

Crimes against humanity in Libya – The Criminal Role of Saudi Arabia and UAE.

Responsibilities of the ICC and UN Security Council

By Mahmoud Refaat

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Introduction:

Libya is located in a key strategic location. Its thousands of miles of Mediterranean coast offer direct access to Europe, while its location in the African continent also enables it to have a very significant amount of influence and access to the rest of the continent. These reasons with the addition of the vast amounts of natural resources that Libya has within its territory as for instance it counts with one of the biggest oil reserves of any country in Africa, offer a great explanation to why so many international actors have been particularly interested in obtaining influence over this country. Several powers like the Ottoman Empire or Italy have been able in some form or another to obtain a significant amount of control over Libya, nonetheless, through history other powers like France or the Soviet Union (and later Russia too) have tried to exert their power over Libya in order to increase their control over the region and have the chance of reaping the before-mentioned benefits. However, after the end of the First World War, Libya was able of using the new international order that was being created after the end of this event in order to establish a federal monarchy with King Idris as monarch. This system lasted until 1969, when Gaddafi was able to carry out a coup d'état that instituted the Libyan Arab Republic, where he was the ruler. Gaddafi was able to stay in power through

various decades where he gradually increased the repression in the country against any opposition that dared to challenge him.

Nevertheless, the changes that were occurring in the region severely affected the situation in Libya. In December of 2010, what is known as the Arab Spring started, where several revolutions asking for democratic regimes swept through countries like Tunisia or Egypt. In Libya, this created a severe increase in tensions, which developed into a civil war between Gaddafi's regime and a coalition of civilians that were backed by foreign actors like France, the UK, the UN. This civil war resulted in the end of Gaddafi's regime with his death. This led to a complete change in the country, as a power vacuum was established and shortly after both national as well as international actors tried to take advantage of the situation and fill this vacuum. This process is key for understanding the situation that Libya is experiencing at the moment as it crucially contributed to the divide that has torn the country in two and that still continues. On one side, there is the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is led by F. Sarraj and controls the Western half of Libya and is located in the city of Tripoli. On the other side, the east half of the country is controlled by the House of Representatives, which is backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Marshal H. Haftar and is located in the city of Tobruk. This conflict

has had a severe impact on the Libyan population as they have had to endure life in a war-torn country, which all the negative aspects that this entails, like street violence or food shortages. Several international actors have been able to use this situation for their own advantage as they have gotten into the conflict in order to be able to increase their control over the country. Countries like the United Arab Emirates or Turkey have pursued a very direct approach as they got into the conflict from the very beginning and strongly back one side. On the other hand, countries like Russia or China have been able to increase their influence in the conflict and in the country while remaining at a distance. Not only that but, even Russia which strongly supports Haftar and the LNA has always maintained ongoing conversations with the GNA, thus ensuring that they will be able to garner their objectives no matter, which sides ends up victorious in the conflict.

This book will seek to give a detailed explanation of the objectives that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have in this conflict. It will also explore the different actions that these two international players are carrying out in order to ensure that their objectives in the Libyan conflict are met. In addition, this book will give a brief overview of other international players like the United States or Russia, which are also immersed in the conflict. Finally, a series of recommendations will be given to showcase how the International Community should act in order to to stop the

conflict for continuing and also stopping the UAE and Saudi Arabia from their ongoing actions in this country.

Chapter 1

Saudi Arab and UAE Intervention in Libya

1. Saudi Arab and UAE Intervention in Libya

The US-led NATO pounce in Libya triggered a series of incidents. Firstly, after the North African countries carried out popular uprisings against dictators and former allies of the United States, like France and Britain, this brought this region into conflict and crisis. In a military offensive launched by the West, after the fall of Gaddafi and his public assassination, many tribes sought take advantage of the power vacuum to take control in Libya. Competing territories were formed throughout the country, and later armed militias were formed to increase their strength. Khalifa Haftar is the 76-year-old leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), an army loyal to the Tobruk government in the east of the country. In April 2019, LNA announced an attack on Tripoli to overthrow Libya's internationally recognized national government (Government of National Accord). This attack caused the LNA to be driven out of several western cities by the Allied GNA forces [1]

Furthermore, when Haftar launched the offensive, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was in Libya and said he was "deeply concerned and saddened" to have to leave the country. Also, Magdalena Mughrabi, deputy director of Amnesty International's Middle East and North Africa region, said the attacks on residential areas were indiscriminate. The LNA said it was trying to

restore security and take counter-terrorism actions. Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj of the GNA called the attack an attempted coup. Although there is a national government with international support, Libya has been in a state of lawlessness, instability and violence since 2011. After the end of Gaddafi's regime, Libya has become a war-torn country divided into two very differentiated camps. This situation not only persists but it is also growing as different countries have surrounded Libya and tried to influence its future direction [2].

In Libya, the UAE is testing its ambitions as a medium power, as it has in the past. As it is the case in Yemen, the UAE has intertwined geopolitical and ideological goals and in order to achieve these goals, they need strong forces and reliable allies. Indeed, being influential in subnational geographic regions (such as Cyrenaica in Libya or areas in southern Yemen) means weakening competitors (Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey) and working to acquire a platform to predict power generation, especially at sea level. Thus, this makes Libya a key region for the UAE's objectives as its location in the Mediterranean coast offer great geopolitical and strategic leverage.

The UAE's approach to control over the region is based on two different but connected strategies. Firstly, the presence of capable and powerful actors on the ground, like the militia in Yemen and the traditional presence of powerful allies in

the region of interest, like in Libya with Egypt. Some units are still stationed in Balhaf, Riyan and Socotra, but the UAE is still the most influential actor in southern Yemen because the formations they created played a key role. This is key to understanding developments in Libya as the withdrawal of UAE troops from Yemen is related to the growing strength of Abu Dhabi in Libya. This would not be possible in Yemen without the support of Egypt. So far, in Libya and Yemen, the UAE has shown similar characteristics and differences, which proves Abu Dhabi's tactics and purposeful pragmatism [3].

1.1 UAE's Support for Haftar in the War in Libya

The UAE is providing a crucial support to ensure that Haftar remains a political force in Libya and is able to maintain the civil war. The UAE's support for Haftar has been critical for victories in cities such as Benghazi and Derna. A clear example of this is the air base that was established in 2017 in eastern Libya. In addition to continuing to recruit mercenaries in Sudan, the UAE also has provided direct military support to the Haftar forces. Since April 2019, UAE spokesperson stated that Haftar has been killing civilians, causing harm to Libyan citizens rather than NTC forces. As of January 2020, more than 100

weapons have been shipped from the United Arab Emirates to Libya and Egypt (the United Arab Emirates' main regional allies) [4].

The conflict in Libya has been affected by the air strikes. Not only that but, the United Nations has also described the "terror" incident of the multinational company that recently discovered the Talka mass grave.

Nevertheless, the UAE has pledged to unconditionally support Haftar's pursuit of power and has continued to provide jet fuel. Haftar has continued to play an important role in the Libyan crisis, which has been largely focused on liberating Libya from the LNA-controlled eastern half of the country. However, this conflict has not gathered the importance that it deserves by some international actors, for instance, the United States and the United Kingdom have ignored the destabilizing influence of Abu Dhabi, whereas France, as an ideological supporter of Haftar, does not seem to bear the tremendous pressure to withdraw its troops from the LNA despite the security crisis.

The security relationship between France and UAE¹ was used to manipulate peace negotiations, prolong the civil war and strengthen Haftar's position. At an international conference on Libya held abroad, Haftar launched a military operation that ran counter to the obvious purpose of the conference. At the

¹ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/21/libyan-civil-war-france-uae-khalifa-haftar/>

beginning of 2019, with the support of France, after the military operations, Haftar expanded to Fezzan in southwest Libya and took control of the country's oil infrastructure [5].

Furthermore, the UAE welcomed Haftar and Prime Minister Sarraj to negotiate a power-sharing agreement. There are still contradictions in the UK, whereas France fully supports the UAE drone's attack on Tripoli, which were carried out by Haftar in April 2019. Russia and Turkey are also involved in the Libyan conflict. They are at war with the United Arab Emirates.

1.2 Foreign Policies

The foreign policy guidelines of the Gulf countries are driven by specific threats to regional stability. Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the strategic goals of these countries have been constantly changing, based on variations in threat perception and the development of political changes in Egypt. Syria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia have always been the traditional hegemons of geopolitics in the region, while Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have become new regional heavyweights hoping to get rid of the floods in the region [6].

The formation of Libya's political development after the Arab Spring, and its role was evaluated from the perspective of regional geopolitics. Libya has similarities with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar in terms of its small population and energy-based economy. In the past ten years, these states have embarked on economic diversification to reduce dependence on energy and are committed to increasing efforts. However, in Libya, oil is still the driving force of the economy. In 2017, the oil sector accounted for approximately 82% of export revenue and 60% of GDP (OPEC, 2017).

The foreign policy behaviour of the Gulf countries depends on the existence of an external security umbrella. Qatar has been particularly prolific in developing its security umbrella. A great example of this is Al Udid Air Force Base, which was built in 1996 and now has 10,000 US soldiers stationed there. In addition, the US Joint Air Operations Center, the US Air Force Central Command and the US Special Operations Command have 5,000 maintenance personnel stationed at Al Dhafra Air Force Base. The US military also uses Jebel Port and Fujairah Naval Base. With this security guarantee from the United States, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates can take strategic measures without fear of military retaliation. U.S. President Barack Obama turned to the Asian plan [7].

In addition, the gradual restriction of the number of Iraqi troops and the use of diplomatic means to resolve Iran's nuclear program have been seen as a sign of the gradual withdrawal of American troops from the region. After the Arab Spring in 2011, the government was turbulent and as a result of that, Iran has strengthened its political, diplomatic and military status in the region. Thus, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates also see this as an opportunity to expand its diplomatic and strategic presence in the region.

1.3 Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)

LAAF is supporting the militias, armed groups and the belligerent countries with impunity for violations of international humanitarian law, including possible war crimes. They fought between the national government loyal to the capital Tripoli and troops in other cities in western Libya. The GNA Agreement and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) caused civilian casualties, mass displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals. Countries such as Turkey, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have violated the UN arms

embargo² and continue to provide their allies with weapons and military equipment, including prohibited anti-personnel landmines.

Thousands of people have been detained arbitrarily without trial or opportunity. Questioning the legality of their detention, militias and armed groups have kidnapped people, including protesters, journalists, doctors, government officials, and civil society activists based on their real or perceived politics, regional or tribal affiliation, and nationality, taking hostages for ransom; women, girls and members of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and bisexual communities continue to face discrimination and violence.

Minority people strive to obtain adequate health care and other basic services. Officials, armed groups, militias, and members of criminal groups systematically subject refugees, asylum seekers and detained immigrants to torture and other abuse, illegal killings, forced labour, human rights violation etc.[8].

² <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/report-libya/>

1.4 UAE's Attack on Refugees

A confidential investigation by the BBC³ Arab Company into the United Nations revealed that a fighter jet from abroad launched a deadly missile attack at an immigration detention facility in Libya. The country has not been named, but a source familiar with the investigation said it has become the target of the attack. In the July attack, 53 immigrants were killed and 130 wounded. A UN official believed this was a possible war crime. Most of the people killed in the Tajura detention center. To the east of the capital Tripoli, they are said to have originated in sub-Saharan Africa and tried to reach Europe from Libya.

This is the highest publicly announced death toll in the attack since the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched a new offensive in April [9]. The Tripoli National Assembly government supported by the United Nations. The then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michel Bachelet said that depending on the circumstances, the attack may be a war crime. The Special Mission in Libya told the BBC that it provided the coordinates of the immigration centre. Preventing this situation In July, the NTC announced that the attack was carried out by a fighter in the United Arab Emirates. Although it initially bombed a legitimate target but later denied involvement [10].

