In January of this year, the three foreign ministers of Pakistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan issued a joint declaration in Islamabad with a comprehensive agenda for deepened future cooperation. The main message was to combat together ‘Islamophobia’, discrimination and persecution of Muslim minorities worldwide in regional and international formats. Also, the ministers agreed to exchange information, research, expertise and best practices, and called for international cooperation and solidarity to address the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, they demanded enhanced collaboration for food and energy security, environment and sustainable development on an international level (Pamuk, 2021). Dressed in western rhetoric, the declaration was designed to appeal to the international community.
The more relevant part of the joint declaration, however, was the announcement of increased collaboration between the three states on security issues such as terrorism, organized transnational crime, drug and human trafficking among other matters. Solicitations were asserted that the situation in the Indian federal state of Jammu and Kashmir and alleged human rights abuses there perpetrated by the Indian authorities should be solved peacefully according to UN Security Council resolutions; that the conflict in divided Cyprus should find a settlement respecting international law; and that the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be settled with regard to UN Security Council resolutions (Pamuk, 2021). All these points considered together point to a geopolitical scope of this collaboration.
At first glance, Turkey, Pakistan and Azerbaijan do not seem to have much in common except for being Muslim-majority countries, albeit of different factions. Turkey’s and Pakistan’s populations are mostly Sunni, whereas Azerbaijan is majority Shi’a. In Turkey and Azerbaijan, people speak Turkic languages, while in Pakistan Urdu is the most common language which is linguistically close to Hindi. Nevertheless, a Turkish television production about the father of the Ottoman Empire’s founder on Pakistani state television (“Diriliş: Ertuğrul”) has proven to be highly popular and has spurred rumors to create another series together (Rafiq, 2021). Ankara and Baku have traditionally upheld close relations best embodied in the slogan of “two countries, one nation”. At a meeting of military staff earlier this year between Turkish and Pakistani officials, the propagandistic phrase of “two countries, one nation” has been extended to Pakistan (Hindustan Times, 2021).
Military cooperation
That Azerbaijan has been profiting from close military cooperation and arms deals with Turkey was demonstrated only last autumn during the Nagorno-Karabakh war between the former and Armenia. Turkish-made drones used by Azeri troops gave them the decisive edge over Armenia’s army (TRT World, 2021). Pakistan as well wants to benefit from Turkey’s state-of-the-art military technologies and purchase armed drones (in particular the Bayraktar TB-2) as well as deepen the bilateral defense cooperation. Signs of an alignment on foreign policy issues can be seen in the cases of Kashmir and Afghanistan, where formulated policy goals widely overlap (Philips, 2021). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s diplomatic support to Pakistan in regard to Kashmir has been welcomed warmly in Islamabad as they struggled to elicit assistance from other Muslim-majority countries (Rafiq, 2021).
In a display of their companionship, Pakistan’s President Arif Alvi even decorated the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, General Ümit Dündar, with the Order of Excellence (Nishan-e-Imtiaz), one of Pakistan’s highest military awards. This ceremony came after in April of this year, Pakistan’s Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Nadeem Raza, had been awarded the Legion of Merit by the Turkish Armed Forces for his promotion of bilateral defense relations (Philip, 2021).
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ascertained that arms sales between Turkey and Pakistan in the years between 2016-19 added up to $112 million, surpassing the US as Pakistan’s 4th largest weapons importer. At the same time, Pakistan was Turkey’s 3rd largest export market and Ankara will deliver in the upcoming years orders for military equipment surmounting $3 billion. For Pakistan, Turkey serves as an alternative access source to western military technology from which Islamabad is mostly excluded and, concurrently, reduces their dependence on Chinese weaponry. Besides training aircraft, naval vessels, drone parts and bombs, Turkey has agreed also to transfer technology as in the case of a corvettes deal (MILGEM Ada-class), or research and development cooperation as well as staff and student exchanges between the Turkish Aerospace Industries and the National University of Science and Technology in Islamabad, with a special focus on defense technologies (Rafiq, 2021; TRT World, 2021). Turkey not only assisted Pakistan in upgrading its attack submarines and the construction of new Corvettes and oil tankers, but also extended an armed helicopter deal from July 2018 this year, worth $1.5 billion. However, delivery is on halt due to the US refusal to hand out export licenses for parts produced by American companies (Philip, 2021).
