The current situation in East Asia is probably as hot and close to a full-scale war as it has never been before: recently the highest number ever of military aircraft belonging to the People’s Republic of China flew over the Island of Formosa known as the Republic of China or Taiwan.
The declared intent of the PRC is simple, according to Xi Jinping, and it is to reclaim sovereignty over the island and to complete the unification of the Chinese Motherland. In the same speech, Xi Jinping warned any foreign power to not interfere since it is supposed to be a matter of internal affairs.
President of the United States Joe Biden begged to differ and strongly affirmed that the United States will stand at the side of its ally, despite a foggy position over the matter of recognizing what the “One China Policy” should refer to and intensified its presence over the area.
Mainstream media, rightfully, are focusing over what are the stakes behind these three main actors, which are the PRC, the ROK and United States of America.
However, as it is necessary in order to fully understand the full, global scope of the effects in this tension, is also important to focus on who are the actors in the region and understand the common denominator that is shared by all of the countries in the South-East and East Asia which is basically a choice, almost like it used to be during the Cold War, between the United States of America and the PRC and specifically this report will focus on three actors.
In the first part the role of Japan will be analysed in order to understand why Japan, currently suffering from a stagnating economy since the 1990s, fears the rise of the PRC and therefore is being more and more engaged in multilateralism as a way to counter its neighbour.
In the second part the ASEAN community will be briefly analysed and the full scale of the economic relations between the member countries and the PRC will be clear.
Lastly, in the last chapter the similarly ambiguous position of the Republic of Korea or South Korea will be considered.
Japan and the PRC: a complicated relationship
There was a time when Japan was not only the world’s second-largest economy but a country that exerted a notable soft power across the world. This was thanks to Japan’s immense power as a donor towards underdeveloped countries and this compensated for the lack of an aspect which is present in almost every other country, that being the existence of an army.
Due to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, written during the American occupation between 1945 and 1949, Japan formally rejects the use of force. This does not imply that Japan lacks an army: quite the opposite, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are high-technology forces but every time they were displaced across the world their role was minimal and it still was a twisted and difficult interpretation of the aforementioned Article 9.
However, after many years of economic prosperity, the Japanese bubble was soon going to burst. Land prices, upon which banks have been speculating for quite some time before, suddenly dropped and the stock market, which had previously grown since 1989, dropped drastically[1], starting a recession that costed Japanese government enormous money spent as part of the national spending and even when Japan was starting to recover, the unemployment had been raising at unusual levels for the country, starting what was known as “Employment Ice Age”[2].
The 1990-2000 decade would later be known as “the lost decade” due to the persistent economic recession that was experienced in Japan. However, some analysts claim that Japan never came out of that phase at all and refer to this ongoing period as “the lost 30 years”[3] while, on the other hand, the PRC seems to be far from reaching the limit of its own growth.
According to Fodella, in the 1980s Japan was expected to become a superpower based on its impressive economic performances and the majority of the countries of the world either signed economic agreements with Japan or campaigned against it. However, these expectations were made upon uncertain data[4].
However, a period of recession or weak economic activity, commodity and asset price deflation, banking failures, increased bankruptcies, debt bubbles, and rising unemployment gave birth to what is known as “lost decades”, indicating a series of three decades since 1990 of annual GDP growth inferior to 1%, which is well below the average for a developed country[5]. The pillars of the traditional economic system, that guaranteed the success in the first post-war period such as the dependence of the economy over the banking system and a strict regulation over the banking system failed to keep the pace of the modern economy and alongside timid and hesitant reforms it could not hold the pace and became unimpressive at the beginning of the 1990s[6].
At the beginning of the 90s decade, Japan’s real estate and stock market bubble burst and its growth rate set out to become one of the lowest among the developed countries for almost 25 years.
Naoyuki and Taghizadeh-Hesary found six different causes of the downward spiral of Japan’s economy in different causes[7]: behaviour of banks, misplaced public investment, aging population, the reliance of the local governments over money transfers from the central government, lack of private investment growth and Yen appreciation.
In the 1980s Japanese banks lent money with low-interest rates but after the bubble burst banks became much less inclined to lend money to avoid currency shortage and thus creating a credit crunch, that ended up weakening the small and medium firms of the country.
The misplaced public investment, which has been focused on the rural areas, that have a lower impact than in urban areas. The money invested in this way ended up increasing the budget deficit[8].
Japan also has the oldest population of all the world but the retirement age is set usually around 60 years old. On top of that, the working population keeps reducing, and the welfare costs of a long life expectancy translated into higher deficits to keep a reasonable standard of living for the elderly[9].
The attempts of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo between 2012 and 2020 to launch the economy back to the previous heights have obtained meddling results: Abenomics is built upon three simple pillars, or “arrows” as they are commonly called. These “arrows” are monetary policy, fiscal policy and structural reforms[10].
As for the monetary policy, the Abe Cabinet issued a quantitative easing to increase the liquidity in the economy and asked the Bank of Japan to begin a large-scale assets purchase program worth over 660 billion dollars annually. The final goal was the depreciation of the Yen to achieve an inflation rate of 2% and the rise of the stock market[11].
Concerning fiscal policy, there was a massive public expenditure to build new infrastructures and policies aimed to raise the country’s GDP. One key component of this arrow was the rise of the consumption tax, applied in 2014 and raised from 8% to 10% to bolster the GDP. Four different stimulus packages were approved between 2013 and 2016[12]
The economic growth strategies and structural reforms are probably the most substantial part of the Abenomics since the reforms aimed at changing the course of the economic stagnation are many and some were launched in the so-called “Abenomics 2.0” in later years, therefore I will cover them briefly. A wide array of reforms was proposed include agricultural reforms, signing free trade agreements, deregulatory reforms, financial support to small and medium-sized firms, creation of special economic zones[13] and, most importantly, measures to counter the issue of low birth rates in Japan[14]. In 2016 Abe declared that the ultimate goal was to prevent the Japanese population to fall under the threshold of 100 million mark for the next 50 years and Shinzo Abe himself advocated publicly the importance of women’s contribution to the Japanese economy[15]. The measures include support for infertility, free pre-school and support for single parents, work and life balance programmes, and recommendations to the public and private sector to encourage diversity in gender employment[16]. To further counter the drain of labour force the Abe cabinet also made it easier for low skilled workers of other countries to migrate in Japan and has been promoting cooperation and immigration to Japan[17].
