On Sunday 27 June, the United States deployed strikes in Iraq on the Iraqi-Syrian border, killing at least five people (Le Monde, 2021). However, it was not armed groups sympathetic to the Iraqi regime that the American aggressor was targeting, but a pro-Iranian militia. This operation, the second of its kind since Biden took office, follows targeted attacks by Iranian-backed militias on U.S. consular and representative facilities in Iraq. Since the beginning of the year, more than 40 attacks have targeted U.S. interests in the country, where 2,500 U.S. troops are deployed as part of an international coalition fighting the Islamic State jihadist organisation. Indeed, the American bases are frequently, and recently, subjected to sustained assaults by these militias, notably by shellfire, but even more surprisingly, by drone attacks. The new use of drones is a headache for the coalition, as these flying machines can evade the C-RAM defence batteries, installed by the U.S. military to defend its troops against rocket attacks (ibid). The use of this technique, modelled on the attacks by pro-Iranian Houthi rebels against Saudi Arabia, is a sign of escalation in Iraq, experts say.
The US strikes come against a backdrop of several countries wanting the US to return to the 2015 Vienna Agreement on Iranian nuclear power, from which former U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew his country in 2018. It should be recalled that Iran is under a series of U.S. economic sanctions because of its nuclear programme, which Washington suspects of having military aims. The Islamic Republic is also accused by the U.S. of human rights violations and support for terrorism.
The American presence in Iraq is not new, and is a textbook case in international relations. Supporting Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath to invade Iran in 1991 on the one hand, then driving the same dictator out of Kuwait a year later. It is foreign interference, especially American, that contributes to the non-restoration of political stability in Iraq (Benraad, 2015). Yet it is the relationship between the United States and Iran that will be the focus of our study. This article therefore examines the different directions in which the two countries’ foreign policies are moving towards each other and draws the necessary conclusions.
U.S. foreign policies towards Iran
Iraq has been always an important country for the American interests in the region. Though, the bilateral relations were wounded by some controversial policies of Saddam’s regime in the region but after war of 2003, once again Iraq became important U.S. ally in the region in confronting radicalism and Iran, and in guaranteeing the constant exports of petroleum. Most of the agreements with the post Saddam Iraqi governments emphasize to protect U.S. interests in the Middle East. The U.S. Department of Defense has quoted that it has spent over 750 billion US dollars on the Iraq conflict and the fight against ISIS in 2019 (Cordesman, 2020). U.S. also wanted to counter Iran by using Iraq. According to an article, “from the viewpoint of the United States, the priorities are to contain or eliminate the rest of ISIS and to limit Iran’s role in Iraq” (Cordesman & Hwang, 2020). For that, America always desires a pro-Western government in Iraq. America installed and overthrew subsequent Iraqi governments on the pretext of their pro-west and anti-west attitude, respectively (Yasiry, 2020). A strong and independent Iraq is extremely crucial for the U.S., so it needs to come to terms with the fact that its main goal is to support Iraq to be strong and self-reliant. The policymakers must recognize that the goal to combat the outside forces such as the Iranian security interferences is bigger than less critical ambition to form a partnership with Iraq (ibid). It is unclear that the U.S. will maintain its presence in Iraq and continue to help Iraq to solve its problems in its long-term issues (Cordesman, 2020). Indeed, according to a report, Iraq’s forces in 2019 totaled 64,000 as opposed to Iran’s 523,000. Also, Iraq has only 393 battle tanks as compare to Iran’s 1,513 tanks.
