Earlier this month, tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan grew following Tehran’s large-scale military exercise near the Azeri border. This was aimed to show Iranian military capabilities to a neighbour accused, among others, of links with the West and especially with Tehran’s historic rival Israel (Motamedi, 2021). According to Iranian state media, the military drills started near Poldasht and Jolfa border crossings with Azerbaijan and were carried out using armoured and artillery units alongside drones and helicopters (Reuters 2021). Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev pointed out the illegality of such action and repeatedly raised concerns about Iran. Not only did he denounce such exercises for being too close to the border, but he also questioned the reason for it which was claimed to be even worse as it took place exactly in the period of the commemoration of the first anniversary of the second Karabakh war (Jasem, 2021). Replying to the astonished reaction of Aliyev, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, stated that Iran’s right to conduct military exercises on its own soil constitutes a fundamental component of its national sovereignty. Hence, precisely pursuant to safeguard its sovereignity as well as national security, Tehran does not tolerate Israel’s presence in the region and is committed to take whichever measure it declares necessary to impede it. The fact that this recent Iranian show of force was the first after the fall of the Soviet Union to be held so close to the shared 700-kilometer border (Rahimov, 2021) has triggered enormous fear in the region that further threats from the Islamic Republic could follow.
Understanding the dynamics between Iran and Azerbaijan
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, former Soviet countries attempted to find their position in the new global order. The then-URRS neighbours – especially Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – required time to stabilize in the newly formed scenario. Ever since the end of the Cold War, the new independent regions of the South Caucasus area have grown in geopolitical prominence so much so that regional and global powers were incentivized to develop new policies to gain strategic dominance and oil power. Especially Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia became attractive targets due to their natural resources and positions. Accordingly, powers like Russia, Turkey, and Iran revised their foreign policies with the aim of establishing a beneficial dialogue with these newly independent countries to impose their influence in the region (Sadri and Entessar, 2009).
The two Caspian Sea littoral republics, which border for 700-kilometers, are characterized by similarities as well as differences. Both countries share values from their mutual past and some elements of a common culture. Both countries host a Sunni Muslims majority – with Azerbaijan being only second to Iran for the percentage of Shia Muslims compared to Sunni Muslims. Moreover, the allegiance of both Baku and Tehran to Muslim and regional organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference and the ECO, symbolizes a certain degree of similarity in terms geography and religion. However, the two nations have different forms of government. Baku has a secular governmental structure, while Tehran affirmed a theocracy in 1970 with the Islamic Revolution. Hence, contrary to Iran, which is keen on encouraging religious organizations in Azerbaijan, the latter fights religious extremism as it considers it one of the major factors threatening national security (Erendor and Öztarsu, 2019).
In spite of these and many other differences, Baku and Tehran are aware of the fact that for the benefit of both powers they have to engage in cooperation given their geostrategic positions in terms of economy and transportation. As they both have significant oil and natural gas reserves which must be made accessible to other nations through their territories, Iran and Azerbaijan came to terms in 2004 and agreed on a gas swap that provides Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan Autonomous Region – which was cut off from the rest of the country by the Armenian invasion in the Nagorno Karabakh region – with Iranian natural gas. Azerbaijan also agreed to deliver gas to Iran’s northern provinces as part of the agreement. Similarly, The North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) project provides some benefits for both countries in terms of international transport and transfer activities (Erendor and Öztarsu, 2019). However, despite this, the last 10 years of relations and especially recent happening have proven that binding factors, such as sharing the same religious belief or establishing cooperation to achieve common aims may be a good start, but is not enough to create solid intra-national relations.
The main factor influencing the relationships between Tehran and Baku lies in the division of Azerbaijan. Indeed, what we know nowadays as the Republic of Azerbaijan is only one part of it as the other portion of the country is located in the North-West of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here, a several-million-strong ethnic-Azerbaijani Turk population residing near the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan make up a substantial portion of Iran’s population. Azeris ethnic group, to which Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei belongs, are strongly present in the northern cities of Tabriz and Orumieh and have a strong commercial presence in the capital Tehran (Daragahi, 2020). For a long time, Iran’s Azerbaijanis were denied many national rights due to the Iranian policy of chauvinism, especially in the field of national culture. The Azerbaijani Turkish language was banned from main sectors of the societies, such as schools, courts, government offices as well as in the army. Some forms of Azerbaijan culture were outlawed as well. A major example of this nationalism became tangible in the events connected to the parliamentary elections in Iran in 1996 (Nassibli, 1999).