Among the pillars of Abe’s neoliberal policy we can also include hosting major sports events that can boost the Japanese economy such as the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, which were paraded as the event that would have increased the country’s GDP alone by 0.2% according to a 2016 esteem made by the Bank of Japan[18]. Katz or Nakamura and others, it was an ultimate failure based on the faith of the population in their home country and points out how Abe ultimately failed to pursue the path of reforms and classifies the results of Abenomics as decent at most[19] with the labour market not reaching the expected results[20] and only in 2015 and 2017 the GDP growth exceed 1%[21], three if we consider 2013 where the reforms had yet to be completely launched and thus may not be counted for incomplete data purposes.
Furthermore, despite the enactment of new laws to ease the immigration towards Japan, especially of low-skilled workers, massive problems of integration of these workers still persist in a system that historically divides workers in a hierarchy based on race and nationality[22] and the mandatory language proficiency test that needs to be passed in order to get access to the Japanese work market is also considered an obstacle and the immigration reforms have also been a target of criticism[23]. To this day a sense of general discrimination towards foreign workers seems to persist[24][25]. This contradiction is also shared by the reforms for gender equality in the workplace: even if women have become more present in the board of directors of larger companies, and the hurdles that women still have to face to this day such as the choice between climbing the ranks of their company or quitting the job and raise a kid[26] have been described by journalists and scholars[27] quite deeply.
Another devastating blow has been dealt to the national economy by the Covid-19 epidemic, which has delayed the 2020 Olympics and forced the Japanese government to host them without public due to a spike of cases in the country, which increased unemployment, had the GDP falling back to 2012 levels, undoing all of the results of Abe during his terms[28].
Competing over development aid
There is one interesting fact about Sino-Japanese Relations and that is the role that Japan had in the first place towards the PRC, that is the role of benefactor and major contributor regarding the Official Development Assistance (ODA).
According to the official 2008 report[29], Japan had been investing approximately 3, 270 billion yen, in ODA since 1979 in six different areas:
- Coping with global-scale problems
- Support for Open and Reform policy
- Promotion of mutual understanding
- Support to poverty alleviation
- Support for private sector activities
- Promoting multinational cooperation
With the amount of grant aid counting up to about 149.6 billion yen and the total technical cooperation being about 160.1 billion yen, therefore contributing to the metamorphosis of the PRC and, even if it reduced its focus towards the country in the last years, up until 2016 the Japanese government had active projects in Mainland China[30].
Japan has been for the better part of the second half of the 20th century the most reliable ODA provider for many underdeveloped and developing countries of Asia and still is a major contributor to India, Vietnam, and Bangladesh[31].
Since the 1960s, as Japan’s economy expanded, the scope and the sums of money invested in ODA expanded as well as the recipient countries. Whereas before it ODA was disbursed mainly via wartime reparations to the countries affected by the Japanese Army in the previous decades, a shift began to be seen from the focus on Asia to greater coverage of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania[32]. By 1989 Japan had become the world’s largest donor, surpassing even the United States of America[33], managing a very articulated ODA under the jurisdiction and analysis of two different entities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
In the 1990s Japan’s ODA expanded to the new challenges, such as environmental protection and peacekeeping, thus becoming an element that allowed Japan to exert soft power, to balance the incapability of actually deploying a military force in order to be an important player in the modern world.
However, due to the economic expansion of the PRC and, the tables have turned and now Japan is competing against the PRC as the most influential contributor.
A comparative study of the ODA policies in Cambodia highlights that the PRC’s ODA disbursements have been steadily increasing over time and shows that the Chinese’s cooperation is either exclusively aimed at financing infrastructures (related to the BRI project) or it is characterized by funds given with loans that are not bound by any particular purpose, implying that it could be invested even for military cooperation[34] due to the nature of the ODA, based on South-South cooperation and therefore, in sort of Anti-Washington Consensus, does not pose political boundaries to the projects funded[35].
Japan’s ODA on the other hand, while more varied in its scope and with stricter terms of spending but it appears to be driven by the strategic goals concerning the recipient country.
The PRC’s cooperation, especially in Africa, seems to have investment characteristics rather than what is commonly intended as aid policies and Bräutigam notices how the majority of the Chinese ODA in the African continent does not, in fact, fall under that category but rather is composed of export credits, non‐concessional state loans or aid used to foster Chinese investment in the “recipient” country[36].
Japan and the PRC are thus clearly offering different kinds of development assistance and this reflects the current competition that is going on between the two countries, where both parties are perfectly aware of the importance of ODA as a way to enhance political ties and leverage and to promote different kinds of development[37], with potential clashes among countries (such as ASEAN members) due to a divergence in how to face the PRC’s ODA[38].
However, even if scholars can not assess whether the PRC has surpassed Japan in regards of foreign aid, I argue that the former has an advantage over the latter due to the overall economic stagnation that seems to have become endemic in Japan.
As I mentioned before, Japan used its prominent economic status to spread a web of political links over the world, especially over South-East Asia. Although we can not predict how an hypothetical and prolonged period of stagnation will affect the country’s ability to entertain relations with other countries, is likely that the current economic situation of Japan is not making it easy to remain the most relevant and influential State.
The problems of the Sino-Japanese relations: history books, shrines, and disputed islands
This section will focus on what are the main issues hampering the diplomacy between Japan and the PRC. The focus will be on the contested sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the Yasukuni Shrine Visits, the Textbook’s controversy.
However, to better understand the current abnormalities of the Sino-Japanese relations we first have to delve into the historical events of the Second World War, as the Japanese invasion of Continental China is arguably the most relevant issue, given how poorly it has been handled by various Japanese governments and, in particular, by the Koizumi and Abe governments.
There is no denying, given the immense number of historical pieces of evidence, that the war crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Army indeed happened. During its military campaign, the Japanese government was directly or indirectly responsible for massacres, use of biological and poisonous weapons, starvation, and human experimentation of millions of deaths[39][40].
Events such as the Rape of Nanjing, where a number between 40.000 and 300.000 Chinese were either murdered or raped[41], to the point where even General Matsui, who was in charge of the invasion of China, confided to a Japanese diplomat that his men did something “deeply regrettable”[42].
Despite the numerous evidence of not only the Nanjing Massacre but of other atrocities as well, during the occupation of the neighbouring countries Japan developed a historicist policy of promoting the cultural dominance of Japan over countries such as to prove that their colonization was rightful and would have ultimately benefit China, Korea, Machuria, and Formosa, underlining ethnonationalism and nationalism as principles to give a historical perspective of Japan’s colonialism[43].
According to Koyama[44], there are two different historical perspectives that truly stop Japan from dealing with its past: one belonging to the early Meiji period, where history was conceived by way of Eurocentric civilization and that denied Asian agency. The other is a response to this exclusionary history in the 1930s and 1940s, where Japanese theorists sought to reconfigure Japan as the subject and agent of history – the maker of a New Cultural Order and therefore justifying the role of imperialist power colonizing other countries.
