09 June 2021
In reference to a local custom, the relationship between the European Union and India has been described as “a loveless arranged marriage” (Khandekar, 2011). After a long period of inaction leaving negotiations between the two entities at a standstill, the Enrica Lexie incident in 2012 where two Italians were accused of murdering crew members of an Indian ship did not seem to portend a bright future for this partnership.
Yet in March 2016, the situation is changing. On this date, the thirteenth EU-India summit took place in the context of the terrorist attacks in Brussels. The EU and India have finally agreed on a timetable to strengthen their relationship through the Agenda-2020 on strategic issues. However, the European External Action Service’s strategy for 2016 only mentions India twice, which puts into perspective the strength of the Agenda-2020 statements. It was not until November 2018 that the Commission and the High Representative for External and Security Policy formulated an ambitious joint statement: the EU Strategy on India (EUIS). The European Council confirmed the trend a few months earlier by enjoining the Commission and the High Representative to “reflect on the opportunity of a Strategic Partnership Agreement”. In 2019, the Indian general elections and the European parliamentary elections put this partnership project on hold. However, the foreign minister who took office following these elections in India has been very clear about his intention to reinvigorate the EU-India relationship. In this regard, it can be said that the EU and India are on a “dialectical quest to rediscover each other” (Mukherjee, 2018).
If Europe has started to take an interest in India, it is also for its democratic values close to its own. EU’s foreign policy historically showcased a strong commitment towards democratic norms. Since its independence from Great Britain in 1947, India has become the world’s largest democracy in terms of area and of direct democracy (Chand, 2021). India was amongst the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Community in the early 1960s. EU–India relations are based on the 1994 cooperation agreement that extended the relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation. In December 2004 the Indian government published a detailed response to the EU’s communication. It praised the EU in glowing terms stating that India accords highest importance to its relations with the EU which has emerged as a major geo-political and economic force in the new world order (Fraser, 2009). This paper proposes to analyze the perceptions that the EU and India have of each other, which is a condition for the successful development of a durable partnership, before looking at the strengths of this cooperation and then at the current challenges that their relationship faces.
Indian perceptions about Europe, between eternal secondary partner and political power
The study of mutually and self perceptions seems necessary to interpret the underlying dynamics that could undermine partnership development and effectiveness. Indeed, the perception that each has of the other is extremely important, whether in negotiations or in the usual relations between two territorial entities, because it constitutes the first step towards achieving a status, a certain legitimacy in the imagination of each of the interlocutors. We will rely here on several studies spread over the period 2010-2019 including the study in several large cities: Brussels, Dehli, Patna…
To begin with, in India during the 2010s, the elites saw the European Union as the world largest trading power, while the Indian public was considering Europe as on of the “most influential” global actor “in terms of global economic affairs”, but even ranking “behind the USA, India and Japan” (PPMI et al., 2015). In other terms, India is considering the EU as a great market and a great opportunity for its economy that is losing steam, even with the development of trade with Africa and Asia. It is important here to notice the growing role and legitimacy of Europe as a major economic partner for India. A pole made by Pew Research proved in 2013-2014 that a third of the Indian population had a positive vision of Europe (34%) for only a quarter of unfavourable opinions (Pew Research Center, 2014). This is far behind the US with 45% of favourable opinion, but it is still a very impressive score for countries that at that time, remember, did not yet have a stable and defined partnership. But with the European debt crisis and the Brexit, the Old Continent has not restored its image and appears to be a declining power for India (Mukherjee, ibid), in any case insufficient to constitute an economic pole competing with the USA. India’s interest in Europe is not sufficient to make it a privileged trading partner, and the country prefers to continue its orientation towards other areas in Asia and America. The context of the 2016 and 2017 EU-India Summits mixed with the catastrophic Brexit story has brought about a shift in the perception of EU from India. Indeed, in the media and for the economic actors, the EU became a “political actor” by “60%” of the article, in opposition of an economic partner by only “21%” of the sources (Babalova & Goddeeris, 2019). The EU also appears deeply divided, and unable to make a unified decision. Indeed, Indian elites deplore the fact that the EU cannot give a single opinion on serious international crises (as for example with the Libyan crisis of 2011), but also find that the European Parliament harms the international credibility of the Union. Indeed, for Indian officials, some MEP’s “often manipulated to issue statements on foreign policy which run counter to mainstream European thinking” (Winand, 2021).
The described shift in India’s perception of Europe as an essentially political rather than economic actor is crucial to understanding future agreements between the two entities. It is crucial to apprehend the shift towards more strategic or even ideological issues, as opposed to a market cooperation as generally favored by the Union.
EU and India, new stakeholder in Indo-Pacific, but unfinished cooperation
The Indo-Pacific is a rather vague notion, or at least a very conceptual one, which is not unanimously accepted either geographically or politically. However, this concept is used here to designate the area from the African coast to the American coast, encompassing both the Indian Ocean and part of the Pacific Ocean. This area is home to 65% of the world’s population, 62% of its GDP, and over 30% of international trade (Kugiel, 2021).
India is the fifth largest economy in the world, with a major strategic position on the Indian Ocean and is increasingly seen as a security provider for the Ocean. It is also seen as a promoter of the cooperation through some initiatives like Security and Growth for All in the Region (AGAR) providing connectivity, development and Covid 19 vaccines (ibid). The European Union, on its side, is a major extra-regional power: It is the largest trading partner and a huge source of investment in development assistance for most countries in the region. The EU’s trade is also mostly dependant from the Indian and Pacific Ocean, 35% of its exports transit through these waters. The Union’s strong engagement and many links between European prosperity and the region’s stability have prompted many experts to call for an independent EU vision of the Indo-Pacific (Pejsova, 2018). As two undeniable powers in the region, the EU and India have common interests to defend in this area, whether it be issues related to sustainable development or the strengthening of investment in infrastructure to improve the region’s connectivity which, understandably, would benefit both actors. The post-pandemic recovery also brings a shared interest in diversification of supply chains to create “multilateral trade structures not centred on Beijing” (Mohan, 2020), in the context of a shared vision of the need to develop multilateral relations in a changing Asian picture.
