On May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops engaged in an open confrontation in a territory of the disputed border in the Himalayans which both countries claim as being theirs.
For 40-days, the two sides engaged in a tense standoff, and on June 15, 2020, violent clashes ensued between the armed forces of both super-powers, with both sides using blunt weapons and rocks as weapons and with the final result of casualties on both sides.
As a consequence, China and India- two regional super-powers that compromise the two countries with the highest amount of population in the world and that possess both nuclear weapons- are since 2020 engaged in an increasingly more tense and dangerous border crisis that has already resulted in the the most violent clash between both countries since 1962, with the Indian-Chinese war that was also fought over the border dispute.
The strategically longstanding disagreement over the border has plagued bilateral ties since the founding of the Republic of India (1947) and the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (1949), with the dispute being more intense geographically in the Western sector of the border between both countries in Indian controlled Ladakh and Chinese controlled Akhsai Chin, with a growth of military infrastructure being built by China near the area to lay claim to it and a military build up on both sides in the region in the last years.
While both China and India have shown clear interest in de-escalation and dialogue- something that has been demonstrated by their relatively calm and non-escalatory statements after the brutal skirmish on June 16, 2020 restoring a long-term peace settlement and de-escalation of the conflict through negotiations seems to have become an increasingly less likely outcome as of today.
This is because the timing and the nature of the confrontation in the disputed territory has raised several critically strategic questions regarding China´s long-term strategy and its great power calculations for its relationship with India on the grander scope of great-power politics. The CCP wishes to end strategically the existence of military infrastructure along with the current arms race on the part of its neighbour in the territory. However, it is strategically in no hurry to resolve the disputes as it bogs India down as a continental power, with the Chinese authorities pushing to claim the majority of the disputed territory as a reaction response to perceived Indian tactical exploitation in great power politics of China´s vulnerability during the Covid-19 pandemic and its competition with the US.
When strategically looking at the situation, one must ask how is the Chinese power is weighting the positives versus the costs of its current policy of open confrontation along the border with India, with some outside strategist and analysts seeing the antagonism of Chinese Army as a strategic mistake since it might most likely be imprudent for Beijing to openly confront such an important neighbour over a barren stretch of territory that has virtually no valuable resources.
The leadership of the PRC believes however that it needs to stand up and show force to India even if it comes at the cost of antagonising Indian leadership, which would then side with the US as a consequence. Consequently, the results of Chinas policy over the dispute and ultimately the inevitable response from India will dictate the stability in the region and the consequent geopolitical ties and balance of power between China, India and the United States.
Regarding the strategic situation in terms of importance, the context is particularly important for China, since in the eastern sector- the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh- which China´s ambassador to India has claimed to belong to China since 2006- includes a territory named Tawang, which is historically important given the fact that it was the birth place of the 6th Dalai Lama.
Consequently, any acknowledgement of Indian sovereignty over it will undermine China´s sovereignty over Tibet, as it would imply that the Dalai Lama is Indian and as a consequence so is Tibet, putting at stake the unity of China. Furthermore, the western sector of the border- Aksai Chin- offers the only direct road connection between China´s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region.
As such, in an event of a major civil unrest or national emergency, in territories that are home to millions of ethnic minorities, that might put the unity of the China at stake (one of its key security concerns), the Chinese Peoples Republic will have to rely on the road that passes to that territory, the “G219” for access. Consequently, losing Aksai Chin would jeopardize the stability of Chinas entire western frontier, something that would put in danger its great-power plans and its national stability.
For these strategic reasons, the Chinese state has significantly built-up infrastructure on its side of the border, which was done for strategic and tactical reasons, with the strategic factor being a result of China´s 13th Five Year Plan (2016 to 2020) and its new stipulations on transportation infrastructure development in the border regions announced in 2016. Unlike the previous plans, which focused on the development of intra-regional roads within border regions, the 13th Five Year Plan prioritizes an inter-regional transportation network through the “civil-military fusion strategy”, with a mandate that requires army personnel and the local regional government in the border region to strategically cooperate for the acceleration of the construction of the road outward for transnational networks.
The building infrastructure along the border is deeply connected with China´s Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping flagship foreign policy initiative which involves the use of global infrastructure development to expand China´s economic sphere of influence. The critical road infrastructure toward India is included in the five most important territorial areas, with the others being North Korea, Myanmar, Russia and Mongolia, with it being stipulated in the 13th Five Year in line with this campaign- however, given the current ongoing border disputes, construction has led to confrontation with India with the infrastructure construction leading to the Doklam standoff that also originated from the same mandate.
