August 23, 2021 marked the day of launching the International Crimean Platform which has been initiated by the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky as an international response and moreover, foreign policy instrument against the occupation of Crimea by Russia. The summit was solely dedicated to the illegal annexation of Crimea and to bringing the issue back in the agenda of the international community. The Crimea Platform has gained rather a large support internationally, officials from 46 countries and blocs were taking part in the two-day summit, including representatives from each of the 30 NATO members (Euronews 2021, “Crimea is Ukraine’: Zelenskyy opens inaugural Crimea summit”). The platform is supposed to work on several levels: from the highest political level, represented by heads of states to the levels of foreign ministers and defense ministers, inter-parliamentary, and expert levels (Crimea Platform, 2021). Ukrainian president Zelensky hopes that the consolidated political position and the joint international pressure will urge Russia to revisit its statements regarding Crimea and to put the issue on the discussion table.
Contextual background
The dispute over Crimea has a long history dating back to the antiquity. Crimea became a colony of the Russian Empire in the late 18th century as a result of Russian victory in wars with the Ottoman Empire (Bebler, 2014). In the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia started the process of Russification of the Crimean population through massive resettlement of ethnic Russians from central and northern Russia. Other ethnic groups such as Tatar, Greek and Bulgarians were brutally deported from Crimea (Bebier, 2015). During the era of the Soviet Union, Crimea incorporated and remained the part of the USSR until its dissolution in 1991 (Katchanovski, 2015). Following the all-Ukrainian referendum in February 1991, the Crimean Oblast regained the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine (Potichnyj, 1991). However, after the dissolution of the USSR, the tensions between Russia and Ukraine intensified on many issues including the status of Crimea. Russian side has never accepted the integration of Crimea into Ukrainian territory and has been preparing plans for its annexation (ibid). In 2008, Putin’s government started mass distribution of Russian passports in Crimea as one of the mechanisms to justify its forthcoming military intervention – protecting Russian citizens living abroad as it did in Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia during the 2008 August war with Georgia (Karagiannis, 2014).
The Window of opportunity for a smooth annexation of Crimea opened for Russian Federation after Victor Yanukovich was elected as the president of Ukraine. His pro-Russian governing practices, polices and activities led to an increased financial dependency on Russia and expanded cooperation in military sector (Shevel, 2015). However, the situation changed drastically when Yanukovich with a group of high Ukrainian officials unexpectedly fled Ukraine following the intense Maidan protests (ibid). Soon after Yanukovich left Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament removed Yanukovich from office and scheduled early presidential election (ibid). The State power was taken by the groups supported and financed by the West, the fact that was unwelcomed by Russia and in turn, Putin started to carry out an aggressive strategy for annexing Crimea (Grant, 2015). Russian forces entered the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014, President Vladimir Putin formally justified the action as a response to the pro-Russian protesters’ demands, asking for assistance from Moscow against alleged Ukrainian discrimination of national minorities (Biersack and O’lear, 2014). Russian forces seized all strategically important sites, (ports, airports, radio and TV stations) cut off most land, sea and air connections between Crimea and mainland Ukraine (Bebier, 2015). More than 3,077 civilians have been killed and more than 7,000 injured since the war began, according to the UN’s Human Rights Office (Human Rights Watch, 2021).
However, Ukrainian government decided not to involve Ukraine in a more intensified armed conflict and started to withdraw its personnel from Crimea in a few months after the start of conflict (Bebier, 2015). Crimean authorities backed by Russian government proposed a referendum, which was held on March 16. It basically offered voters two choices: to join Russia, or to restore Crimea’s 1992 constitution, which would have entailed significantly greater autonomy from Kyiv. Unsurprisingly, 97 percent allegedly voted to join Russia with a turnout of 83 percent (Thomas D. Grant, 2015). Annexation was finalized on March 18, when the Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed in Kremlin by Aksyonov and Putin. As a result, Ukraine lost about three percent of its state territory and about five percent of its population (ibid).
International Response
Invading Ukrainian territory, Russia clearly violated article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which states that “all members shall refrain …from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity … of any state”. It also violated the “Declaration of Principles of International Law” (UN Charter 1945) adopted by UN General Assembly which declared illegal any territorial acquisition resulting from a threat or use of force. The same applies to Principles 1-5 of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act (1975), to the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine” (1997), among many other bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements (Marxsen, 2014:390).
Occupation and later annexation of Ukraine’s internationally recognized state territory – the Crimean Peninsula – was condemned at the international level (Gardner, 2016). From the perspective of international law, Crimea still belongs to Ukraine and could not enter into any treaty relations with Russia as an independent state. This position has been shared by the UN General Assembly who called upon states under General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262 of 27.3.2014 not to recognize any alteration to the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262, 2014) and referred to obligatory non-recognition doctrine under which states “are under an obligation not to recognize, through individual or collective acts, the purported statehood of an effective territorial entity created in violation of one or more fundamental norms of international law” (Marxsen, 2014:390). The EU leaders in the joint statement also firmly condemned Russia’s unprovoked violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on Russia to immediately withdraw its armed forces, altogether imposing bans and sanctions, canceling a planned EU-Russia summit and introduced restrictions on economic relations with Crimea (Rutland, 2014). The steps taken by the EU in the face of Russian annexation of Crimea is often discussed in regard to its adequacy considering that the sanction policy has not brought any desired results so far. Russia continues to violate the international law and never hesitates to take aggressive steps, as it was the case of downing MH17 and violations of Minsk Agreement (Gibney, 2015). Moreover, Russia has been progressively militarizing the Crimean Peninsula and spreading pro-Russian propaganda, controlling media news and conveying anti-Ukrainian messages (Iasiello, 2017).
Conclusion
Moscow deems Crimea related issues closed and non-negotiable. It has also ruled out any discussions about Crimea from the agenda. Amid this scenario, the purpose of Crimea platform is clear, it aims to sharpen the focus of international community to Russia’s occupation of the peninsula and to mobilize all political, legal, and diplomatic measures that confront illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory (Aljazeera, 2021). Although the international community seem to stand in solidity against Russia’s illegal actions, however, it’s still uncertain whether the Platform become a turning point in forming a transparent, unambiguous, and consistent de-occupation policies. So far, the statements and messages from the number of high level officials are promising, countries seem to firmly follow non-recognition policy and not to turn a blind eye on Crimea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2021 “Joint declaration of the international Crimea platform participants”). Certainly, the united position does have a positive impact on Ukraine’s side but the existed policy of sanctions has proved its ineffectiveness.
While, Ukraine’s primary strategy in de-occupation is diplomatic, the real de-occupation of Crimea is unrealistic unless Russian Federation agrees to involve itself in the negotiations and discussions. In this regard, Ukraine should work with its partners to regularly increase the pressure of sanctions on Russia and to ensure that those restrictions are followed. It is crucial that the Crimea platform regularly discloses the violation of human rights in Crimea, opposes resettling Russian citizens to the Peninsula and in general, the russification policy. It is time to move from the slogans and declarations to real actions and problem resolution. In this process, Ukraine has its task to fulfill as well. Ukrainian government should create a sense of connection with Crimea’s population, to take measures against Russia’s propaganda and to offer legal guarantees for respecting the rights of ethnic minorities living in the Peninsula.
References
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
