China, the Uyghur, and mass surveillance
Whether public or private, institutions for a long time have been interested in individual data (Rule 2007, p. 10). The advent of surveillance is not new and has been brewing in more developed countries for some decades now (ibid, p. 11; Brayne 2017, p. 977). Fueled by the events of 9/11, and the subsequent “war on terrorism” (Office of the Press Secretary of the United States 2001), surveillance has been gradually becoming more prominent, disseminated, and sophisticated (Levi and Wall 2004; Lyon 2015; Goold and Lazarus 2019). Digital technologies have functioned as propellers for mass surveillance systems, as regular life increasingly shifts from offline to online (Lupton 2014, pp. 1-5). From public to private entities, the ability for these organisations to surveil every aspect of peoples’ lives has been growing exponentially and at an alarmed pace, uneven with empirical research (Brayne 2017, p. 977). Whistleblowers such as Snowden and Chelsea Manning have helped to shed light on this issue and portraying how strong the government surveillance apparatus is becoming (Lyon 2015). These issues raise questions about legitimacy, where to draw a line in privacy concerns, democratic procedures, and so on.
The problems related to mass surveillance systems have been widespread, not only in academic circles, but also across populations, specifically in more “prosperous countries” (Rule 2007 p. 11). To be able to dissect the issue regarding the impact of these mass surveillance systems, first, one must address some conceptual matters as guidance for the development of the subsequent study. Not to be too extensive or descriptive, only the more broadly employed concepts will be scrutinised here, namely, privacy and mass surveillance. Given that the present analysis is not meant to address conceptual philosophical complications (see Bennett 2010, pp. 17-23) for the purposes of this research, privacy will be portrayed “as the exercise of an authentic option to withhold information about one’s self” (Rule 2007, p. 3). In respect of surveillance, it will be seen here “as any systematic and routine attention to personal details, whether specific or aggregate, for a defined purpose” (Lyon 2015). The addition of “mass” to the concept of surveillance comes from its separation from surveillance’s typical “targeted” character, as its scope widens, and a broader array of methods is implemented. It can be simply seen, as put by Jeffreys-Jones (2017, p. 8), as “spying on a mass scale”. Drawing from academic conceptualisations, both privacy and mass surveillance are seen here in a macro lens, as to encompass several instances.
Moving forward to the academic discussions regarding the extent to which mass surveillance systems provide safety and security, the debate is ongoing. Before jumping to this problematic, some considerations regarding what academics agree with need to be contended. Overall, the literature on mass surveillance reflects plenty of common ground. Some basic propositions appear to be relatively shared: (1) that, at least in the last decade, mass surveillance has been increasing exponentially (Lyon 2015; Brayne 2017; Cayford et al. 2018; Goold and Lazarus 2019), (2) that, with some exceptions, policy mechanisms have not been fully able to cope with the recorded increase, and need to do so (Rushin 2011, p. 307; Brayne 2017; Gros et al. 2017; ), (3) and that there has been some erosion of people’s individual privacy (Lyon 2003, p. 671; Marx 2004, pp. 244-245; Mayer-Schonberger 2009, p. 12; Mythen et al. 2013, p. 389). These are some of the (not extensive) general consensus shared among a substantial part of the literature on mass surveillance.
This essay, in order to illustrate the potential perils of mass surveillance, will focus on an empirical example, namely, the issue of Uyghur Muslims in China. This case provides a useful look into the future of mass surveillance, and how this tool can be used in dangerous ways.
The situation of Uyghur Muslims in China, more specifically, in the Xinjiang province, has a long history (see Millward 2007). Over the last decades, the relation between the Chinese government and Uyghur Muslims has been deteriorating. These frictions gained more traction after the 9/11, when China “launched its own “war on terror”” against the separatist movement on the Xinjiang province (Chung 2002, p. 8). Since then, reports have been emerging from Xinjiang that the Chinese government has been clamping down on religious freedom and targeting Uyghur Muslims through surveillance (Human Rights Watch 2005; Leibold 2020).
