India and China’s staggering population growth makes them the most populous nations in the world, as well as the two most economically dynamic countries in Asia. Their influence in the diplomatic spheres and in the business world has only grown with time, making them key global actors. The relationship between these two giants
Far from being a walk in the park, is as old as the creation of their nation state, and has been since the 1940s. Mao Zedong was pleased to recall in 1951, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Indian Constitution, the “excellent friendship” which links the two states “for thousands of years” (Leng, 1952). The 1950s were what might be called the peak of Sino-Indian relations, before deteriorating dramatically in the following decade. In 1962, a short and limited war broke out, causing the Indo-China relationship to enter the deep freeze. Subsequently, in the 1960s and 1970s, relations between the two countries came to a standstill, blocked by this thorny border issue. By 1981, India and China had finally returned to the negotiation table. Since then, border negotiation has passed through three different stages, marked by the eight rounds of Border Talks at vice-ministerial level, the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the border issue, and the ongoing Special Representatives’ meetings. The border issue is one of the most protracted and complicated problems between the two countries (Lu, 2007). It was not until 1993 that the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian Border was negotiated between the two nations which establish the conditions for the control of the border and the demilitarization of the area.
Two areas were of particular concern: the eastern sector (145,000km2), which the Indians called the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and which the Chinese viewed as South Tibet; and the western sector (34,000km2), which included most prominently the Aksai Chin plateau, bordering Kashmir, Xinjiang and Tibet. But neither has developed a grand strategy with regard to the other. An unshakeable and largely unprofitable preoccupation with the past on the Indian side, and an equally intense preoccupation with domestic consolidation on the Chinese side, have left the relationship under-tended. It might best be seen as one of geostrategic competition qualified by growing commercial cooperation. And there is some asymmetry: China is a more fraught subject in Indian national debates than India is for China. China does not appear to feel threatened in any serious way by India, while India at times displays tremendous insecurity in the face of Chinese economic success and military expansion (Malone & Mukherjee, 2010). Until 2013, the agreements between the two countries concerning the construction of the border, the exchange of strategic information and the control of the area multiplied, in a kind of relative peace and proactive negotiations. But even today, this border issue is still not settled, and skirmishes still take place, which makes us fear the worst, namely the emergence of a new conflict between two nuclear-armed powers. This article will therefore attempt to demonstrate how the evolution of tensions and negotiations around the border are symptomatic of the relationship between these two Asian giants, and propose an historical geopolitical analysis of the subject following.
An abundant negotiation, but which turns around the pot
Prime Minister of India, H.E. Shri Narendra Modi and President of People’s Republic of China, H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping held their first Informal Summit in Wuhan on April 2018 to exchange views on overarching issues of bilateral and global importance, and to elaborate their respective visions and priorities for national development in the context of the current and future international situation (MEA, 2018). It is part of a kind of Sino-Indian tradition since 1993 to solve problems through dialogue – although this maxim needs to be verified today as we shall see. The peculiarity of the Wuhan summit is that it is claimed by both leaders as an informal meeting, which puts the diplomatic relations of the two countries on a new level. Indeed, through this, the two countries affirm their willingness to see each other more regularly by freeing themselves from the embrace of protocol. The border during this summit was only a secondary subject, appearing in the press as a summary subject. However, it can poison the bilateral relationship—as is evident from the series of face-offs in Depsang in 2013, Chumur in 2014 and Doklam in 2017—and render relationship-building efforts ineffectual (Joshi, 2018).
A 4,000-km Line of Actual Control (LAC)—a notional line to which both sides agree—marks the India–China border. There are around 20 places where their claims overlap: Samar Lungpa, Trig Heights, Depsang bulge, Kongka La, Pangong Tso, Spanggur Gap, Mount Sajun, Dumchele, Demchok, Chumur in eastern Ladakh, and Namka Chu, Sumdrong Chu, Yangste, Asaphilla, Long Ju, Dichu in Arunachal Pradesh, and Kaurik, Shipki La, Barahoti and Pulan Sunda in the central sector. As much to say that the points of discord did not miss during this summit having however not drawn the glance on this question. This is in addition to the fact that both countries have consciously developed friendly relations with each other’s natural enemies. Thus, China maintains good relations with Pakistan while India develops its partnership with the United States. In the past China has built alliances and partnerships with countries in the Indian periphery, most notably Pakistan, but also Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and, more recently, Afghanistan. Combined with the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region, this has created some concern among Indian policy-makers of strategic encirclement (Hoffman, 2010) New Delhi continues to follow a one-China policy favouring Beijing, despite growing military exchanges with Taiwan (Athwal, 2008). India’s Look East policy, a serious attempt to correct the conceptual drift in India’s approach to Asia beyond China, has resulted in substantially growing economic relations with Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia.
