The already six-year long war in Yemen does not seem to envisage an end in the near future. Charged for having been involved in the 2018 Saudi Arabia-led coalition air attack that led to the killing of Saleh al-Samman – then the armed group’s top civilian leader – this month nine men have been shot to death in Tahrir Square by authorities of the Yemen’s Houthi movement. The court also tried in absentia and condemned to death seven other people, among which the name of former US president Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman were mentioned (Aljazeera, 2021). Earlier in May, Houthi representatives “passed up a major opportunity” that would bring relief to the Yemeni population. They declined the offer of meeting in Oman with UN special representative for Yemen Martin Griffiths, who is asking all parties for an immediate negotiation to end the warrying situation in the county (Aljazeera, 2021). This scenario shows that at the moment there is no end of the war in sight which aggravates the already catastrophic conditions of Yemenis people thereby exacerbating the humanitarian situation which has been claimed to be the largest humanitarian crises in the world. Indeed, since 2015 death toll hit 100,000 victims including more than 17,500 civilians where a quarter of them were women and children killed in air rides (Human Right Watch, 2020). According to UNHCR sources, more than 20 million people are facing food insecurity, 10 million of them are at risk of famine, and 14 million require urgent humanitarian assistance (UNHCR, 2019). Also as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.N. has claimed that that the number of deaths could exceed 230,000 counting a death rate of five times the global average. These atrocities have been claimed to represent infringement of human rights as well as international humanitarian law for which all parties involved in the conflict are to be held responsible (Karasapan, 2020)
The rapid rise of the Houthi movement
After the modern Yemeni state had been created through the merger in 1990 of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the USSR-backed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the former military officer and ruler of Northern Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, assumed authoritarian guidance. However, the government’s failed try to fulfil the needs of its citizens, the uprising of politically marginalized Houthis and the corrupt state, progressively led to Saleh’s incapability to maintain governance and, hence, to the outbreak of the 2015 bloody civil war (Reuters, 2020).
The way in which President Salih raised his regime in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1978 can be sees as one of the main sparks of 2015 crisis. His establishment of “a strong security and defence forces led by members of his family, his Sanhan tribe or loyal associates; the mobilization of the support of the powerful Hashid tribal confederations (of which the Sanhan is a part) and its paramount chief, ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar, through patronage; “coopting tribal and local leaders throughout Yemen into the patronage networks and isolating those who would not participate”; building the General People’s Congress (GPC) as a means of mobilising political support to win elections; and using divide-and-rule tactics”, have played a crucial role in lighting up the war (Brehony, 2015, p.1). An additional reason for the start of the conflict has been identified in the failure of the political transition which was supposed to repristinate stability in the country after a tumultuous period caused by an Arab Spring uprising in 2011. Saleh’s failure to do so forced him to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011. However, the latter’s struggle to deal with some of the country’s pressing problems (such as jihadists attacks, a separatist movement in the south, alongside corruption, unemployment and food scarcity) enabled the rise and the consolidation of the Houthi movement. The latter, known as Ansar Allah, had long been fighting for Yemen’s minority Zaidi Shia Muslim community. By taking advantage of the disastrous economics and social condition of the county, the Houthi movement gained control of northern lands in the Saada province as well as of the neighbouring areas. Disillusioned with the possibility of an improvement of the country’s situation, many ordinary Yemenis started to back the Houthis who, between the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, progressively conquered the capital Sanaa and other governorates, eventually forcing Hadi, through the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), to award them major political privileges up against their promise to remove their troops from the capital. However, not long after Hadi had fulfilled his part of the PNPA the Houthi broke their word, did not withdraw their militias but instead requested even more concessions until the president was forced to resign in January 2015. Thus, instead of settling an armed conflict between the Houthis and the government, the PNPA served as a tool to legitimise the violent political change and occupation of Sanaa (Transfeld, 2014). What strongly contributed to the Houthi’s success on the frontline was their support of the former president’s Saleh military units (Robinson, 2021). From this point onwards, the changing dynamics of the game brought to the unfolding of events which led the war to transform from an interior conflict fought between national actors to a proxy war between foreign powers.
While the Houthi Revolutionary Council began to establish a new political system, president Hadi revoked his resignation, lifted all measures taken so far by the Houthi regime who answered by mobilising troops to cooperate with pro-Salih militias to gain control of Aden and the south part of the country, and arrest Hadi. This last action led to the transformation of the war patterns and to the entrance of foreign powers, first of all of the Saudi-led coalition in March 2015. At this point, the UN Security Council Resolution 2216 required Houthi’s immediate withdrawal from Sanaa and other controlled areas, the cede of their weapons as well as their recognition of President Hadi’s regime (Brehony, 2015).
From a localized conflict to a proxy war
What strongly contributed to the UN declaring Yemen’s situation the worst humanitarian crisis in the world is the unfolding of the war itself throughout the intervention of regional parties that imperil the country to plunge into a “broader Sunni-Shia divide” (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021). The intervention of the Saudi-led coalition into the conflict to prevent the complete collapse of Hadi’s government and the consolidation of the Houthi’s power grounded – according to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – more in its necessity rather than its choice. Indeed, both parties could simply not permit that an ideological movement such as the Houthi could gain control of the whole country and consequently threaten their strategic interests.