The factor of the divided Azerbaijan and the strong presence of Azerbaijani within Iran is crucial to understand what shapes today’s relations between the two nations. Against this background, and although Azerbaijan is an important historical and cultural neighbour for Iran, it represents a potential source of instability for Iranian national insecurity (Nassibli, 1999). Proof of this is the fact, despite Iran being geopolitically more affiliated to Armenia, in 2020 during the Azerbaijan and Armenia war the Islamic Republic politically and military backed Azerbaijan against every expectation. This choice mainly resided in the importance but also in the concern that the 10 million Azeri population in Iran represent for Tehran. To emphasize Iran’s support for Baku, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei once asserted that “Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenia should be liberated and returned to Azerbaijan” (Daragahi, 2020). An important factor for choosing sides was also played by the Iranian recognition of Baku’s military superiority over Armenia – so Daragahi. Probably if a part of Azerbaijan’s population was not within Irian borders, relationships between the two countries would have developed along completely different roads
Another major factor impacting the Iranian-Azeri relationship is the religious factor. Baku has repeatedly accused Tehran of trying to expand its Shia geopolitical policy on Azerbaijan by applying Iranian revolutionary methods. Indeed, ever since the reign of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran has shaped its foreign policy around the aim of exporting its Islamic revolution and its Shia ideology abroad, beginning from its neighbourhood. Shi’ism is the strongest factor linking Azerbaijani Turks to Persians and other Persian-language peoples of Iran and precisely because of this religious affinity, Tehran chose Azerbaijan as the most appropriate target for exporting the Islamic revolution. Hence, even nowadays Shi’ism and Iran’s constant attempt to spread Islamic values and ideas of Islamic statehood in the Republic plays a very significant role in the creation of the foundations for Iranian influence over Azerbaijan. However, despite the numerous attempts, Tehran did not manage to intensify Islamic influence within Azerbaijan. Responsible for this unsuccess may be that the foundations of Islam have been undermined in Baku’s society during the previous 200 years as a result of Russia’s and later the Soviet Union’s severe anti-religious policies, and atheist attitudes are more common than religious beliefs (Nassibli, 1999). In spite of Baku’s resistance, as Nuriyev (2012) claims, “Azerbaijan has indeed been significantly affected by the ideology of the Iranian-trained clerics, since Tehran has consistently exploited any unrest to strengthen its political weight there. Azerbaijani leaders have already seen Iran interfering in their country’s internal affairs and Baku has long been under pressure to cooperate more closely with the clerical regime in Tehran”.
On the other hand, Tehran has suspected Baku of exporting Azerbaijan’s profound nationalistic sentiment to Iran. This became a concern for Iranian national security and, hence, a core element shaping Iran-Azerbaijan relations as well as regional order. Fear for the integrity of the Islamic Republic coming from Azerbaijanis’ nationalism was already expressed by the then-Iranian leader Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who “emphasized the potential danger of an Azerbaijani nationalism as an equal threat of the former communist presence in the region. He clearly stated that Iran wouldn’t allow any kind of nationalist movement even if they have an Islamic motivation” (Erendor and Öztarsu, 2019). Greater autonomy for ethnic Azeri regions of Iran and enhancement of pan-Turkic sentiments have been increasingly on the rise in the past two decades. “After Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh once again escalated into open conflict in July, Iranian Azeris took to the streets of north-western Iran and Tehran in support of Baku in late September and early October. Security forces immediately cracked down on protests and subsequently summoned and arrested activists, with at least 50 reportedly detained thus far” (Toumaj, 2020).