What about the changes in US policies towards Iran between Obama and Trump? President Obama privileged a foreign policy that is based on conversations and cooperation, not conflicts. Consequently, the American foreign policy excluded the military option and opened up conversation and negotiation channels with the US adversaries as Iran, and this is through opening space for negotiation over the Iranian nuclear file (Nunlist, 2016). Obama stressed in his statement at Cairo University on launching a long-term diplomatic campaign in the Middle East; and with respect to Iran, he stressed on the importance of escaping from the “Trap of the past” and continuing toward a future full of mutual respect (Castiglioni, 2013). Obama started to discuss the mutual economic and strategic interests between the two states, starting from the possibility of turning Iran from a revolutionary and ideological state rejecting regional and international reality into a state working to integrate into the world system (Abdul Fattah, 2014). The negotiations resulted in the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal in 2015 between the P5 + 1 and Iran, including the guarantee of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a gradual lifting of sanctions (Hijazin, 2016). As a result, the sanctions on Iran were lifted when the agreement was put in place in 2016.
The American foreign policy trends highly differed with the arrival of the current American President Donald Trump. Trump started attacking Iran and accused it of always sponsoring terrorism by providing money and weapons and not preventing the development of its long-range missile system (Katzman, 2019). He officially announced the withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, followed by the announcement of a new set of economic sanctions on Iran, from which the US President was exempting Tehran every 90 days (Zaid Khalaf, 2020). This has resulted in Iran’s return to strengthening its nuclear capabilities, increasing the political vulnerability to the US military action with helping Saudi and Israeli and opposing European and Russian (Blackwill, 2018). The tensions between the Iranian regime and the Trump administration can be summarised in three factors (Zaid Khalaf, ibid). Obviously, there is the Iranian nuclear deal which for the president Trump allowed Tehran to threaten international inspectors to prevent them from accessing suspected places. Secondly, the Iranian ballistic missile system, because Iran is now able to target US military pieces in the Persian Gulf waters and the US military bases located nearby. Third, Iran’s role in destabilizing the region which represent an intellectual, political and in some cases military extension, as is the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shiite groups in Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Trump’s policy towards Iran has thus resulted in mixed actions of delegitimisation, sanctions and containment. The main goal was to reduce the Iran’s influence, in the region and worldwide.
Iran’s international relations, between soft and hard power
Iran is often identified as ‘the big winner’ of the 2003 Iraq War. Over the past 17 years, the Islamic Republic has gained extensive lever-age over Iraq’s national security and political decision-making at both local and national levels. Political and security actors backed by Iran have been amongst the principal targets of popular allegations of high-level corruption and the promulgation of sectarian agendas. It is therefore a real anti-Iranian sentiment that has developed in Iraq since then. But the assassinations of the Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and his longstand-ing Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, by US forces in January 2020 has shifted popular perceptions of Iran’s role in Iraq in several key respects (Watkins, 2020). The Iraqi parliament, minus some Kurdish and Sunni MPs, voted to expel US troops from Iraq and it is a genuine consensus that appeared against the U.S. presence in the country. After the assassinations, Sadr’s Mahdi Army came down on the Iranian side and called for a ‘million man march’ in Baghdad to demand an immediate US withdrawal. The Sadr’s army has been trained by Iranians for three years between 2003 and 2006 (ibid). After protestors rejected the Sadrist candidate to succeed Abdul Mahdi as prime minister, Sadr withdrew support for the protest movement. While many demonstrators continued to denounce Iranian interference, fears of reprisals by Iranian allies led some to abandon the cause. At the same time, amongst Iran’s core support groups in Iraq, the assassinations triggered a leadership crisis. In a system dominated by patronage politics, the importance of individual personalities in commanding loyalty cannot be underestimated, and neither of their replacements appear to command the same respect. Today, therefore, there are still militias trained and armed by Iran in Iraq with the aim of driving the Americans out of the country.
Iran has interfered in Iraq since Obama’s term to enhance its regional role and to achieve its regional interests, especially after the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) posed a threat to the Iranian role in the region; given that “ISIS” was an extension of Sunni Jihadist movements and given the fact that “ISIS” invaded nearly one-third of the total area of Iraq, which led to enhance its power to threat the Iranian interests through limiting Iran’s role in the region (Abdul Latif, 2015) despite the bias of the Central Government of Tehran – formed by the USA – that is under Shiite’s control, it is not surprising that Iran has enlisted. Iraqi Shiite militias and played an official role in leading the Iraqi’s campaign against ISIS. Obama’s policy encouraged the Iranian role to exert influence on the Iraqi internal balances. Although Iran is not officially involved in the Global Coalition against Terrorism that is led by Washington, the US Administration welcomed the Iranian role in Iraq, giving, thereby, Tehran the green light to play its regional role in Iraq (Khouli, 2016, p. 4).
