous place in the international order, as any tension could rapidly rise into a conflict due to the importance that it has for NATO and Russia (Challis, 2020). Thus, Lukashenko has been able to remain in power for so long by keeping both sides happy enough that the risk of getting him out outweighed the possible benefits. In addition, Lukashenko was able to use events like the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 smartly in his favour, as he was able to position himself as a defence against Russian dominance over his neighbourhood. By doing this he was able to position himself in a better view with the West that even lifted some sanctions after the release of political prisoners by the Belarusian government and he was able to acquire greater independence from Russia (Whitmore, 2021).
However, everything changed especially after the presidential election of August 2020, which were viewed as rigged by an important part of the Belarusian population, which took to the streets with massive protests and labour strikes which were met with brutal repression by the police. These protests showcased the very weak position that Lukashenko’s regime was in, as well as it stopped the ability of Lukashenko to negotiate with the West as sanctions were reinstated and the actions that were carried out by the Belarusian police were heavily condemned by the West (Mankoff, 2020). In addition, the weakened condition of the Russian economy after the sanctions that had been established since 2014 had left the Belarusian economy even more weakened than before and in a very vulnerable situation, which Russia has taken advantage of as for instance different Russian firms connected with the Kremlin have been trying to acquire Belarusian companies in key industries (Whitmore, 2021). These two events have left Belarus in an extremely vulnerable position, as it is no longer able to count on protection from the West and with a vulnerable and dependent economy. Thus, Russia has taken advantage of this and has started increasing its control over Belarus in a very subtle way and President Lukashenko is no longer able to shake this off and has had to accept this Russian domination in exchange of security and remaining in power (Whitmore, 2021). What is more, Russia has been able to learn from past events like Georgia and Ukraine and has used a slyer approach towards its extending control over Belarus. Nevertheless, this has also been motivated by the current state of Russia’s economy, as well as the possible public discontent that military action in Belarus could provoke, especially Syria and Ukraine (Courtney and Shatz, 2020).
Chapter 2: Russian intents on Arctic and European concerns
In the fifteenth century, Peter the Great ordered many northern expeditions in order to map these frozen lands. Virtus Bering and Simon Laptev then discovered a pathway between Eurasia and Northern America, giving their names to the biggest arctic cities. During the Bolshevik regime, mapping was replaced by nature domination to finally get more strategic value against the United States after 1945. Today, the Cold War has ended. There is no importance for Russia to display an army close to the US no more.
But is the situation safer anyway? In 2007, Russia sent a submarine to pick a flag under the North Pole, claiming by the way its legitimacy in this area. The 7th of October 2020, the Russian Amiral Gorchkov frigate conducted a Zircon hypersonic missile test from the White Sea to the Barents Sea. This manoeuvre undoubtedly had as a goal to show the Russian presence in the Arctic Sea, but more, to prove its action capacity. Indeed, many countries are actually trying to assert their right to this area. In the early XXIst century, only arctic states like Russia, Canada, USA, Norway and Denmark had such claims. But now, other farer countries like China, Japan, India, South Korea and even Singapore are interested in cold waters. In other terms, Russia is nowadays trying to proclaim its sovereignty in this area, bypassing this competition. This situation takes place east of the European continent, where the Union remains strangely quiet. Nevertheless, the close instability should worry this peacemaker institution.
But what are the stakes behind the Russian behaviour and how should the European Union react?
What is the situation in the Arctic?
Glacial climate, inhospitable flora, shallow rock reefs and sea strewed with icebergs, the Arctic Sea can’t allow a prosperous traffic. For a long time, the Northern Sea Route was a utopia, because the ships of more than ten meters high couldn’t pass. 22 of the ships passing by the Northern Sea Route of the 30 yearly in 2012 were pleasure boats. The others were composed of hydrocarbon extractors and arctic fret ships (that came from or to the arctic region)(Frédéric Lasserre, 2013). The navigation is very dangerous here and the cargos have to be equipped with reinforced hulls. But nowadays, global warming turned the situation upside down. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2019, global warming will cause two or three times more damage in the arctic than anywhere else in the world. In addition, NASA’s observations clearly show a diminution in the volume of ice floe that could totally disappear by 2040 or 2050. It’s naturally a disastrous fact for the environment, but it also brings a couple of other stakes.
First is a geopolitical opportunity with the accessibility of two pathways: one in the North-West, through the Canadian boreal isles, and another in the North-East, the Russian Bering Strait. The two countries both demarcated their national water borders in 1986 for Canada, and for Russia in 1984 according to the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea in 1982). By claiming such borders, Russia and Canada both asserted their national sovereignty on these waters, and they can also choose to close the access to this area, for environmental protection for instance with Canada. It also grants the right to levy taxes on the passage of ships. But the UNCLOS could be read in another way. Indeed, for the European Union, the straits are in international waters, with free circulation as a result of course. It refers to the article 37 on the Convention: “Straits […] are used for international navigation” and to the article 38: “all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded”. Here it’s a conciliatory position: EU’s priority is to preserve peace, economically notably, to guarantee peace on a more global level. But this neutral and supranational point of view is not very well accepted by the arctic states mentioned earlier (Canada, Russia, USA, Norway and Denmark) preferring the national sovereignty approach. A proof is embodied by the rejection of the European candidature to the Arctic Council in 2009 and 2011. This institution created in 1996 got 8 member states together: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. 15 observer states are allowed (with France for example) and 6 native associations. The European Union is accepted as an observer international organisation since 2013, but not as a member and after a long path of multiple refusals and its role is not even official. Symbolically, the arctic states are refusing supranational arctic governance. This position is reiterated by the Ilulissat declaration on May 28, 2008 when arctic states opposed an international regime of the Arctic Ocean (Frédéric Lasserre, 2017). For these 5 coastal states (Canada, USA, Russia, Norway and Denmark), the common juridical base is the UNCLOS from 1982, blowing all other decisions that could be taken after that. The rejection of all supranational governance is important to keep in mind and must be taken in count when elaborating a new policy. It’s the reason why the EU is struggling to assert supranational cooperation interests, especially since it does not have a coastal member state in the Arctic Ocean itself.
A second important stake in the Arctic area is directly linked to the ice’s melting: new resources are now available. Indeed, the Arctic is home to close to 30% of the global natural gas resources and nearly 13% of global oil resources according to the US Geological Survey. Here it is important to combat a misconception about this so-called new El Dorado. The resources on the ground won’t be exploitable because of mass CO2 and methane rejections: it’s only a danger for men and the environment. When we speak of available resources, we must understand the submerged ones. This question leads us back to the Montego Bay Convention of 1982 once again, introducing the notion of EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) where the states possess the sovereignty of “exploitation”, “exploration” and “conservation” of natural resources. These rights are extended to the continental shelf where the ground level slowly falls to the bottom of the sea. Traditionally it measures 200 nautical miles, but in some exceptional cases, it can simply follow the true geological end of the shelf, where it reaches the bottom of the sea. Yet about 95% of these arctic oil and gas resources are located on a continental shelf. From the Convention’s ratification, states have 10 years to submit their demands about the continental shelf to the CLCS (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf). It entails a plethora of claims like Norway in 2006. In 2007 and 2008, Canada and Denmark jointly led geological and oceanographic researches to get the specific continental limits. Russia, member since 1997, registered in 2001, but the Commission rejected its proposition in 2002 mainly due to the Lomonosov ridge: Denmark insisted on attaching it to Greenland, a compromise had to be found: Russia and Denmark jointly conducted studies, far from a violent competition. Russia sent another candidature in 2013, rejected once again then another in 2015, but the results are not disclosed yet. We are far from a journalistic representation of a shelf race about to implode. On the contrary, the EEZ concept is not in doubt and we can observe a cordial scientific cooperation instead of a violent escalation. We must of course keep in mind the importance of the resources hunting, but without imagining such a pre-war situation. This scientific cooperation is reasoned in one hand by financial interest, leading a study of such amplitude alone is very expensive, and by political purposes in other hand, common results being unquestionable.
What are the Russians’ objectives in the Arctic?
The Russian Federation leads an ambitious and global strategy about the Arctic, which includes an economical and a national security constituent.
The Arctic appeared in Putin’s 2001 policy called “the Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic”. This document was updated in 2008 taking the name of “the Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond” approved by the former Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev. In 2009, the text concerning the National Security Strategy was insisting about the Arctic’s stakes (Daniel Pasquier, 2016). Therefore it is all the more important because the same year, symbolically, the national Security Council was organised on the François-Joseph isle, the northernmost border post. The least we can say is that the Russian government is conscious about the Arctic current importance and is not deceived about the situation. But what is this strategy about?
