COVID-19 has heightened tensions between China and the United States, placing Europe as the middleman. The EU has the tough challenge of managing its complex ties with Beijing and Washington so that the rule-based global order is not further jeopardized. However, to avoid getting stuck between the two powers, the EU should approach this war on its own by keeping in mind its values and defending its interests.
For the US, which considers itself a Pacific power and global hegemon, China’s rise poses a unique challenge. On the one hand, it is viewed as an assertive authoritarian state and a major potential military adversary, while on the other hand, the economies of Washington and Beijing are inextricably interwoven. Among public attitudes and elite discourse, the idea that China will challenge conventional US primacy not only in the Western Pacific and East Asia, but also globally has increasingly gained foothold (Rudolf, 2020). US-China ties, which had been unstable over the previous quarter-century, have been deteriorating and seem to have taken a dangerous direction. Tensions between the two powers in the 1990s intensified during the Obama administration in the first decade of the twenty-first century, when the Sino-American relationship – then characterized by a combination of collaboration and limited rivalry – was questioned. This created the groundwork for what appeared to be a significant shift for the worst under Donald Trump’s administration. Following a debate in the United States over whether Beijing and Washington had already become enemies in a new cold war, experts in the US started to glimpse similarities between the four-decade-long war between the Soviet Union and the US, and the increasingly tense Sino–American relationship. Despite Beijing’s initial scepticism about such interpretations, it eventually started seeing eye to eye with the US and considered itself as its fierce opponent. Even if today’s world is plainly not the same as it was during the Cold War, and the reasons for China and the United States’ rivalry are dissimilar from those that fuelled Soviet–American competitiveness, the Cold War parallel has persisted (Goldstein, 2020). Given both the US and China’s key role in the international economic and geopolitical scenario, their struggle to find a “modus vivendi” aiming at defining the future developments of their dialogue will be of fundamental relevance for world development and international order. The pandemic has undoubtedly aggravated this underlying antagonism. Optimistic researchers believe that existing and maybe new differences will be resolved peacefully, or at the very least will not lead to direct clashes. Contrarily, pessimistic experts believe that persistent rivalry and conflicting interests will sooner or later lead to the use of force (Tzogopoulos, 2017).
EU democracies between the US and China
Reality has to be admitted, whether we like it or not. The European Union has now been finding itself for years pressed between these two superpowers, thereby leading concerns about the EU’s future to increasingly push through. Thus, experts have been questioned whether there is any specific space that the EU may aspire to fill, given the worldwide changes resulting from China’s galloping international influence, increasingly severe Sino–American competition, and the growing multi-polarisation of the international political economy. Concerns whether there is a world that is being established outside the EU by Sino-American relations, and whether the Union is capable of establishing strategic autonomy and asserting itself as one of the international order’s fundamental pillars, have been increasingly rising (Santander and Vlassis, 2021). This long-standing US–China rivalry, which will be defining the geopolitical framework for the next few decades, will particularly be of great impact to the EU who will be asked to define its stance and purpose. Acting as a balancing player within the complex US-China relations is a major task with which the EU will have to struggle in the upcoming years, but its capacity to do so would be proof of its indispensability in the international scene to maintain international order.
With little sign of rapprochement in sight, both China and the United States are preparing to court Europe even more aggressively. However, the EU may not be keen in having to choose sides between the US and China. Indeed, it has legitimate reasons to straddle the line. The EU has tremendous advantages from friendly relations with both great powers. The long-standing security agreements with the United States provide stability and protection against chronic threats such as Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Furthermore, the EU’s historic commitment to the U.S. and its democratic values is a major tile of today’s EU-US relations. Contrarily, China’s economic progress provides European businesses with a treasure trove of growth prospects they could not find at home. For a while, the Union may be able to maintain this balancing act, but such position will likely grow increasingly unsustainable. European leaders will have to take a stance within the Sino-American “conflict” at some point, and their choice will have to be clear: either choose values and take the side of the U.S., or prioritize economic benefits by supporting China, which would bound the EU in the background of the international scene. However, experts say that no side should be chosen as this would fuel bipolar thinking (Schuman, 2021).
Although agreeing with then-President Trump that “China was never going to be socialised into internalising fundamental liberal principles and institutions” but that it “seeks to outperform liberal states as the first among equals and reinstate China as the leading world power and civilisation” (Obgaard, 2020), for now the EU has decided not to choose sides, but to carefully balance its relations with both powers. Moreover, the EU parted from Washington’s fierce and punitive behaviour towards Beijing and adopted a more nuanced stance based on diplomatic pressure and economic interdependence. Reasons behind this may be that China is the EU’s most important economic partner, and that Brussels’ role in the international scenario may not be threatened as much as compared to the Washington’s. Against this background, some European political and business leaders have repeatedly asserted that the US conflictual stance on fully aiming to keep up the pressure on Beijing’s is the wrong tool for facing China’s economic and political rise. As such, they prefer to remain outside the battlefield (Schuman, 2021).