In 2018 the candidacy of the leaders of PMF militias in the elections was a part of Iran’s significant policy to control the region to threaten the US interests in the region. In addition, Iran played also a military role through financing, training and arming the armed Shiites guerrillas in Iraq, especially through “Quds Force” affiliated with IRGC (Salah, 2018). Many Iraqis are disappointed because of the imposition of the Iranian version of Shiism, because this strengthens Iran’s claim that it is the leader of the Shiite world (Haddad, 2019). It cannot be ignored that the Iranian dominance and penetration in Iraq and its interference in Iraq’s decisions were among the causes for the demonstrations and the public outrage. Iran tries to address its crisis and confrontation with the USA through turning Iraq into a battlefield of a war by proxy and exploit and plunder the Iraqi resources to address the Tehran economic crisis. The concern of the present study is to focus on the external determinant and its impact on the Iranian foreign policy, especially Iran’s relation with USA. As the prevailing international system led the USA to be dominant and resulted in its non-compliance with the provisions of the game but rather applying its own rules that serve the continuity of its international hegemony and its strong influence, the ability of Iran’s external political decision-maker to take a decision depends on his awareness of the capabilities and possibilities he possesses. This gives him a margin of political, regional and international freedom of movement based on power and influence and his willingness to play an active, influential and independent role in the international community (Al-Nuaimi, 2011). With the shift in US foreign policy toward Iran from rapprochement to hostility and confrontation under Trump current administration, Iran has worked to complete the Iranian airspace program and to gain an influential and distinctive regional role. Moreover, it has sought to preserve the imbalance of power between Iran and its Arab neighbors by removing Syria completely from the equation of Arab power and playing on sectarian and ethnic differences in Iraq and Yemen by spreading anarchy, a matter that has maximized the potentials of the State of Iran and its control over the region as a compensation for the loss of the American support (Al-Atoum, 2016).
The situation on the ground is therefore much more complex than it appears, and the two powers, the United States and Iran, are planning to confront each other in Iraq. The situation is getting worse, so much so that we can imagine the advent of a real drone war in the near future, which, as we know, will not be to the benefit of the local population. The situation must therefore change or risk seeing crimes against humanity become widespread in this area, which has seen too many atrocities in the past. According to the official Syrian agency Sana, one child was killed and at least three people were injured in the attack mentioned at the beginning of this paper, underlining the danger to civilians. It is therefore imperative to:
Immediately stop the supply of money, weapons and training to Iraqi militias by Iran. This situation only creates a potential for conflict to erupt and puts US consular facilities at risk. Transparency must therefore be demanded by the United Nations on the regularisation of arms sales and payments to Iraqi militiamen. If precise traceability is not possible, the embargo option should be considered.
Renewing the dialogue between the United States and Iran. Trump’s defiant and childish attitude towards Iran must end with the arrival of Biden. Dialogue must be favoured, it was successful under the Obama administration. It is absolutely impossible to thwart Iran’s nuclear plans through threats and surveillance, as they will manage to deflect one or the other in one way or another.
Continue to investigate unmanned terrorist devices targeting US positions in Iraq, if hostilities cannot be stopped immediately. Learning more about them will help to counteract them and avoid new victims. Systematic retaliation by drone attacks must stop, as it only endangers civilians without affecting the capacity of the militia to act. Self-defence must be proportionate.
Unlocking humanitarian aid for people on the ground who find themselves in the middle of the fires. About 1.5 million Iraqis are still displaced and 250,000 Syrian refugees are still in camps. The coronavirus pandemic is putting a strain on the already fragile health system in this troubled country.
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
