Monday’s military makeover of power in Sudan which threatens to destroy the country’s fragile transition to democracy, has been severely denounced by the US, EU, and UN, contrarily to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE who have rejected an over-criticizing behaviour. Instead, they called for calm and dialogue.
What happened
Monday’s military coup in Sudan is only the last crisis in a turbulent period for the country and the last of many military democracy-threatening actions that have been attempted ever since revolts in 2019 led to the removal of three decades long Islamist autocrat Omar al-Bashir. The coup headed by the General and head of the country’s Sovereign Council, Abdel-Fattah Burhan, led to the arrest of the only executive authority recognised by the Sudanese people and the world, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s, as well as to the deposition of the Sovereign Council. The latter is a power-sharing assembly of military officials and civilians that had been ruling the country after al-Bashir’s overthrow aimed at leading the country to free elections and democracy. Yet, ever since the start, the 2019 agreement between civilian and military leaders has proven fragile as a number of previous coup attempts have been destabilizing the country, the last just over a month ago (BBC News, 2021). Burhan declared Sudan’s state of emergency and announced that a technocratic administration would be created to run the country until elections could be conducted in 2023 – promising to keep his word about holding a “democratic vote” on schedule. However, in a year and a half much can happen, and it is unclear whether the powerful military is eager to relinquish its decades-long hold on power (BBC News, 2021).
Despite raging population taking to the street to demand return to civilian rule, the General asserted that the military’s action was far from being comparable to a coup. He justified the military’s takeover of power, claiming that the government was dissolved to avert civil strife. Indeed, the coup was deemed to be necessary to put politicians who were agitating against the armed forces on the back burner (Al Jazeera, 2021). He also claimed that “the agreement with civilian members of the country’s transitional sovereign council became a conflict over the past two years, threatening peace and unity in Sudan” (Kottasová and Mackintosh, 2021). He accused that the path towards state freedom and peace was hampered by political powers who he accused of disregarding the country’s political, economic, and social threats.
This has led to mass uprising all over the country which continue despite troops have opened fire on demonstrators, wounding around 140 people and killing at least 10. Thousands of Sudanese protesters flocked to the streets in Khartoum, where they were met by gunshots near the military headquarters. Protesters in Omdurman blocked streets and chanted in favour of civilian control. Protestors ask for Civilian rule as it is the people’s only choice. The Sudanese Professionals Association group of trade unions claims, “reports of retaliatory attacks by coup forces on protesters’ gathering sites” in the capital Khartoum and other cities using bullets and attempts to break through barricades” Pro-democracy protesters fear that the military will strengthen its power over the country and therefore promise to keep up the pressure on the streets, increasing the chances of additional and more dangerous clashes. On Saturday, when demonstrators will organize a major march to demand a restoration to civilian authority, the military’s response to the resistance might be put to the test (Abdelaziz, 2021). Accordingly, the SAF’s (Sudanese Armed Force) power consolidation efforts represent both a throwback to Sudan’s past—prior to former president Omar al-Bashir—and a new trajectory for the Sudanese military.
The coup has drawn global condemnation and preoccupied many international powers who have only recently been trying to restore relations with Sudan after years of isolation. Not only have they declared the military takeover as a “betrayal of the revolution”, condemned the dissolution of democratic institutions and called for the release of those arrested, but they also signed a statement which expressed the countries’ ambassadors’ support for the popular resistance to the coup (Al Jazeera, 2021). Even African Union’s Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, called for the release of Sudan’s political leaders, the respect of human rights, as well as the immediate renewal of consultations between civilians and military as consensus is the only possibility for the country’s democratic transition (France 24, 2021).
How did the current trouble start?
The coup did not come as a surprise as the military takeover followed weeks of rising tensions between military and civilian authorities over the direction and pace of Sudan’s democratic transition. Moreover, Hamdok was well aware of the army’s plans and had been pressured to dissolve the government and issue a declaration in support of the military takeover. Instead, he urged pro-democracy activists to take to the streets in a peaceful demonstration. Going further back in time, Sudan’s political life is characterized by a tumultuous history marked by a steep path towards regime transition and democracy, which revolts and seizures of power have been repeatedly threatened to derail.