As stated by French President Emmanuel Macron in February 2021, a situation in which the EU would flank the US to fight China would be “a scenario of the highest possible conflictuality” which would be “counterproductive” for all parties (Walla, 2021). Indeed, such a scenario would lead China to assume a threatening behaviour, that is, withdraw from its commitment towards major issues like fighting climate change, as well as intensify its aggressive behaviour in Asia as it is currently proving with its repressive acts in Hong Kong (Momtaz, 2021). This low-key approach appears not to be totally wrong. Indeed, in response to European concerns China announced its commitment to reduce peak emissions 2030 and to become carbon neutral by 2060. However, EU leaders Europe will remain vigilant to see if China keeps its promises in the future (McGrath, 2020).
Yet, China should not be treated as a “clear partner or place itself at the same distance from the US as from China, because China is a systemic rival, and the EU and United States share the same values” – President Macron (Atlantic Council, 2021). Driven by its historic image of a nation with a strong and independent defence outline as well as by its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, during the Trump administration France proved a firm European stance against the China’s increasing presence in the region by cooperating with Asian partners such as India, Japan and Malaysia. Following France’s example, German and the Dutch publication of Indo-Pacific strategies in 2020 proved to be in support of the idea that China (Obgaard, 2020) – besides being a strategic partner with which the EU cooperates – is “an economic competitor” and a systemic rival promoting alternative methods of governance” (Casarini, 2019). This shows the EU’s willingness to accept the US’s greater project of a cooperation among allies to challenge China’s growing military and economic power but still maintaining a more diplomatic confrontation. The fact that China is a “systemic rival promoting alternative methods of governance” has been proven once more during the pandemic crises by China’s economic and diplomatic behaviour to the EU. Indeed, “the assertive tone with which China’s new ‘wolf warrior’ diplomats tried to control the narrative around the emergence of the virus, the country’s efforts to use medical goods for political leverage at a time of highest need, and its failure to cooperate in a meaningful way to identify the origins of the virus did not go unnoticed” and pushed Europeans to radically change attitudes towards Beijing (Oertel, 2021).
One major factor that prevents the EU from siding with Beijing, is the latter’s suppression of human rights. While the EU should accept the reality that major world powers like China, Russia and North Korea are increasingly repressing human rights, it can try to intervene to convince Beijing to change position or at least to return to the negotiating table. Indeed, for quite some time now the EU has repeatedly denounced breaches of international law and human rights violations, which the EU is committed to promote and protect universally as it represents one of the major core values on which the EU and the concept of a Union of sovereign states ground. By means of the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime and for the first time after the 1989 Tiananmen Square happening, in 2021 the Council imposed sanctions on four officials from the People’s Republic of China who have been accused of human rights abuses in the form of political indoctrination, ill-treatment, and torture against the Muslim minority of the Uyghur inhabiting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) (Scuccimarra, 2021).
The fact that the EU strongly denounces the abuse of human rights in China and the fact that Brussels and the Washington are closer in terms of morale and shared values, does not automatically imply that the EU should align with the US, also because not all European objectives and aims are similar to those of the US. Choosing a side implies being more reliant on that side. The EU’s choices should be based on European interests. The EU cheered US President Joe Biden’s arrangement to reconnect in multilateralism and yet again join multilateral foundations like the World Health Organization, just as to restart joint effort with allies and countries in the Middle East. Europeans, however, cannot be expected to simply follow American leadership (Bernmann, 2021).The need for the EU to emancipate from the US lead was proven earlier this month when, despite the attempts of the Biden administration to engage in talks with the EU about cooperating against China’s threats, the AUKUS defence pact at the expenses of the annulation of a multibillion-dollar French submarine deal with Canberra, demonstrated that Washington will seize any opportunity to limit China’s military might, even if it means disregarding European interests.
Conclusion
The US–China rivalry is not just a battle between democracies and autocracies and a possible risk of conflict between the US and China presents grave risks to the EU. Hence, the question of how the EU should deal with an increasingly influencing China is of primary importance as it defines the future of the Union. The Brussels Consensus can only find its place among its American and Chinese equivalents if the EU admits its strengths. The EU is indispensable for the international order and, therefore, needs to acknowledge its key role in the international scene. Indeed, despite the role of the EU perhaps seeming passive and duplicative of other’s behaviours at first impression – such as its initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic – the Union is characterized by great power and agency and, as such, “needs to be a player, not a playing field” (Besch, Bond and Schuette, 2020). Nevertheless, only by presenting a unified front and utilizing Community tools, particularly the strength of the Single Market, will the EU be able to act constructively. Since no European country can defend its interests and principles against a country the size and strength of China on its own, unity is essential in every aspect of interaction with Beijing (Borrell, 2021). In other words, “the EU should develop strategic autonomy and should not be afraid of the language of power” like in the past when it used to believe that power had been the catalyst for two lethal conflicts leading to “its current focus on concrete cooperation and economy” (Bermann, 2021).
