Jacques Delors once defined the first-ever project of long-lasting peace and cooperation between a union of sovereign states, i.e., the European Communities and subsequently the European Union (EU) as an “identified political object” characterized by uncertainty and inexplicability (Zielonka, 2006, p.4). Just like many of those cooperative projects aiming at developing integration and closeness between member states (hereafter MSs) have encountered difficulties or have even been shot down, EU integration through enlargement policies has proven to be controversial, at times enigmatic as well as ambitious and not always a straightforward achievement. Indeed, despite the fact that several countries have experienced a smoother entry process into the Union many others have faced difficulties and rejections to join the EU. Notwithstanding this, the integration process brought the Union not only to be the world’s largest economic region but also the vastest community of values. The latter and, hence, the membership of the current 27 members grounds – inter alia – in the fact that all MSs are at the moment of their accession to the EU committed to the preservation of some principles (e.g., democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and human rights) that are defined by all 27 actors as essential for a harmonious coexistence as well as fundamental in order to avoid past mistakes and atrocities. Proof of the MSs’ readiness to commit to such values is the fact that they have surrendered a significant part of their state sovereignity to a supranatural entity thereby allowing the latter to conduct many crucial policy decisions on a community basis. This commitment and readiness to surrender certain state powers represent one of the key factors underlying the mechanism of EU integration thereby permitting the latter to concretely happen through enlargement policies and decisions. To understand how to conduct future enlargement it is of high importance acknowledging which structural forces of national interest, power logic and influence have been emphasising the dynamics of the enlargement project until the present day. From this analysis then, it is worth reflecting on whether conducting enlargement nowadays in the way it has been conducted in the past is still an effective method or if an improvement is needed.
Generally, enlargement could be interpreted as a power game between different actors. On one hand, the more powerful one (in this case the EU) seeking to “maximize the benefits of an expanding membership in terms of economic, political and security gains and, at the same time, minimize the costs of accepting new members (in terms of the budgetary, economic and political impact of the new members on the EU’s economy, budget and institutions)”, while on the other the want-to-be MSs aiming at maximizing their personal stake of the collective benefits of enlargement thereby trying to curtail their contribution to the costs as much as possible (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p.29-31). Alternatively, incorporating new states may be driven by deeper rooted reasons, such as common identity and goals as well as shared history, political values, and tradition thereby leading MSs to replace material and personal interest reasons with other motivations grounding in historic and moral responsibilities (ibid.). Although European integration through enlargement policies seems to have momentarily decreased speed after some MSs have become very doubtful about whether further enlargement efforts would be beneficial or if they would bring to future complications, up until the present-day EU enlargement schemes can be said to have been driven by different aims and forces. Especially the last wave of enlargement which culminated with the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 has been fuelled by peculiar reasons making it a milestone in EU history.
The eastern enlargement cannot be said to have been mostly driven by a feeling of shared identity or history, nor can it be simplified to an enlargement fuelled by a will of maximization of specific benefits of an expanding membership.
Precisely, the eastern enlargement represented an impressive exercise in empire building fuelled by the aim of asserting political and economic control over an unstable and destitute region, thus, aiming at filling a power gap left by the fall of the communist regimes. Thus, besides aiming to be the first one at conquering, reforming, and regulating new markets which could have enabled it to expand its influence and power, with the eastern enlargement the EU developed an astonishing projection of the EU’s political and economic power upon the easter states. In doing so, more remarkably than the re-creation of its internal political space following imperial traits, the EU started to act according to an imperialistic way in the neighbouring region (Zielonka, 2016, p. 44-48). Hence, with this wave of enlargement, priority has been put on tangible strategic and power politics and less on historic justice and shared common identity. Indeed, contrary to what claimed by many leaders, namely that enlargement had the aim of securing peace prosperity and democracy in the new European neighbourhood, many authors state that enlargement schemes were driven by the will of acquiring control “[…] over developments in the post-communist space in a carefully orchestrated, comprehensive, and largely friendly manner” (ibid., p.54). This has been realized – inter alia – through an extensive and intrusive EU conditionality package, i.e., a system of conditional accession, which virulently intervened into the domestic affairs of the new members. Indeed, the agenda for Eastern European readjustment foresaw detailed proposals in every sphere of human life. This was proof of a remarkable asymmetry of powers between the bargaining partners that lead scholars to talk about a bulky “EU imperial governance” in the new MSs. In this situation, the latter’s compliance to the EU’s orders and proposal was voluntary only on the utter appearance. The new members had little power of ignoring the Union’s expectations and requests thereby enabling the latter to exercise an outstanding share of control and influence over the new neighbourhood.