The difficulties to address the historical problem of Japan and how to come to terms with history writing evolved then into international problems, as I will show when addressing the history textbooks controversy
In Japan, every school, private or public, has to pick the history book from a list of titles approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology every four years. In 1965 Ienaga Saburo, a historian, filed a lawsuit against the Ministry as the latter rejected his book as it gave a negative portrait of the Japanese occupation of China and Korea. Among the many corrections that he should have done, Ienaga should have written “advanced into” instead of “invading” according to the Ministry[45].
The lawsuit would last for over 30 years and in the meanwhile, PRC and ROK protested against the Ministry and the Japanese government. Thus, by the end of the proceeding, many books already covered the vicious deeds of the Japanese army such as the comfort women issue, the atrocities of Unit 731, the Nanking massacre, the anti-Japan movement in Korea, and the forced suicides in Okinawa[46].
Despite that, there are still issues concerning the history textbooks: especially concerning the aspects of the Nanjing Massacre or the exploitation of Korean “Comfort Women”, textbooks with nationalistic views that consider the accepted history as “manipulated by the United States” have been published[47][48] and whenever this happens, especially regarding the relationship with the Republic of Korea, the diplomatic response of the Japanese government is that further reparations are not needed as they were already been covered in the post-war agreements and are to be considered closed for good[49], not, therefore, pushing for a permanent change in the historical narration.
Another factor that provoked embarrassment to Japan regarding the relations with the PRC and the other countries involved with the Japanese occupation is the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine controversy. This shrine, located in Tokyo, is a memorial dedicated to those who died in all the wars waged by Japan since it started expanding after the Meiji revolution. However, different war criminals of World War Two and more that had were condemned by the American tribunal in the Tokyo trial were also buried at the shrine in 1969[50].
Since the shrine is the most prominent monument for those who lost their lives during World War Two, whenever a Prime Minister decides to pay homage to those who died usually it has to go to Yasukuni. However, by doing so, they pay homage to generals who planned and conducted pernicious deeds such as the Nanjing Massacre (although they do so indirectly). A proposed solution is the creation of a nearby secular monument but so far the agreement upon such monument seems far away. Thus, when a prime minister decides to pay a visit to the Shrine, they decide to visit it as a regular citizen and not as a Prime Minister. Nevertheless, when a Prime Minister deliberately visits the Shrine is, at least in the opinion of the author, purposefully acting against the interest of peaceful relations between Japan and the countries that had to endure the yoke of their military expansion[51].
Both Koizumi and Abe visited the shrine, with Koizumi visiting the shrine each year[52]. However, whereas Koizumi signed himself in the honor guestbook as “Prime Minister”, Abe did visit the Shrine as “Citizen”[53]. While in both cases there were protests by the embassies of the PRC and of the Republic of Korea and even if both PMs said that they did not mean to disrespect the casualties of other countries but simply to mourn the Japanese dead, I can not help but see that Abe’s way of signing shows that he learned from the mistake of Koizumi and instead is not representing his country but only himself and that he can show to Japan that he is a man of strong nationalistic sense.
One more notable unsolved issue between the PRC and Japan has gradually become more and more critical as time went on and that is the Senkaku Island dispute.
Senkaku Islands are a small group of islands, not far away from the coasts of Taiwan and continental China. The largest of these islands is only 4.3 square kilometers and the smaller islands are essentially large rocks surfacing from the sea, where only sea birds can live.
In 1895, during the first Sino-Japanese war, the islands were claimed by Japan on the terrae nullis assumption, meaning that after an inspection Imperial officers found out that since they were inhabitable the Chinese empire could never settle there and never did, and thus Japan took control of it[54].
After that the Ming Dynasty lost the war against Japan in 1895, Formosa and all the islands belonging to it were surrendered to Japan but the precise status of the Senkaku was never truly defined but it was occupied by Japanese fishermen.
After World War II both the Ryukyu and Senkaku archipelago were placed under the jurisdiction of the US according to the San Francisco Treaty and neither Taiwan nor the PRC claimed the small archipelago.
However, that position changed once the jurisdiction was given back to Japan in 1971 in accordance with the “Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands”[55] and once the existence of oil reserves in the islands was discovered the issue of which country is the legitimate sovereign over the archipelago sparked[56].
This probably explains the newfound interest of both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China, as both started making claims supporting the knowledge of the islands by the Qing dynasty thus dating back to the reclamation by China of several centuries. And considering that since the 70s the price of oil raised by many times and that both Taiwan, PRC, and Japan largely depend on oil import for their sustainment it is not impossible to see why a conflict arose in the first place[57].
The current situation in Senkaku Islands sees Chinese fishing vessels entering Japanese territorial waters often escorted by Chinese Coast Guard boats facing off against Japanese coast guard vessels[58].
To complicate the matter, Japan’s official stance about the dispute is that the islands simply belong to Japan, thus denying the disputed status of the area and not giving diplomats the chance to work out a possible solution[59], such as rotating turns of patrol on the islands so that both countries are asserting dominance over the archipelago. In 2012 the Japanese government tried to settle the dispute simply by buying the contested islands that, so far, did technically belong to a private owner, paying a total of 2.05 billion Yen[60] and there has been even a successful attempt (that fueled the diplomatic tension between PRC and Japan) by former Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara even started fundraising events to finance the operation[61].
However, is worth noticing all of these controversies, minus the Senkaku/Dioaoyu disputes due to the potential involvement of military vessels, have never interrupted the overall relations, especially concerning trade. Japan’s export towards the PRC was worth 140 USD Billion[62] in 2020 and the PRC’s towards Japan has been slightly higher in the last years[63] and this is reflected in the dualism, almost hypocritical, of the respective governments, as both parties are willing to sit down and discuss their own issues in a very pragmatic way that will not harm the trade between the two countries[64]. Even Abe had talks with Xi in order to resolve the dispute, despite a mutual dislike towards each other[65].
On the other hand, it is safe to say that Japan is not without its faults and handled poorly certain aspects of the diplomacy and especially when it comes to Abe’s presidencies, it is easy to see how his ideology played a role in not moving the disputes towards the shared means for dispute settlements, such as arbitration. And although both countries’ representatives have met in the last years, we can not say that significant steps ahead have been made on both sides to actually solve the situation given the current status of uncertainty.
