When South Sudan achieved independence in 2011, its conditions led to hopes for the possibility of positive development for the new nation. The act of self-determination concretised in a remarkably peaceful secession from the parent State of Sudan, combined with a richness in natural resources such as oil and gold, however, were not sufficient to counterbalance some of the structural problems that had contributed to 50 years of regional instability. The divisions among the different ethnic groups of the country run deeply within the social fabric, which allowed the elites to instrumentalise such rivalries once the political dispute between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar erupted in 2013 following the accusation against Machar of having planned a coup against the President.
The ensuing civil war has torn through the social, economic, and political system of South Sudan until today, despite the numerous attempts to achieve a stable peace agreement. The non-linear development of the conflict has been, in fact, reflected in the peace processes, which have overall been largely unsuccessful. The latest pact, the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), was signed in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on the 12th of September 2018, and represents the 12th agreement between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar. The R-ARCSS soke to reframe the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) of 2015, which had officially been made void by the reignited clashes taking place in the capital Juba in July of 2016, by amending some of the loopholes present in the previous treaties.
The agreement came to be as the result of the coordinated efforts of the opposing factions of the civil conflict, aided by the intervention of non-primary actors acting as mediating parties. As its predecessors’, the R-ARCSS negotiations were facilitated by the direct involvement of multilateral frameworks, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as by the endorsement of international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union and by the support of the Troika led by the United States. The establishment of the High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) by the IGAD in light of the failure of the ARCSS was influential in the drafting and signing of five preliminary agreements; these tackled fundamental areas such as humanitarian aid and civilian involvement, as well as security and governance issues, laying the grounds for the final document. Such background work, combined with the participation of a wide range of civilian stakeholders in the agreement process, allowed the R-ARCSS to have a much more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and, for many, led to hopes of having reached a sustainable solution for South Sudan.
Furthermore, the involvement of international actors in the R-ARCSS sets it apart from previous versions of peace agreements: former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni, involved in the conflict in support of opposing factions throughout the conflict, cooperated in the stilling of the pact, and undersigned it as guarantors. Their collaboration, and particularly that of Sudan, comes as a lesson learned from the failure of previous agreements, which excluded the two regional powers. Nevertheless, such internationalization can act as a double-edged sword for the stability of the country: despite the UN arms embargo against South Sudan, both foreign regimes continue fuelling the flow of weapons into the country to sway the allocation of South Sudan’s oil reserves. Such a power-sharing agreement, lacking appropriate frameworks for international monitoring of activity, and rather allowing parties to self-regulate in its implementation, can hinder the ability of international bodies, such as the IGAD or the African Union to keep track of the progress – or lack of it. Additionally, foreign involvement in the agreement can be seen as a eradicator of national agency, through which South Sudan might be “on its way to becoming an informal protectorate of Sudan and Uganda.”[1]
Despite having been recognised by early analyses as a “significant development signalling the dawn of peace”, obstacles to the implementation of the R-ARCSS have been identified since its drafting. The long-standing history of antagonism and instability that has torn apart the country for years, combined with a generalised lack of political will and perception of unurgency, results in unwillingness to operate in good faith and implement the agreed-upon amendments, which was worsened by the practical complication caused by the covid-19 pandemic. As reported by David Shearer, head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), progress has in fact been “painfully slow”, making the growing gap between the officialization of the agreement and its actualization a threat to the delicately orchestrated equilibrium. This appears particularly relevant given that the reaching of a peace agreement was never able to factually halt or prevent violent clashes between the rebel factions of Machar and Kiir’s governmental troops, which resumed merely six days after the signing of the R-ARCSS.
The continuous cycles of violence, starting from the very birth of South Sudan as a country, have prevented the establishment of functioning national institutions, and initiated what has been called a “domino effect of humanitarian emergencies.” This all-encompassing nature of the crisis has led the UN to attribute to South Sudan the classification of a “level three” humanitarian emergency; such denomination represents the highest level of urgency in the UN marking scale and is assigned, for comparison, to only three other conflicts – those in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.