³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50302602>

1.5 Deadly Drone Strike in Libya

The BBC⁴ found new evidence that UAE drones killed 26 unarmed students at a military academy in Tripoli, the capital of Libya, in January 2020. The so-called Libyan National Army denied responsibility for the attack and suggested that the students were killed by a local bomb. However, there is evidence that the students were hit by a Chinese Blue Arrow 7 missile launched by a drone named "Yonglong II". Investigations by the BBC Africa Eye and the BBC Arab documentary also found out that "Yonglong" was only Evidence of Type II unmanned aircraft. The attack took off from Al-Khadim Air Force Base in Libya. The UAE provided and operated drones stationed here. Shortly after 9 pm on January 4, 2020, about 50 cadets conducted routine exercises at a military academy in southern Tripoli.

Due to drone air strike on schools in Libya, 26 students died. Many of them were still teenagers and they are unarmed. One of the survivors was 20-year-old Abdul Moin. He was in the college when the coup took place. He told the BBC: "It's simply indescribable." "We saw our colleague die and gave one last breath. We can't do anything some people have their torsos separated from them. This is a terrible crime. It has nothing to do with human beings." Seven months after the

⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53917791>

attack, no one admitted that they were responsible for the killing of these youths. The press has been told that the explosion might have been caused by mortar shells fired on the spot or an attack inside the academy [11].

1.6 Targets Social Media Users and Journalists

Police and armed groups continue to harass social media users and journalists through detentions, arbitrary arrests and threats of criticism or completion of work. Police in Tripoli and Misrata parked their cars at the checkpoint, forced residents to unlock their phones and arrested them. In July, a military court in eastern Libya convicted reporter Ismail Buzriba al-Zuei guilty of “terrorism” and was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his media work and criticism of LAAF. In addition, in August, the Navassi militia, nominally belonging to the GNA Ministry of Interior, kidnapped Sami al-Sherif, a TV news reporter, and detained him in a secret location for 11 days to cover up the protests in Tripoli [13].

1.7 Violence against Women

As the authorities did not provide any compensation or protection, girls and women has been subjected to gender and sexual based violence by non-state actors and the government. Women and girls face legal barriers with rape and other forms of sexual violence, including the risk of prosecution for extramarital sex criminalized in Libya and the risk of retaliation by suspects. Activists and politicians face gender-specific threats and online violence for instance, in April, members of al-Qaeda armed groups kidnapped at least four women, possibly in retaliation for the public shooting of lawyer Hanan al-Barassi by unidentified militants in Benghazi in November when they posted it on social media.

Continue to face discrimination in law and practice, including issues related to marriage, divorce and inheritance. In October, the Supreme Judicial Council of Libya appointed five judges to two newly established special courts in Tripoli and Benghazi to handle cases of violence against women and children. The court closed at the end of the year [12].

Obviously, the eastern part of the country is a restricted zone for journalists, and the situation has not improved. In February 2017, a self-proclaimed Libyan National Army spokesperson announced that all women that were between 18 and 45 years old. In 2014, Salva Bugaigis, a well-known lawyer and senator, was

shot dead at his home in Benghazi. In a series of murders and disappearances of women active in political activities, she is the most obvious victim.

Heba Morayef of Amnesty International said in a report released earlier this year: "The murder of Salva Bugaigis marks the hope of Libyan women after the uprising. Active participation in the turning point of public and political life. 2011" pointed out: "Gender-based violence against women continues to escalate, and these women continue to fight for political integration." As the Sarafians continue to gain strength in the political structure, this has resulted in increased difficulty in being a women. In religious beliefs, men don't even want Asma Khalifa, the co-founder of the Tamakigut Women's Movement, to say on the phone, don't think of yourself as a "feminist" [16]. The civil war that overthrew the Libyan dictator Gaddafi gave the country's women a foothold in public life.

Now they are being crushed and even killed. Fatma al Omrani said that she had always wanted to be a journalist, but it was over. The reason for studying accounting is that women in the media under the rule of Dictator Muammar Gaddafi enjoy the reputation of being "loyal to the regime." Women or other people have no freedom of speech," said a 28-year-old DW man in the coastal city of Zuwara, which borders Tunisia in western Libya [17].

1.8 Deprivation of Liberty and Arbitrary Detention

Security forces, armed groups and Militias continue to arbitrarily detain millions of people without trail or charge, some for up to a decade. The NTC announced the release of approximately 2000 inmates who may have had a COVID-19 infection in prison. At least 10 people from Maharba, the LAAF-controlled city of Ajdabiya, were kidnapped and arrested for working with the imprisoned former oil service chief Ibrahim Jadran has family relationships, which have also suffered. Dozens of people were arrested. In less than a year, the family was arbitrarily detained for many years without trial in Mitiga Prison in Tripoli, under the control of the Rada Forces and the nominal PNS. They won several protests and requested his release [18]. Multinational companies such as the Special Containment Forces (radar forces), the Bab Tajura Brigade, al-Nawassi, the Abu Selim Brigade and the Al-Zawiya First Support Force are illegal.

1.9 Treatment and Torture

Armed groups have systematically ill-treated and tortured prisoners in informal and official places of detention with impunity, subjecting them to beatings, electric shocks, mock executions, arrests and sexual assaults. Activists say that violence involving multinational militias and air force armed groups spread on social media in January, May and September. In July, 30-year-old Tarek Abdelhafiz was tortured by the detention of the 128th Brigade (128th Brigade), an armed group of the US Air Force, 14 days ago Arrested in Hon City. In August, members of the Navassi militia and armed groups from LAAF beat up several people detained in connection with the protests in Tripoli and Margi.

1.10 Battle over Blockage of Oil

The NOC accused the UAE of instructing Eastern forces to block oil exports⁵ again after the first tanker evacuated within six months during the civil war in Libya. Reported by the Libyan National Army, even though the tanker is stored in Libya, but the blockade will continue. The hostile forces between Tripoli and

⁵ <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/7/12/libyas-noc-accuses-uae-of-being-behind-oil-blockade>

Haftar in the east of the UN-approved National Assembly government were torn apart.

The company said in a statement on Sunday: "National Petroleum Corporation has been informed that the United Arab Emirates has ordered the cessation of LNA production." After the GNA gained momentum, NOC also tried to resume production in the Sharara oil field, but said its efforts soon stopped. On Friday, the tanker Vitol Kriti Bastion called at the port of Es Sider and invited him. He set sail on Saturday. Since the blockade, Libya implemented its first legal oil export in January [19]. Fight with Syrian mercenaries against the currently occupied LNA Es Side. According to international agreements, only Norwegian kroner can extract and export oil, and the proceeds must be transferred to the Central Bank of Libya.

It said on Saturday that the blockade will continue until a series of conditions are met, including the transfer of oil revenues to new bank accounts abroad, which are then distributed to various regions. The US Embassy in Libya said on Sunday that the blockade was restored after "a few days of intense diplomatic activities" to allow the Olympic Committee to resume production and said it "regrets that foreign-supported efforts have hindered the effort."

There has always been a lack of reconciliation between the two hostile governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, which split the oil infrastructure and the oil terminal is controlled by hostile government groups and militias. The national oil company has legal control over Libya's oil resources and exports. Since 2014, his competitor NOC East has been stationed in Benghazi. During the conflict, it remained neutral, and his control of oil exports was hindered.

NOC East seeks international recognition and strives to sign development contracts with the company. Disputes broke out between rival national oil companies that led to the blockade of the port of Marsa al-Hariga for three weeks, resulting in a drop in oil production to 200,000 barrels per day. In July 2016, competitor NOC agreed to the joint oil sector.

Both NOC factions agreed that the leader of the NOC in Tripoli, Mustafa Sanallah, would take over as the president, and the leader of the NOC of the East, Naji al-Magrabi, would come to power and become a member of the board of directors. In 2016, PK signed an agreement with Ibrahim Jadran, the former head of the Libyan Central Petroleum Facility Guard, to reopen the Sidrah and Ras Lanuf stations that Jadran had controlled since 2013, and block Made sales in about US dollars. The GNC in Tripoli was unable to regain control of the oil station. This allowed LNA, under the leadership of Haftar, to occupy the oil ports

of Sidra, Ras Lanuf, and Buraik, and supply oil through the integration of NOC [20].

NOC President Mustafa Sanallah has suspended foreign investment in the oil sector. The country increased its daily output to 1 million barrels in July 2017, but Jafran. However, with the help of the United Emirates, Jadran's attempt was thwarted. Who managed to catch him? However, after LNA gained control, it decided to transfer control to NOC East [10].

Although it was unified in 2016, it still exists in Benghazi. However, due to international pressure, Haftar succumbed and handed over the oil terminal at NOC Tripoli on July 11, 2018. Nonetheless, the control conflict between the port and the oil terminal continues. Recently, on February 11, 2019, Tuareg Alli from Haftar extended control of the largest confiscated oil field, El Sharara. Since December 8, 2018, tribal groups, armed protesters and the National Guard have called for salaries and development funds. The UAE believes that the strategic merger of Haftar's main oil fields is a welcome change, and international investment in Libya's oil sector is also increasing. During this period, the control of the Libyan oil market and the rise of world oil prices.

1.11 Death in Custody

Amnesty International has received numerous reports of the deaths of humanitarian, former, human rights organizations, journalists and current detainees in detention facilities in official and informal places of detention. Amnesty International is aware that it has not yet conducted an independent investigation into the causes and circumstances of the deaths in these detentions. Between 2017 and 2020, seven refugees and immigrants detained at the DCIM detention centre told Amnesty International that they witnessed the death of detained friends, family members or other detainees. Several other refugees and immigrants learned of the deaths of several relatives at the DCIM detention centre, including a man who lost an eight-month-old baby in 2018.

Amnesty International recently learned of the death of an immigrant from a DCIM detention centre in July 2020, apparently due to malnutrition and lack of medical services. Witnesses pointed out that gun violence, torture, starvation, lack of medical services and generally poor detention conditions. For example, "Abdi", who lived in Libya from November 2017 to January 2019 after escaping from Somalia, told Amnesty International about his experience at the DCIM detention centre in April 2018 in Sikka. He stated that he saw about 600 people there.

There are many things in the air is so bad that it makes people feel uncomfortable. Health and nutrition problems have been encountered. Amnesty International has documented an incident in which the security forces used illegal lethality in the city of Combs against refugees and migrants who did not pose a threat to the security forces or the lives and safety of anyone else. Two people with knowledge of the landing of Al Khums told Amnesty International that on July 27, 2020, security forces opened fire on 72 refugees and migrants who landed. 150 survivors were taken to the DCIM detention center in Souq al-Khamis [14].

According to the International Organization for Migration, when the school dropouts tried to flee, "local authorities" opened fire on them, causing three deaths and two injuries. The media quoted the department as saying: "The riot at the Al-Khums landing site resulted in the wrongful execution of three immigrants from South Sudan." He added that the lander attacked the base where LCG staff and their families were located, "anti-terrorism". The troops" fired warning shots and "accidentally" killed three men. His claim was supported by the refuted "Declaration".

The international humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) stated that refugees and migrants are actually trying to avoid

arbitrary detention, noting that they are not armed. 150 International Organization for Migration and Médecins Sans Frontières also regularly report deaths while in custody at the DCIM150 Center. For example, the IOM reported in March 2020 that a young man died in a fire in So-el-Jabl, a DCIM detention facility in Jindan. According to statistics from Amnesty International and Human Rights, 152 refugees and immigrants were killed in the "camp" due to poor condition or violence.

