Following a 30-year period of “non-aligned” foreign policy after its independence, Ukraine’s commitment to a transatlantic orientation in its strategic culture, including the pursuit of NATO membership, was dramatically reinforced as a result of the 2014 crisis (Glebov, 2017). According to the vast majority of foreign policy experts, joining NATO would help Ukraine achieve three major foreign and security policy objectives. First, to provide a credible deterrent against Russia which constitutes the Ukraine’s principal geopolitical threat, second, to modernize its navy and armed forces and, third, to eventually restore full Ukrainian sovereignty over the “temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine”, namely the Crimean Peninsula and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Kravchenko, 2021).
Since February 2019, the desire to join NATO, along with EU membership, has been enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution which requires a national referendum to begin the NATO accession process, however, recent surveys show that support for NATO membership among the Ukraine’s population has been hovering around 50% (Polianskii, 2021).
NATO-Ukraine relations
Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994). Dialogue and cooperation were strengthened with the signing of the 1977 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to enhance cooperation and to provide a forum for consultation between the Allies and Ukraine on security issues of common. In 2009, the Declaration to Complement the NATO-Ukraine Charter mandated the NUC, through Ukraine’s Annual National Programme, in line with the decisions of the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, and gave it a central role in deepening political dialogue and cooperation to underpin Ukraine’s reform efforts to improve the rule of law, its democratic development, human rights and the market economy, as well as to transform its security and defense sector (NATO, 2021).
Following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO has showed its political support to Ukraine as well as it has reinforced its practical assistance and cooperation to strengthen the ability of Ukraine to provide for its own security. NATO’s actions in support of Ukraine were included in the Comprehensive Assistance Package at the 2016 Warsaw Summit (CAP). The CAP is intended to help Ukraine become more self-sufficient in terms of security and to execute broad security and defense reforms based on Euro-Atlantic ideas and best practices. It currently includes the NATO Representation in Ukraine’s advisory mission, as well as 16 capacity-building programs and Trust Funds (NATO, 2021).
The Ukrainian Parliament passed legislation in June 2017 that reintroduced NATO membership as a key foreign and security policy goal and corresponding change to Ukraine’s Constitution went into effect in 2019. Finally, the actual President Volodymyr Zelenskyy adopted Ukraine’s new National Security Strategy in September 2020, which calls for the establishment of a unique cooperation with NATO with the goal of NATO membership. Currently, Ukraine has the Enhanced Opportunities Partner status, which is part of the NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which aims to preserve and strengthen collaboration between Allies and partners who have contributed significantly to NATO-led operations and missions.
At the June 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO leaders reaffirmed the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine would join the Alliance, stating that “Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process”. Moreover, according to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Russia will not be able to block Ukraine’s membership in NATO. However, the Brussels Summit Communiqué remarks that Ukraine has to enhance reforms “including combating corruption, promoting an inclusive political process, and decentralization reform, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law” (NATO, 2021)
Challenges of the NATO accession:
Although NATO-Ukraine cooperation has intensified following the conflict of 2014 and the Alliance maintains its “open door” policy according to article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, there is no consensus among the NATO’s member states when it comes to accept Ukraine’s membership, mainly due to its relation with Russia (Dempsey, 2021).
In terms of the kinds of political, economic, and defense reforms demanded by NATO, Ukraine in 2008 fared comparable with nations like Bulgaria and Romania, who obtained MAPs in 1999 and joined the Alliance in 2004. Furthermore, Ukraine has unparalleled recent experience in resisting Russia’s assertiveness and even aggression that all NATO member-states would benefit from Ukraine (Taras, 2017) as it has proved its ability to contribute major military capabilities. Among other examples, Ukraine has contributed in NATO-led operations in the Balkans and as the fourth largest contributor to the US-led coalition force in Iraq from 2003 to 2005 (Pifer, 2021) and additionally, Ukraine has already contributed troops to support NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo (Sparks, 2021).
At the end, Ukraine’s membership to NATO would spur Ukraine to accelerate the reforms of its military, security services, politics and economy (Pifer, 2021) and constitutes a powerful incentive for democratic development and a path for European integration for Ukraine (Spiegeleire, Holynska and Sapolovych, 2018).
However, Ukraine’s membership aspirations pose a difficult question for NATO as, in the face of Moscow’s opposition, allied leaders remain weary of issuing a binding security guarantee to Ukraine (Pifer, 2021). There is the fear that the adhesion of Ukraine to NATO would provoke Russia and escalate tensions within the Crimea-Russia conflict. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky, said NATO’s military presence in the Black Sea region would be “a powerful factor for deterring Russia,” and that Ukraine’s NATO membership was the only way to settle the Donbass conflict. For its part, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova claimed that Ukraine’s prospective NATO membership would result in a significant increase in tensions and irreversible implications for the country’s statehood (Hong, 2021). However, NATO restraint did not prevent Russia from attacking Crimea and stoking war in the Donbas.