Behind Tehran’s deep concern for Azerbaijan’s nationalism is the fear of the “emergence of a strong and wealthy Azerbaijan that would act as a magnet for Azerbaijanis living in communities in the northern part of Iran” (Nuriyev, 2012). Hence, the reason why the Islamic Republic has been trying to gain the upper hand on the Republic of Azerbaijan, bring it into its political orbit and eradicate the influence of the former on Iran’s Azeri population is the fear that “the presence of over twenty million Azerbaijanis residing in Iran is the spark which could ignite the fragile powder keg”, that is, the multi-ethnic structure of the Islamic Republic – so Nuriyev. This fear is exactly what shapes Iran’s policy toward Azerbaijan nowadays. Accordingly, it can be claimed that it would be in Iran’s best interest if Azerbaijan would fall under Russia’s influence.
Another major reason for Iranian-Azeri tension grounds in the division of the Caspian Sea. The dispute over the sea’s division mirrors broader tensions in the energy-rich Caspian region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, littoral states of the Caspian Sea – i.e., Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan – had debated the division of the sea to manage natural resources and deployment of security forces. Tehran has always been demanding a greater share than the former Soviet republics were willing to concede. While Russia has gradually taken a more accommodative position towards Azerbaijan and the participation of Western oil firms, Iran has taken a more antagonistic stance (Frantz, 2001). Indeed, for a long period, Iran and Azerbaijan have maintained a different stance on the division of the sea, fuelling tension of bilateral relations between them.
These became extremely strained in 2001, when two Azerbaijani research vessels have been halted by an Iranian gunboats and aircraft from oil exploration in the Alov-Sharg-Araz structure in the Caspian Sea and expelled from an area of the sea which Tehran claims for itself. The then- Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister Artur Rasizade denounced Iran’s action by calling it a “gross violation of international norms that could cause serious damage to relations” (Lelyveld, 2001). Iran had allegedly threatened to use force if the ships did not withdraw from Iranian Caspian waters. Iran claimed that it was in the interest of national security to protect its legitimate rights and to halt foreign influence – pointing at the Azerbaijanis vessels that under Britain’s BP oil company had been appointed to explore an oil field about 150 km southeast of Baku (Lelyveld, 2001). Tension over the Caspian See seemed to have decreased in 2018. In light of ex-President Rouhani’s claim that “the fields should serve for the benefit of both nations instead of remaining locked up in the sea”, Tehran and Baku signed “a memorandum of understanding on joint development of offshore hydrocarbon fields in the Caspian Sea” (Rahimov, 2018) thereby raising hopes over this decade-long dispute.
Iran’s fear of encirclement
Recent military drills conducted by Tehran at the border with Azerbaijan can be interpreted as Tehran’s reply to two major happenings. One concerns the Azerbaijani restrictions on the access of Iranian truck to Armenia and the detention of two drivers. Iranian truck drives have been imposed tariffs and detained as they have been accused of entering Azerbaijan illegally from Armenia (Isayev, 2021). The second reason lies in the joint military action hold in Azerbaijan alongside Turkey and Pakistan in September 2021. The aim of this action was to “further strengthening the existing ties” between the three states and their respective militaries. What immediately provoked Tehran’s reaction as well as concerns is not only limited to Ankara and Islamabad’s cooperation with Baku, but is mainly dictated by the nature of the powers baking Azerbaijan. In fact, Turkey has the second-largest NATO army, and Pakistan is a key player in the nuclear field (Esfandiari, 2021).
Iran’s military exercises conducted this month were named “Fatehan-e Khaybar” (“Conquerors of Khaybar”), which refers to the historic Battle of Khaybar where Muslim fighters managed to defeat Jewish force. Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari which was at the command of the Iranian army “attributed the significance of the drills to what he depicted as the overt and covert presence of the Zionist regime’s proxies and the possibility of a significant number of Daesh [Islamic State] terrorists in regional countries” (Rahimov, 2021). From here the main reason for Tehran’s display of military capabilities becomes clear: Tehran would not tolerate Israel’s presence in the Caucasus thereby condemning any activity of the Zionist regime harming Iran’s national security. Additionally, during the drills, the commander of the Iranian army’s ground forces expressed its fears regarding fighters recruited by Azerbaijan during last year’s fighting over the of Nagorno-Karabakh region. He claimed that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has never started any invasion. But when there was war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a considerable number of ISIS terrorists were called to the area” (Motamedi, 2021).
