President Joe Biden is programmed to meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on June 14 during his tour of European allies. American-Turkish relations have been under strain in recent years due to Ankara’s diplomatic flirts with non-Western powers, especially Russia, and its involvement in the Syrian civil war. Furthermore Turkey’s ambition to gain independence from foreign weaponry and technology is a critical point, not to mention the deal to acquire the Russian S-400 anti-missile defense system.
Large investments in the high-tech and defense sector have led to the development of drones and provided the army with higher operational capacities. For example, the Turkish defense company Baykar Makina has been developing armed and unarmed drones for Turkey’s army which have been used in its operations in Syria (Pamuk & Stewart, 2020). Turkey’s rising profile as a world leader in the field of drones has attracted other states’ interest; clients include Ukraine and Qatar, and most recently Poland (Harper, 2021). The funding for military research and development has tripled since 2007 and the modernization of the Turkish fleet has made big strides (Tsiplacos, 2019). A continuation on this path depends of course on the economic stability of Turkey. Increased arms sales are certainly helpful to sustain the growth of military clout and the aspiration of surpassing US$10 billion of arms sales by 2023 seems very optimistic (Cannon, 2020).
Western attention has been attracted by Russia’s activities in the Mediterranean Sea, especially its participation in the civil wars in Syria and Libya. In Russia’s shade, Turkey has managed to get an impressive grasp on the wider Red Sea region, stretching from the Levante and the Suez Canal to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.
Blue Homeland and Strategic Depth
Since Erdoğan came to power in Turkey in 2002, the Turkish foreign policy strategy has changed dramatically. The first new concept that appeared was dubbed ‘Blue Homeland’ (in Turkish, mavi vatan). Proposed in 2006 by Admiral Ramazan Cem Gürdeniz, it lays claim over half of the Aegean Sea including the Greek islands there and further territorial demands in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Shortly after, the plan of gaining ‘Strategic Depth’ (stratejik derinlik) surfaced promoted by former foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. This strategy aims at reordering political, economic and social relations in the Middle East and wider Muslim world to Ankara’s advantage (Gingeras, 2020).
Already in 2002, a $3 billion naval program was introduced to increase capacities of Turkish navy (Tanchum, 2019). In September 2011, Erdoğan declared publicly his blue-water ambitions stating that Turkish national interests spread from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. The new objectives for a navy enhancement included from this point forward sea denial, forward presence, and limited power projection (Frantzmann, 2019).
Considering the geographical and geopolitical position of Turkey, the Blue Homeland and Strategic Depth strategies make sense. Turkey builds a land bridge between South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region and the Levante. Thus, Turkey geographically connects the Middle East to the Balkans and via its Black Sea shore projects its influence further to the Western littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine) and into the Caucasus. Its Eastern Mediterranean shore allows it to project influence to Northern Africa (Egypt and Libya). These geopolitical opportunities, on the other hand, come with increased competition with Russia in the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia as well as with Iran, Egypt and Israel in the Middle East and Northern Africa. As these areas made part of the Ottoman empire it has become fashionable to insinuate that Erdoğan has a neo-imperialist design in mind to recreate the empire with his policies concerning the wider Middle East.
Turkey’s Growing Presence in the Red Sea region
The Turkish naval (and air) installations in the Mediterranean Sea already include bases in Syria and Libya and contribute to Ankara’s ability to control the sea routes in the Eastern Mediterranean and through the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean (Aslı Aksoy, 2020).
Lending tangible support to Turkey’s military advances is Qatar which has amply sponsored the Turkish economy. For instance, in 2018, when the Turkish Lira had fallen around 40% against US dollars, Doha announced US$15 billion worth of investments to Turkey’s economy and a currency swap of $3 billion (Frantzman, 2019).
So it does not surprise that Turkey’s first overseas military base opened in Qatar in October 2016, though further afield from the Red Sea but nevertheless connected by the highly important shipping lines between the Persian gulf along the Omani coast and the Gulf of Aden. It garrisons now 3,000-5,000 troops as well as special operations, naval and air units (Tanchum, 2019; Aslı Aksoy, 2020).
Ankara’s second overseas base opened in Mogadishu, Somalia, close to the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb, one of the pivotal chokepoints in the world. The military compound also houses the largest training base outside Turkey to train Somali troops and equip them with Turkish weaponry as well as facilities for Turkish military assets (Tanchum, 2019). Turkey’s light aircraft carrier ‘Anadolu’ scheduled to be operational this year with a range of 1,700 nautical miles (around 3,150 km) would cover almost completely the distance of Red Sea between the Suez Canal and Mogadishu (Tanchum, 2019). Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has been the most intensive and may foreshadow what could take place in other sites in the region.