Its first mainstay is economical around two major interests. First of all, the Siberian hydrocarbon resources are becoming exhausted. It’s a prominent stake, because Russia mainly depends on its hydrocarbon exportations (it represents about 60% of its exportations). It turns out that the Russian Arctic, according to the IPCC and US Geological Survey observations, holds 80% of the Russian hydrocarbon resources. A primary objective is therefore to exploit the Arctic land resources. A second economical issue is the creation of an international corridor about 6000 km from Mourmansk to Bering: the well known Northern Sean Road (NSR), Sevmorput (Севморпуть) in Russian. This project has a great value and could maximize the fret in the area. Actually about 26 million tons, the fret could reach 80 million tons in 2024. The NSR project follows the “Northern Sea Road Development Plan” signed by Medvedev in 2019 and covers a period from 2020 to 2035. This plan is very ambitious, and we can identify eleven major policy areas:
– First the modernisation by 2022 of the Sabetta, Pevek and Dikson ports at the mouths of the Siberian rivers. It will permit a link between the international road and the national lands.
– Increase “research and rescue” by building in Sabetta and Pevek a coordination centre and 11 specialized vessels. As we said before, circulation in the Arctic sea can be very dangerous, it is fundamental to enhance the rescue capacities so.
– Support for navigation’s help and hydrography by the building of 13 new vessels representing about 400 million dollars per year.
– The strengthening of the icebreaker fleet with nuclear powered ships.
– Stimulate the traffic by building a logistic platform in Mourmansk and Petropavlosk-Kamchatka.
– Develop the railway and airports network to assure a link between the lands and the sea.
– Install a reliable communication network by the display of four satellites by 2024 and a Weather Service by 2025.
– Enhance the electricity production to endow the new ports with.
– Train and perfect the NSR workforce.
– Stimulate the shipbuilding with a particular accent put on the container ships.
– Reduce the pollution risk by giving to ships modern and efficient technologies on board.
By 2035 all these targets have to be done, giving to the Russian Federation a massive advantage in globalization. Russia is in vital need of merchant ships, as evidenced by the “maritime doctrine” adopted by Putin in 2001 and renewed in 2015. Paradoxically, Russia wants to keep its national Sovereignty on this road. In February 2018 a law forbade the natural gas transport in its national water for every ship that does not fly a Russian flag. It’s a bad signal for trade, even if its goal was to restrain the hydrocarbon from the Arctic to external countries.
The second pillar of the Russian strategy concerns national security. A priority is given to the border’s protection by dissuasion. Contrary to common sense, the military Russian strategy is mostly defensive. The country knew, as some European countries did, a terrorism wave that motivated many actions in the Near East. These operations and the political interference in western elections lead to an international aggressor reputation. However, the Russian military strategy is mainly defensive, due to its economical disadvantage after the Cold War. Moreover, according to Sergueï Choïgou (Russian Defence Minister), “a wide range of potential challenges and threats to our security is forming in the Arctic”. Another objective is “to protect Russia’s economic interests in the Arctic area and to defend the important industrial facilities of the Northern Sea Route”(Sergueï Choïgou, 2020). Here again we can doubt the Russian will to globalize. Instead, we have the impression that Russia is trying to take advantage of an open market that would simply pass through its national territory, keeping the right to close it any time.
But are these ambitions achievable? It will sure need very huge human and financial investments that Russia is actually not able to pay. First, Russian Federation is subject to several international sanctions, especially after the annexation of Crimea. Then, the price of hydrocarbons is historically low, and very unstable due to the different lockdowns put everywhere in different chronology. As we said before, if hydrocarbons represent almost 60% of the Russian exportations, it’s difficult to be confident about the financial capacities of the federation. Moreover, the principal partner is this gas trade is the European Union that is shaken by numerous lockdowns making demand unstable too. Another fragility factor is the COVID 19 pandemic destroying the local and the global consumption. It also affects the consumption habits and the production capacities, making the economic future uncertain. In other terms, before asking us about the effects of this policy, we had to question its feasibility.
To answer this question, we have to weigh the pros and the cons of the Russians capacities.
Concerning the advantages, we must concede that the “northern fleet” is more effective than in the past. Indeed, after the Cold War, since 1991, many military installations have been dismantled. The security policy changed, and the barracks were emptied. The Arctic population fell drastically, and for instance the population of Dikson was divided by five and that of Tiksi by two from 1989 to 2005 (State Committee on Statistics and Administration of Cities in Russia). But some new units have recently been launched and modernisations have been operated in many battalions. A focus is put on the strategic submarines, anti-submarine fighting ships and patrol frigates (Lasserre, 2013). It is, without any doubt, a defensive posture. Thus we can notice, in the expected evolutions of the military fleet, the doubling of frigates from 6 in 2008 to 13 in 2020, the display of 2 amphibious helicopter carriers, but a great diminution of destroyers’ number from 19 in 2008 to 6 in 2020, and of the nuclear attack submarine from 35 to 17 (Lasserre, Le Roy and Garon, 2012). But the Northern Fleet is a multimodal army, including not only sea forces, but also a ground and air battalion. The ground army is composed of two motorized rifle brigades and a marine infantry brigade, but also featured by Bastion and BAL coastal defence systems. The air army is also well featured with Su-34 and MiG-31 fighter bombers and interceptors and S-400 air defence complexes. Infrastructures have also been enhanced with the creation of the Arctic Trefoil military camp in François-Joseph and the Northern Clover base in Kotelny. 14 air bases have been rehabbed and modernised. The Northern Fleet is training hard in very difficult cold conditions with unstable terrain that give it a huge advantage in this area. Moreover, it is able to set up coordinated and specialized inter-army actions in these extreme conditions, winning by the combination of the air, ground and sea armies. In February 2020, Serueï Choïgou declared: “the Northern Sea Route is now under reliable protection”, and it is probably far to be wrong. But it is important to remember here that all this armament and this competence is in the service of the defence. Indeed, an external military action is almost impossible with this arrangement. It is therefore very unlikely that Russia was the source of a conflict in this area. Furthermore, with the Northern Fleet’s action capacity, it is highly undesirable to see a confrontation emerge: the situation could very quickly degenerate with an efficient Russian response. The passive way must be privileged in this area.
Another Russian advantage is the success of its gas projects. First with the Yamal LNG1 that, despite the sanctions due to the conflict in Crimea, extracts about 16,5 millions m3 per year. Its success is such that two other projects are in preparation: LNG2 close to the Utrennoye deposit that could be finished by 2022, and Ob LNG, close to Yamal that could be finished by 2023. Japanese and Indian investors are also interested, reinforcing these projects (Daily Times, 2019). The private sector is also in support with Novatek that already finances 50% of LNG1. Here the resources extraction from the “Northern Sea Road Development Plan” can totally be considered.
A last Russian advantage in favour of this policy is the effective modernisation of the icebreaker ships through two programmes. The first one called the 22220 programme is for the construction of five nuclear powered icebreakers. One of them, the Artika is already on sea, the Yakuta is about to be ready and the Ural and the Sibir are in construction. These vessels have for purpose to open the way to other ships, like cargos. The second programme’s goal is to display more “Arc7” class icebreaker ships that can transport merchandises themselves (about 172 000 m3 of GNL per ship). The private society Novatek already own 15 vessels of this type and ordered 10 ships in addition with the Korean group Samsung Heavy Industry’s technologic help. These fleet reinforcements are a real strength demonstration contributing to legitimate the Russian’s place in leading such great project like the NSR.
But the Russian situation suffers from many constraints. The greatest obstacle to these achievements is, no surprises, the cost of these entire infrastructures: railway, airport, ports etc. It is a preoccupation for the Russian Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister: “This is indeed a costly undertaking requiring the search for new cooperation algorithms (Alexandre Grouchko, Russian Foreign Affair Vice-Minister, 2019)”. Yet, the Russian Federation is in lack of capital inflow. The estimated cost of these works is around 14 billion dollar, one third of which must be paid by the federal government. We can deduce two facts:
– First, it will be necessary for Russia to have recourse to national private or stranger funds to fulfil all the financial needs. But as we saw before, Russia sometimes sends bad signals to the international market, like the law of 2018 concerning the circulation right in Russian sea or the struggle to impose its sovereignty in the Arctic zone to determine the circulation right in the howl area.
– Secondly, and we have already addressed this issue, Russia is under numerous international sanctions. This could be terrible for the future of the Northern Sea Route in terms of financing, but also in terms of future road attendance. In case of embargo, the road will remain empty, and all the money put in this project will be painful for the Russian economy. According to Daniel Pasquier, US sanctions could be added to the paint, as they did for the Nord Stream 2, blocking the European gas pipeline realisation. In addition, the Americans are not in position of power in the Arctic area. If they are not the leader, they could withdraw and block the Russian projects. In fact, they already began in 2018 when Exxon Mobil withdrew from the Pobeda oil tanker project in the Kara Sea, even though they had committed 600 million dollars (The Barents observer, 2019) due to the economic sanctions against Russia. In the same situation, in 2020, Norway has been severely called to order after having transhipped 15 million tons of Russian LNG from ship to ship between 2018 and 2020.