Coups d’état have been a recurrent feature of Sudan’s political life. The SAF first overthrew former president Gafaar Nimeiry’s Islamist dictatorship in 1985 and then ousted Sudan’s democratic government in 1989 after years of civil war. Soon after, in 1993 Gen. Omar-al Bashir, who led the coup, becomes president of Sudan. In 2003 violence erupted in Darfur, in Western Sudan, when rebels launched an insurgency against the Sudanese government’s alleged disregard for the western area and its non-Arab inhabitants. As a result, the government equipped and funded Arab militias, known as Janjaweed, to combat the rebels in Darfur. The region’s population was frightened and negated foreign assistance from agencies in terms of food and medical supplies. By the end of the war 300,000 people were killed, according to the UN. Consequently, an arrest warrant for Bashir, on the grounds of genocide and war crimes related to the military campaign in Darfur, had been issued in 2009 by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. February 22, 2019 marked the start of the end of Bashir’s 30 year-long dictatorship. Indeed, seven years after South Sudan became an independent state – which was the outcome of the peace agreement between the north and the south of the county according to which independence for southern Sudan was to be achieved within six years – protests nationwide erupted calling for Bashir’s resignation (Kottasová and Mackintosh, 2021).
In December 2018, the government imposed emergency austerity measures and a severe currency devaluation in an attempt to avert economic collapse spurred on by years of US sanctions and a lack of oil income. Bread and gasoline subsidy cuts triggered protests in the east about living conditions so much so that the rage quickly reached the capital, Khartoum. Although most sanctions were lifted in 2017, the county – which had already lost most of its oil resources with the independency of South Sudan in 2011 – did not manage to recover. Initially, malcontent was concentrated on the county’s economic problems, particularly on rocketing prices. However, the protests swiftly grew into calls for President Bashir’s and his government’s overthrow. Demonstrations reached a pinnacle on April 6, 2019, the anniversary of a nonviolent revolt in 1985 that ousted then-dictator Jaafar Nimeiri (BBC News, 2021).
After the overthrow of Bashir on April 11, 2019, the military leadership established the Transitional Military Council (TMC) which granted it the control over the power. Hence, the end of Bashir’ dictatorship could only be considered a partial victory as the military has not been excluded completely from the political sphere. However, as consolidated mass street demonstrations increasingly called for civilian rule, and pro-democracy movements opposed the Council, the military was forced to negotiate a plan for a transition to a democratic government. Thus, the Sovereign Council, which is composed by civilians as well as military leaders, has been founded with the aim of guiding the county through the long process of democratic transition with the new appointed prime minister Hamdok in charge of this transitional government (CNBC News, 2021).
However, this has proven to be a precarious partnership. Indeed, the euphoria that characterized the country after Bashir’s dismissal has faded, due to tensions between the two factions regarding the control as well as the different point of view on the country’s future. Multiple times, the transitional government’s military chiefs have sought reforms from their civilian colleagues and have called for the cabinet to be removed. Civilian leaders, however, condemned this as a power grab (Ramani, 2021).
The instability which has been characterizing Sudan ever since Bashir’s deposition concretizes in the numerous failed coups that have been carried out in the previous years, the last happening the past month. Prime minister Hamdok denounced the failed coup bid by claiming that “forces of darkness” connected to the overthrown President Omar al-Bashir were behind the attempt as a way to obstacle the transitional government in its path towards democracy, which was what removed him from power in 2019 (BBC News, 2019). “What happened is an orchestrated coup by factions inside and outside the armed forces and this is an extension of the attempts by remnants since the fall of the former regime to abort the civilian democratic transition,” Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok claimed (Mirghani and Abdelaziz, 2021). He assured that Sudan’s transition would be protected by government bodies. They would act in the front line against dissidents by means of immediate measures aimed at strengthening the transitional process and at definitively demolish the reminiscences of the former regime which appear to be still a major threat for the county.
Thus, the recent military dissolution of Sudan’s ruling council and transitional government can be considered a continuum in the history of revolts and coups d’états in the country between the military forces and the pro-democratic parties which have been trying to steer Sudan towards a democratic future. Renewed tensions between the two factions supporting opposing rules – the civilian and the military one– have been fuelling for months. The major protest umbrella organization, the Forces for the Declaration of Freedom and Change (FDFC), i.e., the revolutionary umbrella organization of opposition parties, civil society groups, and rebel groups) required the military to hand over power to civilians in the government, while tribal demonstrators have been blocking the major route to Sudan’s Red Sea port, as well as petroleum pipelines, since September, demanding that Hamdok’s administration be deposed. The only common characteristic between the two factions is that their assertiveness for power is motivated by the country’s economic hardship, which has been worsening ever since 2019 (CNBC News, 2021).
