Ever since the end of the days of the bipolar world, where the world’s attention was more focused to the great struggle between the two major world powers, – the United States and the Soviet Union –, that many other regional and even international skirmishes have been taking place. The Middle East has been one of the biggest centres in terms of global attention, in respect of the power struggles that have been constantly occurring, focusing on the tension between the more influential regional powers such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Moreover, this region has also continually been the stage where action takes place in terms of foreign intervention, with emphasis on the United States’ endeavours justified by the so-called “war on terror”. Nonetheless, even with the international focus being more embroiled in Middle Eastern affairs, there have been – and currently are – other instances that are worth both political and academic concentration. One of these cases is the growing presence of factions associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in Mozambique. This South-eastern African state, since about 2017, has been embroiled in internal confrontations with ISIL, as a consequence of the group’s permeation in the local society. The ISIL affiliate in the region, namely, the Ansar al-Sunna, started manifesting their presence in 2015 and, two years later, started launching quasi-military offensives in some localities in the city of Cabo Delgado. Since then, many other skirmishes have been taking place which have led to hundreds of casualties and thousands of internally displaced people.
Concerning this scenario, this essay intends to shed some light on this issue, by exposing the current situation in Mozambique, the atmosphere that led to it, and possible actions in the context of the governmental initiatives. To illustrate this view, this paper will be segmented as follows: (1) first, an introduction to the conflict, mentioning the historical background, the rise of the Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique, and the recent tragedy in Palma, and (2) some recommendations for meaningful responses to this situation. Through this structure, this essay will provide not only an introduction to the rise of extremism in Cabo Delgado, but also a frame that can possibly be used for further and more in-depth analysis of the ongoing scenario in Mozambique.
Historical background
Mozambique is one of several other Portuguese former colonies that is situated in the South-eastern part of the African continent. For centuries that this region has not only been the stage of various international struggles, but also a key geo-strategical location for commercial purposes. Specifically during the so-called “Age of Discovery”, this region was particularly important, considering its potentiality as a harbour or seaport. Even before this period, the region where the Republic of Mozambique is currently located had already been strategically important for trade as a port town. When the famous seafarer and explorer Vasco da Gama started his journeys on the sea and, eventually, found out the first maritime path from Europe to Asia, this region gained increased importance for the Europeans. As such, following the typical characteristics of the European countries during that period, the Portuguese colonizers were not shy in their intentions of settling and occupying the region, – in fact, Portugal’s sovereignty over the region only started to dissipate in the end of the 20th century, resulting ultimately in Mozambique’s anticipated independence. However, this break from the Portuguese colonial chains did not come by means of a mutual agreement or a peaceful transition. It took two things: a colonizing regime becoming more fragile both domestically and abroad, and a lengthy war fought on the foundations of the right of self-determination and nationalistic sentiments. In this context, in parallel with the domestic disruptions happening in Portugal (the end of a military dictatorship which idolized Portugal’s colonial presence) came the recognition of Mozambique’s independence in 1975, leading to the establishment of a communist regime in the region.
Two years after Mozambique’s efforts towards independence succeeded, the country entangled itself in a civil war, with the communist movement and the anti-communist movement facing off alongside other domestic militias. The country was basically split in zones or spheres of influence during this long conflict which some estimates say took the lives of more than one million Mozambicans. The internal skirmishes in the South-eastern state only dimmed down with a change in leadership which came paralleled by economic and ideological reforms that eventually paved the way towards a peace agreement in 1992. Since then, the left-leaning Liberation Front of Mozambique party (FRELIMO) has constantly won the national elections, a situation which, for years now, has been creating some tensions with the opposing party (Mozambican National Resistance).
The rise of Islamist extremism in Cabo Delgado
Moving forward, with Mozambique’s origin story very parsimoniously explained, it is also worth mentioning the dynamics that permitted the permeation of the Islamic State affiliate, the Ansar al-Sunna, in the region. The main theory regarding this issue relates to Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a sort of Muslim religious scholar from Kenya associated with Islamist extremism (Makonye, 2020). This man, who was very influential in these religious circles, was assassinated in Mombasa in 2012, and allegedly some of his most avid supporters left Kenya and (after also settling in Tanzania) began establishing themselves in Mozambique, more specifically, in the North-eastern region of Cabo Delgado, forming what is known as the Ansar al-Sunna (West 2018; Morier-Genoud 2020, p. 397; Alden and Chichava, 2020, p. 6; Makonye, 2020). Ever since the beginning of their settlement there that they have been igniting confrontations – however, this has only been possible due to a multiplicity of factors that characterize this region’s fragilities, best explained in Alden and Chichaya’s (2020, p. 2) words:
The crisis in Cabo Delgado, while cast in terms of the incendiary rhetoric of armed religious extremism, has its origins in the systemic neglect and regional inequalities that plague this ‘forgotten’ province in northern Mozambique. The onset of a resource scramble has seen an influx of economic migrants and spurred rent-seeking by the elite with multinationals. As a result, local communities have become even further marginalised. In this context, Mozambique’s self-styled ‘al-Shabaab’ – and the government’s inept security crackdown in response to these attacks – is further seeding the ground for localised grievances to deepen into long-term structural problems.