But another actor acquires a new importance in this complex and entangled situation, raising once again the question of cooperation or tensions.
Russia and China: Is it about peace or conflict?
As we discussed at the beginning of our argumentation, China is a new actor in the Arctic area, claiming a right on these lands while it is located at 6000 km from the Bering Strait (La Croix, 1st of July 2019). Difficult to envisage it as a “close from Arctic” State, even if it is a great Russia’s partner. Precisely, until now, the relations between Russian and China reach a sort of harmony. It is mainly due to the fact that both have advantages to draw from the other:
Russia accepts the Chinese FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) in the oil and gas deposit due to the Russian Economic situation. It is also profitable when China invests in the Arkhangelsk port and the Belkomour railway. For its part, China supplies itself with Russian LNG and oil with preferential rates and security of supply. In addition, China has a strong interest in taking the Northern Sea Road if it opens one day. It is a safer way for China than in the South, controlled by India and the United States, its commercial enemies. Moreover, the Malacca and Ormuz Straits are very much more clogged up.
But in the future, this balance is about to fall. The principle reason is that Russia and China have opposite goals. China wants to keep the Arctic sea under an international right, with free circulation without any right of passage to pay. As usual, China pursues its liberal ideal. On the other hand, Russia wants to get national sovereignty on the Northern Sea Road to maintain this area under its jurisdiction. It seems clear that these strategies will remain irreconcilable. This feeling is reinforced by the efforts of China to bypass Russia in the Arctic diplomacy. Indeed, China trivializes its presence in this area by discussing with Island and Greenland in order to develop some collaboration with these countries. In the meantime, China develops its own icebreaker fleet: the Xuelong 2, an oceanographic research ship performed its first sea excursion in the Arctic in July 2020. Five other 30 000 tons vessels should arrive in the future, with nuclear power. If the situation is today peaceful, it will probably raise some tensions in a very near future. China will soon try to make its own way and Russia won’t let it happen. With the power of its defence armament, a conflict is not inevitable between the Bear and the Dragon.
What about the EU policy in the Cold North?
For a long time, the European Union remained silent about the Arctic State. However, the EU seems to be legitimate. Indeed, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are Arctic and Member-States at the same time, we can say without being ridiculous that the Union has a say in the matter. Moreover, Norway and Island are both part of the Economic European Area Agreement, so the EU has economic interests in this area too. Finally, Canada, USA and Russia are three strategic partners (economically but also politically). So is the EU legitimate in the Arctic area: definitely yes, and it’s a sufficient reason for it to act.
In fact, the EU also depends on natural arctic resources, from fishing for the first time consuming one third of the fish caught in the Arctic, but also from gas and oil. The provider of this energy is none other than Russia, the principle source of gas for the Union (around 40%). The diplomatic relations with Russia must remain good or the entire continent will experience shortages. But the hydrocarbons imports are raising another question: that of pollution, where the EU is greatly engaged.
The European Union has some competences to act directly:
– First, it has to fight against the carbon emissions at a global level, and particularly those coming from its jurisdiction. Yet, the hydrocarbon demand came directly from Europe, and this latter is therefore responsible for the pollution generated by the Russian extractions.
– The Union is also competent in oceans governance by leading integrated sea policies, fishing community policies or sea transport policies (in a durable approach) (Marie-Ange Schellekens, 2019). It could be an influential actor in the arctic sea governance.
– The Union is also the principle profitable from the living and non-living resources from the Arctic sea (as seen before), and attaches durable respect to indigenous people.
Despite the plenty of tools the Union has at its disposal, it remains a lack in arctic policy as we can observe for Ukraine for example. Until 1999 –with the Northern Dimension- the Arctic references in texts remained anecdotal and remained confined to issues of competition for resources and military presence (S. Weber, 2014). The Northern Dimension is a common EU policy, initiated in 1999 and strengthened in 2006. Its objectives are to promote dialogue and intensify cooperation; strengthen economic stability and promote economic integration, competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe. The main goal was to put on an equal footing the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia to enhance the cooperation in the Great North. In October 2007 appeared the first occurrence of the Arctic in a worrying environmental context in order to “promote European leadership in international maritime affairs, increase the impact of regional cooperation with neighbouring countries in shared sea basins and develop and expand bilateral relations with key partners” (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, 2007).
In 2008 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Arctic governance in a proactive way. It was a question of “the adoption of an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic based on the Antarctic treaty”: but it went against the Ilulissat declaration taken in May 2008 where the Arctic States claimed themselves against all supranational governance. In November, the Commission backpedalled and aligned itself with the Ilulissat declaration, giving up on the creation of new supranational juridical instruments.
The joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, “Developing an EU policy for the Arctic region: progress since 2008 and next steps” in 2012 takes note of the environmental and strategic stakes in Arctic (the trade and the resources extraction as we saw upper) and recognize the Arctic Council as the “major regional authority” in the area where the natives are also well represented.
But it is the 27th of April 2016 that the things really changed with the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: “An Integrated Arctic Policy for the European Union”. Three great stakes are underlined in this communication: the answer to challenges of global warming, the sustainable development of the arctic region, then the international cooperation aspect called “Peace, prosperity and constructive international cooperation”.
Global warming is more visible in the Arctic than anywhere else in the world. Since 1979, the ice volume has fallen around 40% in summer than expected. But the IPCC also warned about the permafrost melting, causing carbon and methane rejections noxious for humans. The permafrost is the shelter for many endemic species too. The European Union therefore invested in research on the reactions of the environment to external actions with €200 million (until 2020 due to the Horizon 2020 programme planning). It also unified 22 different institutes under the same programme (PolarNet EU) and followed the same objectives. The Copernicus programme is another way to monitor the ice melt evolution with a network of satellites. 20% of the European global budget is also allocated to the reduction of carbon emissions thanks to the Paris Agreements: the EU’s engagement is to reduce its carbon emissions of 40% by 2030, and of 80% by 2050. Finally, the EU supports the Stockholm and Minamata Agreements concerning the reduction of pollutant emissions and the UNCLOS, which means that Member-States have to protect their marine environment.
The second aspect of regional sustainable development is concentrated on the European Arctic Member-States. The Union is here insisting on investments in SMEs, and particularly in innovating technologies in a hard cold environment. It also takes into account the infrastructures of renewable energies. These investments will mainly be assured by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and by the European Investment Bank (EIB). The European Union relies on the principles of green economy, through low energy consumption practices, and blue economy, including investment in biotechnology and responsible and sustainable fishing. The financial instrument is used to encourage sustainable development in this region. Finally, the European Arctic Stakeholder Forum was created in 2017 to define the investment priorities for the first time, and to measure the results of this investment for a second time. This provisional forum brings together the European institutions, the Member States and the regional and local authorities and is a good way to include civil society to the process.
The cooperation aspect is the most ambiguous in this declaration. Indeed, in 2018, an agreement on the moratorium on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean was adopted by the European Council. The main goal was to produce such regulation in fishing, a sector that was terribly lacking in rules. Scientific cooperation is also organised with Canada and USA with the participation in the Transatlantic Alliance for Ocean Research and a project of multi-resolution map of the entire seabed.
But the political cooperation itself is planned on different levels. First at an international scale with the UNCLOS, that remains the privileged framework for every action in the Ocean according to the Ilulissat declaration. At a regional level, with the participation to the Arctic Council as an international (informal) observer organization. But here the Union has no decision power and is often left aside. At an infra-regional level with the participation to the Barents Sea Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council. The first one is an economic and social cooperation institution for the Arctic European States, with the participation of the natives. The second one is a forum gathering Nordic States (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Island, Finland) in a regional economic and inter-parliamentary cooperation. Then a particularly important place is given to bilateral agreements with Canada, USA, Russia, Island, Norway and Greeland. In general, the EU is seeking to strengthen its presence in regional bodies and forums and to develop preferential bilateral cooperation.
The principal actions privileged by the EU in the Arctic are so the financial instrument through investments in SME and renewable energies, and also to reinforce its presence in the international instances. The EU failed to impose supranational governance in the region, and struggles to have its legitimacy recognized. But there are some flaws in this policy too.