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt’s stance
Sudan’s new strongmen the general Abdel-Fattah Burhan and the chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo have strong ties with important players in the region: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. In fact, the two generals participated in the coordination of the deployment of Sudanese troops to Yemen as part of a Saudi-led coalition (Associated Press News, 2019). Furthermore, during the 2019 protests calling for an end of Bashir’s 30 years reign – in which Egypt and the UAE perceived an opportunity to finally bring Sudan in their axis, unbothered by the autocrat’s ambiguous positioning in regard to Iran, Qatar, Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood – the regional superpowers established contacts with opposition parties, rebels, and high-ranked members of the military prior to the coup. They found allies in al-Burhan and Dagalo, who directly participated in the protests and refused orders from Bashir to violently disperse protesters. Ultimately, both were part of the military apparatus that overthrew Bashir, which subsequently installed the Transitional Military Council led by al-Burhan with Dagalo appointed as its deputy to rule the country (Talebi, 2020)
This partly explains why the Gulf superpowers contrarily to the US and EU countries, did not denounce the recent coup d’état, but instead, called for calm and dialogue (Associated Press News, 2021). According to Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. State department official and Sudan expert, this is justified by geopolitical preferences. “There’s a general preference for a strong military leader who is very transactional. That fits Gulf interests more than a democratic government” (Debre and Magdy, 2021).
In fact, at the creation of the TMC the three regional super-powers advocated for a military-led government (Talebi, 2020). However, at the time the Forces of Freedom and Change and the TMC failed to reach an agreement on power sharing. This failure led to frustration within the FFC and to a radicalisation of their demands, namely, the idea of a mix-sovereignty being replaced by a call for an exclusively civilian-led council. Nonetheless, the Emiratis intervened and co-opted factions within the FFC and, as a result, they began speaking positively about the military led TMC and the intervention of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the conflict. However, the notorious crack-down on a Karthoum sit-in that left hundreds of deaths by Dagalo’s RSF led to international condemnation (Burke & Salih, 2019), noteworthily, from the US and the UK who have been relatively passive in front of the developments occurring in Sudan, leaving no other choice for the UAE and Saudi Arabia to call for a dialogue between the TMC and the FFC.
The power-sharing agreement that followed left considerable power in the hands of the military: Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the TMC, would act as the head of the new sovereignty council – and as de facto head of state – for the first 21 months of the transition. Besides, military leaders kept the control over the crucial ministries of defence and the interior (Walsh, 2019). Since then, the TMC gained influence over the civilian government led by Hamdok, partially dictating the country’s internal affairs in line with the Gulf states’ priorities by arresting members of the National Congress Party, al-Burhan weakened Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Similarly, on the international scene the TMC has been acting independently from the civilian-led government, in line with the interests of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt: normalising ties with Israel without the accord of the acting Prime Minister and praising Egypt’s stabilising role in the region whilst the disagreements between the civilian-government and the country mounted over the Ethiopian Renaissance dam construction project. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt actively supported the TMC, and did not perceive the presence of a civilian-led government as positive for their geopolitical interests in the region, hence, the countries’ reserved reactions following the coup against Hamdok’s civilian government (Reuters, 2021).
Conclusion
Thus, the military seizure of power highly jeopardized Sudan’s path to democracy in a moment where the country was beginning to emerge from decades of authoritarian leadership, global isolation, and debilitating economic sanction, thereby leading to uncertainty of whether it will keep the promise of its pledge of free election in coming years. Burhan stated on Tuesday that the transitional phase would continue to focus on establishing a civilian administration and that the Sudanese military will remain out of politic as the only aim of the military is a temporary correction of the path of the transitional phase (CNBC News, 2021). The risk remains that Sudan’s difficult political transition would be jeopardized or even negated as a consequence of the country’s independence and sovereignty being undermined.
Although it did not represent a novelty in Sudan’s political context, the recent coup fuelled preoccupations among international powers as several articles related to the constitutional document governing the transitional period have been suspended (Al Jazeera, 2021). International players have to intervene in the shortest time possible as the situation and human rights violations are likely to escalate following new demonstration.
Regarding Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, especially the first two have been gaining ground in post-Bashir Sudan in recent years. The recent wave of political transformations in the region has provided a new chance for the two Gulf giants to develop friendly governments in a region that is becoming increasingly strategic. Economic help and political support are the major means, while overall conformity with the bloc’s vision for the area, security cooperation, and a firmer stance against political Islam are the main demands. Sudan appears to have followed this course in the first year after the fall of Bashir’s Islamic government. Indeed, generals strongly backed the Saudi-UAE position, and Prime Minister Hamdok was left conducting a balancing act. Now that military forces have gained the power in the county, in the future Sudan could find itself forced to make hard choices, as it will find itself trapped between the need to satisfy its Gulf supporters and the task of not alienating its population (Perteghella, 2021).
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By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