Because it is seen to be increasingly crucial to Jerusalem’s fundamental goal of confronting Tehran, Israel’s expanding presence on Tehran’s doorstep is a significant security issue for the Islamic Republic. The latter has long viewed neighbouring Azerbaijan as Israel’s proxy and the increasing military support provided to Baku by Israel alongside Turkey would radically change the geostrategic balance to Iran’s disadvantage. Indeed, Tehran is concerned that if Azerbaijan is successful in forcing the Zangzur corridor on the Armenian government, Baku would be able to easily link by land to Turkey, Israel, and the European Union, thus eliminating Iran from its transit calculations. Iran sees this as a move to strengthen Israel’s and NATO’s presence on its borders, as well as a threat to Iran’s relations with Armenia (Qaidari, 2021).
Iran regards Baku’s connections to Israel as a danger to its national security. Israel has been suspected of using the relationships with Baku to spy on Iran for years, employing techniques such as unmanned observation planes. The State Border Service of Azerbaijan is the primary recipient of Israeli intelligence and assault drones. According to Tehran, Baku has allowed Israel great operational flexibility to organize operations deep within Iran on Azerbaijani soil. The newest accusation from Tehran is that Israel used Azerbaijan as a staging site for an operation that embarrassed Iran’s leadership and security agencies in 2018. Israel stole tens of thousands of key nuclear papers in 2018 (Vatanka, 2021). Azerbaijan and Israel increasing cooperation has been proven by $1.6 billion arms agreement in 2012. Azerbaijan has been accused by Iran of assisting Israel in the assassination of an Iranian scientist in 2012, as well as permitting Israel to launch a drone from its territory in 2014 (Toumaj, 2020). To these accusation Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister replied by stating that “Azerbaijan pursues an independent foreign policy and, on this basis, establishes relations with its neighbours” but “does not allow anyone to interfere in its internal affairs” (Frantzman, 2021).
The Israeli goal of pushing closer to Iran reflects Iran’s own attempts in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza to strengthen its presence on Israel’s doorstep. Because of improvements in Israel’s relations with many other powers in the Middle-East, Tehran is feeling the pressure of a rising Israeli encirclement strategy. Indeed, improved diplomatic dialogue has been achieved in 2020 in the framework of the Abraham Accords between Israel and both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as between Israel and the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq. Israel has never had so many diplomatic, economic, and military-intelligence relationships with nations surrounding Iran, all of which turn to Israel for help in countering Iran’s regional ambitions (Vatanka, 2021).
In the midst of the security challenge posed by Israel-backed Azerbaijan, it is uncertain to what degree the new Ebrahim Raisi administration and Supreme National Security Council can establish a coherent defense and security policy. However, given the fact that tensions in the Middle East and the Caucasus are significantly higher than last year, the prospect of an assertive defense and foreign policy is obvious. Despite the fact that Israel has a new prime minister, the country’s security posture toward Iran has not altered. The purported covert Israeli activities that destroyed Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have heightened the danger of Iranian reprisal against Israelis and interests in the Middle East (Qaidari, 2021).
The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War was the even that started to threatened Iran’s position in the South Caucasus thereby urging for a change in the Iranian foreign policy especially because of Turkey’s and Russia’s growing influence in the region. It was evident from the start of the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow was not worried about Tehran’s influence. What mainly concerned Russia was the Turks as well as Ankara’s capacity to make additional gains into the South Caucasus (Vatanka, 2020). The peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan of November 2020 excluded Iran from the negotiations thereby highlighting its precarious position in the shifting geopolitics of the South Caucasus. After all, Tehran lacked the necessary clout to sway the conflict’s outcome. Both Russia and Turkey, on the other hand, were the principal players who then negotiated a ceasefire accord and oversaw its implementation (Avdaliani, 2021). Knowing that Iran would be unable to thwart any plans in Karabakh, and that it requires Russia’s assistance, such as in its dispute with the United States in the United Nations Security Council, in early in November 2020, Moscow humiliated Iran by announcing that it would accept an Iranian cease-fire plan, only to shut Tehran out and offer a seat to Turkey (Toumaj, 2020). Russia as the main power deciding war negotiations together with the return of Turkish forces to the South Caucasus represented the start of the decreasing regional power of the Islamic Republic and, hence, its absence from the newly formed power competition in the region.
