The Persian Gulf Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman share similarities in terms of economic development patterns, state governing models and social lifestyles (Martin, 1984). One of the main common characteristics of these countries are the oil-driven economies, autocratic monarchical rule and religion based politics (Barnes and Jaffe, 2006). Strategically, Abu Dhabi and Riyad have much in common: they both worry about the development of the Iranian nuclear program and its regional influence and, recently, they are trying to diversify their economies from the traditional hydrocarbon driven economy (ibid). However, on regional affairs, these countries are not aligned on the same visions and priorities. The new economic patterns undertaken by both countries and the fact that the UAE has challenged the traditional leadership of Riyadh in the region have the potential to provoke a clash between them (Aljazeera 2021, “Saudi-UAE: Despite turmoil geopolitical goals remain steadfast”).
Since 1981, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been united in a regional organization known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was created as a result of regional insecurities and in particular by the onset of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran (Christie, 2019.). Among other GCC members, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are the two supreme countries in the region, comprising the highest population numbers, most extensive militaries, and setting political directions (Barany, 2021). The relation between these two countries emerged as being the two gulf allies considering that in the past decade, they have often worked closely in political and military coalitions, especially since the onset of the Arab Spring protests in 2011 (Khashan, 2018). The both countries joined forces in Syria, Libya, and Egypt for example, and the most recent example is the military offensive against the revolutionary Houthi forces in Yemen (ibid). Furthermore, The Saudi and Emirati cooperation has intensified in counterterrorism and security efforts followed by the penetration of regional enemy Iran in neighbouring countries, as well as the threat of terrorist attacks launched by the Islamic State (Qurtuby and Aldamer, 2021). Since 2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have, alongside Bahrain and Egypt, enforced a strict blockade on Qatar, as they accused of supporting terrorism (Ulrichsen, 2020.).
Even though Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been strategic allies and the main players in the Coalition, ideological and territorial divisions, as well as hegemonic aspirations have recently started to emerge between the partners (TRT World, 2021 “Why the UAE-Saudi differences will continue to escalate”). After the UAE’s independence from the British influence, it has witnessed Saudi interference in its domestic relations (Foley, 1999). The newly formed UAE was not yet recognized by Saudi Arabia, and the latter showed itself willing to use military force to destabilize the federation. The disputed border revolved around Khor al-Udaid, an inlet at the Qatari border as the UAE claimed that its border extended to this location, while the Saudis maintained that it was the only country with a land border with Qatar, meaning that Emiratis had to pass through Saudi territory to reach Qatar (Ramin Seddiq, 2001).
In 1974, the two countries signed the Treaty of Jeddah defining their boundaries, the treaty became public only in 1995 (Al Mazrouei, 2013). The treaty granted Saudi Arabia a coastline of fifteen miles east of Khor al-Udaid, directly contradicting the UAE’s claim (ibid). Furthermore, the agreement gave Saudi Arabia the right to all income from the Shaybah-Zarrarah oil field in the disputed area (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2001), Border Disputes on the Arabian Peninsula”). However, the UAE still claims the territory as its own on its maps and national ID cards. Tensions have risen several times, for instance in March 1999, when the UAE boycotted a Saudi-led meeting of GCC oil ministers and instead organized an inauguration of the Shaybah oil field by crown prince Abdullah (The Guardian, 2017). Furthermore, when the UAE pulled out of the GCC Monetary Union in 2009, Saudi Arabia responded by closing the Saudi-UAE border at Al Ghwaifat, preventing UAE citizens from entering (ibid).
Despite Islam plays a central role in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the countries’ legal systems are built on Islamic values, however, the UAE rejects Saudi Arabia’s sectarian approach to conflicts in the region, preferring instead a foreign policy vision that prioritizes secularism and the creation of non-ideological coalitions (Rabi and Mueller, 2018). The UAE is passionately opposed to collaboration with factions from al-Islah, the Yemeni sympathiser of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia has made frequent use of its alliance with the party (The National Interest, 2017 “The Saudi-UAE Alliance Could Be Weaker Than It Appears”).
A new era in the relation of the two states and in their foreign policies has been signaled after the rise of crown princes MBS (Saudi Arabia) and MBZ (UAE) (Aljazeera 2020, “MBS-MBZ: A special bond between two Gulf princes”). Both rulers initiated aggressive and assertive policies in which they both aimed at gaining influential positions in the wider region (ibid). They also encouraged the expansion of their spheres of influence into East Africa, which is of strategic relevance. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made use of military bases and ports in countries such as Djibouti, Eritrea and the self-declared republic of Somaliland to launch strikes into Yemen (International Crisis Group, 2018 “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa”).
Looking at their approach in terms of regional affairs, it is possible to identify at least three major points of disagreement. In August 2020, the UAE and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, normalizing their pre-existing relations, while Saudi Arabia announced its decision to remain committed to the Arab Peace Initiative (Reuters, 2020). However, the position of Saudi Arabia on this issue has been quite ambivalent, considering the fact that Riyadh approved the Accords and encouraged Bahrain to join them (Daz-Héni, 2020). Another issue of contention is represented by the UAE’s support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. Despite signing of the Riyadh Agreement, the uncertainty of the future of southern Yemen still represents an element of tension between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (Cafiero, 2021). Indeed, while the UAE has increased its support to the STC, Saudi Arabia still backs the idea of a unified Yemen, continuing to support the national government (Riedel, 2021). Finally, the UAE have clearly expressed their dissatisfaction about the outcome of the Al-Ula summit in 2021, reluctantly joining the other participants on the final decision. However, the episode has exposed the possibility that the UAE may be the first inner-Gulf country strong enough to potentially challenge Saudi Arabia, which instead strongly supported the summit (Thafer, 2021).
Apart from the above-mentioned issues, the recent concern between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is a post-hydrocarbon future. The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s overlapping diversification schemes are assured to bring about more economic competition as both countries are undermining one another in the race to diversify their economies through increasing private sector investment and promoting industries like tourism, renewable energy and technology (El-Kholei and Al-Jayyousi, 2018). This competition and rivalry could put the future of OPEC and the GCC at risk. This could have significant political repercussions for a region that has been a bastion of relative stability in the Middle East since the first Gulf War. Indeed, despite their historical relation as strategic allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have implemented new competing measures in order to attract investors and businesses (Bohl, 2021). On 4th of July, Saudia Arabia restricted travel to and entry from several countries, including also UAE over Coronavirus concerns (Reuters, 2021). Two days later, Riyadh amended its import rules from GCC countries, challenging the UAE economic status in the region. This decision is aimed at excluding goods made in free zones or using Israreli input from preferential tariff concessions (Yaakoubi et al 2021). This recent rule has been implemented regardless of the fact that the UAE represents its second major trade partner in terms of import value (ibid).
The power struggle among the Middle East countries is real and it might escalate anytime, as the UAE and Saudi Arabia regularly express dissatisfactions towards each other. For instance, lately all Saudi TV channels that were located in the UAE have been moved to Riyadh, also they asked companies that belong to Saudi investors to move their operations in Riyadh. These tensions predict two possible scenario development, either Saudi Arabia and the Emirates find ways and capacities to bring back the old relationship and return to norm or to form a rivalry relationship, ignore mutual interests, follow individual agenda and keep competing for regional leadership and prominence. The latter will also have impact on the GCC’s political, financial, energy and business trajectories.
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By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