1.12 Forced Labour

Immigrants and survivors of slavery in Libya are tense about their future due to the halt of rescue operations, aid and resettlement because of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) announced⁶ last week that it will cease certain activities in Libya, including visits to detention centers and the opening of registration centers set up to register new immigrants. At the same time, both UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have suspended flights to resettle refugees and migrants. As with humanitarian aid in the Mediterranean, refugees and migrants are deeply

⁶ <https://www.freedomunited.org/news/refugees-subjected-to-forced-labor-in-libya-now-threatened-by-coronavirus/>

concerned that Libya's harsh conditions, including forced labour and abuse, may worsen due to work stoppages. In addition to aid, many people worry that COVID-19 may spread in overcrowded refugee communities. Even if there are no conclusive cases, humanitarian workers and activists are worried that this pandemic may further stigmatize refugees and immigrants, among which respiratory diseases are common.

Immigrants are deeply concerned that cessation of work may exacerbate harsh conditions in Libya, including forced labour and abuse. In addition to the possibility of not getting any help, many people are also concerned that COVID-19 may spread in a sparsely populated refugee community that has no chance to fight the disease. Even if there are no confirmed cases of the disease, humanitarian workers and activists are worried about a pandemic. This North African country has been in various wars for nearly a decade.

Due to its fragile state, it is one of the main destinations for immigrants and refugees who wish to enter Europe from its coast. Due to low government participation and lack of social order, the exploitation of these desperate people is widespread. Forced labour by refugees and immigrants is widespread: they are forced to carry heavy objects, build shelters for military personnel, and in order to oppose forced labour, some even call themselves slaves. Many reports

of exploitation come directly from it. With generous funding from the European Union, the Libyan Coast Guard will return migrants detained in the Mediterranean to prison [19].

At the same time, after militia leaders reportedly used it as a base, they had to withdraw from the refugee center established by UNHCR in Tripoli earlier this year to replace the detention center. The Free Federation is currently working to end slavery in Libya and pressure the European Union to end its funding policy for the Libyan Coast Guard, to ensure that prisons are closed and the current cycle of exploitation is broken. In the face of the coronavirus pandemic, Libyan refugees and migrants have become more vulnerable, and they need your help more than ever.

1.13 Illegal Arms Transfer

The UAE has participated in a large number of arms transfers from the rebels to Libya, which violated the UN arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. According to a detailed report in the New York Times in 2012, the United Arab Emirates turned to the Obama administration for the first time in the first few months of the uprising in Libya to facilitate the delivery of American-

made weapons. The government rejected this request, but asked the UAE to send weapons to Libya that could not be traced back to the United States. "Over the years, the United Nations PoE, which oversees embargoes, has recorded many cases of arms transfers from the UAE.

Some examples show violations not only by unscrupulous weapons dealers but also by member states. In September 2011, the excess from Tirana The inventory of Abu Dhabi shipped 800,000 pieces of Chinese-made heavy machine gun ammunition to Benghazi, Albania. It was completed by the Armenian agent and the Ukrainian state-owned company UKRINMASH on behalf of the UAE Armed Forces. Abu Dhabi International Airport had obtained a flight permit but changed the flight route. The subsequent three flights violated Emba's arms supply and transported the cargo to Benghazi. The transportation "is part of a larger agreement between UKRINMASH and the coalition government.

The number of United Arab Emirates (through Armenian agents), including 2 million 12".7 x 108mm rifles and 1,000 AK-47 assault rifles," the general practitioner said. Experts pointed out that despite the arms embargo, all three flights were given conflict-free NATO numbers with the approval of the UAE military. This translation was repeated, but no response was received. This case clearly shows how the UAE has played a key role in providing appropriate

weapons and ammunition to the Libyan rebels despite the arms embargo, with or without the tacit approval of NATO allies.

One of the many violations of the Libyan arms embargo is the further decline in the credibility and effectiveness of the international arms embargo. Since 2012, STREIT is a Russian-Canadian company whose production bases are mostly located in the United Arab Emirates. With the approval of various administrative agencies, it has exported hundreds of armoured vehicles (Cougar, Spartan and Cobra) to the Libyan Ministry of Interior. Office in the UAE. The United Arab Emirates includes goods and materials submitted to the Import and Export Control Executive Directorate. "Although STREIT rejects any suggestion," the suggestion was hurt intentionally or in other ways national or international law", which means he did not realize the embargo, which is an unlikely and pathetic excuse for large international defence companies.

At the same time, Canadian authorities are investigating the sale of STREIT to Libya and Sudan due to the UN embargo. He also recorded the transfer of UAE military equipment to the Zintana Sawaik brigade in southwest Tripoli in 2013, including UAE NIMR armoured personnel carriers and AR assault rifles. -M9F Bulgarian descent and uniform [5].

The report mentioned one the case of a Mi-24p attack helicopter, which was delivered to LNA Haftar in eastern Libya in April 2015. Belarus confirmed to the team that the Mi-24p helicopter with this marking had been handed over to the United Arab Emirates. In 2014, Part of the 4 Mi-24p delivered, Belarus issued an end-user certificate and registered the transfer in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in 2015. The transfer of this helicopter and Belarus has received an application from the United States to the United Arab Emirates permission to allow the helicopter to be re-exported to Libya, but no response has been received. “In 2015, “Defense News” reported that negotiations between the commander of the Libyan National Army, General Haftar and Arab leaders are guiding the Libyan army to purchase weapons, including helicopters delivered by Emirates in April 2015.

The source said: “Finally, a month ago, a large amount of Russian equipment, including anti-tank, armoured weapons and ammunition, had been delivered to five upgraded Mi-35 Hind helicopters.” Since 2016, several aircraft have flown into the distance shift. Harding Airport, 100 kilometres west of Canada, is under active development. In October 2016, Jane’s Defense Weekly published a list of UAE aircraft, which included six AT-802 light attack aircraft, two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and two Wing Lung drones. As the transport aircraft of the Il-

76, Jane said that the aircraft combination "is the same as the aircraft combination.

1.14 Libya Untenable & Dire Situation of Children

The chaos and violence caused by the prolonged civil war have severely harmed Libyan children, including immigrants and refugees. Although fighting resumed in the capital Tripoli and the western suburbs of Libya in April last year, the living conditions of thousands of children and civilians have deteriorated, and indiscriminate killings in densely populated areas have claimed hundreds of lives. According to Ms. Fall, these children were mutilated, killed and involved in fighting. Chairman) In 2011, Libya faced economic collapse and turmoil despite its large oil reserves. Fighting between the arrogant factions of the Libyan National Army resulted in thousands of deaths. An important international summit will be held in the German capital next Sunday. The UN Prime Minister admitted that the government and Haftar Commander will attend the meeting to seek a permanent ceasefire.

More than 150,000 people have been evicted from their homes, 90,000 of whom are children and have now been displaced. He pointed out that the "infrastructure

on which children depend" is being threatened. He said: "About 30 medical facilities were damaged during the conflict, and 13 of them have been closed." He added that attacks on schools and threats of violence caused schools to close and about 200,000 children were unable to attend classes. They were attacked and the waste management system collapsed, greatly increasing the risk of water-borne diseases, including cholera.

The 60,000 refugee and immigrant children currently living in urban areas are also at high risk, especially the 15,000 unaccompanied children and children in detention centers. These children are already struggling with protection and basic services, because the escalation of conflict will only increase the risks they face. "UNICEF and its local partners provide children and their families with health care, nutrition, protection and education, as well as water and health support....Before the Berlin Peace Summit this Sunday, fall urged scammers to call all parties. Those who have influence on this "urgently seek a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement for the benefit of all children in Libya" [20].

Chapter 2

Emerging UAE Power to Oppress Libyan

2 Emerging UAE Power to Oppress Libyan

Human Rights Watch report today that the US should withdraw its offer to sell weapons to the UAE. It should suspend all future sales until the UAE ceases illegal airstrikes on Yemen and Libya and ceases weapon support and supply. On November 10, 2020, the U.S. State Department formally notified the U.S. Congress that the government plans to sell weapons, including aircraft, to the UAE for \$23.37 billion including aviation ammunition and air-to-ground ammunition.

He mentioned that the UAE must defend itself against Iran, and mentioned the UAE's diplomatic agreement to normalize relations with Israel. Sarah Hovinsky, head of the Washington Bureau of Human Rights, said the authorities ignored the massive evidence of illegal killings of civilians in Yemen and other attacks by a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. "Officials hope to reward the UAE for recognizing Israel, but this does not mean complicity in the murders carried out in Libya and Yemen with the direct assistance of the military" [21].

The BBC has uncovered new evidence that a drone operated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) killed 26 unarmed cadets at a military academy in Libya's capital Tripoli in January 2020. At the time of the strike on 4 January, Tripoli was under

siege by the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA). It has denied responsibility for the attack and suggested the cadets had been killed by local shelling. But evidence indicates the cadets were hit by a Chinese Blue Arrow 7 missile. [22].

2.1 Report on Human Rights

Geneva (February 25, 2016)-A report released by the United Nations* on Thursday documents widespread violations and abuses that have occurred in Libya since the beginning of 2014. The report recommends urgent action to combat impunity and strengthen and reform the judicial system. The human rights situation in Libya only occasionally makes headlines. The United Nations Verkhovna Rada said: “Many state and non-state actors have been accused of very serious violations and abuses. In many cases, this can be equated to war crimes.” Human Rights Commissioner Zeid Raad Al Hussein. The recorded violations and abuse are related to the following: Illegal killings: Since 2014, all conflict areas and most major armed groups have reported cases, including executions, captives, detentions, kidnappings or being deemed indiscriminate. People: Many of the attacks since 2014 seem to have been especially in densely populated residential areas such as Benghazi, Tripoli, Warsaw, the Nafusa Mountains and southern Libya. Adequate precautions have not been taken to protect civilians and people and property protected by international humanitarian organizations. Laws, including medical centers, ambulances and medical personnel, and torture and ill-treatment: Torture is particularly common in detention centers. According to reports, the detention was beaten by plastic

pipes or cables, and the long-term suspension was stress, solitary confinement, execution, lack of food or water, sexual threats and extortion. Torture caused the deaths of prisoners in various places of detention, including various military police and military intelligence agencies

Arbitrary detention: After the armed conflict in 2011, thousands of people were still detained, most of whom did not give due consideration to their cases; some were held in secret or unidentifiable facilities operated by armed groups. Almost nothing has been done for judicial review of the legality of these detentions, and even if there is a release, the release order is not always followed. Kidnapping and Enforced Disappearances: Enforced disappearances have been accused of national forces and armed groups on several occasions. And discrimination against women: Since 2014, armed groups have launched multiple attacks on militants. The murder of Salwa Bugaygis, Farikh Al-Berkawi and Intissar Al-Hasaeri and other prominent female activists, as well as the threats to many others, the elimination of harassment and assaults, seem to convey a broader message that women should not speak publicly. The fear of retaliation, stigma, family pressure or injury proves that dances are difficult to record. In one case, a woman said that she was kidnapped by a member of an armed group in Tripoli and was repeatedly drugged and raped within six months. According to data, six 11-year-old girls were victims of sexual violence by the same group of human rights defenders and journalists: human rights defenders have been victims of murder, attempted, kidnapping, threats, surveillance and attacks on their houses and buildings. . Established an office since 2014. Fearing this kind of behavior, the high profile of the attackers and the perpetrators' impunity, many human rights defenders and journalists who have been murdered, death threatened, and arrested are hiding or fleeing. Random and kidnapping.