The categorisation appears understandable when assessing the scope of the effects of the conflict: as of 2022, estimators indicate that over 75% of the population, or close to 9 million people, are in crucial need of assistance due to the combined repercussions of direct violence, economic slowdown, environmental deterioration, and of the COVID-19 pandemic. Active fighting and insecurity have led to the displacement of around 4 million people, whether internally into displacement camps with low access to resources or flowing into foreign countries as refugees; furthermore, 8.4 million people are estimated to be experiencing food insecurity or malnutrition, Though famine was declared in 2017, and the dire conditions that almost 70% of the population has to endure were publicly denounced by Payton Knopf in his testimonial address to the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, estimations of undernourishment are currently at an all-time high – and expected to continue worsening.
The food crisis caused by the increase in global prices triggered by the war in Ukraine, as well as the growing effects of climate change on a country where over 85% of the population derives their livelihoods from environmentally dependent activities, would call for an increase of aid to prevent the expansion of famine. Instead, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) has called off part of its humanitarian food aid to the country at what has been called “the worst possible time,” blaming critical funding shortages. The decision, which came after instituting rations in 2021 and, according to the WPF, having attempted all other routes, is expected to affect 1.7 million people who will face higher risk of starvation, including 178,000 children whose school meals used to be delivered by the program. WFP acting country director Adeyinka Badejo stated that the program would need $426m to run for the next semester and that, unless a functioning funding solution is found, the country “will face bigger and more costly problems in the future, including increased mortality, malnutrition, stunting, and disease.”
The suspension, announced in the middle of June, reinforces the listing of South Sudan as one of the world’s 10 most neglected displacement crises by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The ranking, headed by the DR Congo for the second year, and with South Sudan in the fourth place, is for the first time completely composed of African countries. NRC chief Jan Egeland expressed his concerns following the publication of the list, highlighting the impact of the war in Ukraine not only in terms of direct effects on food supply chains, but also as an overshadowing event that hinders humanitarian funding for the continent. A humanitarian appeal launched in March for Ukraine, in fact, took only one day to be almost entirely funded, representing “the immense gap between what is possible when the international community rallies behind a crisis, and the daily reality for millions of people suffering in silence within these crises on the African continent that the world has chosen to ignore.”
The current famine and the predicted aggravation of the conditions will not only have extreme direct humanitarian effects, but also contribute to an exacerbation of social tensions and further erosion of the few institutional improvements that have resulted from the R-ARCSS. According to the timeline established in the agreement, in fact, elections should be held in 2023; the practical possibility to run an electoral process, however, appears low, and might be further decreased by growing famine, disease, and overall degradation within the country. Even less likely seems a scenario in which elections yield legitimate results, making the hopes for improvement in South Sudan slimmer and further away from the world’s eyes – and pockets.
References
Jazeera, A. (2022, June). NRC: World’s 10 “most neglected” refugee crises all in Africa. Retrieved from Aljazeera.com website: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/1/worlds-most-neglected-refugee-crises-all-in-africa-ngo
Machol, D. (2022, June 14). UN cuts food aid to 1.7 million hungry people in South Sudan. Retrieved from AP NEWS website: https://apnews.com/article/politics-africa-united-nations-south-sudan-d24f75ac51ae8eb70fe493af310875f5?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2022Jun15&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief
Appiah Afriyie, F. (2020, May 4). Comprehensive Analysis of the Conflict in South Sudan: Determinants and Repercussions. Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, 6(1). Retrieved from https://e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/view/173/160
European Commission. (2022). South Sudan Factsheet. Retrieved from European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.
[1] Mamadani, M. (2018, September 24). The Trouble With South Sudan’s New Peace Deal. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/opinion/south-sudan-peace-agreement.html
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