In contrast, Turkey requires fighter aircraft systems and missile technology from Pakistan (of Chinese origin), as the US has put a hold on technology transfers to Turkey because of the S-400 affair. Pakistan possesses missiles technology of conventional as well as nuclear nature (Philip, 2021). At the December 2020 Turkey-Pakistan-High-Level Dialogue Group meeting, high-ranking members of both countries’ governments were discussing Pakistani support to a Turkish nuclear program (Khan, 2021).
Military cooperation between Pakistan and Azerbaijan has so far been very limited. The chiefs of the Azeri and Pakistani air forces met in January 2021 to discuss joint pilot training and military exercises (TRT World, 2021). On the diplomatic stage, nevertheless, mutual support has been exhibited. In May 2020, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, voiced his concern over alleged human rights abuses in the Kashmir region, which gave a slight lift to Pakistan’s campaign (ibid.).
In return, Pakistan supported Azerbaijan’s right to defend a region internationally recognized as national territory of Azerbaijan in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Islamabad was also the second government after Ankara to recognize Azerbaijan as an independent country after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As an interesting side note, relations between Pakistan and Armenia have been strained ever the latter’s independence: Islamabad does not recognize Armenia as a state; and in 2016, Armenia blocked Pakistan’s ascension to observer status at the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (ibid.).
Economic cooperation
In the economic realm, cooperation between the three has been increasing. Here as well, the relations between Turkey and Pakistan have been much stronger than between Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Ankara’s foreign direct investment in Pakistan has numbered over $300 million since 2009, and Turkish companies have bought themselves into the Pakistani market – like Arçelik, a subsidiary of the Koç Holding conglomerate, which took over a Pakistani enterprise for $258 million -; or they have built infrastructure there – like Zorlu Energy, which has been involved in several renewable power projects. However, trade has been stagnating between the two, to a good part owing to Ankara’s protectionist policies (Rafiq, 2021).
Islamabad’s handling of its ailing economy has faced a lot of criticism, and hence, President Khan’s hopes rest on improving trade relations with countries in the region. Turkey plays a decisive role in the Pakistani government’s plans since investment by Turkish enterprises have grown to over $1 billion now. Last February, the two leaders signed a Strategic Economic Framework agreement on a range of areas from health, science and technology, to defense and tourism. Also, negotiations of a Free Trade Agreement between the two are ongoing. Even large-scale infrastructure projects like a rail line between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have been reactivated this year to ease and increase trade flows. Besides this, cooperation on several other infrastructure projects involving both states are taking place at the moment, such as the Trans-Afghan Railway or the Central Asia-South Asia transmission line (to export surplus hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan) and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (Khan, 2021). Both Turkey’s and Pakistan’s economies are not in the best shape, and both are net energy importers. Especially, Pakistan requires sustained economic growth to be able to attain strategic autonomy and geopolitical leverage (Rafiq, 2021).
As economic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have been steadily growing, negotiations to a Free Trade Agreement between the two may increase the bilateral trade volume to $15 billion (Daily Sabah, 2021). Ankara profits from Baku’s energy exports, while the Azeris are most interested in Turkish military technology. Still, the improvement of trade flows is a priority and the strengthening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail line and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is seen to benefit both states mutually (ibid.). Although Pakistan and Azerbaijan signed an Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1995, trade flows have remained small and stagnant amounting to only $13.2 million in 2020 (Khalilov, 2021). To change that, both governments decided to establish a joint Chamber of Economic Cooperation. Membership in this organization shall facilitate setting up businesses and increase trade (ibid.). Islamabad has also shown great interest in energy exports from Baku.
Regional developments
The current geopolitical developments in the Middle East shed a light on the motives behind the gradual forming of an alliance between Turkey, Pakistan and Azerbaijan. As Pakistan’s ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been weakening over the last years and Turkey has been trying to increase its role in the region according to sources from the Pakistani defense and security establishment, the deepening of Turko-Pakistani relations on an economic and military level make sense: Turkey can increase their influence in the Middle East with its selling of military equipment and Pakistan can boost their military power with these purchases significantly (Philip, 2021).
Since Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have been seeking closer ties to India to export their energy to the latter and Pakistan has been looking north for energy supplies, they have distanced themselves from Pakistan’s Kashmiri case (Findlay et al., 2020). Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have traditionally been Islamabad’s two largest sources of foreign direct investment; however, the worsening relations between the former two and the latter will possibly lead to further financial troubles for Islamabad if they cannot gain more from other states: besides Turkey, China is committed to include Pakistan in its Belt and Road Initiative (Hindustan Times, 2021). When Pakistan sought support as India revoked the autonomous status of Kashmir calling in an Islamic summit in Malaysia at the end of 2019 together with the hosts, Turkey and Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates made Pakistan resign from the summit. Furthermore, after a Turkish state visit by Erdogan, Saudi Arabia requested Pakistan to pay back a $1 billion tranche of a $3 billion short-term loan intended to exacerbate Pakistan’s external financing situation (Findlay et al., 2020).