Migrants: Many migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by authorities, armed groups and human traffickers. They have been subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, forced labor, extortion, human trafficking and sexual violence for a long time. Sub-Saharan Africans are particularly vulnerable as immigrants. They were sexually abused and exploited inside and outside the detention facility. A large number of immigrants are still in detention without judicial supervision, and there are at least 3,245 in western Libya alone.

Children: It also records the forced recruitment and use of children by ISIS sworn groups in hostilities. According to reports, some people were forced to engage in religious and military activities. In training sessions and beheading videos, some people said they were sexually assaulted. Zaid said: "The most striking element of this report is that impunity and the inherent shortcomings of the justice system are still widespread in Libya." The High Commissioner added: "This report clearly shows that the justice system has no resources or Ability to conduct immediate, independent and credible investigations, or bring to justice those responsible for human rights violations." Become the target of murder⁷ [23].

The UAE is also part of the ongoing conflict in Libya. They have launched air strikes and unmanned attacks, the UAE has also established a base of operations there, and provided direct support, including weapons, to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF, the former Libyan National Army) headed by Khalifa

⁷ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17089&LangID=E>

Shiftar including the transfer of ammunition, armoured vehicles and other military equipment⁸

2.2 Report Regarding Drone Attack

Human Rights discovered an apparently illegal drone attack directly from the UAE. It attacked the Al-Sunbulah biscuit factory in Wadi al-Rabi on November 18th, 2019, killing 8 civilians and wounding 27 others. Not only that but, the UAE's illegal air strikes on immigration detention centers controlled by the Ministry of the Interior of the National Agreement Government killed more than 53 people, most of them African immigrants. According to reports, in December 2019, the UAE "provided weapons to the UAE Armed Forces on a regular basis, and sometimes even publicly," in violation of the UN's bilateral arms embargo on all parties that take part in the conflict in Libya. Experts include patrol ships, armoured personnel carriers, high-explosive disc lasers, air defence systems and unmanned aerial vehicles [28].

In Libya, strikes carried out in the name of LAAF killed civilians, and international humanitarian law did not observe the principle of proportionality. Human Rights

⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/01/united-states-embargo-arms-united-arab-emirates>

Watch has repeatedly documented abuses by the Air Force, including executions, enforced disappearances, torture, desecration and illegal air strikes on the bodies of opposition fighters in eastern Libya between 2014 and 2018 and during the Battle of Tripoli in May, including an apparently illegal air strike in a residential area of Tripoli in October 2019, resulting in civilian deaths. During the recent conflict in Tripoli, LAAF and related foreign armed forces used internationally banned cluster bombs, anti-personnel mines and booby traps in southern Tripoli.

Human Rights Watch stated that the UAE's completely illegal drone attack hit the Al Sunbulah biscuit factory in Wadi al Rabi, south of Tripoli, on November 18, 2019, killing 8 civilians and injuring 27 others. Few measures have been taken to minimize the damage to civilians and incidents caused by attacks. Transparent investigations should be conducted, results should be announced and compensation should be paid to victims or their families. It broke out in April 2019. The UAE is launching air strikes and drones to support the Libyan Arab Army (LAAF) (formerly known as the Libyan National Army), one of the two main Libyan parties in the conflict, some of which have caused civilian casualties⁹.

⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/29/libya-uae-strike-kills-8-civilians>

2.3 Weapons and Arms Transfers from the UAE

According to a legal UN report, the UAE increased the supply of military equipment to Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar and circumvented the arms embargo because the Gulf States tried to save him. He is the leader of the military campaign and controls the influence of its regional competitors, like Turkey. A diplomat said that he had obtained an unpublished report from a group of American experts monitoring weapons, stating that the number of weapons controlled by Haftar is increasing because he has been able to prevent the internationally recognized Libyan government from blocking Tripoli for years.

Collapsed after the attack. Between January and April, the U.S. Air Force flew about 150 flights. According to U.S. experts, these aircraft were equipped with ammunition and protective systems. The diplomat said that even after the cancellation of Haftar's offensive, an American-made C-17 military transport aircraft was still making dozens of flights from the UAE throughout the summer. The European Union has also been accused of violating the Libyan arms embargo by using ships to transport jet fuel to Libya for military purposes. The EU has launched maritime patrols this year to strengthen the embargo, and the ship was arrested earlier this month [30].

EU officials say the aircraft was equipped with jet fuel and was intended for military use in Haftar-controlled areas. American weapons have contributed to Libya's large-scale arms building. The continuous attacks on the central government of Tripoli have brought the UAE to the opposite side of the United States in this conflict. President Trump has for instance recognized the GNA in Tripoli as the legitimate government of Libya [31].

The airlift of weapons and other items from the UAE to Haftar has turned this small, wealthy country into one of the mediators in the conflicts between Turkey, Russia and Libya¹⁰. The government of Tripoli, which Turkey has intervened, hopes to bypass competitors such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates and strengthen its commercial interests, such as gas rights in the Mediterranean. The UAE's arms supply played an important role in Haftar's military takeover of eastern Libya, and he continues to oppose negotiations in Libya [27].

According to information previously released by the United States, in recent years, the UAE has sent armed drones, air defence systems, laser-guided bombs and helicopters to destroy Haftar's forces. "The main saboteur in Libya

¹⁰ <https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/u-a-e-boosted-arms-transfers-to-libya-to-salvage-warlords-campaign-u-n-panel-finds-11601412059>

since 2015," said Wolfram Lacher, a Libyan expert at the German think tank the Berlin Institute for International Relations and Security. Secretary of State Anwar Gargash on the other hand, declined to discuss the details of arms shipments to Libya, saying that the UAE and its allies are fighting Libyan terrorist organizations. Gargash also said: "We are not working alone in Libya." We work with Egyptians, French and other countries. In January, the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed signed an agreement with other world leaders to maintain the US arms embargo on Libya, but the flow of arms to the country has nonetheless increased since then. The influx of military equipment from the United States started at the end of 2019-early 2020, when Haftar's campaign against the government sanctioned by Britain failed. When the situation was not favourable to him, the Gulf countries sent about 150 military flights to eastern Libya and western Egypt, most of which were shipped through large Russian cargo planes [36].

Several planes landed at Sidi Barani Air Base near the border with Libya in Egypt. From there, cars and planes transported military equipment to Libya. This is derived from a US report that contains aerial photos of bases and flight records. Haftar's offensive failed in June, when pro-government forces backed by Turkey suppressed Haftar's militia making them have to evacuate from the

capital. The foreign powers, however, have not faced serious consequences of violating the US arms embargo. In February, Stephanie Williams, Assistant Director of the U.S. Mission in Libya even stated: "The arms embargo has become a joke.

The ship sailed on the Mediterranean for the first time on September 10th. According to the European Union, the ship is likely to transport aviation fuel from the UAE to Libya for military purposes. The EU has also imposed sanctions on violations as part of its efforts to enforce the arms embargo. The blockade last week authorized a Turkish transportation company and a Jordanian transportation company to deliver military equipment to Libya. He also imposed sanctions on the Kazakhstan airline Sigma Airlines, which was previously used by the European Union to deliver weapons to Libya because it violated the gun ban[33].

According to the contract and other documents examined by the Wall Street Journal, the US military initially ordered seven Russian-made Mi-24 helicopters from the Czech Republic through the private AAL group in Dubai in 2015. A year

later, the Air Force commander belonging to the Haftar Libyan militia approved an order for the purchase of 11 Mi-24 helicopters, 7 of which have the same serial numbers as the British ones. An obvious plan to move the helicopter to Libya. This can be seen in the letters reviewed by the journal. According to a former official familiar with the situation, the UAE government once invited the Czech ambassador to inspect the helicopter flying in the UAE to reassure him that the plane was for local use only. Nevertheless, in the past few months, Haftar's forces have used several Mi-24 helicopters for combat, including the attack on Tripoli.

A well-informed former Western official said that Libyan pilots with ties to the Haftar armed forces have been trained in the same type of helicopter in Egypt. An Egyptian government spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment on the helicopters and weapons shipped to Libya. In 2017, U.S. officials expressed concern about the U.S. plans to bring one of the helicopters into Libya. Then in 2018, according to the contract, a transfer certificate and other documents seen by the magazine, he sent at least three planes to Egypt. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs also confirmed that the helicopter has arrived in Egypt and obtained a transfer permit in 2019. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Czech authorities have not yet received any news about

Egypt's intention to transfer helicopters to Libya. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in an email: "We confirm that the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations in New York is in contact with the Libya Expert Group on this matter." Upon request, commented on the details of helicopter exports.

2.4 Libyan Army Seizes Weapons Supplied by UAE

The Libyan army in the Middle East confiscated the weapons delivered by the government of the United Arab Emirates. In the past three days, the Haftar Ennes Kanli militia liberated the capital of Trihun, the strategic city of Talina. The Libyan army Ankara (ANKAR) will seize on Friday Weapons, ammunition and vehicles purchased by the UAE for the warlord Khalifa Haftar (Khalifa Haftar). It is well known that the Libyan army announced in the past 72 hours that it had completely liberated the capital Tripoli and the strategic city of Taruna from the Haftar militia. The UAE is one of several countries that supports the Haftar militia against the legitimate government of Libya along with Egypt and Russia. The government forces seized the FN-6 portable air defense missile system, also known as MANPADS, SPG-9 recoilless anti-tank gun, Kornet anti-tank missiles, and Grad mortars and missiles. The troops also captured mortars, howitzers, missiles, anti-aircraft guns and artillery. According to government reports, dozens of tanks, armored vehicles and weapons depots were confiscated in Tarun. Tarhuna is an important supply center for the militia at Al Yufra Air Base. The Libyan army announced the complete liberation of the capital Tripoli on Thursday. The "Peace Storm" operation was launched to stop attacks on the

capital, and the recent reconstruction of strategic locations including the Alviaia Air Base, which dealt a heavy blow to Haftar's forces. Or because Haftar's forces launched a military offensive, the long-term political agreement failed.

2.6 U.A.E. Boosted Arms Transfers to Libya to Salvage

Warlord's Campaign, U.N. Panel Finds

According to a confidential UN report, the UAE has increased its supply to Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar this year in order to circumvent the arms embargo as the Gulf states try to save the leader's military campaign and control the influence of its regional competitor Turkey. A diplomat who received an undisclosed report said that as Haftar tried to prevent the collapse of his internationally recognized Libyan government in Tripoli, the number of US military flights increased.

2.7 Stop selling US weapons to Saudi Arabia

The war in Libya is the war in the United States. Saudi Arabia spent a lot of money to buy weapons in the United States and launched a war that killed nearly a quarter of its population. This is the worst humanitarian disaster in our lives. The American government started a war. According to the International Peace Research Institute, the United States has sold weapons and tanks to the United

Arab Emirates. The report stated that Saudi Arabia is the UAE's largest importer of weapons. In the first five years of the Libya War (2015-2019), the defense team has grown by 130% compared to the past five years, although the United States and the entire United Kingdom are worried about Saudi Arabia. From 2015, Washington and London continue to export weapons to Saudi Arabia until 2019. Year: 73% of Saudi Arabia's arms imports came from the United States, while the United States accounted for 17%.

Arms send to Saudi Arabia & UAE are 4 billion. Between 2014 and 2020, the United States agreed to sell more than \$64.5 billion in weapons to Riyadh, an average of \$10.7 billion per year. As time passed, the war with the United Arab Emirates escalated. They ended the war in early 2015, interrupting military, diplomatic, and intelligence support to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition that blocked Yemen and launched deadly air strikes on civilian targets. Austin proposed not to support the Saudi campaign because it might fail. In addition, It has not been get the attention. It would be helpful to learn more about Obama early in the campaign. Discuss military management. Who assist Abu Dhabi and Riyadh?