Its important to notice that local and tactical considerations have been taken into consideration by the Chinese state apparatus, since traditionally both states have had a special focus on building a solid presence and control in the eastern sector of the border, which can be traced back as early as India´s “Assam Rifles” and Chinas Peoples Liberation Army border patrol since the 50´s of the last century. Consequently, the persistent presence of both super powers has created an effect of less ambiguity in both sides actual control of the disputed territory as well as their mutual understanding of them with the result of both sides having increasingly less room to expand.
Although this is the current reality, in the western sector, in result of the high altitude and strong weather conditions, with neither side being capable of establishing a permanent military presence in certain territories of disputed land, with that being the origin of the majority of the clashes since there is ample space for minor changes, with room for imagination, alterations and expansion.
For now, the growth of the conflict and the potential for a new wave of confrontations is low, with both countries having in their recent history other clashes along disputed borders with the other recent border dispute having been in 2013, when the Chinese authorities objected to the construction of an Indian observation outpost near the LAC in the Depsang Valley in northern Ladakh, with the stand-off lasting 21 days. There was also another conflict erupting in 2017 when both countries faced a similar standoff for 72 days in the Galwan Valley, with Chinese foreign policy spokespersons consistently accusing India of consistently breaching its de fact LAC in the Galwan Valley which has been populated by Chinese military and currently has roads, bridges and facilities built by the PRC.
China as continuously emphasized for the return of calm in the disputed region while claiming it as well, with the territory remaining within the borders of China, and it should be added that one of the most critical corridors for the strategic success of China´s Belt and Road Initiative runs through Karakorum, close to the Galwan Valley, where the June 15 confrontation took place and that for this reason the region is of high strategic importance.
Chis is activity truing to demonstrate its strategic commitment to the disputed territory while waiting for the appropriate time to advance with its control, instrumentalizing for its strategy the influence it has gained in the region and globally, claiming that it will be appropriate to say that the international state of affairs requires the continuation of the status quo in the region.
China currently possesses a stronger economy than India, possessing a GDP that is at the present time five times bigger than the one from India, with its annual defence spending being also three times that of the Indian defence spending and having a stronger diplomatic strength and power globally speaking. However, China must also be strategically quick to act while also maintain calm and not be completely confrontational, otherwise it might antagonise Indian elite and make India turn increasingly more to the side of the US, isolating China and putting its geopolitical goals ultimately at stake.
The Indian-Chinese bilateral trade equates to 92 billion $ in value, with also an asymmetric trade relationship existing between China and India that benefits China. India on its side is actively invested in a strategy where it acts in a strategically ambiguous manner that is risk averse, since getting itself into an armed conflict would damage its development, while at the same time taking advantage of its size. In an ultimate case, India possesses an increasing army that it can use to face China and choke with its navy Chinese oil imports from the Middle East by blocking the Persian Gulf. It also possesses the ultimate option of actively sideling itself with the West in matters that are strategically important for China where the CCP enters in conflict with other powers internationally, namely with the US.
It is highly likely that the US on its part will most likely side with India if the tensions increase due to the fact that a greater alliance with China that in turn is allied with Russia, a country that also has strong military, energy and commercial relations with India would pose a severe problem strategically speaking for the hegemony of US power in the Indian Ocean as well as in Asia.
The recent great power competition between China and US and pushed India as a pivot, which means India will inevitably have to make a choice between the US and China, where the current territorial dispute will have an impact in the consideration for its final choice, with the strategic foreign policy approach of the US to India gaining depth due to the central strategic geo-economic importance that the region, with 60% of the global trade coming through the Indian ocean- with India being considered by the US as a key state in the containment towards the revisionist great power aspirations and foreign policy of China.
In conclusion, the rise of China as a super-power impelled Beijing to become increasingly more confident and assertive in its territorial aspirations which with the rise of the US-China great power competition escalated and became even more intense, causing an open clash with India which would become inevitable in its borders and that resulted in the armed clashes of 2020 and in a abrupt end to the cooperative relation both countries had before. This has proved to be a decision that can lead to a worse strategic scenario for China, since India is central for its Belt and Road program and its super-power aspirations and useful for the US which is indirectly benefiting from an India that will become increasingly less sympathetic towards China although still neutral for now.
The current tensions and the geo-strategic scenario of China vis-á-vis India, along with the latest news of China this having invested more resources in the military presence along the eastern border serves as proof that there will be more instability in the region and tension building up this decade than in the end of the last decade, with the prospect of long-term peace which is important for the development of both countries being increasingly less likely.
By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