A further motive for Tehran’s recent show of power lies in its concern for the strong ties between Baku and Ankara, which implies a strong presence of the latter at Tehran’s doorstep. Turkey and Azerbaijan have deep ethnic, cultural, and historical links. They both host a Muslim predominant population and share similar economic interests so much so that they refer to their relationship as “two states, one country.” Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence, and the two countries have developed strong commercial relations. A shared concern between the two are Armenia’s strong the regional ambitions. Turkish diplomatic relations with Armenia, on the other hand, are non-existent due to the mass murders and deportations of Armenians by Ottoman Turks a century ago, which had already strained relations between Armenia and Turkey (Fraser, 2020). Turkey’s backing for Azerbaijan during last year’s Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict strengthened ties between Ankara and Baku. What mostly concerned Tehran was the possibility that Turkey’s supporting strategy for Azerbaijan would lead Ankara to gain a stronger influence in the future of the South Caucasus. At the moment, Turkey is stepping up defense cooperation with Azerbaijan in order to build on last year’s military victory to the extent that there was suspicion that Ankara was willing to establish a combined military force with Baku in order to expand its influence in the South Caucasus (Ozcelik, 2021).
Conclusion
Given their ethnic, religious, and historical closeness, this geopolitical competition is extremely sensitive for both Iran and Azerbaijan. A hypothetical conflict with Baku could lead Iran’s own Azeri minority to cause turmoil. Indeed, within Iran, ethnic Azerbaijani nationalism, along with current discontent over socioeconomic conditions, might result in an explosive scenario in the country’s northern districts. This situation could be intensified by both Israel and Turkey’s long history of attempting to rally the Iranian Azerbaijani population against the Iranian government (Vatanka, 2021). The current Israeli military assistance for Azerbaijan has prompted Tehran to believe that the two nations’ ties would only become stronger in the future, thereby exacerbating Tehran’s fear of encirclement by the two allies. Iran’s close proximity to the South Caucasus and extensive historical links to the region should have made it a natural role in the region. Instead, throughout the previous 20 years, Iran’s decision to focus its troops and resources in the Arab world has resulted in Tehran’s irrelevance in influencing the trajectory of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and, hence, in Iran’s exclusion from overseeing the dynamics of the South Caucasus (Vatanka, 2021). Accordingly, Tehran’s military exercise along its recent intensified ties with Armenia can be interpreted as a proof of combat readiness and high military capabilities to disguise the rising fear of losing foothold as international player – a fear that led Tehran to strengthen its stance in the Caucasus and particularly to rise tones with neighbour Baku.
One thing for sure is that a direct fight between Baku and Tehran would lead to disastrous consequences for the entire region as other major world powers would be called to intervene thereby destabilizing international order. NATO member Turkey has long been Azerbaijan’s most ardent military ally, openly arming and advising the country against Armenia. Thus, a flare-up of violence would swiftly ensnare Ankara, which in June inked a mutual defense treaty with Azerbaijan, promising “necessary support” in the event of an assault. These strong ties between the two countries have been concerning Tehran for a long time now as Turkey’s supportive policy of Azerbaijan may lead to Ankara gaining a strong position in the future of the South Caucasus. Moreover, President Erdogan has now dispatched troops to oversee the cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia, alongside Russia, which has committed 2,000 peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, Russia finds itself in good terms with Armenia where it maintains a military base. Ties between the two have enhanced through defence accord, while diplomatic dialogue between Moscow and Baku have been strained since the Azerbaijan-Armenia due to disagreements over the cease-fire agreement (Agayev and Motevalli, 2021).
Relations between Tehran and Baku are extremely tight and are not showing any signs of either side taking steps to deescalate tensions. Neither Tehran nor Baku can afford for recent events to escalate into a full-fledged crisis or a military confrontation between the two Shia Muslim-majority countries. However, whether the Iran’s military posturing will lead to something more serious remains unsure for now.
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By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
