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Consequences of the Completion of the Nord Stream II

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Consequences of the Completion of the Nord Stream II

Recently Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in St. Petersburg that the work on the first line of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea had been completed, as he pointed out that “today … the pipe-laying work of the first Nord Stream 2 (NS2) line was successfully finished. Work on the second line is ongoing” (DW, 2021). The NS2 is a project under construction, which seeks to build another gas pipeline between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea. The NS2 will be placed alongside the already constructed Nord Stream pipeline and there has been estimations, which argue that this new gas pipeline will increase the amount of gas, which is channelled through the Baltic to 110 billion cubic meters per year, which would be double the current amount. Therefore, the goals of this project are to supply Europe with a sustainable amount of gas, as well as grating Russia an increased access to the European gas market. The pipeline is owned by Nord Stream AG, and Russian state-run energy firm Gazprom is its majority stakeholder (DW, 2021; Stevens, 2019).

Nevertheless, there are few concerns regarding Europe as controversial as the Nord Stream 2. This is mainly due to the fact that this project raises serious doubts on the effects that it will have on crucial issues like energy security, or national security, as for instance there have been questions about whether or not this project severely hinders the national security of countries like Ukraine or Belarus among others (Åslund, 2021; Zachmann, 2017). In Germany, there has been wide support from politicians, companies and business leaders, who see this project as a very profitable opportunity, and some have even argued that it would improve the energy security in the continent. However, outside of Germany there are many who categorically oppose the Nord Stream 2 project. Several Member States of the European Union, as well as the United States and Eastern European countries have shown their aversion towards this project as many believe that this pipeline would be an imminent threat to Europe’s national security, as they argue that it will enable Russia to gain an increasing amount of influence in Europe in a moment where tensions between both sides are running high, after incidents like the crisis in Ukraine (Temnycky, 2021; DW, 2021).

National Security

Several countries have argued that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would pose a threat to their national security. Nonetheless, no nation probably has a better case for this than Ukraine. Ukraine has been a country of crucial importance for the European gas market, as it has been regarded as Russia’s “gatekeeper,” for instance in 2017, 40% of all the gas supply that reached Europe was exported by Russian companies through Ukraine. This position has given Ukraine important economic benefits, as it has been estimated that the transit fees were between $2 billion to $3 billion annually. What is more, this position as the “middle-man” also provided Ukraine with crucial geopolitical leverage, which was key for maintaining their national security, therefore many see this new pipeline as a crucial problem, particularly due to the fact that, it would mean that Ukraine would not only lose an important amount of revenue, as it could reduce the country’s GDP by up to 3%, but also this would leave Ukraine ever more dependent on Russia and thus, in a weaker position to restrain Russia from acquiring even more influence in the country (Stevens, 2019).

In addition, this project also poses some serious threats to various EU Member States and for the EU as a whole. It has been pointed out that Poland has already been making preparations, which will seek to counterweigh the effects of the Nord Stream 2, as it has started to import more a more liquid natural gas from the US. This is because, if Poland was forced to get its gas from Germany, this would have added costs for the Polish economy compared with the current model using the Ukrainian-Polish pipeline (Temnycky, 2021). Nonetheless, this is a very minor problem compared to the ones that could be created, with the increase of Russian influence over Europe, which would put Europe’s energy security at great risk. If the majority of gas that came into the EU was directly delivered from Russia, this country would have the ability to use the coercive tactics that it has used with former Soviet republics to influence the decision-making at the European level (Temnycky, 2021; Sziklai, Kóczy and Csercsik, 2020). Not only that but, this higher dependency on Russia for gas, would severely hinder the EU´s position when Russia carried out actions like the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, it is very probable that Russia would try to acquire other obscure benefits from this project, for instance it has been argued that if Nord Stream workers were granted access to Swedish ports, including their main navy base in Karlskrona, the Russian government could take advantage from this by gaining intelligence and even carrying out espionage activities. Moreover Jacek Czaputowicz, Polish Foreign Minister and other experts have argued that this project also enables Russia to increase its military presence on the Baltic Sea (Stevens, 2019; McBride, 2018).

Impact on European Governance

The Nord Stream 2 project has also had an important impact on European Governance, as there are several examples of how Gazprom and the Russian government have tried to corrupt the governance at various European countries like Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, for instance, the CEO of Nord Stream AG is Matthias Warnig, former member of the East German secret police in the city of Dresden and someone that has been reported as very close to President Putin. Therefore, it is very clear that this new pipeline will also give the Russian government even more influence over the German business community. What is more, there are various other examples of possible corruption in this project, for instance in the northern German state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the government established a state-owned “climate” foundation, whose goal is to support the completion of this project. Nonetheless, it has been reported that the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state will spend €200,000 on this foundation, while Nord Stream 2 AG, with Gazprom as its majority stakeholder, will spent around €20 million, which clearly showcase the meddling of a foreign-government on Germany (Åslund, 2021; Meliksetian, 2018). This levels of corruption have not only appeared in Germany, in Austria for instance several former politicians have went on to work on Russian state companies after their retirement and in Hungary, after a meeting between President Putin and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in January 2014 the relationship between the countries notably changed, as Hungary decided to change its policy towards Russia after a decision was made to purchase a new nuclear power station. This decision also resulted in substantial decline of Hungary, for instance in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. There are various examples, which showcase how Gazprom and the Russian government have repeatedly tried to buy their influence regarding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, thus, it must be put into question that even though it may be a profitable project for some in Germany, the negative consequences that it could spark are considerable (Åslund, 2021; Zachmann, 2017).

Conclusion

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is one of the most controversial topics at the moment. It is clear that even though this project may present some economic benefits to Germany and some other European nations, this project should not be finished due to the increased amount of power and influence that it would give to the Russian government. The Nord Stream 2 project, would leave countries like Ukraine in an even more vulnerable position than the one that they are currently in. Moreover, it would also damage the European Union’s position. Firstly, it could provoke a rift between countries like Germany, Austria and the Netherlands who have been more in favour of the project, and others like Poland which have already raised some doubts about the possible impact that it could have. What is more, this project would leave the EU´s geopolitical stance in a very shaky situation, particularly due to the fact that it would find it ever more difficult to position itself strongly against Russia on critical issues, when Germany, the most powerful and influential EU Member State would have such dependencies regarding the energy sector with the Russian government. Therefore, it could be argued that carrying on with this project would be a very short-sighted decision by the EU and its Member States (Åslund, 2021; Temnycky, 2021).

Bibliography:

By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.

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