In the beginning of their settlement in Cabo Delgado, the Ansar al-Sunna focused more on religious indoctrination and not in proper assertions of dominance in the region (West 2018). As such, their establishment in the area began in a more discrete fashion, using in their favour the local dynamics of the region – a “large Muslim population, high youth unemployment and marginal economic development” (West 2018). Moreover, there has been noted that the place where Cabo Delgado is situated is not only rich in mineral wealth, but also a common route for trafficking resources such as precious stones or other goods such as drugs, while at the same time, it lacks proper fiscalization and oversight from the government (Mosca 2020).
After developing their local enterprise for about two years, in the end of 2017, the Ansar al-Sunna manifested themselves in more concrete terms:
On 5 October 2017, assailants armed with machetes and machine guns began a two-day attack on police stations and other government buildings in the town of Mocímboa da Praia, in the north of Cabo Delgado province. The ordeal claimed the lives of 17 people, of whom two were police officers, 14 were members of the attacking group, and one was a civilian. (Matsinhe and Valoi 2019, p. 3).
After this assertion carried out by the group, many other local confrontations took place on the following weeks – in fact, after this incident, the attacks have multiplied in a seriously large scale. Most of these attacks involved situations characterized by the killing of civilians (sometimes by beheading), the destruction of homes and the theft of peoples’ goods (Caldeira, 2018; Africa 21 Digital; News24).
One of these local conflicts which brought more attention to the ongoing situation in Cabo Delgado took place already in 2021, namely, the Battle for Palma. Palma is a coastal city on the North-eastern part of Cabo Delgado, very close to the Mozambique’s border with Tanzania. The insurgent group had already captured the city of Mocímboa da Praia during 2020 and was for some time creating some incursions on the outskirts of the city of Palma. After asserting themselves on the fringes of the city, in March of this year the Ansar al-Sunna started an attack on the city, aiming for its control. The attack left dozens of civilians dead, displaced about fifty thousand Mozambicans, many of whom are children and women (Isufo 2021).
What can be done?
There are some measures that might be suitable to try and mitigate the current situation in Mozambique, more specifically, in Cabo Delgado. For example, investments in literacy rates, employment opportunities, and a focus on stopping organized crime could be important factors against the spread of this group’s influence in Mozambique (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, pp. 11-12). The low literacy levels, specifically in Palma, have been pointed out as potentially making “it easier for the young and gullible to succumb to extremists’ propaganda and to reject local Muslim leadership” (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 11). Considering this, an investment specifically in facilitating the population’s access to schools would be a benefit to limit the group’s influence in the region. Moreover, the government’s response to Ansar al-Sunna assertions in the region has not been very fruitful, in fact, it seems to have caused more alienation in the local population (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, pp. 13-14). On top of this, the government should create a formal procedural framework, with checks and balances, for the assessment of the introduction of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in the ongoing conflicts. It has been stated that the current security apparatus is filled with many types of PMCs (with what seem to be dodgy connections with the government) and that this has created a conflict of interest and an unorthodox situation (see dos Santos, 2020).
On top of these measures, the leadership in Mozambique should also consider the creation of more communication and cooperation channels with the different religious groups that are disseminated across the country (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 15) This action would permit the government to build up information sharing and try influencing the groups to stop pursuing what seems to be military solutions to the several economic and societal problems (dos Santos, 2020). Furthermore, the easy border access has taken a toll in some communities which are located near it, specifically in the Northern part, which means that a pertinent measure would be to the formulation of a strategy to better control Mozambique’s borders – including the maritime borders, also with considerations to the traffic of drugs and other goods (Alden and Chichava 2020, p. 1).
In terms of possible paths of action in the context of the international community, some actions would also benefit the current situation in Mozambique. One of them would be to provide financial assistance aiming at the increase of access to education and to better jobs, specially in the younger layers of the community (Alden and Chichava 2020, p.1; (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 16-17). This aid would have to be provided on this specific condition, and some oversight body would have to be set in place in order to not only coordinate the investment, but also make sure that it was being made correctly and appropriately. Moreover, the government in Mozambique should try and increase cooperation with other states interested in helping the situation on the ground – specifically at this stage when the Ansar al-Sunna are not yet such a huge, centralized, and well-oiled organization. This would mean, for example, allowing the presence of humanitarian assistance which seems to be of the utmost importance, considering the amount of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in need of help. If the government does not act accordingly and stops, for example, “fighting terrorism with terrorism”, the current situation could potentially grow into a much worse scenario (dos Santos 2020; Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021, p. 16).
Bibliography
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