The references to hydrocarbons in this policy relate only to their impact on the environment. But as the Parliament highlighted it (European Parliament resolution), it is also an economic interest for the EU. As we saw before, Russia and the EU are interdependent in this field. And if Russia extracts these new exploitable resources, it will be the European market that will benefit in large part. However, no mention is made of actions around these potential sources. It is impossible to know here whether this is an omission or an environmental commitment of the EU, but the result is that this issue lacks specific treatment. In addition, there is no detail about Russia itself at all, on a strategic level as well as for the rest. However, it is necessary to engage in a lucid and constructive dialogue with the Federation. Indeed, the presence of hydrocarbons and the potential for future human activity in the area are raising many tensions and it is necessary to adopt a strategic position, otherwise peace will be disturbed even on the European continent. The demonstrations of strength multiplied: in 2015, Russia claimed half a million square kilometres including the Mandeleïev and Lomossov ridges, leading to direct competition with Denmark and Canada. In 2018, NATO organized the Trident Juncture exercise in Norway, bringing together 50,000 men and 70 ships including an aircraft carrier: the main goal was to simulate a Norway’s invasion from an unknown aggressor[28], so we can almost call it a provocation. Obviously, Russia did not like this exercise and was offended: a symbol that tensions are high in the area. However, the communication on the integrated Arctic policy does not include a strategic or military component. Of course, in the European Global Strategy in 2016 Russia is mentioned, and we can read that “selective cooperation could be established on subjects that are also of interest to the EU, notably […] the Arctic”. But here again, the Strategy remains very woolly and hazy.
Chapter 3: Russia in Ukraine: the beginning of a neo-tsarist foreign policy?
Even though Moscow decided to pull back partially some of its forces from Crimea and the Ukraine borders on the 22nd of April, after an aggressive military buildup in the recent weeks that many feared that would escalate to a full-fledged conflict, it is clear that Putin orchestrated another “show” to demonstrate Russia’s vital interests in Ukraine to the new administration in Washington (Roth & Harding, 2021). Nevertheless the relations between Kyiv and Moscow have been turbulent, especially after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas region in 2014. Therefore this part of the report examines the Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine via a short presentation of the recent history that led to the events of 2014.
Ukraine and Russia: difficult neighbors
Ukraine became independent in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the same year, but it did not adopt a constitution until 1996. However, the neophyte state did not achieve neither the establishment of a strong institutional capacity that would guarantee the division of the legislative, judicial and executive power nor the introduction of a new political elite (Wilson, 2016, p.96). Therefore, despite its old status as the “breadbasket of Europe” with its thriving economy, Ukraine developed a hybrid economic system that performed poorly throughout the 1990s and created numerous problems that would deepen the cleavages within the society and would set the stage for the conflict with Russia. More precisely, in the first decade of independence, Ukraine was marked by the appearance of nationalism, clans, extensive corruption and general state inefficiency, that failed to address the socioeconomic problems of the different regions and especially those of the eastern provinces. In this framework, Kyiv and Moscow continued the process of dismantling the USSR, by removing the Soviet assets from Ukraine in 1994 and establishing a positive model of cooperation (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016, p.80). Russia was providing gas to Ukraine at a highly discounted price which was then resold to European markets, bringing significant gains to the country and stabilizing a strong economic oligarchy that would play a central role in the politics of Ukraine. Moreover from the late 1990s, the export of metals and minerals that were cheaply produced in Ukraine’s soviet-era factories constituted an additional lucrative business (Yekelchyk, 2015, p.79). The Yeltsin government went a step further into strengthening bilateral relations with Ukraine by signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership in 1999, officially recognizing the sovereignty, the independent status and the territorial integrity of the country, while securing its military presence via its naval base in Sevastopol in Crimea (Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016). It is also worth mentioning that Ukraine became the first state among those of the former USSR, that signed an agreement with the West in 1995 and announced its desire to join the EU in 1996 (Yekelchyk, 2015, p.70).
This favorable climate between Kyiv and Ukraine was quickly reversed after the rise of Vladimir Putin to the president’s office of Russia. Despite the early hopes for a fruitful cooperation between Russia, Ukraine and the West, it was made clear that things would proceed differently under Putin’s leadership. Putin described early on the demise of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and introduced the discourse of a “New Russia” that would not be a pariah on the post- bipolar world order (NBC, 2005). Undoubtedly, NATO’s military campaign against Serbia in the late 1990s and the war in Iraq in the dawn of the new millennia contributed to the adoption of a more affirmative stance that would reposition Russia in the international stage, and recalibrate its influence in its near abroad. In addition, the spark of the orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 against corruption and the Russian backed-elite of the country, pushed Moscow to reintroduce itself in the region and take steps away from the intense cooperation with the West (Yekelchyk, 2015; Haukkala, 2015). Thus, Putin adopted a new foreign policy doctrine that would enhance the Russian influence in the ex-soviet space, via economic, military and political cooperation, resisting any attempt of further NATO expansion to the East. Hence, he supported the government of Viktor Yushchenko (2004-2010) and of Viktor Viktor Yanukovich (2010-2014) by constant financial assistance via loans, a lower gas price and augmented bilateral trade which exploded from 9 billion US dollars in 2000 to more than 38 billion US dollars in 2013 (UNComtrade, 2021).
From Euromaidan to Donbas: a change of plans
Things changed rapidly after 2013 and led to a widespread crisis that could affect not only Ukraine but also the European Union. It all started when the EU organised its Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in 2013 in the context of its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), inviting Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia to sign an Association agreement (AA) that would also follow the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) among them (Haukkala, 2015). When the Ukrainian government agreed to sign the agreement, Russia reacted quickly threatening to impose sanctions on Ukrainian products and offered Yanukovich a loan of 17 billion US dollars as well as an extra discount on natural gas (Haukkala, 2015, p.9). Henceforth, on November 21, just a week before the scheduled signing ceremony, the Ukrainian government suspended talks with the European Union and issued a telling order to start aligning Ukrainian trade laws with those of the Russian-led Customs Union (Yekelchyk, 2015, p.104). This is what sparked the protests in the central Maidan square in Kyiv (Maidan means square in Turkish), that ousted the Yanukovich regime the following year. What started as a peaceful demonstration in November 2013 against the then Ukrainian government rejection of the Association Agreement with the EU, over the course of 2014 devolved rapidly into a full-fledged national revolution and the East- West crisis over Russia’s brazen intervention (Stulberg, 2015). The protests had wider objectives that came down to the central motto of “Europe”. Russia did not wait long to react after the removal of Yanukovich in February 2014 and sent military troops without identification, the so-called “little green men ” to seize control over the Crimean peninsula, which hosts the Russian naval base in the Black Sea. The area was transferred administratively from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 and it is the only region in Ukraine that the population identifies itself as predominantly Russian, with the exception of the Crimean Tatars (Retro, 2015). After the occupation, Russia organised a referendum that would “ratify” the will of the people to join the Russian Federation, which was heavily condemned by the West as illegal. In April, Russian forces extended their presence in the two provinces of the Donbas region, Donetsk and Luhansk, seizing control of governmental buildings and supporting pro-Russian separatist population in the area. The Russian army took not only a commanding role, but participated in combat as a coherent fighting force (Sutyagin, 2015). This led to an open conflict with the Ukrainian army that cost the lives of more than 13 thousand people, left 2 million without shelter and caused extensive material damages until today (Pifer, 2019).
In this context, Ukraine, Russia alongside with other major powers of the international community tried to resolve the conflict in a diplomatic way with the negotiation of four agreements, notably the Kyiv Agreement of February 2014, the Geneva Agreement of April 2014, and the two Minsk Agreements of September 2014 and February 2015 (Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018, p.196). Even though the first three agreements failed to deliver tangible results, as they were violated by the signatories, they managed to offer precious time and space for the two sides to find common ground and establish their differences, while outlining the central role of the OSCE, in promoting regional dialogue. Therefore the Minsk 2 agreement succeeded in creating and preserving a fragile peace, while acquiring legal status via its unanimous endorsement it received in the Resolution 2202 of the UN Security Council. However as Malyarenko and Wolff underline:
“The four agreements thus represent “snapshots” or milestones in the change of Russian policy from maintaining a pro-Moscow regime in Kyiv at the beginning of 2014 to securing a permanent foothold in Donbas from which to hold a pro-Western government in Kyiv ransom, while the periods in between take us from largely peaceful anti-Maidan protests in eastern Ukraine in the aftermath of the first agreement (February 2014) to active Russian support of, and arguably participation in, the civil war in Donbas by the time of the second Minsk Agreement (February 2015).” (2018, p.196)
Nevertheless, the Russian aggression did not stop Ukraine from pursuing closer ties with the EU. After the expulsion of Yanukovich and the victory of the protestors, the following president, Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) an oligarch with a personal fortune worth more than 1 billion, was elected with 54% of the votes in the elections of the 26th of May 2014. He quickly signed the Association Agreement with the EU on the 24th of June, sending a clear message to Moscow, while he launched a great offensive, recapturing important cities in the eastern provinces and pushing the separatists and the Russian army deeper into Donbas. However, although Poroshenko came to power with the promise of strengthening the democratic institutions and the economy and of fighting endemic corruption, his presidency was marked by an economic scandal that cost him the presidency in the elections of 2019, when he lost the presidency to Volodymyr Zelensky.
