Tensions between DR Congo and Rwanda heightened as M23 rebel group reemerges

Since November 2021, Congolese forces have been battling a resurgence of the M23 rebel group in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Though one of over 100 non-state armed militias currently active in eastern DRC, the recent reemergence of M23 has exacerbated an already dire humanitarian situation and contributed to a rapid deterioration in relations between the country and its neighbors.¹ If regional and international actors do not pursue immediate and longer long term solutions to de-escalate the crisis and address the security situation in the DRC, it could cause instability to spread at the very least, and at worst, risks reigniting interstate war.

Background and recent developments

The northeastern provinces of the DRC have been plagued by instability since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003. Despite the signing of a peace agreement between rebel forces backed by Uganda and Rwanda and DRC government forces backed by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, poor governance and weak institutions have allowed armed groups to continue to flourish in the region. The March 23 Movement (M23) emerged in 2009 following a failed peace deal and in 2012, captured swaths of North Kivu province before government troops, supported by UN peacekeepers, defeated the group in 2013.²

In the decade after, M23 remained largely dormant until last November when UN and government military stations in villages bordering Uganda and Rwanda in North Kivu were attacked. In the months since, the rebel group has made large territorial gains along the borders of both countries.³

As one expert from the African Center for Strategic Studies notes, “the long-standing rivalry between Uganda and Rwanda in the DRC…is a key driver of the current crisis.” ⁴ Following the defeat of M23 in 2013, the armed group split with some fighters seeking refuge in Rwanda and others in Uganda.⁵ The two countries are long-time regional rivals with a history of funding rebel groups in the DRC to carve out competing spheres of influence in the mineral-rich eastern provinces. However, analysts suggest that recent economic and military endeavors strengthening ties between Uganda and the DRC have left Rwanda feeling particularly marginalized. ⁶ It is within this context that M23 has reemerged.

What makes this time different?

While the resurgence of M23 could easily be written off as simply one more militant group among the hundreds currently active in the seemingly perpetually unstable region, several elements of this group’s comeback are cause for greater concern.

The first is the group’s firepower and capability. The head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Bintou Keita, suggests that this time around, “M23 has conducted itself increasingly as a conventional army, rather than an armed group.” ⁷ The sophistication of M23’s equipment and operational capacity pose a serious problem for the peacekeeping mission, despite MONUSCO being one of the largest active UN peace operations with an annual budget of around $1 billion.⁸ Moreover, the redirection of UN and government personnel and resources to respond to the M23 threat has created a security vacuum that other armed groups are taking advantage of. The UN has recorded a sharp uptick in reports of looting, rape, and murder, and increasing instability makes it exponentially more difficult for humanitarian aid groups to access communities in need. As a result, over 700,000 people have been forced from their homes just this year in a region that has one of the highest overall levels of displacement in the world.⁹ Without a solution, the already dire humanitarian situation will almost certainly continue to worsen and could spill over into neighboring countries.

But perhaps even more concerning for the sake of regional stability is the subsequent deterioration in relations between the DRC and Rwanda. Despite a thawing of hostilities between the two countries following the election of President Tshisekedi in 2019, the resurgence of M23 violence has reignited long-standing tensions. The DRC has accused Rwanda of supporting the M23 rebels and Rwanda, in turn, has accused the DRC of supporting the Rwandan rebel group the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which also operates in eastern DRC. Both governments deny these accusations.¹⁰ In June, cross-border rocket fire and an incident in which a Congolese soldier was killed in a dispute with Rwandan border guards resulted in the DRC closing its border with Rwanda. While strained relations between these two governments is not new, what is cause for concern is the regional context within which this crisis is unfolding. The presence of Ugandan troops in North Kivu and Ituri and the growing ties between Uganda and the DRC has heightened Rwanda’s sense of isolation, and this growing threat perception in the absence of an effective dispute resolution mechanism between the two sides makes the risk of a wider interstate conflict a stronger possibility than in the recent past.¹¹

The role of the international community and recommendations for key priorities going forward

Regional actors have taken steps to try to identify a solution. In March, the DRC joined the East African Community (EAC), a regional trade bloc, and following support from Kenya, approved the deployment of a multinational East African force to eastern DRC. However, this approach has yet to become operational and comes with several complications that must be taken into consideration, including the composition of the force, which should exclude countries with direct interests in the DRC (namely its neighbors), and its coordination with existing interventions.¹²

On the diplomatic front, the EAC has also pursued negotiations between the DRC and some of its rebel groups and between the DRC and Rwanda. In April, the DRC government met with 23 armed groups, including M23, in a first round of talks hosted by Kenya, but concrete political progress has yet to be seen.¹³ At the state level, President Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame met in Angola in July. The talks resulted in a commitment by both leaders to ease tensions and establish a joint commission on rebel operations affecting both countries.¹⁴ However, an unpublished report by a UN Group of Experts began circulating in early August and seemed to confirm the DRC’s accusations that the Rwandan military did provide M23 rebels with equipment and ammunition ¹⁵ This has spurred fresh accusations and renewed hostility between Rwanda and the DRC.¹⁶

