The rise of the far right in the last decade is of significant relevance as it has been accompanied by a significant increase in the violence perpetrated by individuals belonging to it. While a few years ago Europe was concerned about jihadist attacks, the balance has shifted in favour of attacks perpetrated by the extreme right, with worrying data from countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria (European Union Agency for Human Rights, 2018).

Background

It should first be clarified what is meant by right-wing terrorism. On the one hand, although there are numerous meanings of terrorism and there is no consensus, according to Resolution 49/60 of the United Nations General Assembly, a terrorist act is defined as “criminal acts for political purposes designed or planned to provoke a state of terror in the general population, in a group of persons or in specific individuals” (Avilés, 2017). On the other hand, the extreme right is also a complicated term to define, especially considering that those whose actions can be identified as such often reject this denomination. The extreme right, according to Mudde (2017), has three typical characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nativism seeks homogeneity in the nation and creates a distinction between individuals ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the core group. Authoritarianism refers to order, to severity, particularly in the repression of crime which will be illustrated by strict policies. And populism is based on a criticism of the elites, described as corrupt and opposed to the “pure” people who should hold power, and the rejection of all forms of opposition.

However, attacks by far-right groups are rarely considered as terrorist acts, but rather as hate crimes or “any criminal offence, including offences against persons or property, where the victim, the premises or the target of the offence are chosen because of their real or perceived connection, sympathy, affiliation, support or membership of a group” (Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2013).

While hate crimes are just as condemnable as terrorist acts, they are placed in a lower category in terms of severity, making attacks carried out by the far right less of a concern than jihadist crimes, which are often considered terrorism (Ravndal. 2016). The question then arises as to what extent a violent act by the far right can be considered a hate crime rather than terrorism. While hate crimes are a prelude to the escalation of violence by individuals.

Finally, it is necessary to define what a lone wolf is, as it is a term commonly associated with right-wing extremist attacks. They are identified as those who act without the contact/assistance of another individual or group (Hartleb, 2020).

Factors behind the rise of far-right terrorism in Europe

Normally, attacks perpetrated by the far right appear to be isolated cases of individuals acting independently – known as lone wolves – who decide to carry out these despicable acts, such as those in Christchurch, Charlottesville or Halle, among others. But terrorists are linked to each other, apart from the ideological connotation, through mutual references at the international level – the Christchurch bomber had the names of other terrorists engraved on the weapon he used in the attack (Cai & Landon, 2019) – or through the internet.   Today, such attacks are on the rise and acts in one part of the world seem to inspire others to follow suit, as warned by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (2020).

There are a number of factors that explain the rise of right-wing extremist violence in Europe in recent years, and although they do not apply to all cases, we consider these to be the most relevant and closely interrelated.

1. Immigration

The economic crisis of 2008 triggered a migratory movement within the European Union.  High levels of unemployment resulted in citizens from the countries most affected by the crisis deciding to immigrate to the rich core of the Union (mainly Germany and the United Kingdom) to improve their economic level, with the tensions that this entailed for the countries of arrival.

 A few years later, after the ‘Arab Springs’ and in some cases failed revolutions, the migratory flow towards Europe increased, reaching its peak in the migration crisis of 2015, with people arriving mainly from Syria and Libya. Moreover, these people entered Europe through the countries most affected by the economic crisis, such as Italy and Greece, complicating their already delicate situation. To this must be added several jihadist attacks on European territory, starting with the attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine, which took place in the main European cities -Paris, London, Brussels, Barcelona, Nice, Berlin, Manchester- (European Parliament, 2020). This only increased the rejection of immigrants, blaming them for the problems suffered by European nations, and inviting some individuals to “take action on their own”. For example, after the 2015 attacks in France, violent incidents against the Muslim population increased by 281% (Mark, 2015).

Most of these individuals come from Arab countries, so there is strong rejection towards them, but it is not concentrated on this group, and other minority groups (LGTBI, Jews, gypsies, disabled…) are also the target of these attacks. It is relevant to analyse this, as most of the attacks by the far right have been against immigrants (Jones, 2020).

For example, Jews have been targeted on numerous occasions due to the belief in conspiracy theories that their aim is to destroy Western civilisation. Recently, a rally was held in Madrid in which Jews were singled out as the enemy, which is currently being investigated by the public prosecutor’s office as a possible hate crime against the Jewish community (Cobo, 2021). Or in Havard Bustnes’ (2019) documentary The Girls of Golden Dawn, the wives of the leaders openly accuse Jews of being to blame for the crisis situation in Greece at the time.

