Besides the common culture, religion and social values, Morocco and Algeria maintain a mutual mistrust, a lack of political will and essential arguments over the Sahara, since their political independence in 1956 and 1962 respectively. They have competing narratives and lack of recognition for the other side. The long disputes that activate the tensions and conflict between them is the physical border in western Algeria and eastern Morocco, which has been closed for nearly 26 years. This very characteristic costs a lot to both countries, as it accounts for an impediment on the movement of goods and people, and consequently has a negative impact to annual GDP ratio for almost two to three points.
The past crises in 1963, 1975, and 1994 have established the existing mistrust and -in addition to- each country’s grievances and aggression, make the reconciliation efforts quite challenging. Nevertheless, a potential escalation of their tensions is unlikely to happen, since both see the maintenance of status quo as the safest option.
Assessment of the past crises
The first time that the two countries had a conflict was soon after Algerian independence over an unresolved dispute regarding the drawing of their colonial border and its aftermath. This resulted in the brief “War of Sands” in 1963, with an outcome of a moderate level of physical and human damage, although it was the initiator factor of the overall hostile relationship that exists until today. The nature of their hostility was obvious as well during the Cold War, where Morocco and Algeria spent considerable resources on their militaries. The former county was a conservative monarchy supporting the Western camp, while the latter was allied with the non-aligned and prograssive camp.
The second crisis came in the 1970s over Sahara’s decolonization, where Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania confronted for the sake of the territory under Spanish colonial rule. Algeria supported the Polisario organization, as it claimed independence, while Morocco orchestrated the Green March in 1975 to claim de facto control of the region. The latter was seen as an imperial move for the creation of a “Greater Morocco” including Algerian parts as well. Thus, Polisario with the aid of Algeria started a guerilla war against Morocco in the South, which froze in 1991 through a UN ceasefire.
Six years before the third crisis, a convergence took place among the five states of Maghreb, as they signed the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union, which was modeled on the EU and created a free-trade zone, along with collaboration in numerous sectors. Just before the creation of the Union, Algeria and Morocco agreed to sideline their competition without providing a final solution, a fact that didn’t really resolve the underlined tensions and made the approach unstable. In addition, the real reason for signing the Union was out of fear, rather than hope, due to decrease of energy prices that led to bread riots in both Algeria and Morocco. Hence, AMU was a solution in order to calm down the domestic grievances.
The third crisis demonstrates exactly the sloppines of the reconciliation. An incident of killing several foreign tourists in a hotel in Marrakesh was the initiator of freezing the AMU, as Morocco accused Algerian security services and expelled those they deemed to be on their land illegally. The rising tensions proved once again the inherent mistrust and suspicion in the Algeria-Morocco relations.
Recently this month, there was another incident of killing three Algerian truck drivers, who were killed in Moroccan territory that is controlled by the Polisario and Algiers, leaving question marks regarding the involvement of Morocco.
GME as a leverage
After a series of tensions, Algeria ends the contract for a gas pipeline that operates through Morocco to deliver gas to Spain. This decision was taken due to Moroccan hostile behavior, with Algeria maintaining the leverage of the Gas-Maghreb-Europe pipeline (GME) for the past 25 years. Algeria tends to find another solution to supply Spain through the Medgaz pipeline, which is a smaller one and needs expansion. The termination of GME can negatively affect Morocco, as the latter currently receives 10% of its gas supply as compensation, and thus otherwise it has to import 95% of its energy.
Conclusion
Although tensions between the two countries came up again recently, neither side can afford a possible escalation to armed conflict, as they don’t have any interest in waging a war. It is quite possible to continue the rivalry at a low intensity level. A potential stable convergence requires actions that neither state is ready to take so far, and thus the tensions may last for decades. The new geopolitical dynamics have been affected by Morocco’s normalization with Israel and its presence in regional politics, nevertheless Algeria demonstrates a motive to act diplomatically and emerge as a respected actor in the region.
Diplomacy is currently necessary due to three factors: the ambiguity of France’s position, Israel’s involvement in the region of Maghreb, and Russia’s presence in the Sahel region. Yet still, true reconciliation of Algeria and Morocco needs to be comprehensive and combine all the dimensions of their grievances, providing at the same time an alternative that suits both countries. Such an endeavor seems extremely difficult to succeed, as the traditional reconciliation approaches have failed in the past.
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