The presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020 was followed by an extraordinary surge of social protests against Aleksandar Lukashenka’s regime. The flagrant fraud of election results, which declared Lukashenka the winner with approximately 80% of the vote, was the catalyst for these protests. As a result of widespread protests and strikes, the government responded with brute force, beatings and detaining thousands of protesters.
Political crisis
President Aleksandar Lukashenko has ruled the country since 1994, when he won the country’s first presidential election after achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The 1994 Constitution was amended by a referendum held in 1996, which increased presidential powers and established a bicameral system. In 2004, the constitutional limit of two consecutive presidential terms was repealed, hence, allowing the perpetuation in power of the President Lukashenko.
He has promoted a statist and centralised model that can no longer meet the needs and expectations of the Belarusian people, particularly as it relies heavily both on state run enterprises and Russian subsidies, concretely on imported energy. Lukashenko has long used that model to Russify the country’s identity and promote a sense of Soviet nostalgia in this young nation (NATO assembly, 2020). As that model begins to crumble, added to an economic crisis, the opposition is raising fundamental questions about the country’s identity and future course.
Belarus is strategically important in the defense field and as an energy transit route for both the West and Russia due to its geographic location between Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltics. Russia has been Belarus’ strongest ally since Lukashenko was elected president in 1994 (Zogg, 2021). However, as stated by Charles Michel, the President of the European Council at the moment of the Belarusian elections, “The protests in Belarus are not about geopolitics. This is in the first place a national crisis. It is about the right of people to freely elect their leadership.”
The current political crisis has its roots on the loss of legitimacy of the President Lukashenko after twenty seven years in power and is to be attributed to several factors, but mainly, to the emergence of a new generation of leaders promoting democratic values and rejecting the actual authoritarian and repressive regime (Dunay and Herd, 2020).
Meanwhile, the economic crisis worsens the population’s plight. Belarus’ economic downfall is being accelerated by brain drain and a weak investment climate, which are both linked to the global economic downturn. As a result, there is a potential of an economic and monetary crisis in addition to the state crisis (Zogg 2021).
The state-dominated economy with clear signs of stagnation, a constitution that perpetuates authoritarianism, systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and periodic failure to adhere to international standards and commitments in the electoral process, all contributed to the popular protest movement in the aftermath of the 9 August 2020 presidential election (Soroka, 2020).
Since August 2020, about 35,000 Belarusians reportedly have been detained or imprisoned. More than 500, including 62 women, are considered political prisoners and several individuals have been killed or have died under suspicious circumstances (Congressional Research Service, 2021). The United Nations (UN) human rights experts reported 450 documented cases of torture and abuse in police custody, including reports of violence towards children, sexual abuse, and threats thereof.
International response
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) voiced its utmost concern about the worsening human rights situation in Belarus since the presidential election of 9 August 2020 and the participating States appointed Professor Dr. Benedek of Austria as OSCE Rapporteur, who, on 5 November 2020, presented to the Permanent Council his report concerning alleged human rights violations related to the presidential election. The report concluded that “there is overwhelming evidence that the presidential elections of 9 August 2020 have been falsified and that massive and systematic human rights violations have been committed by the Belarusian security forces in response to peaceful demonstrations and protests”. Moreover, the Report suggests to cancel the results of the elections and to organize new ones under OSCE/ODIHR observation. However, the authorities’ arbitrariness is not the only cause of the fraudulent elections, but also it is the lack and inconsistencies of the legal framework, the constitution, the law on the political parties, the electoral code, etc. (Soroka, 2020). Therefore, to guarantee a free and fair elections, there is a need for a constitutional and legislative reform securing democratic values.
The United Nations Human Rights Council, the EU and the US have all urged for a halt to the crackdown, as well as for the government to engage in discussion with the opposition and stage free and fair presidential elections.
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) held an emergency meeting on Belarus and adopted a resolution requesting that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) closely monitor the situation in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential elections while calling on authorities to end their policy of repression and fully respect the legitimate aspirations of the Belarusian population.
Concerning the European Union, the West has sent strong signals of disapproval of the regime and solidarity with the protest movement (Zogg, 2021). In the European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on the systematic repression in Belarus and its consequences for European security following the abductions from an EU civilian plane intercepted by Belarusian authorities (2021/2741(RSP)), the EU “reiterates its non-recognition of the election of Aliaksandr Lukashenka to the post of President of Belarus; considers the current regime in Belarus as illegitimate, illegal and criminal; continues to support the people of Belarus in their legitimate demands and aspirations for free and fair elections, fundamental freedoms and human rights, democratic representation, political participation and dignity; condemns the crackdown on the thousands of Belarusians who peacefully protested in defence of their right to freedom, democracy and dignity”.
The EU had sanctioned 166 persons, including the President Lukashenko, and 15 entities in Belarus as of June 25, 2021 (Congressional Research Service, 2021). The EU has also implemented sectoral measures, which include prohibitions on trade in petroleum products and potash, two of Belarus’s most important exports. The democracy movement in Belarus believes that EU sanctions are insufficiently broad to allow for constructive change. The penalties, according to critics, were mostly symbolic and at first, they did not directly target Lukashenko, who was, after all, the undisputed architect of the electoral fraud and crackdown (Viaorka, 2020).
Furthermore, Belarusian airline companies are not allowed to fly over the EU airspace or use their airports and the European Aviation Safety Agency has urged EU member states to impose flying restrictions over Belarusian airspace. Belarus’ land borders have been closed since December 2020 (supposedly due to Covid-19), however, completely eliminating flights would be risky for people who need to leave the nation. To show its continued support for Belarusian citizens and to assist those in need, the EU might subsidize all Schengen permits for Belarusians. This would indicate support for Belarusians in one fell swoop while causing no undue harm to individuals (Ryhor, 2020).
