Georgia is located on the crossroads of Western Asia and Eastern Europe. It lays at the eastern end of the Black Sea, with Turkey and Armenia to the south, Azerbaijan to the east, and Russia to the north, over the Caucasus Mountains.The capital and largest city of Georgia is Tbilisi. Georgia’s total territory covers 69,700 square kilometers (26,911 sq mi). Its approximate population is about 3 716.9 million (National Statistics Office of Georgia, Population and Demography 2020). Georgia is a democratic republic shifting from a semi-presidential to parliamentary system with the President as the head of state, and Prime Minister as the head of government and head of Cabinet of Ministers. The parliament of Georgia is the supreme representative body of the country that exercises legislative power.
Being under the rule of the Soviet Union almost seventy years, the nature of Georgian state was greatly influenced by the communist party regime. Georgia emerged as an independent state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and regained the independence back in 1991. Since then, the political processes alongside with economic and social, have been changing constantly. After the breakdown of the Soviet empire, the post-communist countries could not escape a serious deterioration of social and economic conditions. However, the situation was all the more dramatic in Georgia, as the country also experienced civil war and a threat to its territorial integrity (Baumann 2012:262)
Political regime in Georgia, in the early 1992 to 2003, was obviously perceived as a “collapsed state” with ineffective governing practices, unstable state institutions including the police and the tax authorities, insufficient policies and “prosperity” of corruption. The power was mostly exercised by the oligarchs and rent-seekers trying to optimize their personal benefits (Baumann 2012). Georgia was one of the most corrupted countries in the post-Soviet decades ranking 85, according to the corruption perception index (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Georgia 1999-2019). Bribery was part of everyday life for years and consequently, the international financial institutions lost confidence in Georgia’s political actors and avoiding to support economic or social reforms. Post-Soviet Georgia was struggling with poor health care system, improper infrastructural development, low economic growth.
The point of departure
Economic and political cooperation between Georgia and the EU began in 1992. Through various humanitarian, financial and technical programmes or projects, the EU contributed to the process of building a modern state of Georgia, to the development of the country’s market economy and to the establishment of democratic principles. In 1996, Georgia and the EU signed the partnership and co-operation agreement (PCA). The PCA did not include provisions for a free trade area between the EU and Georgia, neither indicated that the EU would consider the possibility of signing an association agreement with Georgia (nor indeed with any other country of the South Caucasus) — neither in the short nor in the long term (Georgian Center for Security and Development, Policy Paper 2017:7).
Following the so-called “Rose Revolution” (2003), Georgia has experienced drastic changes in political life and state-society relations (De Waal 2011, Jones 2013, Tudoroiu 2007). The new government after the Rose Revolution announced a “new wave of reforms” (Jones 2013:21) and “the strong course toward the EU and NATO integration” (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008:158). The reforms targeted construction of a modern liberal market economy, a strong support for the privatization of state-owned property and less bureaucratic decision-making in public sector. Georgia became the member of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP included four main components: 1. Effective governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights 2. Economic development for stabilization 3. Security 4. Migration and mobility. The strong pro-Western orientation led to the “adoption of policies and institutions that corresponded to Western model of democracy” (Dobbins 2014:762). The new state building initiative was followed by the trend of democratization and institutional strengthening, as well as decentralization policy and citizens’ involvement in governing processes (Jones 2013).
The achievements of the reforms should not be underestimated. The young and ambitious then President – Mikheil Saakashvili’s team succeeded in securing macroeconomic stabilization by creating market institutions, making an impressive upward leap by imposing financial order and by conducting a successful fiscal policy with tax revenues. Attracting foreign direct investments played a crucial role in economic growth since 2004 (Baumann 2012:262). Alongside, Corruption was announced as the main impediment to the development process of the country and the strong anti-corruption strategy was launched to fight corruption (Mitchell 2009:175-176). The actions included firing the acting ministries, arresting senior government officials on corruption charges filmed and broadcasted to the public, increasing term of imprisonment and many others. The overtones of those actions aimed at creating the narrative of intimidation, harassment and fear. As a result, the country became the exemplary model for defeating corruption. According to 2008 UNDP Human Development Report, “the Government’s success in removing day-to-day corruption has been astonishing” (UNDP 2008 in Mitchell 2009:176). Although, the level of corrupted cases was drastically minimized, however, the prosperity of the country and namely, the welfare of the citizens was not as shinning as the numbers and perceptions above. Beyond the anti-corruption activities, there were numerous cases of inhuman treatment, violation of human rights and private property, political interference in investigations and state-controlled media (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008:163-164).