The unclear position towards the Japanese crimes is costly for Japan, not only as it weakens its prestige but also because many of the anti-Japanese protests in all the formerly occupied areas, including Continental China, are due to false historical statements by Japanese politicians or visit war-criminals memorials.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is not immune from missteps, as Dore mention[66]: while the United States could avoid assigning the islands automatically to Japan in order to further discuss and mediate the sovereignty, it is also true that Japan agreed with the PRC during the 1972 normalization process to revise in the future the status of the Archipelago but instead of undergoing dispute settlement, Japan stubbornly denies the status of contested area, avoiding a permanent settlement of the dispute and thus promoting indirectly tension.
On the PRC’s side, there are still issues concerning the actual resolution of the dispute. First of all, according to the aforementioned Dore, Beijing is claiming ownership of the Diaoyu based on old maps dating back centuries and is therefore aggressively supporting claims based off somewhat weak evidence. And the flagship policy of the PRC, the Belt and Road Initiative, is doing little in order to reassure the neighbouring Japan that what the PRC is doing is not ensnaring the Rising Sun within its sphere of influence.
The Japanese fear
The aforementioned factors help to explain Japan’s fear of the PRC: the military pressure over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, how the PRC might overtake Japan’s influence over neighbouring countries via its own ODA in the same way it already surpassed Japan’s economy, Japan’s incapability of bringing effective reforms to its economy and society and, last but not least, Japan’s impossibility to have a fully functional Army.
Atassanova and Sato state that Japan is facing the fear of being abandoned by the United States should a conflict regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or that if Japan gets involved in a war between the PRC and Washington, the United States of America will agree to not interfere with the dispute between the PRC and Japan.
This is why Japan’s fear for abandonment against a power that has high chances of taking control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has led to policies that enhance multilateral support[67].
Washington has already stated that the treaty of mutual defence and support between the United States of America and Japan will take place if the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty is contested[68] and, according to Atassanova and Sato, has the interest to maintain with Japan a very close strategic cooperation in order to potentially deter the PRC from actively trying to secure the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as it would do with the ROC and the position taken by all Prime Ministers has been the one of actively condemning and worrying about the expansion of the PRC as a territory which is formally part of Japan is also aggressively contested as part of the one and true China.
One might be led to believe that Japan has focused its whole foreign policy exclusively against the PRC. However, it has been shown that Japan can not completely exclude the PRC as a trade partner due to the solid trading history between the two countries.
It must also be reminded that Japan’s economy has been undergoing a period of economic crisis in recent years due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has significantly slowed down the economy and blocked foreign workers that were supposed to move to Japan due to the strict policy of closed borders to non-Japanese citizens.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement is an agreement to broaden and deepen ASEAN’s engagement with Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. The RCEP participating countries account for about 30% of the global GDP and 2.2 billion people. The goal of the RCEP Agreement is to lay the foundations of a modern, comprehensive, high-quality economic partnership with benefits for all the participants that will ease the expansion of regional trade and investment to contribute to growth and development[69] by reducing trade fees between the members of 85 to 90% and will lead to a 0.2% increase of global GDP and a 10% increase in worldwide export[70]. It will lower trading fees not only across the ASEAN countries but also to other which have been consolidated trading partners of the ASEAN countries, in order to even the field and make trading easier.
The inclusion of Japan in the RCEP might seem like a contradiction given that the RCEP is an agreement where the PRC is not only a member but is also one of the most important actors, as it aims at broadening its commercial scope in order to be able to export in countries like Japan, ROK, and Australia by using the same trade fees reduction existing between ASEAN States.
However, Japan has an interest in joining the RCEP. And it is related to the dwindling numbers of its economy, further impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, shrinking to 5% due to the increased public spending[71] and damaged by the postponement of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, which cost to Japan not only in terms of public international image but also economically, since hosting the Olympics without public would cost approximately 2400 billion Yen in lost revenues[72].
In fact, it is highlighted how India and the United States of America, who pulled out from the agreement, will inevitably lose money over the decision to not join[73]. If anything, this proves the solidity of the PRC as an international actor, which pragmatically managed to get through countries with radically different political ideas in order to boost the economy in a difficult time of global pandemic[74].
ASEAN torn between PRC and USA: the issue of unity
When it comes to regional international organizations, the first example that comes into someone’s
mind is, of course, the European Union. However, there is one more lesser-known but nevertheless,
fundamental organization that promotes intergovernmental cooperation and facilitates economic,
political, security, military, educational, and sociocultural integration among its members and other
countries in Asia and its name is Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN for short. Its
main goals are to improve the economic growth of its member States and to uphold the rule of law
in order to maintain peace in the region should disputes ever arise.
ASEAN’s forerunner was the Association of Southeast Asia, an organization formed on July 31,
1961, and consisting of Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia. It then becomes ASEAN when the
foreign ministers of these three countries plus Singapore and Indonesia signed the ASEAN
Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration in 1967.
Aside from the common interest of strengthening economic cooperation, amity, and non-
interference with internal affairs, however, one theory suggests that the fear of Communism pushed
the creation of ASEAN as mentioned by Eccleston and others[75]. However, this theory is difficult to prove since not only the Bangkok declaration does not mention any political agenda but also since Vietnam, the would-be menace would join ASEAN later after the end of the Cold War. Other members of the organization include Brunei (joined in 1984), Laos, Myanmar (joined in 1997), and Cambodia (joined in 1999). The “four pillars” ASEAN is built upon are a competitive economic region, equitable economic development; and integration with the global economy[76].
In 2007 the member states reunited in Jakarta voted in favor of the creation of a charter inspired by
the European Union. Among the other things, it included upholding international law with respect
to human rights, social justice, and multilateral trade, appointing a secretary-general and permanent
representatives of ASEAN, and the establishment of a body that can uphold basic human rights and
an unresolved dispute mechanism[77].
ASEAN and the PRC: a difficult paradigm
Originally the creation of the ASEAN was seen negatively by the PRC, associated with an ensnarement all the way around Beijing which at the time was starting to expand its economy and starting to impose itself as a regional actor[78]. However, the PRC soon started to engage with the ASEAN countries as part of its “peaceful rise”, establishing bilateral ties and ultimately establishing strong economic ties as a part of the ASEAN economic forums including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus One (PRC) ASEAN plus Three (PRC, Japan, Republic of Korea), and the East Asia Summit[79].
In 2003, the PRC acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, upgraded the relations to “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” and by 2008 the PRC established its permanent mission at ASEAN[80].
Of course, this opened the way for numerous investments of the PRC in the ASEAN countries and to other examples of non-traditional security such as the role in disaster relief and preparation against disasters as Xue explains[81].