While both countries have since recommitted to talks following a visit from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken,¹⁷ the international community needs to do more to ensure de-escalation of the current crisis resulting from the M23 resurgence and a lasting political solution in the DRC. From a moral standpoint, external actors, especially western countries that pride themselves on their commitment to human rights and democracy, have an interest in ensuring that the humanitarian situation does not continue to worsen. From a geopolitical perspective, the situation in the DRC is also strategically significant for Western actors because according to some analysts, the destabilization presents an opportunity for rival great powers such as Russia and China to bolster their own influence in the region and gain access to the DRC’s valuable rare earth mineral reserves.¹⁸

As a result, the immediate priority should be the employment of a third-party verification mechanism to investigate and resolve disputes between the DRC and Rwanda. The current security environment has heightened both governments’ perception of threats, so having this measure in place now would help to prevent smaller disputes from escalating into full-blown conflict. A third-party verification mechanism has been used before in the DRC during the Second Congo War, and the East African Community could use its resources to replicate the measure. The longer-term priority of the international community should be targeting renewed support toward political mediation between the DRC government and its many rebel groups rather than military intervention. This is because the problems facing the DRC are at their roots political in nature.¹⁹ These actions could go a long way toward de-escalating tensions and making significant political progress more possible. Thus, while the resurgence of M23 has created new problems for the DRC, its neighbors, and international actors with interests in the region, it may also provide new impetus for the international community to do something about the situation that has given rise to this crisis in the first place.

Citations

1. Sengenya, Claude & Patricia Huon. “Revived M23 rebellion worsens DR Congo’s security troubles.” The New Humanitarian, 7 July 2022. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/07/07/Congo-M23-Rwanda-martial-law-demobilisation-ADF-CODECO
2. “Instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Center for Preventative Action, 3 August 2022. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo
3. “UN experts say Rwanda provided military support to M23 rebels in eastern Congo.” France 24, 4 August 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220804-un-experts-say-rwanda-provided-military-support-to-m23-rebels-in-eastern-congo
4. “Rwanda and the DRC at Risk of War as New M23 Rebellion Emerges: an Explainer.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 June 2022.
5. Sengenya, Claude & Patricia Huon. “Revived M23 rebellion worsens DR Congo’s security troubles.” The New Humanitarian, 7 July 2022.
6. “Rwanda and the DRC at Risk of War as New M23 Rebellion Emerges: an Explainer.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 June 2022.
7. Besheer, Margaret. “UN: Well-Armed M23 Rebels Resurgent in DRC.” VOA News, 29 June 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/un-well-armed-m23-rebels-resurgent-in-drc/6638775.html
8. “UN ‘regrets’ DR Congo’s expulsion of peacekeeping mission spokesman.” France 24, 4 August 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220804-un-regrets-dr-congo-s-expulsion-of-peacekeeping-mission-spokesman
9. Besheer, Margaret. “UN: Well-Armed M23 Rebels Resurgent in DRC.” VOA News, 29 June 2022.
10. “DR Congo President Felix Tshisekedi accuses Rwanda of backing rebels.” France 24, 6 June 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220605-dr-congo-president-felix-tshisekedi-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-rebels
11. “Rwanda and the DRC at Risk of War as New M23 Rebellion Emerges: an Explainer.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 June 2022.
12. “Rwanda and the DRC at Risk of War as New M23 Rebellion Emerges: an Explainer.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 June 2022.
13. Fabricius, Peter. “Now the East African Community tackles the eastern DRC’s rebels.” Institute for Security Studies, 6 May 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/now-the-east-african-community-tackles-the-eastern-drcs-rebels
14. Ndebele, Lenin. “Talks yield positive results as Angola brokers peace between Rwanda and DRC.” News 24, 7 July 2022. https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/talks-yield-positive-results-as-angola-brokers-peace-between-rwanda-and-drc-20220707
15. “UN experts say Rwanda provided military support to M23 rebels in eastern Congo.” France 24, 4 August 2022.
16. Schipani, Andres. “DR Congo criticizes Rwanda after report claims its troops are backing rebels.” Financial Times, 5 August 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/2045ffc9-fbbf-4c80-876e-d4dcd8c23baa
17. Tord, Senanu. “Rwanda, DR Congo Leaders to Begin Talks to End Regional Tensions.” VOA News, 11 August 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-dr-congo-leaders-to-begin-talks-to-end-regional-tensions-/6697887.html
18. Amunga, Victoria. “Bliken Arrives in DRC; Regional Stability Tops Agenda.” VOA News, 9 August 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/blinken-arrives-in-drc-regional-stability-tops-agenda/6694772.html
19. “Rwanda and the DRC at Risk of War as New M23 Rebellion Emerges: an Explainer.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 29 June 2022.

By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.