The turmoil decades the Balkans went through seems not to have ended: transboundary rivalry, localized violence, and political uncertainty are raising tensions in an exponential way, making the world question whether nationalism-fuelled conflict over borders might be resurging. In Particular, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo is still very tight. Serbia seems not willing to take a step forward to ease tensions. Similarly, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are going through political instability, causing grievance in the population and increasing the risk that internal struggle might fuel a rebellion. With the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the fear that the conflict would spread out to former Yugoslavia was very high, nevertheless, several factors make a full-scale war unlikely, such as NATO’s presence in the territory, EU integration efforts, and economic interdependence that also act as deterrents.
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008: major global powers such as the United States and numerous European Union countries have officially recognized the nation. However, Serbia, backed by Russia, still refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence, as do most ethnic Serbs inside Kosovo, leading to frequent political and security clashes. It has to be remembered that after the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serbia responded to separatist factions with a violent crackdown in Albania, which terminated with the military intervention of NATO in 1999. Recently, border tensions raised as a consequence of NATO deploying peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, in response to Russia’s aggression, to be ready for any further expansion of the conflict in the Balkans. In response to the presence of the international army, the Serbian president threatened several times to deploy the Serbian army to Kosovo, if NATO did not back up. The future dynamics of their relationship might even be more at stake, due to the new US envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell, known for his pro-Serbia stance, who has also criticized the former president of Kosovo for worsening relations with Washington (Zorić,2025).
However, transboundary conflict might not be in the interests of neither Kosovo nor Serbia, which is currently dealing with internal struggle. The country is indeed experiencing one of the biggest protests, described as civil rebellion, the country has ever seen led by students, who are demanding a more transparent, and less corrupted government. The Serbian government has accused Western foreign intelligence services of fuelling the protest with a specific attempt to destabilize his regime, especially now that Russia cannot fully support the country as it is dealing with the Ukrainian war.
The internal situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also very unstable. On one side, the leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has repeatedly threatened secession, raising concerns about the potential fragmentation of the country. On the other, a recent report published by The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption has shown a worrying situation such as high levels of corruption, the lack of transparency of legislative processes, but moreover the increased deterioration of public trust in institutions. If the government doesn’t focus on increasing its political stability and regenerating social cohesion and faith in public institutions, it might soon experience high levels of grievance that might explode into internal conflicts.
Similarly, Montenegro is also dealing with political instability, external influences and pressures, and socio-economic challenges. In particular, Montenegro’s aspirations of entering the European Union were challenged once again by the coalition of Serbian-aligned political factions and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), which influence significantly Montenegro’s political and social stability. The Serbian Orthodox Church is not just a religious institution, it is deeply rooted in political and social layers, fuelling nationalist sentiments, and promoting the idea that Montenegro, despite declaring independence in 2006, it’s still part of Serbia. The SOC therefore undermines Montenegro’s national identity and fuels ethnic divisions not only among its borders but also in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reinforcing Serbian identity and legitimacy over those territories.
In conclusion, despite the high level of tensions internal and external to national borders across all Eastern Europe’s states, a full-scale war in the Balkans is unlikely to happen, as several factors act as deterrents. Many Balkan states, such as Montenegro and Albania, are NATO members, so if Serbia, even if backed by Russia, decided to military attack one of those countries, it would trigger a collective defense reaction from the European Union. The EU on the other side is also providing financial aid and integration policies to incentivize a major dialogue in the Balkans. However, localized violent conflicts are still a possibility, considering the ethnic division and the political instability that are a common trait among all Eastern European states.
By The European Institute for International Relations