However, rather than the complexity of the economic relations that the PRC entrails with each and every one of the ten States that form ASEAN, this report will focus on specific issues that involve the PRC and ASEAN.
First and foremost, the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indo-Pacific context will be shown, as well as how the BRI has become one of the main tools for the PRC’s foreign policy.
Secondly, the Myanmar crisis that sees the PRC as one of the few international actors that supports the 2020 coup.
Then, the territorial disputes between various states such as Philippines and Vietnam and the PRC and in these regards the 2016 Philippines vs China arbitration will be analysed as well.
The Belt and Road Initiative across South-East Asia
The Belt and Road Initiative is, according to the official website, “…a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a road toward peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-round exchanges”[82]. It marks the principles of the new economic policy of PRC, focused on an open economy and it is reflected in the principles: openness to any country, harmony and inclusiveness, respect of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (these being mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) and seeks mutual benefits under the rules of international trade.
Esteems done by the World Bank based on an algorithm, the overall shipping time between all countries of the world is going to be reduced by 1.2%, while shipping from South-East Asia to the rest of the world is set to be reduced by 4.37%. Notable gains will also involve Africa, as shipping time between the two continents will be reduced by 2.31%[83].
The project, launched in 2013, consists of the creation of trade corridors where goods can be traded as smoothly as possible and it includes both terrestrial and maritime transportation and the South-East is going to have a particularly important role given its key position in the trade from the East to Africa and Europe[84].
However, the Chinese penetration in form of projects of the BRI presents its own risks. The deal works in an unusual way, where the partner country of the PRC receives a loan from the Chinese Central Bank and promises to build that certain piece of infrastructure that is going to be a part of the BRI.
The penetration of Chinese firms in a country that is being the recipient of a BRI project is not necessarily a win-win situation as proved by Abodouhi and others, as they gathered a number of sources that highlight the harm done by Chinese companies in the African Continent[85].
Is also true that the same research suggests that there are many more points supporting the opposite as for instance China greatly helped the economy of Madagascar[86] and that China is also being a target market for African goods. Other studies underline that Chinese entrepreneurship has led to the formation of skilled workers[87] and that investing in Africa has also formed a class of young, African entrepreneurs[88].
Furthermore, the benefits largely depend on the economic stability of the recipient country since important amounts of money are required to finance the massive infrastructures necessary for the cooperation projects and excessive expenses may end up causing financial instability, not to mention the environmental damage coming from the construction of the infrastructures[89].
One of the main noteworthy critiques that are risen against the project and the government, that being the so-called “debt trap”[90], which would consist in having the recipient country that is not capable of paying back to finance the infrastructure of the BRI via a loan provided by Chinese State-owned banks. If the country can not pay back, the infrastructure (such as a port) will be owned by the PRC, such as happened in Sri Lanka[91].
On the other hand, it must be said that the aforementioned Sri Lanka case is the only instance of such an occurrence happening and therefore we cannot say for sure if this is the intended strategy for the BRI[92].
The Myanmar coup and the role of Beijing
On the 1st of February 2021, an unexpected event happened in Myanmar, an ASEAN country that was already at the center of attention by other ASEAN countries due to its human rights violations, a coup orchestrated by the opposition party ended up in the arrest of numerous members of the government lead by Aung San Suu Kyi including the Prime Minister[93].
The reasons behind it are difficult to determine as of today but the reaction of the PRC towards the coup is interesting due to its incoherency.
First and foremost, Myanmar is a key country that sees competition between the PRC and Japan, both of which are currently engaged in the country as providers for infrastructures and, in particular, the PRC has turned Myanmar into a key point for the Belt and Road Initiative due to its position in the region and due to its role as an energy supplier while Japan, which is a historically solid ally of the country in terms of development, is not determined to leave the country entirely under the Chinese influence[94].
Although the policy of the PRC is the one of complete non-interference over the internal affairs of a country, in this case, the central government expressed uneasiness for the coup and asked the various local actors to restore the normality[95].
On the other hand, it seems that the PRC is more aligned with the coup rather than the previously existing democratic government: not only the PRC, alongside Russia, vetoed against a Security Council resolution that would have condemned the coup[96] but allegations of sales of weapons to the authors of the coup[97] cast a shadow of doubts upon the true intentions of the PRC concerning the Myanmar crisis.
The campaign of the PRC is still unclear to be defined for what concerns Myanmar but is certain that the cooperation that it promotes with the ASEAN countries is not as transparent and clearly defined as it was supposed to be. Rather, it shows that the PRC is willing to defend its interests by keeping countries as close to its influence as possible.
The territorial disputes and a dangerous judicial precedent
Picking up from what was said regarding the PRC willingness to maintain its influence over a certain territory, the dispute over numerous territories against other States proves that the PRC is not just a benefactor that wishes to bring benefits and gains to everyone but can also be intransigent when it comes to not allowing any kind of interference over what perceives as its own internal affair.
Beijing claims for itself the various small islands that are numerous in the South China Sea and that, like the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, are rich in reserves of oil and other resources[98].
The claims of the PRC towards all of the various islands are listed under the generic term “South China Sea Territorial Disputes”, which contains all the territorial claims made by the PRC over the South China Sea up to a hypothetic line called “Nine dash line” and that includes claims of islands currently under the control of the PRC against Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and the Republic of China[99]. The original claim was made by the Republic of China immediately after the evacuation to Formosa in 1947 and due to the nature of the dispute between the PRC and the ROC regarding the “One China policy” it is no wonder that the two countries’ claims are mirrored[100].
Unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, which has never been brought up in a court due to the refusal by Japan to acknowledge the contested status of the islands in the first place, on January 2013 Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against the PRC under the United Nation Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) across different issues including the historical claims made by the PRC and ROC, considered to be without lawful effect[101]. The arbitration would formally take place between the Philippines and the PRC, since is the one recognized by the Philippines but the positions made by the ROK are identical to those of the PRC.
On 12 July 2016, the tribunal unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines concerning most of its submission and thus ruled against “any question of sovereignty over land territory and would not delimit any maritime boundary between the Parties” and also specified that neither the PRC or the ROK had “legal basis for China to claim historic rights”[102]
International arbitration is meant to be a quicker way than the International Court of Justice to settle international disputes and even if differs from the usual proceeding (in the arbitration the parties choose the arbiters and the set of rules), it is still considered a binding ruling[103].
Therefore is at least unusual, from an outside perspective, that the PRC and ROK rejected the ruling, especially since the decision was unanimous[104][105].
President Xi claimed that, although the PRC would continue to support talks with other countries regarding the disputed status of the islands, he will not accept the bindingness of the ruling[106] and that will continue to consider his claims over the islands legitimate[107].