•  Normalisation

In recent years, right-wing extremist attacks have been normalised by society, being whitewashed and even institutionalised, i.e. the presence of groups which, although they do not directly identify with radical groups, encourage their actions and even justify them[1]. 

On the one hand, the increase in the number of extreme right-wing parties across Europe in recent years is noteworthy. In 2021, there is hardly any European parliament in which an extreme right-wing force has not entered (the last to join the list was Portugal, which did not have the relevant presence of any extreme right-wing party, but after the 2019 elections they achieved representation and in the presidential elections of January 2021, the Chega party managed to be the third most voted force with less than 50,000 votes difference with the second force (POLITICO; 2021). These parties, from their position of public visibility, legitimise the actions of these groups, as they tend to have a very aggressive discourse on immigration, which is an issue favourable to their popularisation and used to achieve electoral success (although this is not a problem that affects the country to a large extent) (Mills, 2015).

This discourse has been present in far-right parties, with parliamentary representation in The Danish People’s Party in Denmark; Fidesz in Hungary; Law and Justice in Poland (currently, in both Poland and Hungary, the far right is in power); National Front in France or the new party under the leadership of Eric Zemmour, Reconquête;  Alternative for Germany; the League in Italy; Vox in Spain; Vlaams Belang in Belgium; the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands; Freedom and Democracy in the Czech Republic; the Party of Democrats in Sweden; the People’s Party-Our Slovakia; the Freedom Party in Austria; and Golden Dawn in Greece. In the latter, the Greek judiciary recently convicted the party’s leaders as a criminal organisation, as it is blamed for the murder of an anti-fascist rapper and numerous attacks on immigrants and left-wing activists (Stamouli, 2020).  This is a clear example of how far-right parties can be directly linked to attacks of the same kind.

The representation of these parties, in principle entirely democratic, serves to normalise and legitimise the discourse of the extreme right, who see in these representatives a way that what they think is not illegal, but the right thing to do. Moreover, the channelling of this discourse is used electorally by these parties for the growth of their representation (Koehler, 2019).

Politicians who target right-wing extremist groups from their position, threatening one of their symbols or defending something totally contrary to them, can end up being lethal for them. For example, in Spain, a man was arrested for planning to assassinate the current president, Pedro Sánchez, when he announced his intention to exhume the remains of dictator Francisco Franco (Bayo & López, 2018).  French President Emmanuel Macron has also been the victim of an assassination attempt by a young man who wanted to kill “Muslims, Jews, blacks and homosexuals” and extolled Anders Breivik, a Norwegian who detonated a bomb in Oslo and shot up a youth camp (BBC, 2017). For others, the consequences have been fatal, as in the case of British MP Jo Cox, who was murdered amidst proclamations of Britain First! in the context of the Brexit referendum (Tubella, 2016).

On the other hand, the presence of advocates of these acts among national security forces is relevant. In recent years, hundreds of cases of infiltration of police and military forces by far-right individuals have been reported. The security forces are part of the state and must play their role in the functioning of democratic institutions, which include protecting the rule of law and the human rights of all. These attitudes take the form of individual prejudice, but it is also a structural problem, as they are known within security institutions and no action is taken unless it leads to a public scandal (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2020). The lack of strong measures against these attitudes perpetuates them, with attitudes that not only affect the citizens themselves, but also other members of law enforcement agencies belonging to a minority.

•  Hate speech and social networks

The discourse used by the extreme right was normally transmitted through less classical channels due to the violence implicit in it. Nowadays, however, it is more and more frequently shown in the traditional media (television, radio or newspaper), where these individuals are given a voice and get the notoriety they are looking for. They play an important role in ‘whitewashing’ these groups in everyday debate, and they are debated and counted as an opinion, although in the case of other groups – again, especially jihadist groups – it is not common to see them represented in the media. They use a divisive discourse of ‘enemies of the people’ and half-truths that fuel hatred against minorities (Jones, 2019).