The current status quo on the border has been the same for more than half a century since the Chinese withdrew their forces from NEFA in 1963. The only circumstance in which one or the other party will unilaterally back off from its claim is if it suffers some catastrophic military or political setback. With India, China confronts a significant military force across the entire length of the border. The Chinese are aware that the border issue can be a major headache, as witnessed during 1986–87. An interesting aspect of the Wuhan summit is that it has the potential to bring the two countries back to a benign point in their recent history, just before Wen Jiabao came to Delhi in April 2005 and signed the two important agreements. Based on the belief that their relations had now acquired a global and strategic character, the two countries established an “India–China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” with the goal of promoting “mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s concerns and aspirations” and with the belief that “an early settlement of the boundary question will advance the basic interests of the two countries and should therefore be pursued as a strategic objective” (Joint Statement from China and India, 2005). The two powers must agree on the very principles of Confidence-Building Measure (CBM) Regime which is to build confidence to the point that the dispute can be resolved through give and take, there is little these measures can do to improve bilateral ties. Strategic communications are necessary as the issue of settling the border dispute has remained mostly constant over the years. Technical solutions can promote restraint and reduce the risk of confrontation and war, but they cannot entirely eliminate them. Elimination can only be achieved by removing the casus belli (Joshi, ibid). Though the two sides came up with an agreement on the political parameters and guiding principles of a border settlement in 2005, they have not been able to work out a framework agreement that can be applied to delimit their border. This issue is, undoubtedly, linked with the strategic calculations of the two sides with each other. As recent events have shown, these calculations could go awry to their mutual loss. The Wuhan summit has led to India and China providing “strategic guidance” to their personnel to implement the CBM regime and prevent any confrontation along the LAC. However, it is uncertain as to what they intend to do with the real problem of settling their boundary dispute.
Road construction a forgotten cause of a conflict
Tensions around the border inevitably crystallized until they reached their peak in June 2020 when clashes resumed near the Pangong Lake and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Other clashes also occurred along the LAC. To better understand the causes of these confrontations, we must look at the question of the roads along the border.
Chinese developed an all-weather road through Aksai Chin in the early 1950s. After consolidating their rule, they developed four trunk highways, linking Tibet to Qinghai, Yunan, Xinjiang and Sichuan. Beginning in the 1990s, road construction and their improvement accelerated with an investment of more than ¥4 billion. By the end of 2000, more than 1,000 permanent bridges and 22,500 km of roads have been put in place across Tibet. In the first phase during the 1950s–70s, connecting mainland China to Tibet was the main goal and developing a network for internal integration and military control (Joshi, ibid). Indian road construction was slower. There was just one jeepable track to Tawang by 1962, and road-building from Srinagar to Leh had just begun. Even in 1986, there was no road to Walong. In 2006, India took the decision to accelerate its own border construction and called on the Border Roads Organisation to finish 70-odd projects in the mountains by 2012. It also took the decision to build roads right up to the LAC rather than stop short by 50–70 km, as was the practice. By the end of the 2012 financial year, however, only 16 of the planned roads had been completed. In 2017, in the wake of the Doklam crisis, it was revealed that the deadline to complete many of these roads had been further extended to 2022. According to a report, 27 of the 73 roads approved for construction have been completed, while the others will be finished only by December 2022 (Basu, 2017). This aspect is essential, because it carries with it the patrols of each of the two countries which, when they meet, inevitably lead to increased tensions. Patrolling altered the dynamics because it generated friction from encounters and meetings. Having enhanced their infrastructure, the Chinese began to strengthen their border posture and increased the number of patrols they sent to the LAC. The process of improving roads was intensified: important roads to Chumur were completed and work begun on a road to link Daulat Beg Oldi. At the same time, they started using the Indian Army or the Indo-Tibetan Border Police to patrol the border instead of those belonging to the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau. The basic patrolling limits had been drawn up in 1976 when the China Study Group was first set up. The Indian side changed the frequency of the patrols to improve their performance, but India’s basic understanding of the LAC, which was worked out in 1976, remained the same (Joshi, ibid).
Today, China has only six border regiments and three brigades in Tibet (Rikhye, 2018). In contrast, India has two divisions in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, four divisions in the east and another four brigades associated with the new strike corps. India is also raising two new independent armoured brigades for use in the mountains and is planning develop capabilities for offensive operations. It can therefore be observed that the situation prior to the outbreak of the conflict tended to show that the latter would occur. The construction of these roads, the movement of troops as well as the patrols more and more frequent and closer to the border in a context of past conflict that has never been resolved . All the ingredients were there for a new conflict to break out. Of course, this is not the only factor involved, and it is not the position we are defending here. However, it is an aspect that is not often studied and yet is important in current geopolitics.