This can be considered a potentially undermining factor for his foreign policy as it clashes with the supposed respect of international law as means to resolve disputes between the various parties of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Furthermore, the PRC has been doing work in order to expand and solidify its control over those islands, by building new ones[108], expanding the old ones by adding sand (hence the occasionally used nickname “great sand wall”[109]) or concrete and adapting the otherwise small islands to host bases for ships and even landing spots for small aircraft, thus hinting towards a tighter control over the contested islands by deploying Coast Guard vessels or even drones[110].
The necessities of Seoul for a Chinese mediator
At first glance, the Republic of Korea (or South Korea) might seem unaffected by the PRC, as the main concern in terms of defence policy is, of course, the menace coming from the Northern side of the 38th parallel.
Although there have been sensible improvements over the peace talks between the two States, the tensions remain high and the main concern of Seoul remains to prepare for a possible attack coming from the North.
However, like Japan and ASEAN countries, the ROK suffers from the same problem concerning the difficult relations between PRC and United States, that being an existing and important economic link with the former but relying on the latter in terms of defence and alignment.
US-ROK Relations
The ROK has been defined more times than not as one of the most relevant non-NATO allies of the United States of America[111]. The reasons for this strong trust that is reflected by an unprecedented level of trust towards Washington by Korean citizens and vice versa[112].
The reason for this level of trust has its roots in the very foundation of the Republic of Korea: not only Washington did have a role in building the foundations of the country in the aftermath of the end of WW2 and of the Japanese occupation but the US army was engaged in the War of Korea, fighting alongside the South and were fundamental in ensuring that Communist Korea could not win and in the years that came after the conflict the US tactical and logistical support to the otherwise small state has been a deterrent for any further attempt of conflict.
Yahuda and Shambaugh agreed that the strategic factors have shaped the alliance and include the challenges the People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and missile program and the potential impact of peace talks over the relations that Washington has with Beijing and over the Sino-Japanese relations[113].
The 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty[114] between the two countries saw the beginning of the American presence in the southern peninsula and, unlike Japan, the ROK has been sending troops in during both the Vietnam War and the Iraq War[115] at the request of United States Presidents and in the peninsula are currently deployed around 28.500 US Marines[116] that are economically sustained by the ROK government as part of an agreement to share the burden of collective defence.
This critical point in the relations between USA and ROK is highlighted by the role of the USA as weapons supplier for Seoul: recently the ROK bought weapons and military equipment amounting to 258 USD Million in order to bolster the defence capacity of its ally[117] and one of the largest military exercises named Foal Eagle happen every year since 1961 between the two allies under the aegis of the Combined Forces Command[118]. Every time the exercise takes place, a strong rebuke comes off the PRK and the PRC[119]. On the other hand, the exercise is supposed to be, according to the organizers, merely defensive in its purposes[120].
What is certain, however, is how the involvement of Washington is bound to raise: figures show that the amount of weapons traded from the United States of America to the ROK spiked since 2016[121], which was the breakthrough year for the nuclear program of the PRK as in that year the first hydrogen bomb produced by Pyongyang was successfully tested[122].
Until the 1990s, US nuclear warheads were placed in the South as well as part of a deterrence strategy but there eventually taken away, even though in recent times conservative politicians of the ROK have claimed the presence of the warheads as necessary but is a request unlikely to succeed[123].
It is no surprise that the ROK agreed to buy anti-missile systems in recent years considering how much the PRK has improved its technology in terms of missiles and especially how close Seoul is from the border. Therefore, the main factor drawing the ROK towards the United States is, without a doubt, the strategic reasons concerning another war against the PRK[124].
Nevertheless, there is an existing anti-American sentiment in the ROK as well, due to the behaviour of US troops in the country, an issue shared with Japan and its US base of Okinawa.
According to researchers, although the sentiment against the United States seems to be mainly triggered by singular events such as incidents near American bases (like the one that happened in 2002, when a truck driven by American soldiers killed two young boys[125]) there might be a common denominator of the anti-Westener sentiment[126], a sort of trend in response to the American foreign policy in Asia.
While the strategic partnership seems to be very solid, the economic cooperation between ROK and United States had its fair share of highs and lows. Although there is a strong commercial relation between the two countries that amounts to tens of billions of USD$ in terms of value, the trade balance has always been more favourable to the ROK since 1985 and it almost reached a balance between 1994 and 1997. Furthermore, as the figures shows, the balance has deepened in recent years.[127]
A very discussed agreement is the Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea or KORUS FTA, originally signed in 2007 but that had gone through a stormy round of renegotiation between 2016 and 2018 after President Donald J. Trump called it an unfair treaty that would ultimately have more benefit for the ROK than for the United States, coming as far as defining it “job-killing deal”[128] and declaring that was willing to pull out from the agreement but despite the harsh words of his statements his administration ultimately decided to opt for a renegotiation of the KORUS FTA[129] and in 2018 the agreement was tweaked in order to better accommodate the requests of Washington[130].
Drezner points out that the provisions were very ineffective concerning the actual benefits that the United States were looking for[131] and the aforementioned data of the trade balance prove that ,in fact, the provisions did not fix the already existing issues of trade between the two countries.
To sum up, even if the road of the relations between USA and ROK has been bumpy in the last years, namely during the Trump Presidency, the relation is strong.
However, what makes the position of Seoul peculiar is the scheme of things concerning Asia. Like Japan and like the countries that make up the ASEAN organization, the Republic of Korea needs to deal with both the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China as not only it has important economic relations with it but, in the case of the ROK, the role of the PRC as a mediator in the perpetual state of crisis is more than necessary to attempt reconciliation and the scope of the relations will be analysed in the following section.
The PRC and the Republic of Korea
While the United States supported the South during the Korean War, the PRC ended up supporting the Communist-led North. Nevertheless, since the end of the war a reconciliation between the two countries was overall extremely positive, undergoing numerous phases according to the scholar Min Ye: from “friendly cooperative relationship” in 1992 to “collaborative partnership for the 21st century” in 1998 to “comprehensive cooperative partnership” in 2003. The relation was defined as “strategic cooperative partnership” in 2008 and “enriched strategic cooperative partnership” in 2014[132].
Nowadays, the PRC is the main economic partner of the ROK, both import and export-wise: its main imported goods are fossil fuels, raw metals and integrated electronic component, necessary to sustain the highly specialized economy of the country while it exports to the PRC high-tech components, cars, and refined petroleum. Exports amount to 136 USD Billions and Imports to 108 USD Billions[133] and since 2006 the trading fees between the two countries on almost 6000 products have been lowered[134].