How did the West react?
From the beginning of the conflict since the end of Poroshenko’s presidency, the European Union and the United States moved rapidly but not coherently to deescalate the situation, prioritizing sanctions as an effective means to pressure Russia and the separatists. This is because according to the EU, sanctions constitute one of its main tools to promote the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Havlik, 2014). More precisely, the measures taken by the two allies were proportional to the level of aggressiveness of the Russian military. In the first stage of the conflict European and American sanctions were imposed on numerous high level Russian and Ukrainian politicians, freezing their assets and banning them from traveling. In addition Russia was expelled for the G8 Summit, which remains G7 until today. After the illegal referendum in Crimea and the illegal annexation of the peninsula, in March of 2014, the number of the officials that were included in the sanctions had grown significantly while also including Russian and Ukrainian businesses. Finally, the most significant wave of sanctions was imposed after the shoot down by the Russian military, of the civilian MH-17 flight of the Malaysian Airlines that killed 298 people on the 17th of July, many among them Dutch. It was at that point that the EU launched an embargo on military and dual-use equipment trade with Russia alongside with the US they imposed strict economic sanction on major Russian banks as well as in many energy companies (Havlik, 2014, pp. 4-5). It was more than expected for Russia to retaliate, imposing a ban on the imports of agricultural products from the EU. But did the sanctions work?
From a purely economic side, sanctions were a strong hit for the Russian economy and had undoubtedly a negative economic effect. They reduced its GDP growth by -3,8%, inflation was raised to 15,5%, the budget deficit was augmented substantially, the ruble was depreciated, the country saw substantial outflows of vital capital, as well as a higher risk of public bonds, while unemployment and poverty were significantly increased (Christopher, 2015, p.191). However from a political point of view, the results have been rather disappointing (Havlik, 2014, p.8). Russia was already experiencing a period of economic stagnation even before the Ukrainian crisis and thus it was ready to adapt in the new sanctions. Moreover the ban on individuals, the prohibition of transactions in the conflict areas, the embargoes on exports of military goods and some energy related technology and the restriction of financial assets had relatively minor impacts for different reasons. Firstly, the EU was divided on if and how to impose sanctions on Russia and some member- states actively criticized the move that was promoted largely by Germany and the Netherlands (Kuzio 2016, Havlik 2014). On a global scale the absence of other major powers like China, India or countries of central Asia, was another critical point, which helped Russia recalibrate its moves and upgrade its economic and political ties by rebalancing in Asia. Secondly, restraints on the rigor of measures could also be observed, in order to maintain the USA–EU alliance and finally the counter measures taken from the Russian government helped also to surpass some of the obstacles posed by the sanctions (Christopher, 2015). All in all, sanctions were a necessary step that offered limited benefits and did not change the course of the conflict.
What is to take?
There are many factors that played a major role in the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict and have to be mentioned. First and foremost the internal weaknesses of the Ukrainian political and economic elite, that failed to address the rigorous demands of the wider part of the Ukrainian society and left many, especially the Russian-speaking population, to be considered as second class citizens. In that sense the widespread corruption, the connection of the economic oligarchy with the political elite and the economic stagnation combined with the weak institutional capacity that does not guarantee the rule of law have been central issues of the citizens that were clearly expressed in the election of Volodymyr Zelensky, a comedian without any previous political affiliation in 2019.
Moreover, as far as Russia is concerned, it is clear that 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it can be considered as a major player that views world politics as a zero-sum game. This means the return of geopolitics in the European neighborhood, contrasting the values and the policy of the EU that was based on win-win agreements and the promotion of multilateralism. In this case, as Haukkala notes: “The ferocity of the Russian reaction following the undoing of Yanukovich regime in Ukraine is made understandable by the key role the country plays in the Russian plans to build a credible counter-pole to the EU in Eurasia” (2015, p.13). This is why Moscow has deployed various means, such as diplomatic and economic pressure, propaganda campaigns and low-intensity proxy warfare including military occupation to take advantage of the regional Ukraine’s weaknesses in order to shape the nature and the outlook of its political regime. Therefore, Malyarenko and Wolff correctly stated that:
“Russia has used the opportunity of a weak regime and the internal conflict in Ukraine to extend its own influence in the post- Soviet space or in its so-called near abroad. The conflict in Donbas area of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea potentially foreshadows more fundamental transformation of Russia’s strategic behavior and illustrated how Russia could use different tactics of societal destabilization and covert occupation as a part of its military and security doctrine to manage a regional security complex that is critical to both its identity and ability to retain great power status and the capability to act globally.” (2018, p. 191)
Therefore Russia has strategically maintained not only its economic and military superiority over Ukraine but has an overwhelming power that can be reflected in the wider region.
Finally the EU did not succeed to deliver practical results, verifying the popular saying the Union constitutes an economic giant but also a political dwarf. To begin with the EU did not take into consideration the hostile view of Russia towards NATO and itself. Therefore the EU failed to understand that Moscow’s approach to international power equilibrium is a zero-sum game where EU’s gain was Russia’s loss. The launch of the Eastern Partnership and the growing influence of the EU in its near abroad triggered the reflexes of the Russian regime which uses tools of the previous century to gain political and economic rewards. Ergo, as Arbatova and Dynkin signal, “the Ukraine crisis is the first direct conflict between the different regional strategies of Russia and the EU and specifically Brussels’ Eastern Partnership and Moscow’s concept of the Eurasian Union” (2016, p.78). Ukraine plays a primordial role on both of these strategies but only Russia can deploy a variety of different means to grow its influence.
Chapter 4: The Russo-Georgian War and Europe’s entrapment
The relations between European countries and Russia have long been troublesome. The defragmentation of the USSR gave birth to a weak Russia that had to go through shock therapy in order to adapt its economy to the new world order (Larrabee, 2010, p. 34). When entering the new millennium with Putin on the wheel, Russia was prepared to start its reaffirmation on the global stage with focus on its “near abroad” (ibid).
This chapter will analyse Russia’s reassertions focusing on the Russo-Georgian conflict. During the next pages, it will be argued that Europe’s response to Russian advancements in Georgia was unsuccessful for the most part, due to the lack of a common line and aggregated engagement and to Russia’s resilience and strategic accomplishments. Additionally, the following pages will portray that the absence of a coherent and unified response is attributed to Europe’s entrapment in the process of decision making. On one side, there is the possibility of the persistency of a frozen conflict in Europe’s backyard that is creating regional instability (Whitman and Wolff, 2010, pp. 87-88). On the other, the possible disintegration of Europe’s current security architecture (Matsaberidze, 2015, p. 84). This dichotomy combined with states’ dependence on Russian energy, their diverging histories and domestic sensibilities gave birth to the polarisation of European responses.
The prior position will be supported through two stages: (1) a brief introduction to the conflict, and (2) an identification of European responses to Russia’s reassertion in Georgia coupled with a critical evaluation regarding its outcomes. For the next pages, this chapter will portray an unstable region, where Russia was able to infiltrate effectively using hybrid capabilities and where Europe’s reaction was slow, disaggregated and, overall, unsuccessful.
Historical context
Russian relations with Georgia have long been troublesome. The Georgian region has been the stage of plenty of conflicts, from the Mongols to the Ottomans, and Russia’s influence there has been gradually permeating the political sphere for centuries. More contemporarily, during the Russian Civil War, in 1921, Georgia was invaded by the Red Army and eventually agglutinated into the USSR. Since the relations between the centralised power in Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia had always been of tension, these regions were considered autonomous during the Soviet rule. After some troubled decades, on the outset of the collapse of Soviet Union, Georgia declared independence and gave the first steps on what were going to be years of social and political unrest. The inner conflicts in Georgia on the aftermath of its independence resulted in Abkhazia and South Ossetia becoming de facto governments, backed up by Russian forces. After some years of increased tension, the relations between Georgia and Russia worsened in 2008 with the start of the Russo-Georgian war.
The war between Russia and Georgia was the culmination not only of years of animosity, but also of Georgia’s “determination to go West”, paralleled with Russia’s determination “to stop it from doing so” (Asmus, 2010, p. 8). Moscow’s rhetoric was that their invasion of Georgia was a consequence of “Georgian aggression in South Ossetia” (ibid), while masking their real intentions of retaining Georgia under their sphere of influence and controlling Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Pallin and Westerlund, 2009). This conflict, often called “The Five-Day War”, started with Georgia’s military pushback against “attacks by secessionists in South Ossetia”, leading to Russia’s military intervention (King, 2008). The turmoil, mostly focused on South Ossetia, was the stage of several breaches of international law, including the killing of civilians, resulting in hundreds of casualties and thousands of people internally displaced (Cohen and Hamilton, 2011, p. 38; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2013). In the end, the status quo remained the same, with South Ossetia and Abkhazia remaining as de facto republics supported by Moscow.