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo firmly believes that the Saudis can win, but this will be a huge setback for the Iranians who support Zayed's Shiite Houthi rebels.

By appointing Zayed to lead the government. There were foreign terrorists last week. Socialist organization. Iran is the victor of this Great War[33]

As the war progressed, the Houthis got closer and closer to Iran, and Iran's influence on Sana'a was greater than six years. The supply of missiles and drones allowed the Houthis to attack Riyadh and other targets in Saudi Arabia. Allies of the Iraqi militia can also attack Riyadh. The pro-Iranian Iraqi group responsible for the drone attack in Riyadh represents the escalation of sectarian violence in the region. Furthermore. Yemen & Libya war cost Saudi Arabia and UAE a huge fortune.

Take concrete steps to end the war; reduce all military deliveries to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the 10th and 11th places; Italian weapons buyers; more than 12,000 missiles were sent to Saudi Arabia; candidate candidate Joe Biden (Joe Biden) Biden) and other countries have pledged to take action to end the United States.

This is a commendable move. His government temporarily suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, including the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Abu Dhabi for \$35 billion. These are the right decisions and must be

permanent. President Biden announced the termination of support for the "offensive" operations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Does this also mean the end of the blockade? What are the main causes of malnutrition in Yemen? Saudi drones and anti-aircraft missile systems continue, but will support for missile battery air strikes end? The cordon killed five people. The UN Security Council will pass a new resolution calling for urgent international efforts. As a special representative with many years of experience in the region, this is a good step. It is time to end the massacre. Stop Yemen's arms race in the Middle East [23].

Chapter 3

UN Role in Libya

3 United Nation Role in Libya

The United Nations has been in Libya since 1950 with many agencies, funds and programmes gathered under a Country Team (UNCT). The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMI) is a United Nations frontline mission established after the civil war in Libya. UNSMI is a political mission, not a military one. The key elements of a specific mission of the United Nations include supporting the Libyan Transitional Authority in “post-conflict efforts”, mediating the implementation of Libyan political agreements, supporting important Libyan institutions, and monitoring and reporting on human rights [37].

3.1 UN Aims

UNSMI’s initial mission was determined by the United Nations in 2011. Its main mission is to assist the Libyan Transitional Authority, including the Libyan National Transitional Council, in “post-conflict efforts” to establish rule of law institutions. In 2009-2011, the mission of UNSMI was more formally defined in the following sense: the United Nations decided to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission in Libya (UNSMI) under the guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with a term of three Months, and

decided that UNSMIL's mission will be to support and assist Libya's national efforts in the following areas:

- (a) Restore public security and order, and promote the rule of law;
- (b) Develop inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, and implement the electoral and constitutional process;
- (c) Strengthen state power, including strengthening responsible emerging institutions and restore public services;
- (d) Promote and protect human rights, especially those belonging to vulnerable groups, and support transitional justice;
- (e) Take necessary immediate actions for economic recovery;
- (f) Coordinate the assistance that other multilateral and bilateral actors may request as appropriate.

In 2016, the mandate scope has been expanded to include mediation in the implementation of the 2015 Shirat Agreement between Libyan transitional institutions competing for political power. Other elements of UNSMIL's mandate are the support of important Libyan institutions and the monitoring and reporting of human rights. Under the guidance of the United Nations Political Affairs

Division, UNSMIL's mandate is extended annually from 2019 to September 15, 2020.

3.2 UN Action

In September 2018, UNSMIL reported 22 injuries and 48 deaths in conflicts among political groups in Libya. In July 2019, UNSMIL boss Ghassan Salameh proposed a three-point plan (ceasefire, holding an international conference to implement the existing and internal arms embargo in Libya) as a preventive measure. A new stage in the Libyan peace process aimed at resolving the second civil war in Libya. In October 2020, Stephanie Williams conducted extensive consultations with Libyan society, including meetings with the mayors of Libya in western, southern and eastern Libya to prepare for the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) [38].

The UN general Reported that Libya conflict has entered a new phase in which foreign intervention and mercenaries presence are "unprecedented" among oil-producing countries. Since the fall of NATO, Libya has been in chaos. The division has been in existence since 2014, the internationally recognized government controlling the capital of Tripoli in the northwest, while military leader

Khalifa Haftar rules East from Benghazi. The governments of Egypt and Russia support the eastern general on one hand, and the official government is supported by Turkey on other hand which is part of its broader strategy as a major player in the Mediterranean.

3.3 Divided Country

This oil-rich country is still divided between the United Nations-recognized National Agreement (GNA) and the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA) government, which attacked the capital Tripoli in April 2019. A month later, the bombing of Tripoli ended, when Tarhouna was recaptured by ANC forces. When Mr. Guterres observed the current troubled truce in the city of Sirte, where hostile forces were at war and civilians were scattered among them, he insisted that he was "encouraged" by the cessation of the past few months, appearing as a statement completely disconnected from reality. In addition, he welcomed Prime Minister Selay and Speaker of the House of Representatives (supporting the left-wing coalition) Aguilar Saleh's proposal to resolve the conflict peacefully after calling for a ceasefire [40].

3.4 Potential Response by UN Chief

In separate statements, the two parties also called for lifting the oil blockade and resuming the political process. The Secretary-General of the United Nations continued, and then called on "all parties" to participate in the activities of the United Nations in a constructive and cooperative manner, calling for a cessation in "the next few weeks" for the military clashes. He said before announcing his resignation to add momentum to the dialogue.

On September 13, the eastern government of the country and Prime Minister Serraj announced their intention to transfer power at the end of October. Guterres said these measures may help "establish a process for the restoration of sustainable peace, stability and development in the country." In the last round of negotiations in August, the two sides discussed about the security and military issues in the future of the country. The security of the military zone and the responsibility for the future security of oil facilities were also mentioned as a principled preoccupation [39].

3.5 Future of Libya

Meanwhile, it has been defined in summit that Libya parties' priority was to settle peace. Guterres insisted that the end of the conflict is still the "top priority" of the organization, adding that the hostilities have "been going on for too long, and today we have the opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to end." It is important to notice the UN participation in the Libya Conference in Berlin in January 2020. Renown representatives from major regional and sub-regional organizations also participated in this high-level meeting. Algeria, Libya, Niger, Chad, Tunisia, Sudan, South Africa and Morocco also attend the meeting. The main goal of the summit was to "reaffirm the participants' commitment to the Berlin Conference's conclusions and emphasize the role of the United Nations in promoting political, economic and security dialogue on Libyan property" and the commitment of the international community to bring peace in the country. According to the UN Ministry of Political Civilian Victims in Libya, the "peaceful solution to reaffirm the Libyan conflict" dropped sharply to minus 19 between June 2020 and September 2020, according to UNSMI at least between April and June. There were 358 hostilities for the ultimate parties, and the acting director of UNSMI has repeatedly held Libyans accountable, which is the "core" of any political debate about their future peace process. He said: "The Libyans want their leaders to

take responsible and constructive actions in the national interest in order to reach a consensus on a comprehensive political solution, which will restore democratic legitimacy."

3.6 The Humanitarian Catastrophe Ignored by the UN

The humanitarian catastrophe of the ongoing crisis in Libya has been ignored by the UN. The New York Times published a total of seven articles mentioning Libya in September 2017, only one focused on the violence that divided Libya. The actions of The Times only emphasized the recent reorganization of the US government's decision on foreign military affairs. Eric Schmidt's article quoted the Pentagon's Africa Command as saying that the U.S. military launched six "precision strikes" against government exercises. Since Donald Trump took office, 17 militants have been killed in the first air strike on the land of Libya in the "conflict-ridden North African country".

Two articles in the Libya Times in September 2017 discussed the Trump administration's travel ban that affected Libyans, but not only. On the one hand, it is about Libyans seeking asylum in Germany just to find "hate"; on the other hand, it is about threats of racism and violence. One could also compare the

current media coverage of Libya with the time before the NATO military operation that led to the tragic death of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. In February 2011 alone, just one month before the United States, Britain and France began bombing the country to overthrow Gaddafi, the New York Times published more than 100 articles on Libya. An editorial on February 24, 2011 confidently stated: "If there is no way to stop him, Gaddafi will destroy hundreds or even thousands of people who desperately want to remain in power." Here is the genuine dictator's enemy. A few months after the flood of violence in the country due to the Western powers, the same newspaper also published an incisive story by senior journalist Rod Nordland entitled "There are more martyrs in Libya than dead bodies". "Where is the dead?" he asked, referring to the charges of conspiracy to kill Gaddafi. No evidence of such murder has been found anywhere in the country.

This outburst of violence is currently happening in Libya and is unlikely to be reported in the corporate media. On August 28, 2017, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Libya, Ghassan Salame, told the Security Council on the first night in the capital, Tripoli: "I fell. Continuous and intermittent. The shot fell asleep."

According to him, due to sporadic armed conflicts, several "civilians" across Libya were killed or injured.

Thousands of people have also been detained for long periods of time, and many of them have been deprived of their right to a fair trial. Libya is currently almost under anarchy. An UN-led initiative led to the Libyan Political Agreement and the December 2015 National Agreement (GNA) so-called government, which brought together two "governments" during the war: the Council of Representatives (elected in 2014) and the Islamic General Assembly of the National Assembly (GNC). GNA has been recognized by the United Nations and internationally. However, their powers remain unclear and limited.

The capital of Tripoli, the GNC sanctuary, continues to be violent and divided. The GNA component is still vying for power, legality, and control over state resources and infrastructure. Despite being set up by an international power, the GNA is struggling to legitimize its position. No actor today can claim to have national influence. Libya's oil production reached 1 million barrels per day in early October 2017. Reported by Salman, the "predator's impression now firmly entrenched in the political economy is obvious, as if the country is using its own resources to feed its crisis, benefiting the disappointment of a few and many." On June 28, 2017, when the convoy of United Nations staff was attacked by militants

with guns and grenade launchers in the country, Sararam reported: “The active presence of the Islamic State is associated with terrorism related to Al Qaeda”. Organizations, foreign fighters and mercenaries, the cross-border economy of the underworld and the people around them, these numerous issues extend beyond Libya and affect its neighbours and the entire international community.

However, this is not the headline news in the mainstream American media. In June, UN investigators reported that terrorists, militants, mercenaries and guerrillas were shooting improvised explosive devices at residential areas where two “governments” and many civilians were killed and injured in the country. Furthermore, the arbitrary detention and torture of journalists and activists by Haytham al-Tajouri, the commander of the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, is also common. Armed groups affiliated with the National Rescue Government have been implicated in several kidnapping and torture cases. With the support of these big groups and their foreign supporters, the near-anarchist violence has killed thousands of people. Of the approximately 6 million newly born Libyan population, an estimated 435,000 have been displaced [35].

After two weeks of clashes, September ended with reports of 26 deaths and 170 injuries from hostile armed groups in the city of Sabrata. In October, CNN reported on the slave trade in Libya: photos of black Africans were auctioned,

each selling for about US\$400. These images prompted the President of the African Union (AU), Alpha Comte, and the President of Guinea, to demand prosecution for crimes against humanity. He condemned the revival of "despicable" trade "from another era."