Another base was planned to be built in Sudan at the port of Suakin where Ankara received a 99-years lease in December 2017. Since the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, however, the deal has been halted and the future of the base remains uncertain (Tanchum, 2019). Nevertheless, Ankara has increased its efforts to gain influence in Djibouti lending economic support to the small country and encourage businesses to settle as well as to establish educational and religious programs there (The Arab Weekly, 2021). Holding a base in the Red Sea would boost Turkey’s sway over the wider region facilitating the control of sea lanes and monitoring rivals’ activities up close, and therefore, will be probably remain on its foreign policy agenda.
To complete the string of strategically placed naval bases along the Red Sea Corridor through the Eastern Mediterranean Sea would be a facility in Northern Cyprus (according to newspapers close to Erdoğan) where Ankara already boasts a military presence of 30,000 troops (Tanchum, 2019). Besides the contentious issue of the partition of Cyprus, the gas discoveries around the island and the related conflict of interests lower the chances of succeeding to build there. In an attempt not to aggravate the US even more, Ankara has only tried to prevent non-American explorers from Cypriot waters; ExxonMobil ships could proceed undisturbed in exploring activities (ExxonMobil, 2019).
All in all, Turkey’s expansion of naval activity from coastal deterrence to power projection already has gone far and is poised to continue. Ankara plans a further enlargement of its marine in coming years with submarines, corvettes, frigates with anti-defense capacities, as well as the improvement of naval armament by developing new sea-launched cruise missiles; its army shall also be modernized by the integration of drones (drone activities on the rise for surveillance over Cyprus, Syria, Libya, northern Iraq), new combat vehicles and gathering experience in proxy warfare (Kasapoglu, 2020). The peacekeeping missions including security assistance and military training in states of the wider Red Sea region emphasize the impetus of Turkey’s outward-bound policies (Cannon, 2020).
Implications for US and EU
Turkey’s growing presence in the wider Red Sea region increases the competition for geopolitical influence as some European states – in the framework of the anti-piracy campaigns of the early 2010s – as well as China have set up base in Djibouti. Other regional actors like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have also established bases there. This accumulation of military installations stresses the geopolitical significance of the Red Sea Corridor and the EU should not shy away from augmenting its own footprint there, lest Brussels will have to live with the negative consequences of being shut out of this space. The recent blockage of the Suez Canal should have been a reminder that the Red Sea Corridor is a lifeline for European trade. By contrast, the US has intensified its maritime activities around the Arabian peninsula in recent years as an experienced geopolitical actor on the global stage. For the benefit of a stronger EU foreign policy projection, it would be imperative to acquire more strategic depth in geopolitically significant areas like the wider Rea Sea region.
Bibliography:
Aslı Aksoy, H. (2020, Dec 16). Excursus: Turkey’s Military Engagement Abroad. https://www.cats-network.eu/topics/visualizing-turkeys-foreign-policy-activism/excursus-turkeys-military-engagement-abroad/
Cannon, B.J. (2021). Turkey’s military strategy in Africa. In Turkey in Africa: A New Emerging Power? (E.E. Tepeciklioğlu & A.O. Tepeciklioğlu, eds.). Routledge, 127-143.
ExxonMobil. (2019, February 28). ExxonMobil makes natural gas discovery offshore Cyprus. https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/news/newsroom/news-releases/2019/0228_exxonmobil-makes-natural-gas-discovery-offshore-cyprus
Frantzman, S.J (2019, December 21). Turkey’s grand plans for Middle East primacy. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/turkeys-grand-plans-middle-east-primacy-107596?page=0%2C2
Gingeras, R. (2021, Jun 02). Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/
Gunn, T . (2020 ). “The Presence Of Turkey In Africa : Results And Perspectives” . Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi,4, 181-190. https://www.dw.com/en/poland-continues-to-draw-eu-nato-ire-over-turkish-drone-purchases/a-57775109
Kasapoglu, C. (2020). Turkey’s growing military expeditionary posture. Terrorism Monitor, 18(10), 7-9.
Pamuk, H., & Stewart, P. (2020, February 5). Exclusive: U.S. halts secretive drone program with Turkey over Syria incursion. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-usa-drone-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-halts-secretive-drone-program-with-turkey-over-syria-incursion-idUSKBN1ZZ1AB
Tanchum, M. (2019). Turkey’s string of pearls: Turkey’s overseas naval installations reconfigure the security architecture of Mediterranean-Red Sea Corridor. AIES Fokus, 4/2019.
The Arab Weekly (2021, Jan 26). Turkey maintains presence in Gulf of Aden despite de-esclalation with Saudi Arabia. https://thearabweekly.com/turkey-maintains-presence-gulf-aden-despite-de-esclalation-saudi-arabia
Tsiplacos, A. (2019, May 7). Turkey is willing to set Eastern Mediterranean on fire. Why now and what lies next. https://www.semedenergydefense.com/turkey-is-willing-to-set-eastern-mediterranean-on-fire-why-now-and-what-lies-next/
By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