European answers to Russia’s reassertions
The response of European countries to this Russian advancement on its “near abroad” was fragmented. Individually, countries went from a proper condemnation of Russia’s intervention – states such as Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Estonia, 2008; DW, 2008) –, to mild disapprovals that blurred the categorisation of “victim” and “victimiser” – countries like Italy, France, and Germany (Benhold, 2008; DW, 2008; The Guardian, 2008). Collectively, the European Union went forward with some efforts to stop the war, the less unsuccessful of them being a ceasefire agreement brokered by Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitri Medvedev (Cohen and Hamilton, 2011, p. 87). As a sequence of this agreement, the European Union launched a peacekeeping mission (EUMM) and, in parallel, provided financial support (Whitman and Wolff, 2010, p. 88). For NATO, the response was the termination of dialogue and formal meetings with Russia (NATO, 2019).
After these unbalanced European responses to Russian advancements in Georgia, the frame that was left described Europe’s success. The separationist, self-proclaimed states in Georgia remained under Russian occupation. Regardless of the contested definition of success, (Baldwin, 2000) knowing that the overall purpose of Europe’s response was to check Russia’s reassertion in Georgia, it was clear that they had failed. In the following pages, this chapter pretends to conjure reasons for Europe’s failure and create alternative solutions for its future role.
Europe’s reactions to Russian reassertions were not only flawed in a set of ways but also perpetuated on an already trembling ground. First, NATO’s 2008 bid for expansion and EU’s Eastern Partnership, both including Georgia (and Ukraine), were inherently miscalculated steps that fuelled Russian concerns over its “near abroad” (Larrabee, 2010, p. 36; Mearsheimer, 2014, 2016). Thus, the EU made a strategic mistake, by “couching its advance in the language of regulation, good governance and normative institutions”, and not taking into account the “internal and external complexities of the target [countries]” (Sakwa, 2015, p. 577). Secondly, in the case of Georgia, the Europeans had just sponsored Kosovo’s bid for independence from Serbia, which helped to refrain European criticism of the separatist movements brewing in South Ossetia due to reluctance of seeming hypocritical (Friedman, 2008, p. 4; Matsaberidze, 2015, p. 81).
Placing aside the fragility of the frame in which European responses were displayed, there were still numerous factors constraining the West’s reactions to Moscow’s re-enter in the global stage. The main obstacle was the fragmentation of European responses, which was owed to several variables, such as the multipolarity of “national interests and domestic sensitivities” that limited the EU’s ability to reach common positions (Whitman and Wolff, 2010, p. 102). The member states have different historical ties to Russia and therefore, disintegrated strategies. This is mimicked in the key split between states that see Russia as a potential partner, and those who see it as a threat. This division is such, that Leonard and Popescu (2007) were able to categorise the EU member states into five groups according to their place on the spectrum of proximity to the soviet government. Consequently, when dealing with Russian reassertions, states like Poland and Germany clash with each other. The former, bolstered by insecurity, craves for a tougher stance on Russia, while the latter, justified by its pacifist stance and energy dependency, warns for precaution (David 2014, p. 7; Pezard et al., 2017, pp. 64-66).
Europe’s unsuccessful responses to Russian reiterations in its “near abroad” were also justified by the concern that a variety of European states portray about acting in a way that could aggravate Putin’s regime. While aggressive rhetoric remains in “the new cold-war warriors” positions (Leonard and Popescu, 2007, p. 48), plenty of states are fearful of the array of ways that policies emanating from Moscow can impact their affairs. This is the case for the energy sector, considering that the EU, in 2019, imported about 40% of its total gas for domestic use from Russia (Eurostat, 2019), and that as of 2013, five European countries imported 100% of their gas from the same source (Jones, 2015, p. 9). Intertwined with this vulnerability, other more contemporary issues have been thrusting divisions among Europe. This is the case for the natural gas pipeline project, the Nord Stream II. Some states fear the direct connection to Germany could translate into “more dependence from one supplier”, jeopardizing attempts to diversify natural gas sources (Vihma and Wigell, 2016, pp. 382-383). Additionally, this new pipeline project also fuelled Eastern European states’ concerns that Russia could be enabled to cut off their supply while maintaining it to the West (Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 2010, p. 2 ; Munteanu and Sarnu, 2016, p. 80).
A supplementary reason why Europe’s response to Russian reaffirmations in the international stage lacked efficiency was Moscow’s resilience and ability to adapt and overcome the restrictive measures sought by the West. For example, in the context of domestic politics and using the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea as an illustration, public support for Putin was maintained in Russia, while in parallel, “approval ratings for the EU and US” sunk (Russel 2018, p. 6). Likewise, “only 19%” of the Russian public remained “in favour of making concessions in order to get sanctions lifted” (ibid). Accompanying this, the EU’s attempt to diplomatically isolate Russia through the use of sanctions also failed. Moscow simply started facing Eastward in terms of partnerships, concentrating primarily in its relations with China (ibid). Concerning Russia’s defence industry, Putin’s regime has been trying to adjust to the EU’s sanctions and has had some success in this endeavour. It has made investments in the helicopter and ship engine industries that, although placing a heavy burden on Russia’s economy, might pay off in the middle to long term (Malmlöf, 2016, pp. 14-15). Complementarily, it has continued to be an important exporter of weapons like the S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to countries such as Iran, India and Syria (Reuters 2015, DW, 2017; BBC, 2018).
Along with this, Russian strategic capabilities must similarly be credited as one of the causes for Europe’s retaliatory failures. Moscow employed cyber and information warfare tactics in its reassertions and, from Georgia to Ukraine, it has only improved (Iasiello, 2017). From distributed-denial-of-service (DDos) attacks to cyberspying, Russia managed to manipulate both information and peoples’ access to it (Deibert et al., 2012, p. 4; Iasello, 2017). This represented a “whole new form of Russia military prowess” and in the case of Crimea, it was coupled with a fast, disguised operation and a “large-scale propaganda war”, creating a truly hybrid attack (Daalder, 2017, p. 33)
European states’ responses have broadly failed their purpose. From institutionalist ambitions to cease-fire deals and the Minsk agreements, none of the conjured answers had tangible effects. Achievements can only currently be seen in the sanctions placed in order to restrict Russian banks’ access to Western capital markets, and on the indirect effects of the overall restrictive measures that ended up discouraging foreign investment (Russel, 2018, p. 9). Nevertheless, as Martin Russel (ibid) points out, an evaluation of the sanctions’ impacts has been a hard task, since “[e]conomic sanctions coincided with lower oil prices, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of one from the other”. For the case of NATO, considering its limitations, the alliance has had some success in becoming more coherent and in fighting its relative decline (Daalder, 2017, p. 37). In the context of the North Atlantic alliance, the problems remain defence spending, the role of the USA and the slowness of the alliance’s response (ibid).
The identification of a disaggregated and rather fruitless European engagement in responding to Russian reassertions indicates that Europe is going through an existential crisis. The EU lacks a common guideline, which will continue missing while some states observe Russia as a threat and others as a partner. On top of this divide, there are also states radiating the belief that “what the EU does in respect of Russia must be consistent with its identity as a normative power” (David, 2014, p. 8). The conundrum here is that this belief does not solve the EU’s cognitive dissonance, if one takes into consideration that its “normative identity will not be served by keeping its head in the sand” (ibid).
This chapter has portrayed the European responses to Russian reassertions as broadly ineffective. From all the measures put in place, the EU only partly succeeded in the set of sanctions placed to restrict Russian banks’ access to Western capital markets and in indirectly discouraging foreign investment (Russel, 2018). NATO, with its limitations, had a better response, reassuring members in the East of its presence as a security provider. Nonetheless, the overall tendency shows that “[t]he profound divergences between the attitudes of [European states’] towards Russia” has materialised in weak and timid responses (Macfarlane and Menon, 2014, p. 95).
As previously identified, the causes for the feebleness of European responses were numerous. First, the fact that NATO and the EU overstretched their reach without consideration for Moscow placed the adoption of the forthcoming measures inside a fragile and inflammable frame. European countries completely side-lined that “[g]reat powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 82) and that was a crucial mistake. Second, the lack of a common guideline due to historical divergences and domestic sensitivities represented an impediment for the response of the West. Similarly, the fragmentation and softness of Europe’s replies were similarly owed to the spectrum and length of their dependency on Russian energy. Third, Moscow’s resilience, ability to adapt, and their pursuit for hybrid capabilities in their reassertions further constricted European states’ retaliations.