3.7 Why is there no Action?

After the humanitarian disaster that occurred after the death of Gaddafi, why does the world not pay attention to Libya? Previous year, Human Rights UN commission reported that the Libya detained approximately 8,000 people without any trial. Today, black immigrants are often abused and executed without trial in some cases. Last year, a report made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights found that more than 9,000 peoples were detained without any form of trial. This work does not report facts from improvised camps of isolated militias, but from a facility operated by the police, to the knowledge of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior against Illegal Immigration. It is now clear that those who overthrew Gaddafi want to change the regime without being prepared for all the consequences that this includes. The recent Security Council resolution on Libya adopted on September 14 emphasized the need to reaffirm

its support for NTC, "NTC is the only legal government in Libya, with Prime Minister Fayed al-Sarraj serving as Presidential Councilor."

"The Security Council's firm commitment to Libya's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity", this country was one of the most influential African countries before the so-called revolution in 2011, transforming Libya into the most insecure and fragmented country in Africa. The African Union played a role in unifying the organization. In foreign affairs in March/April, Ivo Daalder (Ivo Daalder), then U.S. Ambassador to NATO, and James Stavridis, NATO's supreme commander in Europe, will describe NATO's actions in Libya as "a model intervention that can't be defended", civilians are caught in the inevitable genocide. Indeed, this is a cautionary story for the humanities as said the British journalist Simon Jenkins, who hailed NATO as a "couch strategist and round bomber".

3.8 Role of African Union

The current problems in Libya have raised questions about the role of the AU, Libya having played a major role beforehand. When NATO bombed Libya in July 2011, Mauritanian Foreign Minister Hamadi Ould Baba Ould Hamadi briefed the UN Security Council on the position of the African Union. Mr. Hamadi talked about “the unspeakable suffering of the Libyan people” and then described the AU’s Road map for peace, and to “immediately end all hostilities”.

Cooperation between the relevant authorities in Libya to promote effectively humanitarian assistance to people in need -protect foreigners, including African migrant workers living in Libya- and adopt and implement necessary policy reforms to address the root causes of current conflicts. "The AU roadmap usually serves as a security director. The meeting file was shelved." The African Union can do more to resolve the Libyan crisis.

The efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa led by the Ministry of Peace and Security have been supported by the leaders Commissioner Smail Chergi from Algeria (the country has historically played an important role in regional mediation work). The current regime in Libya has less emotional or verbal attachment to the AU than Gaddafi, but experts believe that

despite being a major influent power in Libya, the company remains in a unique position to respond to more active participation in the crisis of which consequences are felt in many neighbouring countries in the Sahel and even in West Africa [40].

Chapter 4

4. The complicity of International Community

4.1 The supports to Haftar's camp

Since the abdication of the Islamist-moved government in Tripoli in 2016 and the steady expulsion of its worldwide allies from the city, the largest mobilization of external interference in Libya has come from Haftar's sponsors (a pattern that turned out to be much clearer after the end of the 2017 fight for Benghazi). He has since a long time ago depended on the help, if not followed the lead, of the UAE and Egypt.

Haftar dispatched his attack on Tripoli not long after getting back from an outing to Riyadh, where he probably get endorsement to progress with help from nations of the Middle East and North Africa. The center of this help includes States that share an expansive political vision of moving back the governmental issues of the Arab uprisings, especially fair and favourable to Islamist powers and support dictators who can find a way into another territorial request. Libya's job as a performance center for provincial competitions, just as its monetary potential, has elevated the significance that these allies append to its destiny.

4.2 Egypt's changing computations

Egypt's help for Haftar comes from a combination of financial advantages, direct dangers to its security, and from Haftar's and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's common philosophy of militarism as the solitary cure to an existential Islamist danger. In 2014 Egypt recognized generally its 1,100km-long desert line with Libya as a weakness that straightforwardly added to the developing number of fear-based oppressor assaults on its region and the insurrection on the Sinai Peninsula.

Haftar has been a characteristic partner for Cairo because of the area of his powers close to the Egyptian boundary[41]. Furthermore, Cairo trusts that a steady Libya will set up the weak Egyptian economy, keep up the stock of the financed oil it has depended on since the principal bay conflict, and permit Egyptian workers in the nation –who, before the Arab uprisings, represented generally \$33m each year in settlements– to continue work.

These contemplations drove Egypt to bet intensely on Haftar, furnishing him with meaningful military and conciliatory help after he dispatched Operation Dignity, in 2014. Having started as a military mission to dislodge Islamists and to limit more jihadists' development from their ascendant situation in Benghazi, the activity

morphed to address a more extensive, more political, mission. All things considered, the connection among Egypt and Haftar immediately developed, with Egyptian powers completing airstrikes in Libya in any event for his sake soon thereafter.

Notwithstanding, by 2019, Egypt felt that Haftar had minimized this relation for close contact with any semblance of France, Russia, and the UAE. This, alongside worries that he was hazardously overextending himself, incited Egypt to investigate different roads to secure its inclinations – including by developing binds with the GNA's executive, Fayeze al-Sarraj, and its speaker of parliament, Aguila Saleh, while helping a resurgence of the ancient system.

Egypt additionally started to make its very own political interaction through its chairmanship of the African Union, endeavouring to adversary and, it trusted, replacing the UN's public gathering measure[42]. This proposition was likely intended to make a force dividing bargain among Sarraj and Saleh that might have bound together the state and contain Haftar inside a regular citizen general set of laws – at any rate until Libya held a political race or went through another political change. In any case, Haftar's attack on Tripoli constrained Egyptian pioneers to recalculate and, in the end, reaffirm their help for him. In the "with us or against us" division Haftar made, Egypt plans to secure its speculation, as the

loss of his powers would be ruinous for its inclinations – and, even in a military impasse, Cairo could have freedoms to benefit and to reestablish some authority over him.

4.3 The UAE's push for another local request

The UAE sees the Arab uprisings' guarantee of a push towards agent government – and the possibility that the (frequently Islamist-inclining) parties that stayed in resistance for quite a long time could one day come to control through the polling booth – as an existential danger. Emirati pioneers dread that the uprisings' well known interest for rights and portrayal could arrive at their lines if effective somewhere else. Since 2011, Abu Dhabi has situated itself at the bleeding edge of a territorial fight against the Arab uprisings and political Islamist gatherings – especially the Muslim Brotherhood, which it tried to move back by supporting Sisi's takeover of Egypt. The UAE sees Libya as a focal landmark in this ideological and political battle.

Libya's geographic position makes it critical to the UAE's financial arrangement to overwhelm dispatching paths that stream into the Mediterranean. Libya's immense energy assets and need for recreation – the two zones wherein the

UAE practices – have set out rewarding open doors that the Emiratis expect to abuse, after they neglected to do as such previously. This appealing combination of political and monetary interests has made Libya a vital piece of the local request Abu Dhabi tries to make.

Like Egypt, the UAE sees Haftar's political perspectives and military interpretations as reciprocal to its vision. Since 2014, the UAE has been vital to reinforcing his military capacities, just as his political help base (in Libya and abroad) and his global standing. The UAE has purportedly disregarded the UN Security Council's arms ban to give Haftar an assortment of military gear, including shielded work force transporters and even airplanes.

4.4 A defining moment in Saudi approach

Having since a long time ago considered itself to be the true head of the Sunni Arab world, Saudi Arabia at first took an altogether different way than other local forces to impacting Libya's progress. Maybe than taking part in obvious political mediation, Saudi strategy worked through a Salafist bunch that follows the lessons of Medina-based Islamic researcher Rabea al-Madkhali – a gathering that is on the edges of the Sahwa development yet near the state.

Following quite a while of laden relations with previous Libyan pioneer Muammar Qaddafi, Saudi pioneers saw Libya's upset as a chance to change the country into a partner. Maybe perceiving that one arm of its conventional impact creating system, monetary sponsorship, would be inadequate in oil-rich Libya, Riyadh appears to have zeroed in on the other arm, strict power. In this manner, it apparently intended to fabricate impact and change the socio-political personality of the Libyan State into one more amiable to collusion.

Since 2011, the Madkhalist bunch has developed rapidly to play a predominant part in Haftar's security administrations (in spite of his affirmed secularism, just

as Egyptian and Emirati scorn for Islamists) and Libya's strict organizations. The gathering's confidence in complete acquiescence to the public chief (an idea known as wali al amr) and its ill will towards the Muslim Brotherhood made it an engaging early partner for Haftar.

With a similarity to cross country union, the gathering works semi-self-rulingly: it reacts to the Libyan world of politics and lessons from Saudi Arabia, yet in addition acts in accordance with its own strict thinking and shrewd interests. The messages that Saudi-based researchers have coordinated at the Madkhalists seem to have moved over the course of the years as per Saudi approach, recommending a political connection. Notwithstanding, the gathering's autonomous objectives make it less flexible than Riyadh may want. For instance, while numerous Madkhalists in eastern Libya have joined Haftar's powers, those in the west stay reluctant to take part in the contention – having since a long time ago guaranteed that their strict commitments request unwaveringness to Sarraj as their chief and, apparently, saw the contention as rebellious.

4.5 Russia's quest for impact

As mentioned before on the outset, Russia has been able to remain at a distance in the Libyan conflict. Nevertheless, this strategy has not hindered Russia's ability to increase their influence over Libya. Unlike the Arab nations like the UAE, which entered the conflict from the very beginning, Russia has chosen a very different approach, as they have remained very cautious of any actions that they should take. As they have done before in other parts of the world, Russia has backed a strong-man like Haftar during this conflict as they have provided him and the LNA with not only military but also diplomatic and financial support. Nevertheless, Russia has been able to do so, while remaining in a much more independent position than other nations, as for instance they have been able to use the mercenaries of the Wagner Group to militarily support Haftar while remaining in a much more separate stance than other international players, which have directly supported him militarily like the UAE. Not only that, but it has been widely reported that the Wagner Group has 1,200 mercenaries stationed in Libya, which have been absolutely crucial for Haftar being able to retain its position as the dominant power in the eastern half of Libya (Bermudez, 2020; Yachyshen, 2020).

As it has just been mentioned, Russia has not only offered military support to Haftar and the LNA, as Russia has also been absolutely crucial in their economic backing. It has also been reported that since 2016 Russia has printed over 14 billion dinars' worth of banknotes (more than \$10 billion) without the approval of Libya's central bank, through their state-owned company Goznak in order to support the LNA, as this economic help has enabled Haftar to triple the salary of the LNA's personnel, which has been extremely effective in ensuring his position of power (Harchaoui, 2021). In addition, Russia has been able to use their extensive control over social media to launch several campaigns in different platforms like Facebook, Twitter or YouTube in order to portray themselves and their allies in a much better light, as well as they have been able to use these platforms in order to promote their views, while also being able to heavily criticise other parties, which are also involved in this conflict, like for instance the US. Not only that but Russia has also been able to use more traditional forms of media in order to carry out this strategy as for instance, Russia has been supporting two local broadcast television networks and one print newspaper in Libya, and also has been publishing content in Arabic in the Russian media, like Sputnik and Russia Today (RT) (Arnold, 2020). Nevertheless, even though Russia has been continuously backing Haftar and the LNA, they have never broken their relationship with the GNA. Instead, they have tried to promote peace talks

between the two parties as this would not only portray Russia as a crucial actor for achieving peace in such a unstable country, while also this would ensure Russia the ability to obtain the benefits that they are seeking in Libya (Ramani, 2020).