Although the relations have been normalizing, there is one clear factor underscoring it and that is the role that has the PRC in not punishing directly the North’s nuclear programme and Pak clearly defines this issue as the most prominent obstacle towards completely normal relations.
It is also relevant to notice that former President Obama and Lee had a great deal of trust towards each other and brought the two respective countries towards unreached heights of common trust and it must be remembered that President Obama was the first recent President to reaffirm US interests over the Pacific and Asia, promoting a renewed foreign policy towards that region called “Pivot to Asia”. As this initiative was perceived by Beijing as a blatant attempt to ensnare the Chinese influence over neighbouring countries and regions, it is no wonder that between 2013 and 2016 the relations between PRC and ROK saw a slight decline.
As mentioned before, however, the ROK needs the help and the mediation of the PRC as both countries hope for a stable situation in the Korean Peninsula. In 2014 Xi Jinping came as far as visiting the South before its Northern counterpart in order to affirm how both countries shared the same goal regarding the scenarios of de-nuclearization of the Peninsula[135].
Furthermore, the PRC as its interest to maintain the situation in the Peninsula as it is nowadays, therefore split into two. The northern PRK acts as a cushion between Chinese borders and what would otherwise be a direct border with a US-allied nation and at the same time the PRC is actively trying to erode the net of relations that the USA has with the countries in Asia and at the same time the ROK must harmonize the relations with the United States of America and not diverge too much from its relations with the PRC or otherwise it might find an unnecessary movement of troops relatively close to its doorstep[136].
When it comes to relations with the PRC, there seems to be a constant. As long as trade between a country and the PRC is involved, diplomacy will be swift. However, the PRC seems to be very sensitive when it comes to military activity, even if it is defensive, at its doorstep. The THAAD crisis is not an exception and it is useful to underpin the role of the ROK in what would seem a difficult crossroad to choose. Even if it looks like that it can not choose which side to stand with, it is clear that the ROK will stand with the PRC.
The THAAD (short for Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense) is an anti-missile system that is supposed to prevent possible incoming attacks from the North[137]. The defensive missile system, although boasts a high degree of efficiency and technology, is merely defensive and would concern the PRK alone anyway.
However, the strongest opposition to the THAAD did not come from the PRK but from the PRC as the radar system that guides and intercepts the potentially incoming missiles could “spy” all the way up to Chinese territory[138].
It did not matter that a special meeting between the two governments was specifically held in September 2016, the stance of the PRC remained on the side of not allowing the ROK to have the THAAD system as it would allegedly worsen the relations between the two countries[139].
The ROK ultimately decided to deploy the THAAD anyway but that came at a cost: the Chinese government did not formally condemn the action via formal sanctions but instead promoted a boycott of South Korean products (especially cars) and the presence of Korean modern culture in the PRC such as K-Pop music or Korean dramas have been declining[140].
In late 2017 the Moon Administration attempted to ease the relations (although there were no relations to formally normalize to begin with, as the measures were informal) and exposed his three “no” to his Chinese counterpart: no to a trilateral alliance with the United States of America and Japan, to the participation at the US defence missile system and to further deployment of THAAD in the country[141].
Last but not least, it is interesting how the PRC and the ROK have found unity in joint diplomatic protests against Japan: the atrocities committed by the Japanese Army in WW2 have never been completely accepted by the majority of Japanese society and it is not uncommon to find in history books that those events have been reduced in gravity.
There is no denying, given the immense number of historical evidence, that the war crimes committed by the Japanese Imperial Army indeed happened. During its military campaign, the Japanese government was directly or indirectly responsible of massacres, use of biological and poisonous weapons, starvation, and human experimentation of millions of deaths[142][143]mentioned above regarding the Japanese problem with denied history.
Conclusions
Republic of Korea: A necessary evil?
We can assume therefore that the ROK finds itself in one of the thorniest spots in the whole Asia, at least considering the complex scenario of a balance of powers between the two greatest powers.
It seems that Seoul is fundamental today as it was during the Cold War: it seems like both the PRC and the United States of America are interested in keeping the small country as close as possible by signing important trade deals and if the relations with the PRC is difficult to define under the aforementioned definition of keeping it close, it is surely undeniable that the PRC considers the Korean Peninsula as a key area of interest and the diplomatic reaction following the deployment of the THAAD sure proves that Beijing is keeping under a close eye everything that happens in the Peninsula.
However, like for Japan, open and normalized relation between the ROK and both the PRC and the United States of America does not imply that it will choose neutrality over a regional conflict that could involve both countries. In the past, even more so than Japan, the ROK sided with Washington and sent troops in both the Iraq and Vietnam War.
President Moon recently expressed his concern over the threatening military activities over the Island of Formosa[144] which of course caused a backlash from the Chinese government[145] and it could mean that, given the relative vicinity between the Korean Peninsula and the island, the ROK will act at the side of its ally, if not with its own troops by allowing the US Army to use the bases on the territory as logistical support.
One could argue that the PRC might use the threat of economic sanctions or a boycott of Korean goods as some sort of deterrent to prevent further involvement but whether it could prevent an actual engagement of the ROK is unclear.
What to expect across ASEAN
The PRC is a prime commercial partner for the countries that form ASEAN. However, there is a number of factors that prevent the existence of completely peaceful relations and these factors come from the part of the PRC.
The stance of the ASEAN on the PRC is not unanimous and this is also due to the nature of ASEAN. Every decision must be unanimous and alliances among member States are not allowed in order to resolve disputes that would favour one State. This translates into having understandings that are not legally binding and that are largely informal and this explains why ASEAN moves slowly if compared with other regional international organizations. Caballero-Anthony & Haywood also say that “the ‘ASEAN way’ itself is not an entirely static concept and what has considered interference in the domestic affairs of a country is an ever-widening notion”.[146]
As often emerges from ASEM (Asia-Europe Meetings) meetings, South-East Asian countries give much importance to the sovereignty, supporting multilateral actions only if they support in some way their authority[147] and not casually one of the few binding treaties signed by ASEAN members is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976, which defines the principle of non-interference, respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Ultimately, according to Borchers, a regional mechanism for conflict resolution is unlikely to be
realized in the near future and more in general, “the main obstacle has been the question of whether
and under what conditions ASEAN’s approach to security should include a right to intervene in a
member country’s internal affairs”, a sort of difficult balance between the need to save lives and the
principle of respecting the sovereignty of a fellow member[148]. For instance, it took
more than 4 years to institutionalize the process in The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster
Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and was initiated several weeks before the
2004 Tsunami disaster[149].
It’s also noteworthy how Mueller points out how ASEAN has failed to create adequate
mechanisms to manage its external relations, therefore calling into question how effectively
ASEAN can act as a regional convener. It seems that ASEAN has struggled to impose its strength
as a global power and is being pressured by China and other actors despite in the past it achieved a
certain degree of influence thanks to the ties established with ASEAN plus forum[150].
