COVID-19 was revealed in March 2020 and since then it has moderated completely the modus operandi of our lives. The consequences were numerous, from economic to social aspects and beyond, including security and security management as well. Given the new environment of restrictions and adjustments, there are some challenges that have occurred, due to the impact of extreme measures in such extreme circumstances. Government policies often resulted in grievances among citizens, while radicalized groups had the chance to forward their ideology, using mostly propaganda as a tool to serve their goals. Just like radicalized groups, terrorist groups found a window of opportunity to successfully exploit this situation.
According to the model of “terrorist attack cycle” which was outlined by Stratfor, there are seven major parts of a terrorist operational plan, consisting from selection of target, planning process, surveillance, acquisition of weapons, deployment, escape and exploitation phase.
When it comes to target selection, terrorists try to find the location and the target according to a cost-benefit analysis. This means that they aim to minimize effort and risk and simultaneously maximize rewards. Due to the pandemic, terrorists can not choose long range locations that easily, because the risk gets higher. Although ordinary terrorist attacks that are being held at crowded places (concerts, etc.) are no longer available, there are still some small scale attacks carried out by ‘lone wolves’ that can serve the overall goal of terrorism.
The stage of preparation in the pandemic era contains numerous challenges for terrorist groups, as it poses limitations related to face-to-face meetings, movement of crucial decision makers of the organization and overall planning of complex operations. Nevertheless, the current situation involves opportunities as well, due to the quantity of time they can spend on planning and coordinating future attacks. Along with time for preparation, terrorists may have the time to increase their technical skills and capabilities.
Another part of the operational procedure that is being influenced is surveillance. At this stage, terrorists watch their potential targets in order to determine what are the risks and security measures of their targets. Doing so, they tend to collect as much information as possible and be more successful at the operation. Hence, during national restrictions, surveillance is more challenging for terrorists and beneficial for law enforcement agencies, as the latter perform more control and monitoring operations.
Weapons are vital for terrorists, as they define the scale of their operations. During the pandemic era, it is quite possible for terrorists to exploit opportunities and create new means of violence, using the virus as a weapon. An example of the weaponization of COVID-19 is the Voice of Hind, a pro-Islamic State magazine which urged its readers to become infected and spread the virus among disbelievers and security forces. Besides that, the pandemic may become an inspiration for terrorists, regarding a new biological weapon, even though most of them are not capable of achieving something like this.
At some point, it comes the time to execute the well-organized operation, and once again there are barriers as far as the movement is concerned, especially at the international level. This is a crucial implication, as great parts of the whole procedure can be affected, such as the target selection. During the pandemic era it is very common to select known targets and locations where there are not such strict measures. On the other hand, some high-value security facilities may not be guarded as they should be, because of operational or other limits, a fact that accounts for an opportunity to terrorists.
At the last part of an operation, normally, perpetrators have to escape from the place of the attack by sneaking out from security footage, using predetermined routes and acting under pressure. There is an exception of this stage at sucide missions, where obviously escaping is not part of the plan at all. But when it comes to traditional terrorist attacks, physical presence is essential and executors have to be perfectly blended in the crowd, if they want to stand a chance of succeeding. Yet again, COVID-19 challenged the process of escaping, as normal people have to limit their movements or even stay at home, accounting for an infertile environment for the terrorists to blend in. In addition, there are more strict controls by the law enforcement agencies, increasing the risk of capture. Nevertheless, one of the major opportunities in the pandemic era for terrorists is the face mask. Forced or advised to wear face masks, suspects can not be easily detected and therefore their mission is being facilitated.
Conclusion
The global pandemic, known as COVID-19, caused plenty of changes, not only in our daily lives, but in the operations of terrorism as well. It is obvious that there are both challenges and opportunities arising from this very situation in every aspect of an attack. The main question is if this unprecedented phenomenon can actually contribute to confront terrorism in a better way, or if the facilitation of terrorists’ operations is another kind of ‘collateral damage’ to international scene, along with the economic and social impact of the virus.
From their part, terrorists try to exploit every possible opportunity in order to support their ideology and gain even more popularity. Exploiting the pandemic means that they can rely on their propaganda mechanisms, as the Islamic State already did by presenting the virus as a divine punishment against disbelievers. Once again terrorist groups approved that they can adapt quite easily in any circumstances, under any upcoming challenges. Besides the operational process, it is extremely possible to alter the nature of their attacks as well. Many of them have already realized that the cyber domain is the future, providing a less risky environment to operate and resulting in faster impact. Nevertheless, it is still early to support that all terrorist groups have the capability to perform cyberattacks and cybercrime, since they lack know-how and resources, but the international community should keep this potential scenario in mind and get prepared for that.
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By The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
