Since 2013-2014 European press and mass media started talking about “migration crisis” or “refugee crisis”, according to which more and more people coming from different parts of Middle East and North Africa were forced to migrate to Europe in search for a better future. These prominent waves of migrants were the result of continuous conflicts in the MENA area, especially in the Middle East (Refaat 2021).
Consequently, the European Union and its member States increased their effort in the process of borders’ externalization as well as the securitization and the politicization of borders that mainly prioritize national interest over other values (Papageorgiou 2018).
From EU perspective, the externalization of its borders consists in “sharing” management of migration flows with neighbouring third countries, by signing bilateral agreements “that aim to control legal migration on the one hand and to curtail illegal migration on the other” (Ibidem).
Among Middle East and North Africa countries, Morocco has acquired a predominant role in the externalization program, and although it is mostly known as a sending country, it has widely become a transit and above all a receiving.
As a matter of fact, according to bilateral agreements, Morocco oversees borders and stops migrants from reaching their European destination, becoming de facto “Europe’s policeman” (Gross-Wyrtzen 2020). During the last decade, Morocco indeed “became the first Mediterranean country to sign a Mobility Partnership with the E.U.” in order “to ‘manage’ irregular migration” (Kostas 2017) and, as natural consequence, unable to reach Europe, most of sub-Saharan migrants settle down in Morocco.
For instance, in 2013 it was created the first institution on migration issues, followed by a new policy on immigration and asylum, that in 2014 was formalized into the National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum (NSIA) (Tittel-Mosser 2018)
However, this political strategy has also some specific implication on the foreign and international context. On one hand Morocco is in the strategic position to ask EU for financial and technical support in the implementation of the NSIA (ibidem), simultaneously, the regularization campaign “aimed to demonstrate openness toward sub-Saharan migration”, in line with its political agenda on finding and maintaining consensus over Western Sahara dispute (Jacobs 2019).
In this strategic scenario, Morocco is using “reversed conditionality”, as Tittel-Mosser stated, “to strengthen their domestic political agenda” (Tittel-Mosser 2018), and it is in this perspective and in the external relations’ context that the frequent incidents in both Ceuta and Melilla need to be read.
Ceuta and Melilla are two (“almost unanimously internationally recognized”) Spanish territories within Morocco, where from time-to-time tensions between Spain and Morocco occurred, both for sovereignty matter and migration issues (Refaat 2021).
On 24th June 2022 a mass attempt of crossing borders occurred at the “gate” of Spanish enclave Melilla, causing death to 27 people, according to the Moroccan Human Rights Association (Al Jazeera 2022). Nonetheless the actual number is still unknown, according to research carried out by Amnesty International, that claims that at least 37 migrants died, dozens more were injured and at least 77 people are still missing (Amnesty International 2022). As reported by Amnesty International itself, to December 2022, justice has not been done yet and both Morocco and Spain have responsibilities, even though they have not conducted impartial and independent investigations yet, but certainly people have been subjected to discrimination, violence, and other human rights violations (ibidem).
This was the “first significant [incursion] since Spain adopted its more pro-Rabat stance over Western Sahara” last spring (Pinedo Eljechtimi 2022). As a matter of fact, on May 2021 thousands of migrants crossed borders of Ceuta thanks to the lack of intervention of the Moroccan border’s police.
After this event, in fact, on one hand Spain pointed out Moroccan police who stopped surveillance of the border as a pressure against Europe over the recognition of Western Sahara as Moroccan territory; while on the other hand Morocco simply stated that “some actions implicate predictable consequences”, recalling its ambassador in Spain (Il Post 2021). However, last spring there was a reconciliation over a change of position on Western Sahara by the Spanish PM Sanchez (Al Jazeera 2022b).
While the Ceuta incident is known primarily for the diplomatic dispute between Spain and Morocco, the Melilla event of June 2022 has showed a tragic result of the current management of migration flow, highlighting huge responsibilities in violation of human rights both from Moroccan police and from the Spanish one.
In addition, migration crisis is still a “burning” question, especially in the Mediterranean area, and it keeps being used as a political tool, needed to get advantages both from EU (and its member States) and from third countries. Migration phenomenon is still viewed as a matter of politics and economy more than a problem of human rights violation and access to appropriate living standards.
The case of Morocco highlights a deeper perspective on the weaponizing and the politization of a current situation, by underling the dramatic consequences of EU externalization borders and the covered responsibilities in human rights violation.
Bibliography
Al Jazeera 2022. Morocco: 18 migrants die in attempt to enter Spain’s Melilla. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/24/hundreds-of-migrants-storm-border-fence-in-spains-melilla
Al Jazeera 2022. Spain PM in Morocco to mend ties after Western Sahara shift. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/7/spain-pm-in-morocco-to-mend-ties-after-western-sahara-shift
Amnesty International 2022. “They beat him in the head, to check if he was dead”. Evidence of crimes under international law by Morocco and Spain at the Melilla border. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde29/6249/2022/en/
Gross-Wyrtzen, L. 2020. Contained and abandoned in the “humane” border: Black migrants’ immobility and survival in Moroccan urban space. Society and Space, 38(5), 887-904.
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Kostas, S. 2017. Morocco’s Triple Role in the Euro-African Migration System. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/moroccos-triple-role-euro-african-migration-system
Papageorgiou, V. 2018. The externalization of European borders. Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA), 23, 1-16.
Pinedo, E., Eljechtimi, A. 2022. Morocco says 18 migrants died during mass crossing into Spanish enclave. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/hundreds-migrants-storm-spains-melilla-enclave-2022-06-24/
Refaat, M. 2021. Morocco, migration, and Ceuta. Available at: https://www.eiir.eu/international-law/international-law-human-rights/morocco-migration-and-ceuta/
Tittel-Mosser, F. 2018. Reversed Conditionality in EU External Migration Policy: The Case of Morocco. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 14(4), 349-363.
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