Russia sees Libya as a crucial piece in its international strategy for various reasons. Firstly, its location on the Mediterranean Sea and its 1,100 miles of coastline offer Russia the unique opportunity of strengthening logistically and geo-strategically its navy (Borshchevskaya, 2020; Gehrke, 2017). Not only that but, obtaining a position of dominance over Libya would enable Russia to become an ever stronger player in the European sphere, which President Putin sees as key especially after the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, as well as, to obtain an incredible amount of leverage over the EU, particularly due to the fact that they would have the ability of influencing the refugee flows towards the Union, which has been one of the thorniest issues in the EU, and which has created incredible resentment and disunion between the Member States of the EU (Borshchevskaya, 2020). Therefore, Russia sees the Libyan conflict as a great opportunity for furthering a multipolar international system in which they are one of the most influential powers with others like the US or China (Arnold, 2020). Finally, Libya also offers Russia incredible economic benefits, as for

instance, in 2017 the Russian oil company Rosneft was able to sign a deal with Libya's National Oil Corporation. What is more, it has been widely reported that Nasser Shaglan has maintained talks with diverse Russian officials about bringing back the Benghazi–Sirte railway project, which was stopped after the end of Gaddafi's regime (Ramani, 2021).

4.6 Vulnerability in the United States

Following the episode of the Libyan common conflict in 2014, the US generally returned to its 2011 strategy of "driving from behind". In spite of the fact that it has freely sponsored the UN cycle, driven related monetary exchanges, and occupied with adjustment projects in Libya, the US has taken on a more downplayed part in the country than European and Middle Eastern forces.

However the US has confidently ensured its fundamental advantages in Libya: countering psychological warfare and keeping Libyan legislative issues from upsetting worldwide oil markets. For instance, the US military was critical to

crushing ISIS in Sirte, giving extraordinary powers and air backing to the Misratan-drove Bunyan al-Marsous collusion there.

Albeit numerous in the favorable to Haftar camp straightforwardly upheld Trump's official mission with the expectation that he would serve their political objectives, they were at first frustrated with the enhanced US organization. The past US extraordinary agent to Libya, Jonathan Winer, claims that, soon after Trump was chosen, Haftar's children drove an assignment to Washington in the desire for acquiring the duly elected president's approval for an assault on Tripoli – without any result. What's more, in 2018 the US made a definitive mediation against Haftar, attempting to break a barricade he had set up as a feature of an arrangement to sell oil – an arrangement that was infringing upon an UN Security Council goal that ensures the National Oil Company as Libya's sole authentic oil broker.

4.7 Turkey's inexorably clear job

Turkey has assumed a fluctuating at this point filling part in Libya as its inclinations there have created. At first, Turkey was completely inspired by the craving to satisfy the agreements it had in Libya in 2011, which were worth generally \$15 billion (an interest that drove it to turn into a late ally of the insurgency that year). Following the creation and starting accomplishment of the Justice and Construction Party – the Libyan part of the Muslim Brotherhood, designed in the resemblance of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party – Turkey started to consider Libya to be imperative to its endeavour to help its impact by developing the political Islamist bunches that arose across the district during the Arab uprisings.

After the beginning of Libya's thoughtful conflict in 2014, Turkey turned into an asylum for Libyan outcasts – including political Islamists – as one of the uncommon nations Libyans could make a trip to, and lead business in, without experiencing huge administrative noise. It exploited this association – just as its international safe haven in Tripoli and its office in Misrata, when most conciliatory missions to the Libyan specialists were situated in Tunis – to seek after its political and financial interests in Libya.

4.8 Qatari monetary may

Qatar was one of the key territorial parts in Libya in the Arab uprisings and the consequence of Qaddafi's fall, giving military, monetary, and political help to the dissidents. Be that as it may, its association in Libya wound down after Emir Tamim container Hamad Al Thani took power in Doha, embracing a less interventionist international strategy. As Qatar stepped back from Libya, the country's Gulf equals probably considered sponsorship to be Haftar as a chance to influence the overall hold away from Qatari-moved Islamists in Libya.

During this shift, the LNA crushed a large number of Qatar's Libyan questioners, like the Sallabi siblings and their related powers in Benghazi. Other Libyan Islamists who had abused the common conflict in 2014 to set up their own administration (in insubordination of the GNA and the UN cycle) slowly floated to the edges and were in the end driven out of Tripoli. The individuals who stayed dynamic in Libya, either estranged abroad or in the actual nation, saw their relationship with Qatar shift to the monetary circle, as they began to raise their financial profiles, mostly by making critical interests in TV slots and sites.

Libyan Islamists have drastically expanded their association in such news sources since 2014, planning to go against Haftar in the harmful publicity war that has immersed Libya. Surely, the storm of Qatari-sourced bots and web-based media accounts that followed Saudi Arabia's underlying introduction to the Libyan media grandstands a portion of the flighty parts of this conflict.

As of late, Doha has been extensively strong of UN endeavours to facilitate a political answer for the Libyan struggle. Be that as it may, Haftar's development on Tripoli may urge Qatar to restore its underlying, more self-assured, Libya strategy. For the occasion, it stays indistinct whether it will do as such, regardless of whether there has allegedly been a resurgence in correspondence between the counter Haftar camp and Doha.

Like Turkey, Qatar has presumably expanded its help for Libyan groups that go against Haftar to keep its local adversaries from acquiring power in Libya and the more extensive area. Qatar is supposed to have made secret proposals of help to a scope of Haftar's adversaries, recommending that it will in any event expect the job of lender in a free alliance with these gatherings and Turkey.

The Turkish financial emergency and the irritable idea of the local armies battling under the GNA possibly leave Qatar with a significant part to play in the alliance. However, given that it has to a great extent deserted its territorial political venture

for homegrown issues – and given the assortment of Libyan gatherings it purportedly liaises with – Qatar will probably zero in less on supporting Islamists in Libya than on humiliating and baffling Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

4.9 French interferences

The relations between France and Libya remain tumultuous since the French presidential elections in 2007 and the international controversy of the Libyan campaign funds. Gaddafi has been accused by the investigation journal Mediapart to give EUR€50 million to the former president Nicolas Sarkozy for him to get elected. The French voluntarism contributed in 2011 to the escalation of violence, gathering Western powers in the Paris Summit where the parties reaffirmed their will to fight the Gaddafi's regime. This is France again which will launch the Harmattan Operation to end the Gaddafi's reign in 2011, soon followed by UK, the US and many European States in a second time.

But France is also involved in this conflict through its support to Haftar as explained earlier. In 2016, three French soldiers died in a helicopter crash in East Libya, shot by a terrorist local group. Members of the Directorate-General for

External Security –the French intelligence agency-, they were here to provide some training to the Haftar’s soldier¹¹. GNA was not aware of such convoy constituted with men in arms above its territory, and it constitute a border violation and a several attempt to the Libyan sovereignty. The internationally recognized government explicitly forbade to any foreign country to cross the Libyan territory, *a fortiori* armed and without asking permission.

On the 17th of February, 2019, the French Army Minister Florence Parly announced the delivery of six fast boats to the Libyan navy to fight illegal migration through Mediterranean. But these rapid skiffs are considered as military gear and, at this regard, represent a violation of the Arms Trade Treaty. In addition, Libya is under an arms embargo since the riot of 2011. The main purpose of these boats was to push back the migrant crossing the sea to Libya. In other terms, it also violated the article 2 and 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, contributing to the mistreating of regular people. Indeed, migrants are packed like animals in detention camps, living in harsh conditions without gender distinction and occasional tortures. It goes likewise against the article 12 of the International

¹¹ https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/07/20/trois-militaires-francais-tues-en-libye_4972142_3210.html

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights defending the freedom of movements and to choose is residence country.

The military presence of France is also in question in Libya. In June 2019, four Javelin antitank missiles have been discovered in Gharian, southwest of Tripoli in a former Haftar base camp. These missiles were bought by France to the US in 2010, but there is no trace of transaction to the Libyan belligerent. The French Army minister declared then that these missiles were intended for the “self protection of a French detachment” in an interview he gave for Le Monde. But in the same speech, he said that the detachment was present a long time ago in Libya and that the missiles have been abandoned because of their damaged state. But according to Le Monde’s local observer, the missiles have been damaged in a recent altercation. In a meantime, the French minister assures that he did not sell the weapons to Haftar. Either France provided these missiles to Haftar, in this case it means a violation of the arm embargo and the transparency of the Arm Trade Treaty, or the French soldiers are still deployed in Libya, helping Haftar to spreading violence in the whole country, constituting a grave opposition to the peace process. Oussama Al-Juwaili, the GNA military chief, declared than French soldiers were present on the GNA side “until the 4 of April”,

the day of the Haftar's offensive on Tripoli¹². Instead of disappearing, the French forces probably joined Haftar's camp after the conflict. In addition, according to the European Declaration on the Tripoli offensive in 2019, the European signatories committed to withdraw all forces from Libyan territory. A declaration that France apparently did not respect given the missiles found in Haftar's camp in June.

By providing military gear and support, France is thus violating international laws and has become a brake to the current peace process. It encourages the endangering of many civilians lives by supporting the “strong man” and the partial return of dictatorship in Libya. It's a genuine attempt to human rights and European values of peace and protection of populace.

¹² https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/07/10/libye-des-missiles-appartenant-a-la-france-aux-mains-des-forces-antigouvernementales_5487736_3212.html

4.10 Italy implication in migrant crisis

Libya is a cornerstone for African illegal immigration, embodying a genuine bridge to Europe. As mentioned above, the situation is purely catastrophic with mistreatment from coast guards in detention camps. Italy is directly concerned with this migration crisis, due to the fact that only 190nm separates the Italian island of Lampedusa from the Libyan ground. This configuration transforms this side of the Mediterranean into a real migratory corridor towards Europe. For the beginning of 2021, 5099 migrants already beached in Lampedusa until February according to the half-yearly report of the OIM.

In 2008, Italy and the Libya's dictator signed a cooperation and friendship treaty where Italy is financing the detention centers for migrants. In addition, Italy is committed to push back the migrants to Libya to be imprisoned. This agreement sealed the friendship between the Italian minister Silvio Berlusconi and Gaddafi. But in 2011, the treaty fell with the dictator. A long period of division followed, and the Civil war made the situation even more catastrophic. Without coordination, the arrivals of migrants are multiplying to reach 153 842 migrants on the Italian isle in 2015.

We must wait until 2017 to see the emergence of a new EU-Libya Memorandum of Understanding signed by both Italy and Libya. It consists of a reiteration of the 2008 agreement while going a little further. Indeed the new treaty stipulates the strengthening of the Libyan navy and the improvement of the migrants living conditions in detention centers by an investment of \$240 million per year. In addition, this agreement provides for the organization of the pushing back of migrants by the Libyan coast guard, and no longer by Italy. In other terms, Italy here avoid direct responsibilities regarding the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the 2012 rule about the prohibition of collective expulsion at the article 3. But the ECHR provides also the externalization of the borders, which means that a third State takes care of the management of the external borders of Europe, as here with Libya. As a result, Italy still has indirect responsibilities in the mistreating of migrants by financing the Libyan push back capacities. By its desire to avoid migrations whatever it takes, Italy is “putting the lives, rights and dignity of migrants at risk” [X].

This migratory situation and the abuses from the Libyan navy is still relevant today. Indeed, according to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Italian Interior Minister Luciana Lamorgese and the Libyan Presidential Council Mohammed Menfi met the 19 of April, 2021. Then they discussed about “new

incidents revealing severe abuses, rights violation, killings and the environment of impunity in Libya”, establishing the Libyan authorities incompetence to manage the fight against migration to Italy. While being perfectly aware of the incompetence of Libya, Italy incriminates some of ONG organizing rescue missions in Mediterranean. This is Italy's strategy to guard against the influx of migrants to its shores.

It is important to remember that Italy is facing alone the influx of migrants through the Mediterranean, in that there is no European solidarity in this matter. But acting alone does not justify encouraging the mistreatment of migrants in Libya, or interfere with sea rescues. Symptomatic of the lack of a common European action on migration, Italy uses dubious means putting the lives of many migrants in danger.