The current conflict, in perspective with contemporary geopolitical issues
The conflict that broke out in June 2020 was the first deadly clash in the disputed border area in 45 years. Rivers, lakes and snowcaps along the frontier mean the line can shift, bringing soldiers face to face at many points, sparking confrontations. The two countries however have a long-standing agreement to not use guns or explosives along the border (BBC News, 2021). The geopolitical landscape of forces has rebalanced in recent years, even though after the Wuhan summit their relations seemed to have improved somewhat. India’s trade deficit with China reached a record of $51 billion in 2017 (The Times of India, 2018). New Delhi has long called for China to ease access to its market, but there is no sign of progress in this regard. Contrary to what Indian and Chinese leaders anticipated three decades ago, the diversification of the bilateral relationship is not helping progress on the border dispute.
US and China appear to be on a path of heightened international competition. The alignment with Russia has given China enhanced strategic depth to redefine its role and assume more great power characteristics than it could do alone (Daulet-Singh, 2021). China is nowhere near as isolated, vulnerable or domestically divided as it was in previous episodes when a border resolution was viewed in Beijing as a positive lever to stabilize its south western periphery. China’s deep economic interdependence with its neighbours and relatively swift recovery from the Covid-19 crisis is in sharp contrast to periods of greater domestic instability. The recent 2020 Ladakh crisis has revealed that China can entertain more coercive and unilateral options to secure its security and territorial interests on the border with India (ibid).
On the side of the Indian elite, their original claims on Aksai Chin are not set in stone and that they were inserted too casually into the frontier narrative and the official negotiating position, with consequences that are still relevant today. It is an illusion to think that India could be geographically powerful enough to hope to play a triangular relationship with China or even to tap into China’s economic tap at this time. In fact, since 2015, this geostrategy has largely failed to produce the envisaged gains. A key reason and one that continues to elude many Indian geostrategists is China’s negative or coercive leverage on India — both vis-à-vis Pakistan and structural superiority on the Himalayan frontiers — cannot be offset by an external balancer (ibid). The US actually finds itself closer to China than India when it comes to Pakistan’s case. Furthermore, the main threats that the US seeks to prepare for with respect to China are all in the Western Pacific, a large distance away from the India-China border (ibid). India has absolutely no interest in taking a Cold War approach to the border, constantly monitoring tensions, because the potential costs could far outweigh the geopolitical benefits to the country. India would benefit more from developing its neighbouring relations in a multilateral manner through an informed and transparent regional policy. This may, in the long run, change China’s views on a more stable and peaceful relationship with India in a turbulent regional context. India is also trying to ensure a leadership position in the Indo-Pacific area, whether through trilateral agreements with Japan for undersea security or the development of transport infrastructure in the region with the European Union. However, it is clear that India is unable to compete with China in terms of trade, even with these trilateral partnerships. On the contrary, this rivalry is a risk generated by these strategies of bypassing China that could accentuate tensions between the two nations, producing the opposite effect expected (Saint-Mézard, 2019).
As with historical precedents, opportunities to resolve the crisis will appear fleetingly, before cycles of uncertainty once again impact India-China relations. To transform these fleeting moments into a truly sustainable dynamic, a local political initiative informed by the various regional and international issues raised by this conflict is needed. The recent conflicts have unfortunately encouraged India to join, at the instigation of the United States, a kind of coalition opposed to China, whereas it had previously been reluctant to do so. It has banned a slew of Chinese apps, excluded Chinese companies from building India’s 5G networks, and last year joined the United States, Australia and Japan in their largest naval exercises in over a decade (Fareed, 2021). As we have seen in our study of China’s relations with the EU, such a coalition is highly undesirable. This is particularly the case with India, as it could not only aggravate the border conflict, but also undermine security, and thus trade, in the Indo-Pacific area. As long as the balance of power between India and China remains unbalanced, India will have to opt for a subtle mix between seeking cooperation with this neighbour, seeking external support to confront it, and the need not to provoke it by aligning itself too ostensibly hostile. It seems clear that the relationship with China is already the most decisive factor in India’s foreign policy and that it will continue to be so in the years to come. The diplomatic work to be pursued is therefore a long-term one and, although complex, needs to be carried out assiduously or else this conflict will continue for a long time to come, just like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