The EU should avoid becoming enmeshed in a global hegemonic struggle between China and the United States and, therefore, should utilize whatever leverage it has to guarantee that both sides employ their power responsibly, rather than relying solely on the principle that “the strong do what they can, while the weak endure what they must” (Besch, Bond and Schuette, 2020). A balanced EU–China partnership is critical for addressing and ultimately resolving significant global issues such as pandemics and climate change, as well as the development of effective multilateralism. Accordingly, the 2019 appointed Commission should establish a detailed plan to deal with the continuing US-China conflict in the most effective way, with the goal of minimizing the worst consequences on European interests and the international system. As Besch et al. propose (2020), the Commission should focus on:
- establishing a strong European knowledge base on the United States of America and China. Researchers in Europe can help to better understand US-China relations by studying both nations and presenting their findings in ways that policymakers can grasp. Political leaders and bureaucrats in Europe typically have a poorer understanding of the United States than they believe. Most Europeans are unfamiliar with the US constitution and life outside of Washington and New York. Likewise, knowledge about China remains very limited to most Europeans despite the country’s rising importance;
- Agreeing on achievable goals for ties with China. The EU’s aims must be based on an accurate evaluation of its partners’ strengths, limitations, and intents. This means that the EU should focus on aims that can realistically be achieved by cooperating with China. The Eu should try to invest as much as possible in areas where European and Chinese interests are compatible and accept that on many fronts Chinese stance will never alight to the European one. The EU must stop hoping for and invest in cooperation that will never exists. For example, while developing its own independent stance in the Sino-US conflict, the EU should be realistic and acknowledge that the latter will never conform to the political and economic principles of the West, let alone the morale of democratic regimes;
- Not underestimate China as a security threat. Disregarding freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea which were led by France and Britain, the EU has mostly relied on the US for the defence and security of East Asia and the Pacific. However, given Chinese performance of naval exercises in the Mediterranean and the establishment of military presence in the Arctic, Europeans can no longer ignore China’s potential impact on their security. Moreover, Cybersecurity is becoming increasingly important to national security, and the EU must ensure that its members take cyber-security equally seriously as well as invest in its development;
- Avoiding following Washington’s plans. Although the Biden administration may offer more possibilities for an EU-US cooperation against China’s assertiveness to affirm itself in the international scenario, the EU needs to develop a stance that is not bound to decisions made in Washington and define its own interests and adopt its own strategies even if that involves contrasting ill-advised US policies or jeopardizing economic benefits in order to face to China. However, this is not as easily as it seems. Indeed, it must be based on political, economic, and military strength, as well as unity of purpose in its application. The EU has economic strength but lacks military force, and member states’ opinions toward the US and China are conflicting (Borrell, 2021);
- Avoiding the intensification of Sino-China tension. EU leaders must use all possible leverages to persuade Beijing and Washington to put down the weapons and convey them that a war would be devastating for the entire world. Moreover, the Union should back the ASEAN countries in their negotiation for a binding code of conduct with China to govern activity in the South China Sea by providing them additional diplomatic and technical aid;
- Acknowledging China’s economic growth but rejecting dishonest Chinese competition. The EU should stay out of any broader US campaign to stifle China’s economic growth and continue cooperating with Beijing aiming at tackling major global issues. At the same time, however, the EU should bolster its strategic sovereignty. However, the EU should cooperate to guarantee that China’s development is gradual and within the bounds of international laws and norms;
- Proving the success of models of democratic governance. Instead of fiercely opposing China for it values, principles, and governance model, the best European reaction is to demonstrate that the European system together based on liberal and democratic standards is capable of delivering on par with or better than the Chinese regime;
- Being unified to safeguard and enhance European values. Among these, human rights are one of the EU’s priorities. As proven by recent developments in Hong Kong as well as by the repression of the Muslim minority of the Uyghurs, China is increasingly lifting its authoritarian hand and repressing human rights and, hence, endangering the rule of law. The EU must show intransigent on such violations and intervene in aid of Chinese activists as well as support the use of UN human rights instruments like special rapporteurs to help improve the situation in China on the ground.
All in all, dissociating from the fierce stance of the US and cooperating with Beijing is crucial to avoid negative repercussions on the EU as well as on the international rules-based order. Accordingly, the EU should distance itself from both powers so as to preserve the principles on which the liberal international order grounds.
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By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
