First of all, the good personal chemistry between the two presidents plays its role. Putin and Erdogan are both adepts of speaking frankly, and they present this as an asset in inter-state relations, making it possible to overcome differences and blockages. In fact, each time the different stands they have on Syria, Armenia, NATO, Libya… threatened to reach the point of crisis, the two heads of state met or spoke to each other, finding an agreement to overcome it while acknowledging the persistent disagreements.
Erdogan and Putin also agree on the way they treat opposition in their respective countries, which is brutal to say the least. They both also agree on the strongman image they intend to project, both internally and on the international scene. A turning point in the closeness between the two presidents was Putin’s expressed support for Erdogan after the failed coup in 2016, while Western countries, for their part, criticized the massive repression that followed that event in Turkey.
What role does the West play in the current convergence between Moscow and Ankara?
This is another major point of convergence between the two countries. Wether one sees it negatively or positively, and with obviously very different historical contexts, both countries consider that the West has refused their will of cooperation and integration. They also believe that their Western partners have ignored their security interests as they see them. For example, on the Kurdish question for Turkey, the enlargement of NATO for Russia. Turkey, like Russia, is interested in the idea of a less Western-centric multipolar world, in which regional powers see their role enhanced.
But the anti-Western posture is clearly more structural in the case of Russia (which sees itself as a global power) than in the case of Turkey (who wants to extend its influence but on different regional scales). Thus, for Russia we are dealing with questions of principle, of world vision. For Turkey we are probably dealing with something more situational, more fluid because it is more negotiable, and this can constitute a fragility in the bilateral relationship. This is perhaps why the Russians have been keen, over the last decade, to involve Turkey in economic cooperations that have a strategic scope, creating long-term dependence (nuclear, energy…).
The rejection of Western policies is ultimately a common objective. Syria, Libya, the Caucasus – topics where the interests of Ankara and Moscow are far from fully converging. But the one objective of marginalizing Western countries, and showing the decline of their authority on the international scene reconcile them. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020, the Minsk group (of which France and the United States are co-chairs with Russia) was not very active and the ceasefire agreement was steered exclusively by Russia and consultations with Turkey.
Considering the tensions with the Europeans in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey sees it as useful to be able to display a capacity for coordination with Russia. As for Moscow, it likes to emphasize the spirit of cooperation that governs its relations with Ankara in the Black Sea. Turkey has positioned itself in the Black Sea as a littoral power tending to oppose the plans of Alliance members who are pushing for a stronger NATO presence. This, of course, suits Russia.
Turkey has developed its relations with Kiev, affirming its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, condemning the annexation of Crimea and developing Ukrainian-Turkish arms projects. What impact does the war in Ukraine have on relations between Russia and Turkey?
Before the war, Russian officials have repeatedly denounced the arms cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine. Turkey also participated in the first summit of the “Crimea Platform”, initiated by Ukraine August 2021, in Kiev. As long as this policy is not explicitly part of a NATO strategy towards Ukraine, Moscow can accept the development of Ukrainian-Turkish ties. But when Russia complained, before the war in Ukraine, about the development of cooperation between the latter and the Nato countries, and if it was mainly aimed at the role of the Americans or the British, it also had in mind the Turkish drones.
For the moment, Turkey gives the impression of remaining in its posture of Russia-West balance : it condemns the invasion, it closes the straits to warships, but it does not take sanctions against Russia, continues to work with it in the economic field, and seeks to pose as a mediator. Everything depends on what Turkey wants to do with the opportunity that the war in Ukraine potentially represents for it: continue its game of balance between the West and the Russians as in recent years; or repair its relations with its NATO allies? It seems that the first option prevails at this stage – let’s not forget that Turkey is very dependent on Russia economically (energy, tourism…). It seems to want to make its usefulness known to the various players in the context of this war, which is upsetting many balances, and to gain an additional regional and international aura from it (and to make people forget its economic crisis?).
To what extent does the desire to expand their respective influences constitute limits to their political and economic cooperation?
So far, the two actors are playing in the same arena, sometimes with more or less serious friction. But their order of priorities is different. For Turkey, it is the Middle East and the Mediterranean, while Russia’s foreign policy remains focused on maintaining its weight in the ex-Soviet space. This could change if Turkey were to become more enterprising in this space that Russia claims as its sphere of influence. Moscow is keeping a tight rein on Ankara’s desire to develop its presence in Central Asia in the name of historical, linguistic and cultural kinship.
Above all, with the war in Ukraine, one wonders if Turkey, a member of NATO, will be able to continue for long on its line of a transactional attitude in which it plays the Russian card in its negotiations with its Western partners, and the anti-Western card in its power relations with Moscow. Correct relations with Turkey are perceived in Moscow as an asset in relation to several major strategic issues. The impression has often been given that Turkey is more or less leading the game. Meaning, on the international stage, and in particular in its relations with Western countries and some of its neighbors, Russia has not exactly shown flexibility lately, with an often offensive, if not aggressive, behaviour. In this context, the manifest effort of Russian diplomacy to find points of agreement with a Turkey that does not hesitate to impose its pace and its interests offers a striking contrast! This is because correct relations with Turkey are perceived in Moscow as an asset in relation to several major strategic issues.
The Black Sea-Mediterranean stage is a key issue. Russia proceeds by priorities : Turkey is not a convenient partner in Syria (where it tends to take advantage, at present, of the Russian withdrawal linked to the war in Ukraine), but this is acceptable, as long as it remains on the right line in the Black Sea, an arch-strategic zone for Moscow.
However, one of the major objectives of Russian foreign policy in recent years has been to divide by all means the NATO alliance, which it sees as strong militarily but weak politically. Hence the efforts to quickly complete the contract for the sale of the S-400 anti-aircraft system. One of the reasons why Ankara worked to improve its relationship with Moscow was probably its perception that its Western allies would not necessarily be of much help in the event of a problem with Russia, and that it was therefore necessary to manage and stabilize this relationship as best as possible in autonomy. Regardless the extremely controversial democratic system reigning in Turkey, this is more “looking out for themselves” behaviour than “challenging NATO” behaviour.
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-armenia-azerbaijan-monitoring-centre-idUSKBN29Z0FL
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/13/europe/turkey-russia-missiles-nato-analysis-intl/index.html
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