Concerning future prospects, in order to prevent further escalations and conflicts, on top of the above, the European states ought to give special attention to two key factors. One is Russia’s economic weakness, a factor that has enormous potential to create regional instability (Tsereteli, 2009, p. 1; Forsberg and Herd, 2015, p. 55). The other is the relatively successful Russian internal propaganda that has been able to unite the Russians against a common external enemy, as a means to ignore internal fragilities and legitimise Putin’s government.
Conclusion
Moving forward, after these detailed analyses concerning four specific case studies – Belarus, the Arctic, Ukraine, and Georgia – this report will now provide some recommendations for decision makers to follow, considering each of these cases.
Due to the regional divergences and the idiosyncrasies particular to each case, this part will be segmented focusing on specific recommendations, targeted to each case. To provide a finishing note, this report will also summarize the most salient policy ideas to be implemented by decision makers.
Belarus
As mentioned before, Belarus´ position on the Suwalki Corridor is one of great security importance both for NATO, as well as, for Russia. Therefore, the West must not stand by, while Russia continues to tighten its grip over Belarus, due to the fact that this would create an important problem in the future, especially for the Baltic republics, Poland and Ukraine (Whitmore, 2021). There are several recommendations that could be made in order to achieve this objective. Firstly, even though the main focus of the recommendations is the EU, given the US´ importance in security a small section of this topic will be focused on them. Considering the actions that the US should take, diverse aspects should be taken into analysis. Even though the US is more focused on other issues at the moment like for example, China, they still need to maintain a close look on the events that are occurring in Belarus because of its implications for NATO and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the US should also consider very carefully the repercussion of its actions, as they can lead to a rise in tensions with Russia that could even result in conflict. Therefore, the actions that the US takes towards solving the issues in Belarus should balance on the one side, achieving these objectives of supporting the domestic opposition against Lukashenko’s regime, while on the other hand it needs to maintain Russia’s calmness so that a conflict does not occur from this intervention (Preiherman, 2020). One of the arguments, which have been made in correlation with this view is that the US should send its appointed ambassador to Belarus. In spite of the criticisms that these proposals have received, it has been argued that by having an ambassador on the ground, the US would offer a clear signal that they would try to resolve this issue by communicating through Belarus and not directly with Russia, as the tour done by Stephen Biegun might have suggested, as he went directly from meeting the Belarusian opposition leaders in Lithuania to Moscow (Preiherman, 2020). What is more, putting an institutional network in place in Belarus, like sending an ambassador offers various other benefits. Firstly, it allows Western powers like the US and the EU to acquire a much deeper and well-rotted knowledge of the complexity of the developments that are taking place in the country and how they are affecting the population and the neighbouring countries, which is only possible when a solid network of diplomats and military officials are put in place. Therefore, these offer the opportunity of drafting policy in a more specific and effective manner than before, as for instance Belarus has historically been a country in which Western powers have not established a successful institutional network (Challis, 2020). Nevertheless, the US should also make it particularly clear to the Russian regime what actions they would not tolerate towards Belarus, especially now that with Lukashenko’s very weakened position Russia has a unique opportunity of strengthening its control over Belarus (Shraibman, 2020).
On the other hand, it can be argued that the EU has a wider range of possibilities to affect substantial changes in Belarus, especially because of its proximity with the country, as well as, for the increased importance that this issue has for them, particularly for countries like Latvia, Lithuania or Poland. The EU should focus on helping establish the conditions required so that free and fair elections can take place in Belarus, through credible monitoring that secures fair campaigning by all the sides involved and honest balloting, which would allow a legitimate government to be formed. Nevertheless, this is easier said than done, due to the fact that conditions in the country at the moment do not offer the requirements for this to happen, nor is it obvious that Lukashenko’s regime would allow these changes that could get him out of office to occur (Courtney and Haltzel, 2020). Therefore, the EU should try and help put the conditions into place that would force Lukashenko to accept free and fair elections to happen. This could happen through a wide variety of actions, for instance through financial help, which is crucial, due to the fact that as it has been mentioned before, the current economic situation of Belarus is one of the main factors that Russia is taken advantage of to increase its control over this country (Antonenko, 2020). Not only that, but the fact also that an important part of the Belarusian economy is controlled by the government has meant recently that a substantial amount of people have lost their job due to their political views. Therefore, Belarus is in dire need of economic help, due to the fact that the Covid-19 pandemic has further weakened it and it has resulted in vast instability for the country (Glod 2021). Economic help could be offered in different ways, for example the EU could help NGOs and activists, which are working on Belarus, but also, they have the ability to offer training to professionals like teachers, which have lost their jobs due to the current circumstances (Antonenko et al. 2020). Also, the EU has the ability of supporting the civil society by backing small and medium-sized companies, business associations and trade unions, which would enable the Belarusian economy to acquire a small amount of independence from Russia, plus it would increase the EU´s influence over Belarus (Kirova and Freizer, 2015). This could be achieved, for example through the Eastern Partnership’s EU4Business in Belarus, which is an initiative that offers services like micro loans or consultative assistance to the small and medium-sized companies that ask for it. Nevertheless, this also has its problems as the EU would have to make sure that the help given would reach those that really need it. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the EU could carry out initiatives like hosting workshops or even offering training opportunities in the EU, which would solve them (Glod 2021).
Moreover, the EU also counts with initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for Eastern Partners, which can be a very useful tool for obtaining an increase in cooperation between Belarus and the EU especially Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. If the EU was able to increase its cooperation with Belarus, it would obtain a significant amount of leverage in this conflict as it would be able to have a greater amount of influence and it would have a better chance of taking advantage of the tensions that appear between the Russian regime and Belarus, which would be key in stopping the acquiring of power that is being done by Russia at the moment and that would have severe repercussions for the EU member states that border Belarus (Marin, 2020). In addition, the EU should focus on helping the civil society inside Belarus to continue their protests asking for democratic change (Kirova and Freizer, 2015). The EU could use their long democratic experience to train the opposition in Belarus how to be run effectively. Not only that, but the EU could also offer them training in campaigning, lobbying and even policymaking. The changes that are currently happening in Belarus offer the EU the unique chance of helping the opposition in Belarus with the communication of their message, as this could have substantial results in acquiring even greater amounts of support by the civil society, as well as, it offers the chance of writing a narrative of Belarus, which focuses on the desire for change and stronger democratic values. Thus, the EU should take on this opportunity to strengthen its position in Belarus and to showcase itself as a defender of democracy (Glod 2021). Not only that, but the Belarusian civil society should also be given a crucial role in the negotiations that would take place, due to the fact that they are the most effective tool for achieving and maintaining change, as well as they could be important advocates for European values (Kirova and Freizer, 2015). There have even been more innovative proposals for supporting civic empowerment, like for instance through promoting civitech projects, that could be very useful for supporting democratic initiatives. There are several examples of civitech initiatives having a very positive impact on the Belarusian population, like for instance Golos, which is an online platform who was initially used as an alternative vote counter for the presidential elections of August 2020, but that it is used as a monitor for public approval of the different proposals that the opposition presents or Narodny Opros, which is a civitech initiative whose goal is surveying public opinion and estimating the participation in the different protests that have been occurring (Glod 2021).
Supporting the Belarusian civil society is not only a useful tool for the EU to further improve its position on Belarus, but it is also a necessity for the civil society, due to the situation that they face after several months of brutal police repression by Lukashenko’s regime. These months of protests have enabled important progress for the Belarusian population, particularly as they have been able to push the country into the brink of substantial political change, as Lukashenko’s regime has not been in such a weak position. Therefore, it is a necessity that the EU backs the civil society in the country because if not their efforts would not culminate in the progress that they have been asking for. A very important part of the population in Belarus has been fighting for months for a change in its archaic regime and to acquire a more democratic country with greater freedoms and individual rights. Therefore, it is a mandate for the EU to help them in achieving their goal, especially due to the fact that the EU has postured itself as a defender of democratic values (Glod 2021). In addition, even though sanctions alone have not been able to achieve the objectives that were expected they are still a useful tool that should be considered for achieving a solution in this situation. Moreover, the West should also consider redirecting the financial support that initiatives like the EBRD or EIB loans directly towards the civil society in Belarus, as it could be used for instance for supporting the development of democratic structures, like for media to take on the disinformation campaigns that have been set out by Lukashenko’s regime with the help of the Russian government, which could be key for obtaining democratic progress in Belarus (Glod, 2020).