A further reason for the intervention of the coalition relies in the concern that in case of complete control of the county, the Houthi would have reached out to Tehran, who would have welcomed the idea given the Houthi’s success with groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq. As a consequence, Iran could have established a constant presence directly on the eastern as well as the southern borders of Riyadh (Blumberg, 2019). However, numerous regional experts claim that Iran’s support for the Houthi is rather constrained as they belong to different streams of Shiite Islam. Yet, the geopolitical interests of Tehran and the Houthis seem to have an identical characteristic. Indeed, the former aims to control Saudi and the US’s dominance in the region, while the Houthis contrasts Hadi’s government supported by both the US and Saudi (Robinson, 2021). Indeed, a proof of Tehran’s support of the Houthi are the Saudi’s several intercepted Iranian armament supplies to the rebel movement in the Aden Gulf since April 2015. Iran’s counterreaction has been the establishment of a naval convoy thereby exacerbating military tensions between the parties (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021).
Notwithstanding its divided stance on the Yemen conflict, US has supported the Saudi-led coalition alongside France, Germany, and the UK. U.S. aiming at achieving the following interests: “security of Saudi borders; free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the choke point between the Arabian and Red Seas and a vital artery for the global transport of oil; and a government in Sanaa that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs” (Global Conflict Tracker, 2021).
Although the coalition did not manage to achieve all its aims, it managed to safeguard the city of Aden from Houthi’s power expansion as well as to expel the movement from the entire south part of the county. Tehran’s support for the Houthi shrunk to a mere political backing and armament supply as the former was impeded from gaining a secure grip on Yemen. This allowed the Saudi-led alliance to preserve Hadi’s government whose powers wera restored in some parts of Yemen. Notwithstanding this, Saudi and the UAE’s attempt to reach a political settlement through a military pressure of the Houthi turned out unsuccessful as they repeatedly failed to induce the latter to negotiations. This resulted in the coalitions’ rising involvement in the war and, hence, in its increasing responsibility for the humanitarian atrocities caused to the Yemenis population (Blumberg, 2019).
Recent happenings
Because of recent occurrences, an end to the humanitarian crises does not seem to be in sight any time soon. The Houthi’s capture of Rahabah on September 8th, 2021, marks their latest victory which caused at least 65 deaths on both parties’ sides. As a further sign of their will to establish their power, the Houthi movement has been threatening the last major fortress of the government, that is, the city of Marib (Aljazeera, 2021).
Clearly weaker are the government forces who, again, have been experiencing the same problems that have obstructed their expansion two years ago. “Government forces in Rahabah, along with their allies, were unorganised, said Balgaith. The main tribes fighting with the government forces in Rahabah received limited support, while the Houthi forces were organised and well-supported” (Alzajeera, 2021). The defeat in Rahabah is only the last of a recent series of setbacks for Hadi’s government. “So far in 2021, along with Marib, government forces have launched offensives in Bayda in central Yemen, Taiz in the southwest of the country, and Hajjah in the northwest. While they all brought about initial successes, particularly in Taiz, and much fanfare from pro-government media, none has had much of a lasting effect, and most government advances have eventually been reversed by the Houthis” – so Aljazeera (2021). According to the newspaper (2021), the government lacks an effective military strategy that permits to limit Houthi’s expansion. Indeed, government counterattacks and military offensives are a mere attempt to “increase activity on a front line, alleviate popular discontent, or get more funding”.
The weakness of the government’s actions is also heavily affected by the division within the anti-Houthi side itself. In fact, the government, the southern separatist as well as the supporters of the nephew of former President Saleh claim supposedly to be one the same side but are, instead, in contrast with one another. Thus, “the government would need to completely change its leadership in order to change its military performance […]. The leadership, led by President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, was part of Saleh’s corrupt system. He is a man who was the silent vice president between 1994 and 2011 and is used to doing nothing”. This is, among other weaknesses of the government, what caused the death of at least 30 coalition-backed soldiers following a Houthi attack on Yemen’s most important military base earlier this summer (Aljazeera, 2021).
Another quite recent development which will have major repercussions on the dynamics of the conflict as well as a potential peace agreement, is the withdrawal of the UAE from the war in 2020, who, however, continues to be indirectly implicated. This, together with the curtail of the Sudanese soldiers from 15,000 to only 650 will not only isolate Riyadh in Yemen but also weaken the Saudi lead-coalition and, hence, the support to Hadi’s government forces. This can result in two different scenarios, namely: continuing opposing Houthi’s military advancement despite of the intra-coalition discrepancies, or led the government to agree to “a fragile agreement with the latter to secure a face-saving retreat. Regardless of how Riyadh chooses to proceed, Abu Dhabi has started the countdown to the coalition’s full-fledged military pull out” (Jalal, 2020).
Ways to peacebuilding
Yemen will probably remain one of the main issues of international concern which the international community can under no circumstances disregard. Houthis are unlikely to soften their approach or show signs of internal discrepancies as long as the war continues. Given that it represents an inescapable part of the Yemeni political environment, the Houthi movement will be an indispensable partner for ensuring peacebuilding within the country. Hence, the international community must strengthen its engagement and cooperation with the movement, include its stance on the current international attempts to end the conflict with the ultimate aim of bringing Yemeni actors to the agree to negotiations, while insisting for better conditions for the entire Yemeni population. Moreover, international parties should aim at political settlement only under realistic and reasonable conditions. Indeed, as long as an agreed suspension of hostiles is not achieved and respected by all parties involves, the international community is advised to focus on de-escalation aiming at alleviating the warrying the effect of the war on the population rather than on a political settlement that is likely to lead to opposite unintended adverse effects (Al-Dawsari, 2021).
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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/7/houthis-attacks-worsen-yemens-dire-conditions-us-says
By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