The EU should strengthen its commitment and solidarity towards the Belarusian population and closely monitor the political situation. To maintain this focus, the EU should appoint a special representative to Belarus who will play an essential role in keeping the matter on the European and worldwide agenda and will imply a first step towards the cooperation between Belarus and the EU.
As for United States, the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, modifying the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, was passed by the 116th Congress in December 2020. The act stipulates, among other things, that the United States reject the “invalid results” of the 2020 presidential elections and empowers the President to impose sanctions on individuals in Belarus who violate human rights or undermine democracy. The US Treasury Department has designated 25 officials and 9 businesses for sanctions, including Lukashenko, as of June 25, 2021, and the State Department had placed visa restrictions on at least 155 individuals (Congressional Research Service, 2021). In addition, on April 19, 2021, the Treasury Department announced the revocation (as of June 3, 2021) of a Belarus-related general license that allowed US persons to “engage in certain transactions with nine sanctioned Belarusian state-owned enterprises,” including Belneftekhim, a major petrochemical company, and its subsidiaries. Moreover, the Biden Administration stated that the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is investigating the Ryanair flight diversion, and that the United States is suspending the application of a 2019 US-Belarus Air Services Agreement (CRS, 2021).
Apart from sanctions, the US has also provided for financial support to Belarus, mainly the focus of the financial aid has been in the areas of independent media and civil society, private sector development, and vulnerable people. Belarus received around $47 million in required foreign aid from the US between 2016 and 2020. Belarus will get $10.2 million in help from the US State Department in 2021 and the President’s budget request for State and Foreign Operations for 2022 contains $15 million “to assist the Belarusian people’s democratic aspirations.” (CRS, 2021)
Concerning US diplomatic relations with Belarus, due to constraints imposed by Minsk, the United States has had no ambassador and a limited diplomatic presence in Belarus since 2008 (Zogg, 2021). In December 2020, after the massive protests in Belarus, the Senate confirmed Julie D. Fishertobe’s appointment as the United States’ first ambassador to Belarus in more than a decade in December 2020. However, as of July 2020, Ambassador-Designate Fisher had not yet presented her credentials to the Belarusian government (CRS, 2021).
Recommendations for the peaceful transition towards a democracy:
There is a need for a joint international response to the Belarusian authoritarian regime. The peaceful settlement of the political crisis in Belarus comes from the involvement of the world economic powers and institutions in promoting democratic values and closely monitoring the situation in order to take appropriate measures and help those individuals in need.
At first glance, the most urgent action is the international community’s demand for the release of all political prisoners and the holding of new elections under the auspices of international observers, including the EU and Russia, with the participation of the OSCE (Laputska, 2020). Even though, the US, the EU and the UN have already called for new free and fair elections and have declared the non-recognition of the President Lukashenko, it has been proved to not to be enough pressure for the government to stop repression.
The Belarusian case should be mainstreamed by the international community in order to curb repression and establish ties with actors within Belarus. A monitoring group should be established under the auspices of the UN, the OSCE, or other international organizations to establish a presence on the ground and whose mandate would include not only monitoring of the situation in the country and regular reporting, but also efforts to reconcile conflicting views on Belarus within the international actors (Slunkin, 2021). Governments and parliaments can send their own missions, and foreign media and non-governmental organizations should be encouraged to report on what is happening on the ground. The more the international community’s visible presence in Belarus, the less brutal Lukashenka’s agencies can be in punishing protestors, allowing for more substantive dialogue (Ryhor, 2020).
Additionally, the further introduction of targeted political and economic sanctions will pressure the Lucashenka regime to commit with international standards and stop repression. However, so far the sanctions have been focus on selective visa restrictions or on imposing account freezes, which have little effect on what is happening on the ground (Ryhor, 2020). Visa sanction lists need to be expanded and sanctions should be imposed on many key regime collaborators which nowadays are absent from the sanctions list. There should be increased economic pressure on the regime. Companies that are crucial to Lukashenka’s business interests should be identified and sanctioned, with all of their trading activity suspended and all of their foreign accounts seized. Governments should also convince significant corporations in their own countries to reconsider doing business with Belarusian producers. It is a disgrace that international corporations continue to advertise in Lukashenka’s controlled media while ignoring reports of human rights breaches at Belarusian enterprises with which they do business. Furthermore, a deadline should be given for the cessation of any repression, or else further economic penalties will be applied. The next step is to consider banning financial institutions in the EU member states and within the US from holding Belarusian treasury bonds. This would send a strong message to Lukashenka, but in order to be effective, there is a need of a coordinated action in the international community, mainly the EU and the US, with the collaboration of the OSCE.
Finally, in order to recover the Belarusian economy, which has worsened after the elections and the Covid-19 pandemic, the international community should implement a ‘Marshall Plan for a democratic Belarus’. States and international financial institutions should express their willingness to provide substantial financial support in the form of grants or low-interest loans, but only if democratic transformation occurs first. It is necessary to condition this economic package on democratic reform, but it must also be free of geopolitical constraints. If a democratically elected administration seeks to enhance relations with Russia, it should still be able to rely on financial aid. This would send a powerful message to economic reformers who are still in Lukashenka’s system, giving them a genuine option between a functional Belarusian economy and being loyal to Lukashenka, whose leadership is seen by many as to be responsible for ruining the country’s economy (Ryhor, 2020).
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By Blanca Prat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