Nevertheless, as mentioned before the EU needs to be very careful in the different actions that they take, due to the fact that they can lead to increased tensions with Russia and even an armed conflict. In order to achieve this, the EU could focus on maintaining a smooth relationship with Russia on issues that they both agree on like for instance the Covid-19 pandemic or the climate crisis due to the fact that obtaining this favourable relationship could enable the easier resolution of the conflicts that could arise between the two side because of the situation in Belarus (Trenin, 2021). What is more, by having an open dialogue with Russia they would have a suitable opportunity for putting forward the arguments that increased tensions in Belarus could be very damaging not only for the West but also for Russia, because of the fact that the position of Belarus on the Suwalki Gap makes it particularly easy for tensions to develop into a conflict that could have devastating consequences for all the actors involved in it (Challis, 2020).
Arctic
Concerning the Arctic, it is a little different, due to the regional dimension of the situation. The EU must imperatively strengthen its relations with Russia and engage in a dialogue on the Arctic with this country in order to anticipate possible future military issues and to better secure its supply of fossil fuels, as long as it remains dependent on it. A balance has to be found between sanctions against the conflict in Ukraine in the south and Arctic cooperation in the north. Indeed, if the Northern Sea Route is completed and Russia succeeds to acquire sovereignty over it, any sanctions could result in a tax increase for European ships using it, resulting in a trade war in the North. For the time being, a diplomatic compromise must be found to prevent such eventualities. It is particularly inadvisable to position more troops in the Baltic countries as a possible prevention of an Arctic conflict, which would only contribute to the rise of tensions and mistrust towards Russia. Bilateral diplomacy and trade agreements have to be a priority. It is also essential that the EU strengthen its presence in regional forums in order to have a voice and reinforce its legitimacy in the region. The strengthening of the European presence in regional bodies follows this path, contributing to the weight of the EU in its negotiations with Russia, which can only strengthen its legitimacy. Indeed, the EU won’t be able to negotiate until it is not recognized as a concrete actor in the region. Moreover, the EU must present itself as an actor among the others without pretending to bring about a new supranational Arctic order. The preparation of negotiations with Russia for a Free Trade Agreement can be launched now, to defend the security of hydrocarbon European imports, and the reminder of the common interests between Russia and the EU in the extraction of these resources. In addition, Russia is in deep need for foreign investments and cannot turn its back on an economic power such as the EU.
It may also be preferable for the EU to create a permanent European cooperation mechanism at the Arctic’s scale. Bring together the various Directorates-General on an Arctic institution in order to produce a “ambitious, transversal and closely coordinated” policy (Council of the EU). This is a major challenge given the diversity of themes concerning the Arctic. This has already been done with the regrouping of DG Research and Innovation, DG Regio and DG MOVE under a single European service for Arctic affairs, headed by the EEAS. But here the idea is to go further, because the entanglement of different programs and policies hinders the legibility of the European arctic will: an option is to consider the creation of a DG Arctic as we can have a DG NEAR for the neighbours. This permanent mechanism could bring added value to the European Union’s involvement in the Arctic. The pooling of knowledge and programs must also generate common objectives for a coherent and coordinated policy. A unique, known and identifiable institution is a considerable tool in regional negotiations and symbolizes the European interest in the Arctic issues. The 2016 communication’s initiatives are actually too numerous and tend to be scattered.
Ukraine
Concerning the Ukrainian case, what can be done by the EU and the US to strengthen their presence in Ukraine without provoking the Russian reaction? First of all it is of utmost importance to support the Ukrainian government in its conquest of reshaping a modern nation with the capacity to act independently and democratically. Henceforth the EU and the US should generously provide financial assistance as well as expertise to strengthen the institutional capacity of Ukraine, to promote the rule of law and the values of democratic governance, fight corruption and ensure the division of powers. Via this way the political institutions will be re-legitimized and gain back the trust of all citizens, making the country the only viable alternative for its citizens vis-à-vis the authoritarian counterpart in the east. Moreover it is equally important to establish a permanent communication channel between Kyiv and Ukraine in order to discuss, express and resolve their differences before they escalate into a military confrontation. In the context, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can play a facilitating as well as a mediating role, as it was shown in the negotiations of the Minsk 2 agreement. Finally, last but not least, western powers have to see the world from Russia’s eyes. Therefore it would be a mistake to promote an additional NATO enlargement to the east and find ways of deeper cooperation between the EU and Ukraine without the promise of the membership. That would be the best way to solve the difficult equation of aiding Ukraine to stand on its own feet and respecting the fears and the policies of Moscow, containing its need to utilize military means to protect its interests.
Georgia
In respect of Georgia, there are a variety of possibilities for Europe’s future role in its relations with Russia. This report recommends that the common line of behaviour that should be followed, which has other ramifications, is to stop aggravating Russia and listen to its concerns. This suggests incentivising dialogue in order to enable information sharing (even if not institutionalised), create closer ties, and establish not only patterns of behaviour, but predictability criteria and further interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane and Martin 1995).
A peculiarity of this argument is that, while it manifests a tilt towards a somewhat neoliberal approach, it corresponds perfectly to Mearsheimer’s (2014b) position that Western countries should pursue a distancing approach. If dialogue is set and the challenges discussed, European states can match their aspirations with Russia’s and escape collision. For example, the bid for NATO’s expansion and the EU’s reach for the East would both be second-guessed more assertively by Russia, thus enhancing the odds of preventing the escalations that later came. Additionally, Russia’s concern (whether dissimulated or not) for the minority rights of Russians abroad should be heard and addressed by the Western states (Mearsheimer 2014b, p. 3). Furthermore, instead of pursuing a path of direct expansion and democratisation that ended up with “the EU [becoming] the unwitting instrument for new dividing lines across the continent” (Sakwa 2015, p. 578), the Western states should turn to Ukraine and make it “into a neutral buffer state” (Mearsheimer, 2016, pp. 29). This road would allow the EU to avoid confrontations with Putin’s regime, considering that the Russian President is set on not tolerating Western advancements (ibid).
Complementarily, there is the fact that the EU can work the East through a different set of methods that would neither enter in direct conflict with Russia, nor would they focus on its “near abroad”. As Tolstrup (2009, p. 924) notes, there are “[s]everal studies in the so-called Europeanization literature” that have portrayed “how the EU, through the latest enlargement process, has had a decisive impact on the democratization of candidate countries.”. Hence, the EU has a ramification effect when it comes to the process of democratising countries. Through Western influence on Eastern states that are easier to reach, the EU can circumvent the “Russian sphere of influence” (Larrabee 2010, p. 37) while, simultaneously, having an indirect impact on the region in terms of Europeanisation. The European states, using this method, would not only influence public opinion, but also exert a substantial effect on the prerogatives of target states’ democratic processes. In turn, this could lead to more West-leaning governments in the East without entering in disputes with Moscow. Alongside, if the EU wants to be more influential in its neighbourhood, it must “bring their partners in designing optimal collective responses”, possibly generating a shield preventing its overreach. Either way else, “[t]he consequences will be borne by those that the EU set out to help” (MacFarlane and Menon, 2014, p. 100)
Henceforth, the EU and NATO should have a visible focus on their internal cohesion and postpone ideas of enlargement. Divisions in their core have been a cause for disaggregated engagements that have not been effective, and the challenges ahead can only be met “through unity and strength” (Daalder 2017, p. 38). The EU must primarily focus on consistency and put aside member-states’ internal differences in order to set guidelines for addressing Russia. For the case of NATO, the alliance ought to continue reassuring its most Eastern members in terms of provision of security and include “military assistance with intelligence and early-warning capabilities, cyber security, airpower” and counterinsurgency methods (Kroenig 2015, p. 60). In the same line of thought, considering that the Russians have shown significant aptitude to employ techniques of cyber and information warfare, it is essential for the European states to address this issue by fomenting both information sharing between member states and investment in the cyber realm.
In an attempt to conjure solutions for the future of Europe’s role, this report additionally argued for a European engagement based on three premises: (1) promotion of dialogue with Russia in order to share information and establish patterns of behaviour, predictability criteria and more interdependence, (2) pursuit of a “democratisation through ramification” strategy, preventing overreach but still influencing democratic procedures indirectly, and (3) a clear focus on aggregated engagements and internal cohesion, putting aside differences and, likewise, delaying enlargements and bolstering cyber defence capabilities. Europe must avoid its entrapment between frozen conflicts in its neighbourhood and the complete eradication of the current security architecture, and thus, the need for these premises to be employed (Matsaberidze 2015, p. 84).
Overall, even considering the peculiarities of each of these case studies, the recommendations proposed in this report harmonise under one main parameter: building bridges and enhancing dialogue with Russia. For Belarus, the emphasis lies on a promotion of civil society and on finding common ground with Moscow. In the Arctic, recommendations follow a path of strengthened ties with Russia, with focus on energetic security. For the case of Ukraine, the suggestions concentrate on building institutional integrity and fighting corruption. In respect of Georgia, the focus surrounds enhanced information sharing with Russia, and on European aggregated engagement. In all cases, bilateral cooperation with Russia will be privileged, in order to be part of a durable risk management enterprise.
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