The ongoing political and economic changes were followed by the external support from the US and the European Union (Baumann 2012; King 2004). Georgia’s dependency on foreign aid has been visible in several directions: capacity building, institutional strengthening, technical assistance, infrastructure development (Gvindadze 2017). Between 1995-2000 and 2002-2004, Georgia received over 700 million US$ of American direct aid and became the fourth largest per capita recipient of USAID aid (Tudoroiu 2007:323). Additionally, 420 million Euro was contributed by the European Union as an aid targeting to build democracy, to improve governance and local government, to develop judicial reform and to promote NGOs and civil society (De Waal 2011:9, Tudoroiu 2007:323). Following 2005, Georgia received additionally 295.3$ million in U.S. direct government assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (Mitchell 2006:669). In 2009, Georgia became part of the EU Eastern Partnership Project to improve institutional strengthen (De Waal 2011:32). The financial assistance was followed by the “universal goodwill from EU and US” (Mitchell 2009:175) aimed at supporting the so-called ambitious reforms.
However, the practical implementation of the initiated reforms was incompatible with the perceptions of the international community. The commitment and the firm decision of the government in favour of closer integration with the European Union, raised questions in regard to its realistic perspectives. Deeply-rooted set of social norms, the strong top-down leadership and the existing political and economic systems did not correspond to the European attitudes and practices (De Waal 2011:34). Consequently, beyond the rhetoric of democratic state-building, the incompletely transferred foreign policies on the one hand (Dobbins 2014:763) and “superpresidential” desire (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008:160), on the other hand, has led to move away from the anticipated democracy and took the way back towards the centralized, autocratic ruling culture (De Waal 2011:42).
Current realities
The new political processes in Georgia during 2012-2014 and the transition of the ruling power to the new political party (Georgian Dream Coalition leaded by Bidzina Ivanishvili), drove the second wave of the reforms. The reforms aimed at improving cooperation with the EU and revising the incompleteness of the previous reforms. In 2014, Georgia and the EU signed the Association Agreement (AA). This was the first significant agreement between the EU and the Georgia that has advanced and deepen the cooperation between the Parties. The Association Agreement has defined the priority topics for the cooperation between the Parties, including but not only: the importance of political dialogue; trade, business and investments; legal, economic and cultural cooperation; democracy and the human rights; fight against crime and preventing illegal immigration. In the coming years, Georgia became one of the major EU beneficiaries regarding financial and technical assistance. Georgia’s AA also deals with close co-operation in 22 spheres and several sectoral cooperation agreements have been signed between the parties. Georgia has also joined Europe’s energy union – the membership of which is another precondition for candidate countries.
The political dimension of the AA requires Georgian government to harmonize Georgian legislative system with the European Union. Upon the AA, Georgia agrees to follow the EU’s National regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and takes obligation to reflect it in the national legislation. So far, the Association Implementation Report underlines that Georgia keeps a strong commitment to political association and integration with the EU and has remained committed to the implementation, obligations and undertakings of the Association Agreement (European Commission, Association Implementation Report on Georgia 2020:17). However, the Report points out the necessity of the judicial and the structural reforms that make Georgia’s economy less vulnerable to external developments, adoption of energy efficiency laws, enhancement of the investment climate and trade potential, pro-active solutions for the continued increase of asylum applications (European Commission, Association Implementation Report on Georgia 2020).
The AA also includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union (EU). The DCFTA is based on the principles of international trade organization and implies abolishing the import tax on goods and unlimited access to entrepreneurs’ trading services. According to the agreement, Georgian companies have the right to establish branches and representative offices in the EU member states, to receive services excluding any kinds of discrimination. The European Union has become Georgia’s most important trading partner – 31% of the country’s foreign trade in 2015 came from the European Union, followed by Turkey (about 17%), Azerbaijan (10%) and Russia (7%). The European Union market was also the main direction of Georgia’s exports. For example, in 2015, the European Union was the largest importer of Georgian products (More than 29%). It was followed by Azerbaijan (11%), Turkey (9%) and Russia (7%) (National Statistics Office of Georgia).