Ukraine’s admission to NATO under current circumstances would raise concerns regarding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and… [each ally] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force….”. This issue was considered in the 1995 enlargement study, where paragraph 6 reads: “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles.” Although the fact that candidate states have to internally resolve all international and territorial disputes before joining the NATO, it does not constitute an absolute and mandatory requirement for the accession to NATO membership, as it was highlighted by NATO when stating that: “Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.” (NATO, 1995). Unfortunately, Ukraine is involved in an unresolved conflict with Russia which continues to call the attention of the international community, particularly after the increase of Russian military forces on the eastern border of Ukraine in March this year. However, despite the fact that all NATO countries declare support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, few are willing to go to war with Russia to ensure it. It is not only the unwillingness to start an armed conflict with Russia, but also the credibleness of NATO actions to secure international peace as NATO has a hard enough time showing a credible defense to its current members in Eastern Europe. Therefore, extending a security commitment to Ukraine would extend NATO requirements beyond any degree of realism (Larsen, 2021).
In addition, the Study on NATO Enlargement states that candidates must “encourage and support democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military”. Whilst Ukraine has implemented anti-corruption reforms and has bolstered its defense capabilities as well as has reaffirmed its commitment towards democratic values, these reforms have been stagnated and many NATO members consider that Ukraine has a way to go until it meet these NATO standards (Temnycky, 2021).
Suggestions and conclusions
Ukraine’s pathway to NATO and EU membership depends on the execution of essential reforms in democratic government, rule of law, human rights, market economy, security, and defense. While foreign allies remain committed to assisting Ukrainians in combating Russian aggression, Zelensky and the government must match their efforts to keep Ukraine’s reforms on track if any real progress is to be made. Non-aligned policy of Ukraine clearly proved its ineffectiveness, so Ukraine should seek membership in a collective security organization (Taras, 2017). It may become more difficult for the country’s leaders to maintain high-level international attention without a demonstrable need for democratic change (Prokopenko, 2021).
The international community has a variety of options for pressuring Ukraine to reform. The one that is perhaps the most powerful is one that offers Ukraine clear possibilities for a NATO Membership Action Plan, which Zelensky has identified as Ukraine’s top goal. According to some civil society leaders, the Membership Action Plan for Ukraine should become a new version of the EU Visa Liberalization Action Plan for Ukraine, whose reform benchmarks, in addition to leading to a visa-free regime in 2017, pushed for some of Ukraine’s most important changes (Prokopenko, 2021). The NATO Membership Action Plan, when combined with a clear implementation timeline, could be a powerful tool for speeding up reform. There is still the concern of NATO’s traditional jurisprudence, which stipulates that a country at war with one of its neighbors is unable to join. However, it is worth noting that this rule only applies to full membership, not the MAP, and that nothing prevents transitional procedures from being created to avoid the Allies’ inevitable involvement in a fight prior to membership (Tenzer, 2019).
Reform conditionality linked to foreign macro-financial assistance is another tool available to Ukraine’s partners, as assistance conditionality remains a powerful lever for influencing the country’s policy agenda. Ukraine’s international partners should use this leverage to ensure that the country meets its IMF commitments, avoiding economic instability and allowing public and private funding to flow in. They should also use conditionality to pressure Ukraine to address the constitutional crisis, protect anti-corruption accomplishments, remove oligarchs from decision-making, and overhaul the military procurement system, as well as reactivating judicial governing organizations (Prokopenko, 2021).
Personal sanctions on actors blocking reform progress in Ukraine as well as the U.S. and EU sectoral sanctions against Russia for further blocking the peaceful resolution of the war in Donbas and ongoing occupation of the Crimea have also already proved to be an effective measure and should be extended whenever it will be necessary. (Prokopenko, 2021).
Finally, the international community’s continued support for Ukraine’s civil society is becoming increasingly critical (Dempsey, 2021). They must press the government to unblock investigations into dozens of recent violent attacks on civil society leaders, as well as to ensure justice in the cases of activists who many allege are being prosecuted for political reasons. (Prokopenko, 2021).
Meanwhile Ukraine does not become [GC1] a NATO member, NATO should focus on what it does best with the consensus it has, that is, intensifying training and advisory work, deepening civilian-military relationships, and strengthening the networks that may lead to a greater consensus tomorrow.
Deepening of Ukraine-NATO cooperation will be a powerful factor in deterring Russia and other countries from their aggressive actions against Ukraine (Hvozd, 2019). Without NATO membership, Ukraine will remain vulnerable to Russian aggression and political subjugation and a permanent source of friction and instability in the heart of Europe (Dempsey, 2021).
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[GC1]Do you mean ‘in the meantime Ukraine is not a NATO member. NATO should thus focus..’ or ‘In the meantime whilst Ukraine is currently not a member, NATO should focus…’ ?
By Mahmoud Refaat: The European Institute for International Law and International Relations.