However, despite this obvious convergence of interests, the European and Indian trajectories have not necessarily crossed on many occasions. Indeed, their cooperation seems limited to the maritime security through the Maritime Security Dialogue in January 2021 concerning of the exchanges on developments in maritime security environment, regional cooperation activities, developments of mutual interest and opportunities for cooperation between India and the EU. The two powers also cooperated in regional forums such as Indian Ocean Rim Association (EU-IORA) or the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (EU-SAARC) but do not seem to show any convergence. Cooperation between the EU and India in the Indo-Pacific region has therefore really been oriented towards the prism of security, and more particularly water security. The growing interest in EU-India maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean is an example of this (see Saran et al., 2016). But closer security cooperation only accelerates the superpower competition in the region (Kugiel, ibid). Indeed, one of the most prominent issues today is China’s place in the region, and both the EU and India are seeking to reshape their relationship with the Middle Kingdom. Relations between China and the EU as well as with India are in crisis, on the one hand over human rights and a stillborn investment agreement, on the other over a still unresolved border dispute. China is the greatest power in the Indo-Pacific region and its influence on trade could be catastrophic. It is therefore not in the interest of either entity to enter into competition, let alone conflict, with such a power in such a context.
In addition, Indian view of Indo-Pacific as “inclusive, open” and “not directed against any country” presented by Prime Minister Modi in 2018. If we push the analysis further, we can note a real similarity with the EU proposal of “regional cooperative orders” exposed in the EU Global Strategy 2016. Far from an area of rivalry and a race for security, what both partners need are regional standards that must be respected by all actors and that uphold the values cherished by both democracies, namely human rights, sustainable development and resilience. As it stands, however, there is no movement in this direction, nor any real EU-India cooperation that would go beyond the security aspect, which is regrettable when we know what this area could represent for them.
Latest advances in cooperation and current challenges
On May 8th, the social summit of the European Union gathering the leaders of the European States took a surprising turn, becoming a real EU-India summit by videoconference. This meeting comes just after the diplomatic incident with China and the ping pong of sanctions between the two powers, and is therefore a chance for the EU to build a new partnership to counter China in South Asia.
To start, Europe is jumping on to the ‘connectivity’ bandwagon with a new EU–India infrastructure partnership that promises to bring the European Investment Bank into projects in India. The European Union and India also promise to cooperate on building resilient medical supply chains, vaccines and their ingredients (Lee-Makiyama, 2021). Indeed, the major health crisis that currently affects the EU and India is the subject of common criticism, and it was discussed the intellectual property concerning the production of vaccines, India wanted to partially abolish it in order to be able to produce its own vaccines. Germany, producer of the famous Pfizer vaccine, which remains to this day one of the most reliable and least risky vaccines, firmly opposed it.
More surprising, however, was the relaunch of negotiations for an EU-India trade agreement, especially considering that this agreement was first discussed eight years ago and has since been one of the biggest European diplomatic failures. However, the two entities have wishes that may appear to be opposed. India wants the European Union to immediately slash tariffs and increase purchases of Indian farm produce and other goods in an ‘early harvest’ as a token of good faith. By contrast, the European Union has proposed an investment deal as a stepping stone and reforms to protect geographical indicators like Champagne, Parma, and Assam tea (ibid). EU demands are unsurprising given India’s restrictions on foreign investments are similar to China’s, especially in key EU export sectors. One may wonder whether the agreement with India does not appear to be a simple substitution of a disappointed hope with China, applying the same conditions to a neighbour of a lost partner, and it takes the direction.
In addition to investment and financial barriers, it was also discussed the adoption by the Asian country of a base of standards necessary to be able to converse with the EU, it is a common strategy of the EU that can be summarized by the meaning of normative power: trade agreements appear as a pretext to influence the standards of third countries. This notion is called “level playing field” provisions and requires that the regulatory conditions in which goods and services are freely traded between partner countries be virtually identical (Aatreya, 2021). For India, this translates into increasing labour and environmental protection. First, on the issue of the black-letter law itself, India will likely have to change a slew of labour and environmental regulations, covering issues like minimum wages, working conditions for labourers and limits on the release of harmful effluents to match the higher standards applied in the EU. Secondly, India will have to satisfy the EU that these higher standards are stringently and regularly enforced on producers of goods that are exported to Europe (ibid). In this light, an EU-India agreement, if it is finally concluded, will have to ensure that such standards are in place and that the EU has the right to monitor compliance with these standards.
The resumption of negotiations for a trade agreement is in any case a sign of good relations between the two entities and demonstrates a common desire for development. This agreement could have major repercussions, notably by improving Indian standards regarding labour and sustainable development, while benefiting the EU, constituting a new privileged partner. However, one may wonder about the outcome of such negotiations, as the past has not been glorious in this area. For its part, the EU must do everything diplomatically to ensure that this agreement sees the light of day, and strengthen its relations with India to confront China’s macrocephaly on the Indian Ocean. As for India, it seems imperative that it conforms to European standards in order to negotiate a new trading place that could give it the keys to a major commercial position in the Indo-Pacific. Developing infrastructure, improving working conditions, and fighting for environmental protection are the keys to making the country a real player in the Indo-Pacific, with the necessary support of the EU, giving it a real strategic advantage while opening other privileged partnerships in Africa and America. From the moment when each has something to gain, the two partners should therefore work to develop their relations in order to bury it in a solid, innovative and reforming agreement for the
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
