On February 24th 2022 Vladimir Putin announced a “special military operation” to “demilitarise and de-nazify Ukraine”. The rest of the world saw it for what it was, a clear violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political independence through military force. In other words; an invasion. Leaders in the European Union quickly condemned the decision, including the President of Greece. In her statement, she declared that “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the first significant attack of a sovereign state against another in Europe since World War 2”.
People were quick to point out that such an analysis erases Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus, which has led to almost fifty years of continuous military occupation of its territory and the de-facto partition of the island. So, is Russia’s attack sui generis or should it be viewed alongside the events of 1974? This article explores the similarities as well as the differences between the two events from an international legal perspective. In doing so, it answers the question above as well as discussing what Cyprus can teach us about the outcome of the situation in Ukraine.
A clear violation of Jus ad Bellum
Jus ad Bellum refers to the body of international law which determines the legality of military operations. Rather than regulating the conduct of a military force, it focuses on whether their actions were permissible in the first place.
In the post-UN world, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter clearly prohibits “ … use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. In the case of Cyprus, the violation of its sovereignty was acknowledged by the UN Security Council in Resolution 353, which was echoed by the General Assembly in Resolution 3212. Both called for the removal of foreign troops from the country in accordance with the relevant international treaties as well as a negotiated end to the dispute. Similarly, in the resolution passed by the General Assembly on the Ukraine Crisis, paragraph 1 calls for respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, while paragraph 14 calls for a negotiated solution.
There are further similarities in terms of the illegal attempt to carve out new sovereign states out of occupied territories. The prelude to Putin’s actions in Ukraine was the recognition of the independence of the so-called “People’s Republic of Donetsk” and the “People’s Republic of Luhansk”. Both reside within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine but are mainly populated by a Russian ethnic minority. The illegal status of these secessionist areas was forcefully affirmed by the paragraph 5 of the same UNGA Resolution. Similarly, when Turkey announced the formation of an independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” in its occupied territory, it was firmly deplored by resolution 541 of the Security Council as legally invalid.
In addition to these two clear examples, both the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia broke a series of rules of customary international law. First and foremost the prohibition of the use of violence in international relations, as in both cases we saw the use of military force in order to achieve political aims against another state. In doing so, Russia and Turkey both also violated the customary principle of Non-Intervention, which prohibits a state to coerce another state in order to obtain outcomes in areas that fall under the domaine réservé of a sovereign state. Although similar, these two norms are legally distinct as per the ICJ determination of the actions of the United States in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua.
Guarantor powers and the Right of Intervention
However, a crucial difference between the two cases is the unique status of Turkey as a “guarantor Power” of the independent Republic of Cyprus, whereas there was no such legal arrangement vis-a-vis the sovereignty of Ukraine. The independence of Cyprus was ceded from the United Kingdom via the London-Zurich Treaties of 1959. As was the case with many international treaties involving colonial powers, it was characterised by stipulations that do not belong to the post 1945 international legal system of sovereign equality, but rather harken back to an era of imperialism. One such provision was the system of ‘guarantor’ powers that effectively conditioned the sovereignty of Cyprus on three other states. In particular Article 2 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee states that:
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.
Following the July 15th pro-enosis (union with Greece) coup in Cyprus, Turkey attacked the republic pursuant to the article above in order to ostensibly restore constitutional order. This pretext was rejected by the UN and the international community. However, it does create a legal “window” through which Turkey could officially justify its actions, even if it falls apart upon further examination.
There is no such equivalent in the case of Ukraine. On the contrary, in addition to Russia’s customary and UN Charter commitments, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances guarantees that Russia unequivocally respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Russian government has also regularly invoked Ukraine’s non-compliance with the Minsk II agreements which proscribe political autonomy for the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. A 2020 in-depth analysis from Chatham House shows how the implementation of the agreements would severely restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty. Yet, there is no explicit clause that allows Russia to intervene on Ukraine if the agreement is not followed through. In other words, Russia did not become a ‘guarantor’ of its ethnic minority in Ukraine the same way that Turkey was for its own minority in Cyprus. Due to the lack of any such legal pretext for the invasion, it becomes indeed sui generis.
Is Cyprus a hint towards Ukraine’s future
As is well known, today Cyprus exists in a state of de-facto partition, with the northern third of the island being occupied by more than thirty thousand Turkish troops and having declared itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” with no international recognition except from the occupying power itself; Turkey. The fact of the occupation has been repeatedly recognised under International Law, with the Strasburg-based European Court of Human Rights, which Turkey also recognises, explicitly declaring so in Cyprus vs Turkey (1994) paragraph 110.
As in Cyprus, so in Ukraine the crisis was kickstarted by the declared intention to protect ethnic minorities abroad, however the war quickly extended beyond the areas where these minorities resided. It is likely that Mr Putin’s plan is to partition Ukraine and retain control of the Russian-majority areas under a nominally independent state(s). In that case, the status of these areas under international law would resemble the status of the ‘TRNC’ and would struggle to gain international recognition. Russia would still be considered the de-facto occupying power and thus be responsible for adherence to international human rights law in the region as per the ECoHR decision on Cyprus v. Turkey. The crucial difference being that Russia’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council would prevent the passage of a resolution declaring the partition of Ukraine as invalid.
Having said all that, the situation is ongoing and Ukraine has already demonstrated greater resistance than Cyprus was able to mount in 1974. However, if history is to be a guide then a negotiated or de-facto partition on Ukraine might be the outcome of today’s crisis.
Bibliography
International Treaties and Documents
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 1986, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a44d2.html [accessed 4 March 2022]
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 541 (1983) [Cyprus], 18 November 1983, S/RES/541 (1983), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f16528.html [accessed 4 March 2022]
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 353 (1974) [Cyprus], 20 July 1974, S/RES/353 (1974), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f17658.html [accessed 4 March 2022]
NO. 5475. TREATY OF GUARANTEE. SIGNED AT NICOSIA ON 16 AUGUST 1960
https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf [accessed 4 March 2022]
LONDON-ZURICH TREATIES OF FEBRUARY 1959
http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/app.html [accessed 4 March 2022]
Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Budapest 1994
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ukraine._Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances [accessed 4 March 2022]
European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, available on http://hudoc.echr.coe.int [accessed 4 March 2022]
Secondary Sources
Duncan, Allan (2020) “The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine”
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement [accessed 4 March 2022]
Al-Jazeera (2021) “UN resolution against Ukraine invasion: Full text”
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text [accessed 4 March 2022]
Kuzio, Taras (2021) “Inside Vladimir Putin’s criminal plan to purge and partition Ukraine”
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/inside-vladimir-putins-criminal-plan-to-purge-and-partition-ukraine/ [accessed 4 March 2022]
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