Although, The EU regards Georgia as a key partner in the region and continues to fully support its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. However, the AA does not explicitly offer the membership in the European Union, though neither does rule it out. The preamble of the document says: “…this Agreement shall not prejudice and leaves open the way for future progressive developments in EU-Georgia relations” (Association Agreement 2014:5). This record distinguishes Georgian agreement with other Eastern Partnerships Agreements signed with the Western Balkans countries, where the membership of the European Union is given in the text of the treaty.
Challenges and Perspectives
The balance of power in the South Caucasus region varies constantly between the regional actors such as Turkey, Russia, Iran as well as the external actors: the EU and the US. Considering the regular internal political instability in Georgia, recently expanded Russia’s influence in Armenia, deeply-rooted authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan, produces the context that does presupposes hegemonic order and more specifically, the rise of Russia’s policy maneuvers in the region. The existence of Russia in the neighborhood is a daily threat for the South Caucasus region, since Russia’s neo-imperial aspirations are not hidden anymore (take the invasion in Crimea or the Russo-Georgian August war in 2008). The EU’s vibrant presence in the region is essential for maintaining the global governance order, leaving the possibility for dialogue and cooperation between the actors.
It needs to be mentioned that despite the EU-Georgia Association agreement, the EU membership is a long, complex and time-consuming process. The path towards EU integration is full of economic, political, social obstacles. Economically, Georgia belongs to the low-income countries list (World Bank Open Data, 2020), the unemployment level increases year by year (by 2021, the indicator strikes 21.9%, National Statistics office of Georgia), considerable number of the population lives in misery. The National production is not sufficient enough to produce the public wealth. For comparison, the GDP per capita of Georgia is two times less than that of Bulgaria, the poorest country of the European Union. Unemployment in Georgia remains high; In fact, every third person between the ages of 15-24 in Georgia is unemployed. This high level of unemployment results in the labor force leaving the country in search of jobs in places like Turkey or the EU. It also increases the number of asylum-seekers seeking economic relief in EU member states ( Heinrich Boll Stiftung Tbilisi, 2019).
Politically, the country is polarized. Fragile democracy creates conditions for political crises, state institutions lack strength and are politically biased. Furthermore, there is a lack of the protection of human rights, inclusion and respect for the minority groups represent a significant challenge. The Georgian government has implemented several waves of judiciary reform, but there is a lack of trust to the institution among population. This fact has been highlighted by Georgian civil society, the international community, as well as Georgia’s close international partners. The EU has also placed a particular emphasis on the importance of transparency and accountability in the process of appointing judges in its Association Agreement implementation report of 2018.
However, the ambitions of the Georgian government to join the EU and the lack of enthusiasm in the European Union to boost enlargement, presents a clear mismatch of priorities. Obviously, The Georgian government has to work harder to demonstrate a clear progress when it comes to the implementation of the Association Agreement. This not only entails the alignment of Georgian legislation with that of the European Union and setting up new institutions, but it also means ensuring that the adopted laws are properly implemented.
However, there is a work that the EU needs to undertake as well. More specific steps need to be taken by the EU in order to translate policy intentions into realistic outcomes and to increase the EU’s overall influence in the region. What EU should advance in its open door policy is – the political dimension. Democracy is a process that requires constant vigilance, caution and strengthening. Maintaining functional democracy is also a prerequisite for an international stability and order. Likewise, dysfunction of a democracy is a threat for not only a particular state but the global order in general. The EU member states, since their political order is recognized as a functional democracy, bear responsible for further promotion and diffusion of democracy.
The expansion of the EU eastward consequently aids the creation of a peaceful environment for democracy to survive, specifically the reliability of democratic alliance partners, may be the causal mechanism lessening conflict for these states. The EU needs to boost the open door policy in order to step forward and to avoid possible ad hoc actions. The EU’s open door policy should set the directions for collective strength and to demonstrate the will for the collective security. This will help to strengthen and consolidate democracy.
Beyond that, enlargement can promote several reforms in the eastern neighborhood and contribute to the regional political order, and co-opt younger generations into the Western norms and perspectives. Thus, enlargement should be seen as an instrument for encouraging the democratic regimes in non-member states that in turn, diminishes the chances of a particular hegemonic order in the neighborhood.
References
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By Nino Zotikishvili: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