The current focus of both Turkey and Pakistan lies on Afghanistan. Ankara is negotiating with the US to provide security to Kabul airport from the US (Malsin & Lubold, 2021). Since the Taliban have already threatened Turkey that it shall be treated as a NATO state, in other words a western power, rather than as a fellow Muslim state, Ankara needs Pakistani support because of traditionally close ties between the Taliban and Pakistan (Malsin & Lubold, 2021; Philip, 2021). Plans of joint defense projects and cooperation in Afghanistan as well as larger Turkish investments in Pakistan raise alarms in India. Particularly disquieting to New Delhi is a possible collaboration of the two with China (Philip, 2021). The obvious menace to India stems from a potential encirclement of a China-Pakistan defense alliance and their additional military presence in Afghanistan.
An alliance to contain Iran?
The unifying factor of the triangle Pakistan – Turkey – Azerbaijan seems to be Iran with which all three states may uphold ostentatiously good relations, however, each is eyeing Tehran with some suspicion and are wary of growing Irani influence in the wider region. Although Pakistan has entertained continually positive relations with Iran – for example the latter’s support in the Kashmir conflict -, Islamabad is in dire need of capital and trade opportunities, and prospects of Tehran’s debilitated economy do not look rosy (World Bank, 2021). Azerbaijan’s relations to Iran, on the other side, are more contentious, not only because of its sizeable Azeri minority in the neighboring state. Baku accused Tehran of supporting Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war providing the Armenian military with Russian weaponry (Motamedi, 2020).
With links to Azerbaijan in the north of Iran, Pakistan to the east, and also taking Qatar into the equation in the south of Iran, Turkey’s encirclement of Iran is nearly perfect, particularly if the Turks manage to step up their engagement in Afghanistan together with Pakistan. A reliable relationship to Pakistan would also give Turkey a direct access point to the Indian Ocean and the sea lanes there. In connection to Turkey’s naval bases in Somalia, the last point would bolster their stand on the immensely important trade lines passing through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.
A clear sign that this formation may also serve geopolitical purposes outside Asia can be gleaned from a recent tweet by the Pakistani embassy in Turkey. The tweet itself details the schedule for a three-day event aimed at the public in Northern Cyprus to promote interactions between the northern Cypriots and Pakistan. Speculation has arisen that this could be a hint that Islamabad may recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, along a number of other states including Azerbaijan, Libya, Bangladesh and Gambia with the same intention (Şafak, 2021). In the context of the upcoming state visit of Erdogan to Northern Cyprus on July 20th for the celebrations of the 1974 Turkish invasion where the president announced suggestively “to give the necessary messages to the whole world” (Ahval, 2021). This would mean a great diplomatic victory for Turkey in their quest to secure their (partial) hold over the island of Cyprus, which has an enormous geostrategic value in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Conclusion
The ramifications of this apparently growing cooperation between these three states is directed against their common rival Iran as much as a means for each of them to bolster their own agendas: for Turkey to increase its influence in the Middle East, for Azerbaijan (and Turkey) to strengthen its position in the Caucasus, and Pakistan to find allies against India and assistance in managing the threat emanating from Afghanistan. Therefore, in absence of any great economic shocks, this alliance has the potential to flourish and affect regional developments permanently.
This raises the question how the western approach should look like. As Turkey’s NATO membership may first look like an asset, Ankara has proven time and again that they put their national interest over their allies’ common objectives. The prospect of Turkey winning diplomatic support for self-declared independent Northern Cyprus would put an end to a reunification of Cyprus and strengthen Turkey’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea significantly to the detriment of the EU members Cyprus and Greece, not to mention the added competition for the US and British navies there.
Leaving the complicated situations in the Caucasus and Afghanistan aside, a last important point is the question of supporting India as part of the Quad’s and the EU’s mission to monitor the Indo-Pacific region. As mentioned above, the current regional developments constitute a dangerous change of fortunes to New Delhi. Since the Biden administration appears to bet on Turkey remaining a trustworthy ally, India will have to seek to enhance cooperation with other friendly nations like Japan and Australia invested not to lose control over the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. Turkey is certainly inclined to gain access to Pakistani naval bases or, better, to build one by themselves. In any case, the triangle may benefit Turkey to enlarge their footprint in the Middle East further.
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By Andreas Rösl : The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
