This week, 1,500 Russian and Uzbek troops are engaging in military exercises at Termez, Uzbekistan, close to the border with Afghanistan. At the same time, Russian soldiers also are holding joint exercises with Tajik military forces with the Russian contingent increased from 1,000 to 1,800 units and the doubling of military hardware at Kharb-Maidon, also close to the Afghan border (Reuters, 2021). Not only is Russia concerned about the increasing advances of the Taliban against the government units, neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fear a spillover of conflicts in their territories. Moscow does not view favorably the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Already last April, Russia and Tajikistan held a military exercise involving more than 50,000 troops and 700 units of military hardware, shortly after followed by the signing of an agreement to establish a joint air defense system. Tajikistan houses the largest Russian military base abroad. Around the same time, Russia also signed a four-year strategic partnership with Uzbekistan, a premier in the two states’ history. It is even more indicative as Uzbekistan had left the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) almost a decade ago (see below). Ahead of a state visit by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov to Moscow in May, Kyrgyzstan’s defense ministry declared it will host a joint military exercise under the aegis of the CSTO together with Russian, Kazakh and Tajik armed forces (Simes, 2021).
Defense cooperation in Central Asia: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
In May 1992, just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the heads of state of Russia and the former Soviet republics of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty. A year later, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia joined, and after successful ratification procedures in the member states entered into force in April 1994. The key article (Art. 4) of the document states that any aggression to one of the members will be considered an aggression against all participating countries, and (military) assistance to exercise the right of collective defense (as stipulated in Art. 51, UN Charter) will be given to the state under attack (CSTO, 2021) – mirroring Art. 5 of the Nato Treaty.
At first, the Treaty was concluded for a period of five years but was prolonged, and in May 2002, transformed into an international regional organization. In 2002, the Charter of the CSTO was accepted, and in 2004, received observer status in the UN General Assembly. In 2013, Serbia and Afghanistan were granted observer status (ibid.). By then, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan had already withdrawn from the defense alliance (Radio Free Europe, 2012). The CSTO’s objectives entail the strengthening of peace, international as well as regional security and stability, the protection on a collective basis of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of all members. These objectives shall be achieved by the priority of political means over the military, adhering to the principles of respect for independence as well as non-interference in internal affairs, voluntary participation, and the equality of rights and obligations of the member states (Charter, 2002).
Multilateral cooperation spans various areas such as countering modern security challenges and threats, like drug or human trafficking, illegal migration and information space security and rests on political, parliamentary and military collaboration. Regular political consultations take place to discuss current issues concerning the security of the region (Charter, 2002). At the 2016 Council session in Yerevan, Armenia, the member states adopted the Collective Security Strategy until 2025 aiming at deepening cooperation in the CSTO to make it “one of the effective instruments of international politics that ensure peace and security” in the region offering “cooperation and dialogue with all partners who share the goals and principles” (CSTO, 2021). Three more articles of the Charter are of importance. Article 7 places restrictions on the placement of military bases in member states of third countries which requires the approval of the other members; article 9 asks for the alignment of the members’ foreign policies on international and regional security issues; and article 10 advocates the harmonization of national legislation regarding defense, military construction and security (Charter, 2002).
Naturally, Russia dominates the organization by contributing 50% to the total budget and providing 80% of the military personnel. That way, and the possibility to place military bases in the participating Central Asian states, Russia can retain its influence in the region and create for itself a buffer zone to other states like Iran or Afghanistan (Karimov, 2021). As Karimov (2021) points out the CSTO is in fact less a military-political bloc but more of what he calls a “transfer organization” supporting the transition of the Central Asian members to modernize their armies; for instance, Tajikistan received arms worth ten times as much as their share contribution of a mere $500.000 in 2019. Despite regular joint military exercises like last year’s “Echelon – 2020” and “Indestructible Brotherhood – 2020”, the mechanisms of conflict resolution remain ineffective as seen in the alliance’s failure to prevent the deadly ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 or the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war (ibid.). Furthermore, some member states openly take sides in intraregional disputes such as during the recent conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Whereas Uzbekistan called on both sides to cease the armed confrontation and look for a peaceful settlement, Kazakhstan threw its support behind Kyrgyzstan with which it had historically closer relations and larger investments (Hashimova, 2021).
The Security Nexus Between Afghanistan and Central Asia
The border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan (1,344 km) and Uzbekistan (144 km) stretches over 1,488 km following the Amu Darya river through partially mountainous terrain that can only be secured with difficulty. Recently, around 1,000 soldiers and officers of the Afghan army had crossed the Tajik border to flee from the Taliban highlighting the porosity of it (Litovkin, 2021). The great danger for the northern neighbors of Afghanistan lies in the state becoming a further source of instability for the region. The withdrawal of the Western troops from Afghanistan may well exacerbate the onslaught of radical forces on the central government in Kabul. A fall of the government could create massive refugee flows northwards easing the influx of extremists into Central Asian countries and the expansion of Islamic State into the region (Trenin, 2021).