China has a very sophisticated surveillance (and censorship) system set in place (MacKinnon 2011, p. 34; Qiang 2019). The instability in Xinjiang fomented the further construction of a “multi-layered network of mass surveillance” that has been used for perverse goals (Leibold 2020, p. 46). From punishing to categorising people, “Xinjiang’s surveillance taxonomy transcends and often transgresses ethnic boundaries” as a “social sorting” mechanism – further enhancing socio-cultural predispositions already present (ibid, p. 56). Moreover, not only targeted individuals but even random Muslims have been selected for “mass internment” in “extra-judicial institutions”, called vocational or re-education centers (ibid, p. 57), giving reason to Foucault’s (1977) ideas about “biopolitics” (see Roberts 2018, pp. 234-235). For the future, the Chinese government pretends to put in motion two additional projects: a “social-credit” system and the “sharp-eye” project (see Leibold 2020, p. 58). Both make use of the extensive surveillance network and aim to increase it exponentially.
Discarding future prospects mirroring Leibold’s (ibid, p. 47) worries, a completely understudied and underdeveloped scene is surfacing, mainly in Xinjiang. The surveillance system now incorporates an app, shared by the different public institutions, that is featured in the “Integrated Joints Operation Platform” (Human Rights Watch 2018; 2019a; 2019b). This app allows for the collection of massive amounts of data – “from the color of a person’s car to their height down to the precise centimeter” (Human Rights Watch 2019a). With the collection of such detailed data, they monitor mainly Uyghur Muslim’s behavior and flag them if, for example, they do not socialise with their neighbors or “avoid using the front door” (ibid).
Apart from making use of its surveillance capabilities to target minorities, China’s sophisticated monitoring system also targets press freedom (Lee 2019). Their surveillance apparatus is used to control and censor information, targeting journalists and clamping down on Internet freedom (King et al. 2013). This is seen in reports such as Vice’s (2019) or the Wall Street Journal’s (2017), where journalists travelled to Xinjiang and experienced firsthand China’s developed surveillance system. In these reports, it is visible the incredible efforts made by the Chinese government to censor information coming out from the Xinjiang region.
What is happening in China, and specifically in Xinjiang, offers valuable insights. The situation presents some “globally applicable lesson[s]” (MacKinnon 2011, p. 34), since it shows the perils of mass surveillance, and that, paradoxically, a bid for safety can rapidly turn into a safety threat. Although a proper functioning mass surveillance apparatus has the potential to work as a safety provider, some preconditions need to be checked to avoid repercussions. The developments of “the relations between watchers and watched” (paralleled with questions about “who watches the watchmen?”) are serious concerns, for their practical manifestations resemble “predictions by George Orwell or Phillip K. Dick” (Bauman et al. 2014, p. 123). In these cases, it is not even that “lines are crossed” (Lyon 2015), but that they are either non-existent or poorly drawn.
To tackle a sensitive issue as this one, there are some avenues worth pursuing. At the international level, the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom could form a united block in order to diplomatically and economically pressure China. Diplomatically, by using the United Nations as a platform for exposing Chinese atrocities and constantly publicising them in a bid for international attention. Economically, the block could pose sanctions on a variety of individuals with dubious relations with the Uyghur situation in Xinjiang, considering that wide economic sanctions are unrealistic. Apart from this, two other strategies could be set in place. One would be to create immigration programmes to facilitate Uyghur’s entry to the European Union. Another would be to halt commerce with transnational companies operating in Xinjiang who are suspected of using forced labour.
These strategies would place some pressure on the Chinese government to shift their domestic policy towards the Uyghur minority, considering that the human rights abuses that take place in the Xinjian province have now been extensively documented and proven as a fact.
In respect of the mass surveillance system that is used by China to clamp down on religious and press freedom and on the Uyghur Muslims, Western civil society should be watching carefully and taking notes. These mass surveillance systems need to be accompanied by: (1) a reformation of the deep societal structures that currently exist, (2) transparent and accountable democratic structures, and (3) an emphasis on proportionality. If these conditions are not met, mass surveillance will inevitably work only as a parsimonious solution to a deep and convoluted conundrum. Not only this, but the spread of mass surveillance comes with the risk of creating a sort of Panopticon (Foucault 1977) or Orwellian (Orwell 1949) style surveillance state (Lyon 2015).
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