However, where they have the most power is on social media, where their message is easily transmitted and there are networks where censorship is non-existent. Initially, Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp served as a means to spread hate messages, but they are increasingly strict about what is posted and take measures, such as closing the accounts of those who send hate messages that encourage violence, or limiting the number of people they can reach (Fielitz & Marks, 2019).  However, once a message is on the network, it is almost impossible to remove it and it is passed on from person to person. There are other networks, such as some Telegram or Parler channels, where a large amount of data related to hate speech emanating from the far right and conspiracy theories that fuel it circulate.

In addition, social networks serve not only to disseminate, but also to organise and radicalise hate speech, which is then taken up by individuals who are sympathetic to the far right and decide to take action. In addition, attacks often leave behind a manifesto or video explaining the motives for their attack – as was the case in the Hanau shootings – which are then shared (Ehsan & Stott, 2020). The internet also plays an important role in disseminating images of the attacks, which go viral and reach more people. 

d.  The German case

Germany’s history has been deeply marked by the actions of the Nazi regime. However, the horrors experienced by the population during this period seem increasingly distant, and the institutions have allowed acts of violence by the extreme right to pass, becoming a growing problem to deal with.

There were several acts, but in 2019 the assassination of a politician from the Christian Democratic Union party in Germany marked a before and after (Schuetze, C. & Eddy, M., 2019). Walter Lubcke was assassinated because he was considered to be one of those responsible for the misery in which Germany found itself. His murderer made a donation to the political party Alternative for Germany with the message “God bless you” (Der Spiegel, 2019). Although the party did not comment on this, the killer’s support is a clear sign that far-right parties can maintain indirect relations with these individuals, as many identify with him. However, this is not the first time that a politician has been attacked, as in 2015 the mayor of Cologne was attacked for her permissive policy on migration, or the mayor of Altena, who took in more refugees than legally required (New York Times, 2020).

Another problem that seriously affects Germany is the presence of far-right sympathisers among its security forces. While right-wing extremists to date were considered to be isolated cases, more than 1,400 cases have been documented among the police over the past four years. In 2020, a group of 20 extremists were inside the anti-terrorist Special Forces Command, which had to be disbanded, but from which 61 kg of explosives and 48,000 rounds of ammunition went missing. The police also arrested soldiers who had set up a database in which they established 25,000 targets of pro-refugee politicians, as well as the storage of quicklime and body bags (Benhold, 2020). Although according to the German authorities (2020) cases in the security forces are less than 1%, investigations are important due to their power and easy access to weapons.

The refugee crisis of 2015 particularly affected Germany, which took in more than one million refugees, and served as a basis for a xenophobic discourse that inflames the population.  A German soldier, in 2017, posed as a Syrian refugee to carry out a terrorist attack to be attributed to Islamist terrorism, a ‘false flag’ attack (Caniglia, 2020). Or the call by extreme right-wing groups in the city of Chemnitz to carry out hunts for migrants and refugees.

However, despite the above – and possibly because of its past – Germany is one of the countries that addresses this issue with the most resources, with €1 billion allocated in 2017 to fund 89 specific programmes to combat racism and right-wing extremism (Miller, 2021). Despite these initiatives, it does not acknowledge that the problem has spread beyond a number of specific cases, leaving right-wing extremist terrorism in the background.

Conclusion

In the light of the above, the rise of the far right in Europe is reaching worrying proportions, and a strategy must be devised to deal with it, for if this is not done, it will continue to grow. Therefore, the acts themselves must be condemned, but also those who whitewash them from their position of public visibility, such as the media and political parties, and legitimise their actions.

Europe is undergoing a political crisis in which they are increasingly unpredictable, and xenophobic rhetoric is growing stronger, as seen in the rise of far-right political parties, which target religious minorities and have found a way to gain electoral advantage.

Europe’s political agenda in recent years has focused on tackling extremist jihadist groups such as Daesh, while far-right extremist groups have been sidelined. Moreover, right-wing extremist attacks are considered to be isolated events, citing reasons of mental instability, but in which contact between extremists is increasingly frequent and they may even organise themselves.

For this reason, the institutions must act more seriously and harshly against these acts, condemning them for what they are, terrorist acts, and not underestimate the destructive potential they have for European society. In all likelihood, they will continue to exist, but we must work to ensure that they are not repeated and that they remain marginal and anecdotal.

Verónica Rodríguez Fariña

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[1] Point out that Trump was seen as one of the most supportive presidents of such groups. While he did not show direct support, his reactions on the issue showed a great deal of ambiguity.

By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.