Russia’s greatest worry concerning the current state of affairs in Afghanistan is the Islamic State and not the Taliban. Moscow still hopes the Taliban may adopt a more moderate stance and participate in the formation of a more stable government (Simes, 2021). The Islamic State has had a foothold in northern Afghanistan since 2015 with the aim of diffusing into Central Asia, and currently has between 1,000 and 2,500 active fighters there according to US and Afghan estimates (ibid.). However, Moscow may fear more that the US would get access to military bases in Central Asia.
Some of the countries there had given the US access to bases in the recent past. From 2001 to 2014, Kyrgyzstan housed a US base at the Manas airport until President Almazbek Atambayev revoked the agreement with Washington. Relations cooled further down in 2015, when a cooperation agreement between the two was ended after the human rights activist Azimjon Askarov was awarded with the Human Rights Defender Award (Umarov, 2021). Tajikistan, similarly, has at the moment not good relations with the US, even though in the past, the US air force was permitted to refuel at the Ayni air base near Dushanbe. However, this year has seen new approaches from the US on the issue of Afghanistan and both sides held discussions with Tajikistan (Umarov, 2021).
Another candidate for a US base could be Uzbekistan. Between 2001 and 2005, the US air force had access to the Karshi-Khanabad air base. After the brutal suppression of the Andijan protests in May 2005 and strong US protest, the Uzbek government forced the Americans to withdraw. Since 2016, though, relations have improved and the military ties between Uzbekistan and the US have grown stronger. In 2018, both sides signed a military cooperation plan which has led to an increase in joint military drills as well as the training of Uzbek officers in the US and other Nato countries. Tashkent is also active on the diplomatic stage to end the conflict in Afghanistan and stabilize the country. Most prominently, it engaged together with the US and Afghanistan in a trilateral dialogue in May 2020 for the first time (Umarov, 2021).
Although radical Islamic terrorism is a security concern in the whole region of Central Asia, Uzbekistan has arguably suffered the most from it. Several Uzbek extremist groups have been and still are active there. During the 2000s, two groups in particular, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union, perpetrated many terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan. After government crackdowns on domestic terrorism, the former grouping is based in Pakistan’s tribal areas of Waziristan and has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic Jihad Union is an umbrella term for an extremist network of kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek radicals, which is thought to be allied with al-Quaeda, and is present in Pakistan from where it participates against foreign troops in Afghanistan (Counter Extremism Project, 2021). An extremist presence can also be found in the Ferghana Valley where the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan converge and which has seen its share of terrorism and cross-border conflicts (ibid.).
The security situation in Uzbekistan may facilitate negotiations with the US to host (an) American military base(s). Even though resistance can be expected from Russia and China, which has also increased its diplomatic and military activities with states in the region because of their concerns of a spillover of Islamic extremism and foreign fighters into the Muslim-majority province of Xinjiang. On the other hand, the US special representative for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced a new meeting of the extended Troika on Peaceful Settlement in Afghanistan with China, Pakistan and Russia in the coming days (TASS, 2021).
Conclusion
Russia and the CSTO hold the capacity to contribute to an appeasement of Afghanistan. Besides the military assets in the region with a strong presence of active troops, the fight against drug trafficking through Central Asia to Russia which finances terrorist groups in Afghanistan would play an important role there (Trenin, 2021). However, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov stated at a recent conference that a common solution to Afghan instability with the West would not be automatic, instead accusing western powers of having created the conundrum in Afghanistan in the first place (Gannon, Isachenkov & Chernov, 2021). Pakistan, apart from being a safe haven to foreign fighters (see above), has been accused by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani of having let pour in Afghanistan more than 10,000 jihadi fighters (ibid.). Nevertheless how truthful such numbers are, the key to solving the Afghan situation lies in a multilateral agreement.
By withdrawing their and western forces from Afghanistan, the US administration has put much pressure on the powers close by like Russia and China. As both powers see their national interests and security endangered they will be forced to engage in the stabilization of Afghanistan and have their skin in the game.
Nevertheless, in the long run the mission of the CSTO and its ambition to seek more international cooperation could stimulate a rapprochement with the West. A collaboration with western organizations on Afghanistan could not only have a salubrious effect on the country and enhance the stability in Central Asia; but also help to reduce tensions between Russia and the West and curb a further alignment of Russia with China.
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By Andreas Rösl : The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