ASEAN therefore can be easily picked apart by the PRC, at least on a diplomatic level, as it lacks the unity of other international organizations in order to collectively resist Chinese influence all across its societies.
Japan: the weak spot as a US ally
What truly pushed Japan to pursue a certain path of foreign policy was not just the rise of the People’s Republic of China but the progressive crisis that the country has faced since the bubble burst of the 1990s.
Japan’s status as an economic power has been steadily declining and the issue it has been facing regarding its role in the global defence mechanism has been the center of numerous publications and studies by the academic community.
One might argue that the restriction of article 9 of the Constitution is not a real limitation, since the first interpretations that allowed Japan to commit to the role, almost imposed, of a mutual ally of the United States of America dates back to the immediate post-war when the Self-Defence Forces were formed, however, it certainly did in the past when the action taken by Japan in foreign policy received critiques[151].
Japan’s renewed interest in multilateralism is ultimately meant to bring back Japan as one of the main actors in world’s politics and counteract the decline of its economy which previously was the main engine behind Japan’s soft power worldwide and that is a consequence of how Japan’s decline has not been tackled completely and the lost decade had turned into the lost twenty years and even into the lost thirty years, according to some analysts and therefore Japan is not strong enough (economically and militarily) to act or lead others on its own.
Japanese politicians and lawmakers probably lack the resolve to tackle the issues of the country that have been highlighted so far such as the cultural barriers that stop how to tackle the decreasing natality: the lack of inclusion of women in the workforce even after the birth of the first child, the reluctance to accept foreign workers.
Or how Japan, despite being considered one of the most advanced countries in the world, still relies upon a slow and tedious bureaucracy that refuses to abandon fax as the main device to convey information among public administrators.
Abenomics was set to become the greatest economic reform ever and it was supposed to get Japan out of stagnation but its results ranged from average to mediocre and a GDP growth superior to 5% is still a utopic dream and any dream of stable and continuous growth has been shattered by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Thus we can say for certain that under a formally strategic point of view Japan is not as legitimized as an ally if we want to look at the situation from the point of view of the United States of America.
The relevance of Japan is very clear in the regional context: it is in a hot spot for potential conflicts and it is going to be relevant should a conflict happen in the region even if Japan is not the regional power it aspired to become forty years ago when it was at its economic peak.
Its economy is a mirage of what it used to be and its diplomatic soft power policy is not effective since many years as it has already failed twice to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
Its military policy is hampered by the unclear interpretations of the Constitution and therefore it can not be autonomous in that field.
The political class seems largely inadequate, not only because of the constant presence of corruption scandals but especially due to the nature of the Japanese parties, whose currents and factions inevitably work against anyone who is in charge of the party and therefore of the government.
The nationalistic direction that Japan took with Abe made sure that, if anything else, any existing issue with the PRC was going to get worse due to the aforementioned nationalistic ideology.
At the same time, given how much the PRC has grown, both economically and as a military power, it is with little surprise that Japan was forced to move closer and closer towards the United States of America but does not have a say in what is Washington’s strategy.
Overall considerations on the PRC
Overall considerations on the PRC
The above-discussed trends in the People’s Republic of China’s relations with other regional powers help define the PRC’s position in Asia thereby showing its role as an increasingly powerful actor. This cannot be denied. Indeed, decades of development have given Beijing the financial ligaments of worldwide control. Major ventures in key innovations and communications framework have bought the PRC to acquire a solid position within the battle for geo-economic influence; the PRC is employing a multi-continent Belt and Street Activity to bring other states into its circle. Against this background, think tanks studies and U.S. Defense Division reports worryingly claim that Beijing’s progressive imposing military could stand a genuine chance of winning a war against the US within the Western Pacific. Thus, it is obvious that China has created the aspirations of a superpower: Xi has declared that Beijing wants to assert its sway over Republic of China, the South China Ocean, and other debated ranges. This would empower the PRC to the point of enabling it to challenge the US for worldwide authority[152]. The rise of the PRC as a global power is a major factor fuelling tensions with the United States which, for the time being, is still considered the world’s largest economy and a world leader since World War II.
Beijing’s assertive stance on multiple fronts, such as Hong Kong, ROC and in the Chinese Sea have led international actors to be extremely careful about the PRC’s foreign policy. The latter has been based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, on the respect for others’ sovereignty, non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence for more than half a century. However, while China has never overtly departed from verbal support for those ideals throughout the previous six decades, recent happenings showed that it has repeatedly failed to practice what it taught. This has not only been visible by the PRC’s stance in the East, but also in Africa, where the traditional position of Beijing being in Africa solely for business, or the idea that it does not mix business with politics, was steadily replaced by the idea that Beijing should militarily intervene in Africa’s domestic conflicts through arm-supply. Thus, the PRC’s difficulty to abstain itself from ongoing conflicts in the existing African continent is proof of the dilution of its own non-interference policy which could eventually be expanded to other regions and continents[153].
Yet, as witnessed multiple times, like in the South China Sea disputes or the Taiwan dispute, as soon as foreign powers intervene in an issue which is regarded by the PRC as a matter of internal affairs, it categorically refuses any sort of interference, whether through a state intervention or a binding ruling of international law. Thus, there is no guarantee that the Beijing will abide by the rules of international law should a ruling ever find it guilty of having overstepped its powers. Such behaviour should be a warning signal for international actors with regard to their diplomatic relations with Beijing.
The PRC’s expanding leadership position is becoming increasingly worrying for many international players. Most of all, its growing political participation and involvement in Asia is steering towards the eclipse of the US influence in the area. A rise in assertive and rebellious Chinese sentiments towards the United States’ presence in Asia poses a danger to US foreign policy. The United States’ influence in Asia will dwindle unless major policy adjustments are undertaken that reflect acknowledgment of the PRC’s strategic position in the area.
Against this background, only the US but also other major international players such as the EU, Japan and India should establish a realistic and workable foreign policy towards PRC. This, however, is achievable, only if policymakers have a thorough grasp of how PRC interacts with other Asian countries on a local and regional level. Foreign administrations must acknowledge the PRC’s leadership role in the area and devise a comprehensive plan with which they can assist Beijing in its role with the ultimate aim of guaranteeing the stability of the international scenario.
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
Contribution: Elisabeth Heinz, The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