4.11 Responsibilities of International criminal court

On 15 February 2011, the capture of a Libyan basic liberties extremist in Benghazi started regular citizen conflicts with security powers, which quickly turned into an enemy of tyrant uprising against the Gaddafi system. Many were murdered and harmed as the public authority strongly attempted to stifle the revolt. In August 2011, the primary resistance bunch National Transitional Council (NTC), which was perceived by some Western countries as the authentic administration of Libya, entered Tripoli.

Muammar Gaddafi had to remain in isolation prior to being caught and murdered on 20 October 2011. The NTC assumed responsibility for the nation and, in August 2012, gave over capacity to Libya's recently chosen parliament, the General National Congress, which was confirmed in November 2012. Numerous denials of basic liberties, for instance torment and authorized vanishings, and infringement of global helpful law, for example, focusing on regular folks or clinical units, were accounted for.

On 25 February 2011, the Human Rights Council set up the International Commission of Inquiry to examine all supposed infringement of global common liberties law in Libya. The Commission arrived at the resolution that worldwide

violations, explicitly wrongdoings against mankind and atrocities have been carried out in Libya by both the public authority and the radical powers.

4.11.1 ICC circumstances

The examination concerning the circumstance in Libya was opened by the ICC investigator in March 2011. The investigator's declaration came a month after the UN Security Council consistently alluded the circumstance in non-ICC part Libya to the Court.

4.11.2 First consistent UN Security Council reference to ICC

The ICC circumstance in Libya concerns claims of a 2011 state-level approach to suppress, including by utilization of deadly power, regular citizen exhibits against Muammar Gaddafi's administration. This was the primary ICC circumstance to be collectively alluded by the UN Security Council, which focused on the need to

consider responsible those liable for assaults on regular people after the uprisings in 2011.

The Security Council set out in its reference by "censuring the viciousness and utilization of power against regular folks, despising the gross and orderly infringement of basic liberties, including the suppression of tranquil demonstrators, communicating profound worry at the passings of regular folks, and dismissing unequivocally the induction to antagonism and savagery against the non military personnel populace produced using the most elevated level of the Libyan government."

4.11.3 ICC asserts wrongdoings against saw nonconformists

As indicated by the ICC capture warrants gave in the Libya circumstance from 15 to at any rate 28 February 2011, the Libyan Security Forces, enveloping both military and security units, launched an assault against regular folks participating in exhibitions against Gaddafi's system or those apparent to be nonconformists, and by this way slaughtering and harming just as capturing and detaining many civilians [43]. The supposed government strategy was completed all through Libya, yet specifically in Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi, and urban communities close to Benghazi, like Al-Bayda, Derna, Tobruk, and Ajdabiya.

4.11.4 Capture warrants for Muammar Gaddafi and internal circle

The ICC gave capture warrants against Libyan pioneer Muammar Gaddafi and his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, who headed the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity Associations – and was viewed as accepted leader at the hour of the supposed wrongdoings - alongside Abdullah Al-Senussi, overseer of Military Intelligence in Libya. The warrants affirm that the above-perpetrated violations

against humankind (murder and mistreatment) submitted in Libya from 15 February until in any event 28 February 2011 by this accused.

The argument against Muammar Gaddafi was naturally ended in November 2011 after his demise.

In November 2011, Saif Gaddafi was captured by Libyan specialists. On 5 June 2018, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi ("Mr Gaddafi") documented a tolerability challenge to the Court contending that he had effectively been attempted in Libya for a similar lead as affirmed by the Prosecutor. On 5 April 2019, PTC I, by greater part, dismissed Mr Gaddafi's acceptability challenge, which implies the case stays allowable under the steady gaze of the Court.

In March 2012, Al-Senussi was captured in Mauritania and was removed to Libya in September 2012. As a result of his homegrown indictment, the case was announced forbidden under the watchful eye of the Court, yet so the case has not progressed under the watchful eye of Libya's Supreme Court. There is likewise a remarkable capture warrant against Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled ("Mr.

Al-Tuhamy") for charges of war wrongdoings, purportedly carried out from March 2011 to August 2011

In 2017, the Prosecutor of the ICC gave the main capture warrants against Al-Werfalli, Commander in the Al Saiqa Brigade, for charges of homicide in as an atrocity, supposedly slaughtering 33 individuals in seven occurrences. Regardless of an authority explanation by the Libyan National Army attesting Mr Al-Werfalli had been captured and was being scrutinized. Meanwhile, he purportedly slaughtered 10 additional individuals in an eighth execution which was shot and coursed via web-based media [45]. After these occasions, the Prosecutor gave a subsequent capture warrant on 4 July 2018. The ICC approaches General Khalifa Haftar, administrator of the Libyan National Army (LNA), to work with Mr. Al-Werfalli's quick acquiescence to the ICC.

4.11.5 ICC staff kept

On 7 June 2012, four ICC staff individuals were kept in Zintan, Libya, while undertaking a mission approved by ICC judges and endorsed by the break Libyan government to visit Saif Gaddafi. The four were delivered on 2 July 2012.

4.12 The responsibility of the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council Responds from New York that the UN Secretariat saw advancements in Libya with grave concern. On 20 February the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, had spoken with Muammar Gaddafi on the telephone, revealing to him that the savagery against regular people "should stop right away." Gaddafi didn't regard the direction, yet various senior Libyan representatives, including the initiative of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the UN, surrendered. One representative saw that, declaring that "the more Gaddafi slaughters individuals, the more individuals go into the roads."

Libya's representatives to Indonesia, India and a few different nations surrendered. On 22 February the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi

Pillay, required a prompt suspension of the "grave common liberties infringement submitted by the Libyan specialists." Pillay portrayed the savagery as perhaps comprising "wrongdoings against mankind." These slants were repeated in a joint proclamation by the UN SecretaryGeneral's Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.

The Special Advisers likewise helped Libya to remember its vow at the 2005 UN World Summit to ensure populaces "by forestalling slaughter, atrocities, ethnic purifying and wrongdoings against mankind, just as their affectation." Around the same time, the League of Arab States (Arab League) restricted Libya from going to its gatherings. Ekmeleddinİhsanoğlu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, censured the Libyan government's utilization of exorbitant power against regular people.

The UN Security Council also "censured the savagery and utilization of power against regular people, condemned the restraint against tranquil demonstrators, and communicated profound lament at the passings of many regular citizens." The African Union (AU) followed with Jean Ping, Chair of the AU Commission, requiring a quick finish to "constraint and brutality" in Libya.

On 25 February Ban Ki-moon voiced his developing worries about the violences in Libya to the UN Security Council. In the interim, in Geneva, Navi Pillay helped individuals to remember the Human Rights Council about their individual duty to ensure their populaces and their aggregate obligation to act in a convenient and definitive way when a state is obviously neglecting to secure its population[46]. Soon after, composed activity by the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly made ready for Libya's suspension from the gathering.

The Responsibility to Protect centered the global reaction. Goal 1970, collectively received by the Security Council on 26 February, expressly conjured the "Libyan specialists' duty to ensure its populace." The goal incorporated an extensive bundle of coercive measures like an arms ban, resources freeze, travels boycott and reference of the circumstance to the ICC – pointed toward convincing the Qaddafi system to stop executing its kin.

During the weeks between Resolution 1970 and the selection of Resolution 1973 on 17 March, heightening brutality incited local and worldwide associations to again ask the Qaddafi system to stop the slaughtering and resolve the emergency through "serene methods and genuine discourse." On 10 March the AU's Peace and Security Council set up a specially appointed High Level

Committee on Libya, and on 12 March the Arab League required a "restricted air space" over Libya.

Conclusion

The worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen and Libya is currently raging. Yemen and Libya are the poorest country on the coast of the Arabian Peninsula. The war in Yemen and Libya will only make the situation worse. Humans are also in awe of the atrocities that occurred here. One talked a lot about human progress, and on the other hand talked about people's cruelty and barbarism. People are opposed to people. Because of the bloody war in Yemen, human life is worse than that of animals.

Even when animals saw atrocities against people, they cried. However, the world is not affected by these atrocities, and humans continue to trample them cruelly.

So far, in Libya and Yemen, the UAE has shown similar characteristics and differences, which proves Abu Dhabi's tactics and purposeful pragmatism. From the perspective of the UAE network, maritime dynamics are very important. In Yemen, the UAE has operations in the southern coastal areas, southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb and Socotra Island. Actors related to Abu Dhabi. In Libya, the United Arab Emirates is concentrated in Cyrenaica and Sirte. The eastern region of Libya provides the strategic depth of the Sahel and opens up a geo-strategic highway to West and East Africa (such as Niger, Mali and Mauritania;

Sudan and Eritrea). Cyrenaica must also deal with the Mediterranean and southern regions.

To sum up, the UAE firmly supports Haftar's political power in Libya and supports the civil war in consequence. The UAE's support for Haftar is crucial to winning cities such as Benghazi and Derna. The air base was established in 2017 in eastern Libya. In order to recruit mercenaries in Sudan, the UAE also provides direct military support to Haftar's armed forces. UAE spokesperson Haftar has been killing civilians since April 2019, hurting Libyan citizens, not NTC troops. As of January 2020, more than 100 weapons have been shipped from the UAE to Libya and Egypt, the UAE's main regional allies. During the strike, the United Nations also described a "terrorism" incident involving a multinational company that recently discovered the Talqa mass grave.

Some governments have justified exports and the new agreement. Considering the benefits they will bring to their economy, especially their military industry. "This phenomenon is inherent in the global arms trade: under the pretext of promoting economic and national security to promote regional security, countries often justify exporting weapons to target countries involved in regional conflicts. In general, funds flowing into the United Arab Emirates and the Middle East will affect regional stability in near future.

Recommendations

In order to reduce the damages to civilians in the conflicts in Yemen, Libya and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the following recommendations are formulated:

- The UAE should end its military intervention in Yemen & Libya and seek a peaceful solution through the United Nations to achieve diplomacy. The support to Haftar must stop, because it encourages the continuation of violence in the country. Supporting Haftar can only lead in the best case to the return of a partial dictatorship marked by violence, and in this sense, the International Community must put in place sanctions against UAE to dissuade it from hoping for the advent of its "strong providential man".
- The UAE must stop violating the UN resolution prohibiting the delivery of weapons and providing military support to embargoed countries. More broadly, each country must actually withdraw its troops, and private armies must leave the territory, otherwise the pressure on the peace process will never end. At the same time, a dialogue must be built with local political entities to raise awareness of the issues at stake in the December elections, as well as to ease relations between east and west: mayors' forums or

democratic awareness campaigns are both good examples for the United Nations to implement. This must be organized in cooperation with the NGOs and international organizations present in the territory, which help the population and are aware of the issues at stake.

- The United Nations should work to strengthen the ban of weapons in the UAE by criminalizing violations, but also in Libya where the presence of foreign powers, public as private, are the principled cause of the fights continuation. This can be done by strengthening the diplomatic protocol of the Berlin conference where the participants made clear commitments that must be respected (such as the withdrawal of troops from the territory). But the support to the new internationally recognized government should be more unambiguous, with for example the local help by specialized agencies to ensure that the vote is prepared and held properly. In addition, the UN must work to a better cooperation with the signatory countries of the Arms Trade Treaty to assure a better traceability and transparency of the transactions of military gears.
- The International Criminal Court must continue its investigations in Libya to struggle against violence and force used against civilian. War crimes and

crimes against humanity have been perpetrated by the belligerents in Libya and continue to make victims. It is necessary to conduct thorough investigations into the actions of Haftar and his seconds, who participated in massacres of civilians, such as in Tarhunah. These individuals must be prosecuted and convicted.

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