Thus, the Eastern enlargement represented an invasive strategy as “the EU was providing decisions and expected compliance and obedience from the applicant states. It was providing models and the applicant state were supposed to copy or imitate them. It was offering teaching and training and the applicant states were expected to socialize and learn. The EU proposals and solutions were to be taken over by virtue of their place of origin and not necessarily by virtue of their substance” (ibid., p.57). As such, this strategy did not leave the applicant states a large manoeuvre space nor much choice but to accept the EU conditionality policy and, thus, fulfil all requirements expected by the Union. After all, the EU conditionality policy offered the new applicants a place in a secure, prosperous, democratic, and fairly well-governed Union which could have surely helped them to recover from the harsh economic, social, and political conditions in which the fall of the communist regimes had left them. This is what made the Union develop a remarkable degree of control over these states making the enlargement process rather difficult if not impossible to turn down and at the same time rather quick to achieve.
Against this background, it can be claimed that the intrusive and coercive character of the enlargement policies together with what was at stake may have been the main reason why the candidate counties eventually joined the EU. In other words, common values and the importance given to the fundamental principles, such as the rule of law, democracy, freedom, and human rights on which the EU is based and on which EU membership grounds have only had a background importance in the negotiation for their entry in the Union. In fact, shared identity and common principles were partially set-aside and replaced by an imperialist ideal aimed at fragile nation states which primary motivation to adhere to the EU was for the prospect of greater prosperity that such membership could deliver. This choice of setting aside previously used pre-defined enlargement policies had relevant contemporary repercussion in todays’ European context. Indeed, the fact that these new members did not ground their entrance into the EU on such values may be the reason why nowadays we are witnessing repetitive infringement of these principles by some states, such as Poland and Hungary. Such countries are nowadays showing worrying signs of contrast in their embodiment of democratic values in comparison to other MSs. If the reason MSs joined the EU was not mainly fuelled by the will of sharing what constitutes the source of EU nature and by what is supposed to be the members’ cornerstone of their membership, the development of a hostile behaviour to contravene the fundamentals of the Union is not a surprising consequence. Indeed, if membership is a rather forced one, i.e. based upon the imperialist will of a more powerful actor or performed just for personal, economic, political, or strategic interests without being based in the members’ will to really be part of a group where shared principles represent the reason and the source of the membership, then the flows of such membership are expected to manifest in a short time during a state’s time in the Union.
In conclusion, it can be asserted that the manner in which enlargement policies are developed and implemented certainly has widespread influence on the way membership as well as the commitment to the EU and its fundamental values and principles are performed. Hence, if the desire is to achieve an ever-closer union of sovereign states characterized by possible future common fiscal and political policies, EU membership must be conditional first and foremost on those values that have been declared as vital features of the Union’s nature. Only a common vision achieved through the enhancement of shared values can enable the Union to flourish and develop into a fairer, more cohesive, more efficient, and equally beneficial union. Thus, to strongly foresee a future solid sharing of the fundamental EU principles as well as being characterized by a common vision during the negotiation processes should not be enough to become a member state. Initial promises are prone to easily transform into a mere act of lip service of the safeguard of the fundamental values, thereby mining the inner stability and balance of the Union. Democracy and most of all the long-lasting adherence to democratic principles should represent the real benchmark when considering a states’ membership. Future memberships, like the currently highly discussed West Balkans one, have to be based on a common vision and on shared values, where decisions are considered as a matter of identity aiming to mature and protect the sense of ‘we-ness’ and to establish bonds of solidarity.
Bibliography
Piedrafita, S., Torreblanca, J. (2005). The three logics of EU enlargement: interests identities and arguments. Politique européenne, 2005/1 (n° 15), p. 29-31
Zielonka, J. (2006). Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford University Press, pp. 4, 44-48, 54, 57.
By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
